Meade's orders gave him two responsibilities. He was to operate against Lee's army and, simultaneously, cover the cities of Washington and Baltimore. Meade's situation when he accepted command of the army was not an easy one. The army was on the march, dispersed through two hundred square miles of southwestern Maryland. He did not know his soldiers' condition; he did not know the positions of the other corps of his army; and lastly, Meade did not know the whereabouts of the Army of Northern Virginia.3
By the night of July 3, 1863, the newly-promoted Union commander knew the precise location of Lee's army. It was entrenching in a line along Oak and Seminary ridges west of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. After three days of battle, the Army of the Potomac had decisively beaten it, killing, wounding, or capturing one-third of its soldiers in the process. That night, Confederate ambulances and wagons began to move west along the Cashtown Road, away from the battlefield. Through the night and the next day's rain, Lee's soldiers crouched in their field works and woods, awaiting the Federal attack.4 Meade had overcome the difficulties that marked his assumption of command. He had gathered the Army of the Potomac and defeated the Army of Northern Virginia. It had taken six days.
Given the magnitude and speed of his victory, it is ironic that controversy surrounds Meade's conduct at the Battle of Gettysburg. In particular, many historians criticize Meade for his handling of the army on the morning and early afternoon of July 2. This criticism generally holds that the Union right flank preoccupied Meade and, as a result, he neglected his left. The thesis is this: During most of July 2, the Third Army Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles, held the Federal left flank. Because Meade's attention was fixed on his right flank, the Third Corps commander was permitted to act without proper supervision. Left on his own, Sickles advanced his corps to a position where it was devastated in James Longstreet's afternoon attack.5 The defeat of the Third Corps created an emergency on the left flank and nearly resulted in a major defeat for the Union. Several historians agree with all or part of this thesis. Harry Pfanz, for example, acquiesces when he states that Meade's mind was not on his left.6 Champ Clark contends that Meade neglected his left until Longstreet's attack began.7 Paddy Griffith asserts that Meade thought the left was unimportant.8 Noah Trudeau maintains that Meade gave Sickles too much latitude.9 Edwin Coddington suggests that, when Sickles claimed confusion over the assigned location of the Third Corps, Meade should have gone with him to the left flank and provided specific directions on deploying the corps.10 Freeman Cleaves, Meade's biographer, is critical of the Union commander's attention to his right flank when there had been no attack there. He holds Meade accountable for not personally confirming that Sickles had deployed as ordered and stayed put.11 Glenn Tucker states that Meade was simply inattentive to the Third Corps, giving ambiguous orders and discounting Sickles' concerns and requests for guidance. He asks if the Union left flank was not worth at least one glance.12
This criticism concentrates on the sixteen hours that passed from Meade's arrival at Cemetery Ridge until Longstreet's brigades pushed off against the Third Corps. During that period Meade was in active command, making decisions and giving orders. As commander, he had specific responsibilities. He had to understand his orders and act to obey them. He needed to appreciate the battlefield's topography and evaluate its influence on the opposing forces. He had to know his units' locations and their condition for battle. The position of the Confederate forces had to be established and their intentions determined. While gathering and appraising all this information, Meade had to form a tactical plan. He required a command and communications structure through which to direct subordinates and receive information from them. Finally, Meade had to anticipate the unexpected and react to it. This article will examine the Federal general's performance during that critical sixteen-hour period. In doing so, his attention to his flanks will be evaluated.
Late on the evening of July 1, Meade left his headquarters at Taneytown to ride to Gettysburg. On the high ground south of Gettysburg, exhausted Union soldiers waited, looking through the gathering darkness for a continuation of the Confederate attack that had pushed them off Seminary Ridge and then through the town in defeat and confusion. The attack did not come and reinforcements from Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum's Twelfth Army Corps began arriving on the field. Throughout the day, Meade had remained at his Taneytown headquarters and evaluated the arriving reports. He concluded that the forces on the field could hold until the army gathered at Gettysburg and ordered the other corps to march there. Meade directed Sickles to leave one division behind at Emmitsburg to watch the Union far left flank and rear.13 He had decided to accept battle at Gettysburg.
