HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
MEDICAL DIRECTOR'S OFFICE,
Camp near Culpeper Court-House, Va., October 3, 1863.
GENERAL: I
have the honor to submit the following report on the operations
of the medical department of this army at the battle of
Gettysburg, July 1, 2, and 3:
As the subject of transportation
has an important bearing upon the manner in which the wounded
are attended to after a battle, it is necessary to make some
allusion to the manner in which this department was supplied. It
is scarcely necessary to say that if the transportation is not
sufficient to enable the officers of the department to conduct
it properly, the effect must fall upon the wounded.
In the autumn of
1862, I investigated the subject very carefully, with the view
to the adoption of some system instead of the irregular method
and want of system which prior to that time was in vogue, to
limit the amount necessary, and to have that amount always
available. The transportation was one wagon to each regiment and
one to each brigade. This gave all that was required, and it was
not too much; and, it may be remarked, was a reduction of nearly
one-half of that which had been in use prior to that time. This
system worked well. At the battle of Chancellorsville, the
department had upon the left bank of the Rappahannock means
sufficient, had it been allowed to use them, for taking care of
many more wounded than there came under its control.
On June 19, while
the army was on the march, as it were, from before
Fredericksburg to some unknown point north of the Potomac River,
the headquarters being near Fairfax Court-House, Va., the
transportation of the department was cut down by Major-General
Hooker on an average of two wagons in a brigade, in opposition
to my opinion, expressed verbally and in writing. This reduction
necessitated the turning in of a large portion of the supplies,
tents, &c., which were necessary for the proper care of the
wounded in the event of a battle. Three wagons were assigned to
a brigade of 1,500 men, doing away with regimental wagons. This
method in its practical working is no system at all, as it is
liable to constant changes, and proved to be, what I supposed at
the time it would be, a failure to give the department the means
necessary to conduct its operations.
The
headquarters left Fairfax Court-House on June 26 ultimo,
for some point as yet unknown in Maryland or
Pennsylvania.
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On the 25th of that
month, I directed Assistant Surgeon [Jeremiah B.] Brinton, U.S.
Army, to proceed to Washington, and obtain the supplies I had
ordered the medical purveyor to have put up, and there await
orders.
On the 26th, he was
ordered to proceed with them to Frederick. This step was taken
to obviate the want of supplies consequent upon the reduction of
transportation. At this date it was not known that the army
would be near Frederick; still, the risk had to be run, and the
event justified the order, Dr. Brinton arriving at Frederick on
June 28, the day after the arrival of headquarters there, with
twenty-five army wagon loads of such supplies as would be most
required in case of a battle. The train with these supplies
followed that of headquarters until we reached Taneytown.
On July 1, the
trains were not permitted to go farther, and, on the 2d, were
ordered farther to the rear, near Westminster.
On the 1st, it was
ordered that "corps commanders and the commander of the
Artillery Reserve will at once send to the rear all their trains
(excepting ammunition wagons and ambulances), parking them
between Union Mills and Westminster."
On the 2d, these
trains were ordered still farther to the rear, and parked near
Westminster, nearly 25 miles distant from the battlefield. The
effect of this order was to deprive the department almost wholly
of the means for taking care of the wounded until the result of
the engagement of the 2d and 3d was fully known. I do not
instance the effect of this order, excepting to show the
influence of it upon the department. The expediency of the order
I, of course, do not pretend to question, but its effect was to
deprive this department of the appliances necessary for the
proper care of the wounded, without which it is as impossible to
have them properly attended to as it is to fight a battle
without ammunition. In most of the corps the wagons exclusively
used for medicines moved with the ambulances, so that the
medical officers had a sufficient supply of dressings,
chloroform, and such articles until the supplies came up, but
the tents and other appliances, which are as necessary, were not
available until July 5.
The supply of Dr.
Brinton reached the field on the evening of July 4. This supply,
together with the supplies ordered by me on July 5 and 6, gave
more than was required. The reports of Dr. Brinton and Dr. [John
H.] Taylor show that I ordered more supplies than were used up
to the 18th of July, when the hospitals were taken from under my
control. Surgeon Taylor, medical inspector of this army, who was
ordered on July 29 to Gettysburg, to examine into the state of
affairs there, reports to me that he made "the question of
supplies a subject of special inquiry among the medical officers
who had remained with the wounded during and for a month
subsequent to the battle. The testimony in every instance was
conclusive that at no time had there been any deficiency, but,
on the contrary, that the supply furnished by the medical
purveyor had been and still continued to be abundant." This is,
perhaps, sufficient to show that not only were supplies ordered
in advance, but that they were on hand when required,
notwithstanding the difficulty in consequence of the inability
of the railroad to meet the requirements made upon it, until
after General Haupt took charge of it on July 9. I have not
deemed it necessary to present any tables showing the amounts
ordered and issued, considering what I have just given as ample
enough to show the action of this department. The chief want was
tents and other appliances for the better care of the wounded. I
had an interview with the commanding general on the evening of
July 3, after the battle was over, to obtain permission to order
up the wagons containing the tents, &c. This request he did not
think expedient to grant but in part, allowing one-half the
wagons to come to the front; the remainder were brought up as
soon as it was considered by him proper to permit it. To show
the result of the system adopted upon my recommendation
regarding transportation, and the effect of the system of field
hospitals, I may here instance the hospital of the Twelfth
Corps, in which the transportation was not reduced nor the
wagons sent to the rear at Gettysburg.
Surgeon [John]
McNulty, medical director of that corps, reports that "it is
with extreme satisfaction that I can assure you that it enabled
me to remove the wounded from the field, shelter, feed them, and
dress their wounds within six hours after the battle ended, and
to have every capital operation performed within twenty-four
hours after the injury was received. I can, I think, safely say
that such would have been the result in other corps had the same
facilities been allowed -- a result not to have been surpassed,
if equaled, in any battle of magnitude that has ever taken
place.
A great difficulty
always exists in having food for the wounded. By the exertions
of Colonel [Henry F.] Clarke, chief commissary, 30,000 rations
were brought up on July 4 and distributed to the hospitals. Some
of the hospitals were supplied by the commissaries of the corps
to which they belonged. Arrangements were made by him to have
supplies in abundance brought to Gettysburg for the wounded; he
ordered them, and if the railroad could have transported them
they would have been on hand.
Over 650 medical
officers are reported as present for duty at that battle. These
officers were engaged assiduously, day and night, with little
rest, until the 6th, and in the Second Corps until July 7, in
attendance upon the wounded. The labor performed by these
officers was immense. Some of them fainted from exhaustion,
induced by over-exertion, and others became ill from the same
cause. The skill and devotion shown by the medical officers of
this army were worthy of all commendation; they could not be
surpassed. Their conduct as officers and as professional men was
admirable. Thirteen of them were wounded, one of whom (Asst.
Surg. W. S. Moore, Sixty-first Ohio Volunteers, Eleventh Corps)
died on July 6 from the effects of his wounds, received on the
3d. The idea, very prevalent, that medical officers are not
exposed to fire, is thus shown to be wholly erroneous. The
greater portion of the surgical labor was performed before the
army left. The time for primary operations had passed, and what
remained to be done was to attend to making the men comfortable,
dress their wounds, and perform such secondary operations as
from time to time might be necessary. One hundred and six
medical officers were left behind when the army left; no more
could be left, as it was expected that another battle would
within three or four days take place, and in all probability as
many wounded thrown upon our hands as at the battle of the 2d
and 3d, which had just occurred. No reliance can be placed on
surgeons from civil life during or after a battle. They cannot
or will not submit to the privations and discomforts which are
necessary, an-d the great majority think more of their own
personal comfort than they do of the wounded. Little more can be
said of those officers who have for a long period been in
hospitals. I regret to make such a statement, but it is a fact
and often a practical one. Dr. [Henry] Janes, who was left in
charge of the hospitals at Gettysburg, reports that quite a
number of surgeons came and volunteered their services, but
"they were of little use." This fact is so well known in this
army that medical officers prefer to do the work rather than
have them present, and the wounded men, too, are much better
satisfied to be attended by their own surgeons. I, however,
asked the Surgeon-General, July 7, to send 20 medical officers
to report to Dr. Janes, hoping they might prove of some benefit,
under the direction of the medical officers of this army who had
been left behind. I cannot learn that they were ever sent.
Dr. Janes was left
in general charge of the hospitals, and, to provide against
contingencies, was directed, if he could not communicate with
me, to do so directly with the Surgeon-General, so that he had
full power to call directly upon the Surgeon-General to supply
any want that might arise.
The ambulance corps
throughout the army acted in the most commendable manner during
those days of severe labor. Notwithstanding the great number of
wounded, amounting to 14,193, I have it from the most reliable
authority and from my own observation that not one wounded man
of all that number was left on the field within our lines early
on the morning of July 4. A few were found after daylight beyond
our farthest pickets, and these were brought in, although the
ambulance men were fired upon when engaged in this duty by the
enemy, who were within easy range. In addition to this duty, the
line of battle was of such a character, resembling somewhat that
of a horseshoe, that it became necessary to remove most of the
hospitals farther to the rear as the enemy's fire drew nearer.
This corps did not
escape unhurt; 1 officer and 4 privates were killed and 17
wounded while in the discharge of their duties. A number of
horses were killed and wounded, and some ambulances injured.
These facts will show the commendable and efficient manner in
which the duties devolving upon this corps were performed, and
great credit is deservedly due to the officers and men for their
praiseworthy conduct. I know of no battle-field from which
wounded men have been so speedily and so carefully removed, and
I have every reason to feel satisfied that their duties could
not have been performed better or more fearlessly.
Before the army
left Gettysburg, and knowing that the wounded had been brought
in from the field, six ambulances and four wagons were ordered
to be left from each corps, to convey the wounded from their
hospitals to the railroad depot, for transportation to the other
hospitals. From the Cavalry Corps but four ambulances were
ordered, as this corps had a number captured by the enemy at or
near Hanover a few days previous. I was informed by General
Ingalls that the railroad to Gettysburg would be in operation on
the 6th, and upon this based my action. Had such been the case,
this number would have been sufficient. As it proved that this
was not in good running order for some time after that date, it
would have been better to have left more ambulances. I acted on
the best information that could be obtained.
The number of our
wounded, from the most reliable information at my command,
amounted to 14,193.(*) The number of Confederate wounded who
fell into our hands was 6,802, making the total number of
wounded thrown by that battle upon this department 20,995. The
wounded of July 1 fell into the hands of the enemy, and came
under our control on the 4th of that month. Instruments and
medical supplies belonging to the First and Eleventh Corps were
in some m-stances taken from the medical officers of those corps
by the enemy.
Previous to leaving
Gettysburg, I, on July 5 and 6, ordered supplies to be sent to
Frederick from Washington and Philadelphia, to meet the wants of
the department in the event of another battle, which there was
every reason to suppose would occur shortly after the army left
Gettysburg. While at the latter place, I asked the
Surgeon-General to have 50 medical officers ready to meet me at
such a point as I should thereafter indicate.
On July 7, I
desired them to be sent to Frederick. Late in the night of July
9, 47 reported. These officers were designed to make up, as far
as possible, the deficiency of medical officers existing in
consequence of the large detail from this army left at
Gettysburg.
Tents were ordered
by my request, and the corps supplied as far as their
transportation would permit, and the remainder kept in reserve.
It is not necessary to enter into a detailed list of the
articles ordered and on hand ready for the anticipated battle. I
have the orders in my office, and it is with pleasure I can
state for the information of the commanding general that,
notwithstanding the short time in which I had to make the
necessary preparations, this department was, when near
Boonsborough, fully prepared to take care of the wounded of
another battle of as great magnitude as that which this army
heat just passed through at Gettysburg.
It is unnecessary
to do more than make an allusion to the difficulties which
surrounded this department at the engagement at Gettysburg. The
inadequate amount of transportation; the impossibility of having
that allowed brought to the front; the cutting off our
communication with Baltimore, first by way of Frederick and then
by way of Westminster; the uncertainty, even as late as the
morning of July 1, as to a battle taking place at all, and, if
it did, at what point it would occur; the total inadequacy of
the railroad to Gettysburg to meet the demands made upon it
after the battle was over; the excessive rains which fell at
that time-- all conspired to render the management of the
department one of exceeding difficulty, and yet abundance of
medical supplies were on hand at all times; rations were
provided, shelter obtained, as soon as the wagons were allowed
to come to the front, although not as abundant as necessary on
account of the reduced transportation. Medical officers,
attendants, ambulances, and wagons left when the army started
for Maryland, and the wounded were well taken care of, and
especially so when we consider the circumstances under which the
battle was fought and the length and severity of the engagement.
The conduct of the
medical officers was admirable. Their labors not only began with
the beginning of the battle, but lasted long after the battle
had ended. When other officers had time to rest, they were
busily at work--and not merely at work, but working earnestly
and devotedly.
I have not
considered it necessary to give in this report other than a very
general outline of the operations of this department at that
time. To enter into a detailed account of them would, I presume,
be more than the commanding general would desire.
I am, general, very
respectfully, your obedient servant,
JON A. LETTERMAN
Medical Director
Brig. Gen. S.
WILLIAMS, A. A. G., Army of the Potomac.