Accompanied by his chief of artillery, Brig. Gen. Henry Hunt, and his chief of engineers, Brig. Gen. G. K. Warren, Meade rode up the Taneytown Road to join his army. Guided by Capt. William H. Paine, one of Warren's engineers, the group rode under a rising moon. They pushed along a road crowded with the shuttling soldiers of the Second Army Corps and the guns and horses of the artillery reserve. Along the way, Meade stopped at Second Corps headquarters. The corps was halting along the road about three miles south of Gettysburg. Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock, the corps commander, had halted there to counter any Confederate flanking move against the Union left. Meade ordered Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, in command while Hancock was absent, to hurry his soldiers north at the first light of dawn. Around midnight Meade's party rode through the cemetery atop Cemetery Hill and stopped at the gate house. Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, commander of the Eleventh Army Corps, and Generals Slocum, Sickles, and Hancock had gathered there to meet the new Union leader. Meade asked them if Gettysburg was the place to fight. They answered that it was an excellent place to defend. Meade then told the four corps commanders that the rest of the army was pushing hard to Gettysburg. He concluded by giving general instructions on the deployment of the arriving units. Meade directed Sickles to place the Third Corps' left on the large hills that he had seen south of Gettysburg.14
Meade was impatient to begin a personal reconnaissance. After meeting with the corps commanders, he walked down from the gate house. His path took him through the batteries of the First and Eleventh Corps, deployed on Cemetery Hill. As he walked, Meade saw Confederate campfires burning to the west, north, and east of Gettysburg.15 Around 2 o'clock, he returned to the gate house, mounted, and rode out to inspect the Union lines. General Hunt and Captain Paine again accompanied the commander, along with General Howard. The small group rode left, along Cemetery Hill and down Cemetery Ridge into the area where the Third Corps was bivouacked. Hunt noted that ".. . a high, rocky, and broken peak formed the natural termination of our lines.''16 Even in the dark he saw the importance of the Round Tops. As they rode, Captain Paine sketched a map of the terrain. The group moved east from Cemetery Ridge to the point where Rock Creek crossed the Baltimore Pike and then circled back northwest along the Union lines. Slocum met the riders near Culp's Hill, and informed them of a gap between the First and Twelfth Corps. The gap was nearly two hundred yards wide in low ground around Spangler's Spring. Slocum told Meade he was afraid that a Confederate attack would roll through the gap. Slocum and Hunt then agreed to post artillery there until infantry could be moved to plug it. With dawn showing, the group returned to an army headquarters that was filling with feverish activity. Captain Paine busied himself making tracings of his map and, as Meade directed him, drawing the location each corps was to occupy. When he finished, he sent one to each corps commander.17 Meade directed Hunt to ride out, inspect the lines again, and take charge of posting the artillery.18
For the next five or six hours, Meade was intensely occupied in preparing the army for battle.19 General Hunt commented that: "All this morning Meade was busily engaged personally or by his staff in rectifying his lines, assigning positions to his commands, watching the enemy, and studying the field."20
From his own reconnaissance and from the reports of his staff and commanders, the general obtained a quick and essentially accurate picture of the terrain around Gettysburg and of the Union deployment. His soldiers held the high ground on the right and controlled the Baltimore Pike and the Taneytown Road. These were roads that entered the Union positions from the south and southeast. Farther west, the bulk of the First Corps was on Culp's Hill, a rough, dominant mass of woods and rock. The top of Culp's Hill was 140 feet above the town of Gettysburg and the Confederates therein. The soldiers on Culp's Hill were busy building breastworks using the rock, earth, and timber that characterized the area. West of Culp's Hill, the Eleventh Corps and some First Corps units held East Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Hill.21 Cemetery Hill was another significant feature, rising about 70 feet above the terrain north and west of it. The Union line continued south from Cemetery Hill along Cemetery Ridge. Union forces posted there overlooked the Emmitsburg Road, which approached their position from the southwest. Cemetery Ridge was a long, low saddle that gradually sank until it met the highest terrain in the area, the two masses of the Little and Big Round Tops. The crest of Little Round Top was some 170 feet above its base and Big Round Top, just over 300 feet. Besides the prominent high features, the Union positions were generally 20 to 30 feet above the approaching terrain. It was excellent defensive ground, and offered an additional significant advantage. The distance from Culp's Hill to Cemetery Ridge was only one mile. The maximum distance from any point in the Union lines to any other point would be only two and a half miles. If Union soldiers occupied the dominant high ground from Culp's Hill to the Round Tops, they would achieve interior lines, granting rapid movement of soldiers and speeding communications throughout the Union position.22
The key to the Union position was the Baltimore Pike. In the Gettysburg area there were three improved roads: the Chambersburg, York, and Baltimore Pikes. Improved roads were all-weather roads that could carry heavy trains and artillery and would permit rapid infantry marches.23 Confederates controlled the Chambersburg and York pikes; the Union controlled the Baltimore Pike. Of the two main roads serving the Union position, the Baltimore Pike and the Taneytown Road, the former was the better.24 It was the main avenue for Union reinforcements, and was the main route of retreat if the Union suffered a reverse. In those early-morning hours, divisions from several corps were using it to march to Gettysburg. The Baltimore Pike led directly to Westminster, the army's supply base.25 The Western Maryland Railroad carried Union supplies from Baltimore to Westminster, and the telegraph line that was Meade's communications link to Washington and Baltimore, ended at Westminster.26 As its name indicated, the pike was the route to Baltimore which Halleck had ordered Meade to protect. If the Confederates could break the Union right, they would cut the pike and potentially much more than a road could be lost.27
Meade had a fair appreciation of the location and condition of his army' s deployment on the battlefield. The First and Eleventh Corps formed the center of the Union line. John Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps was on the far left with two of its regiments on Little Round Top. Alpheus S. Williams' division of the Twelfth Corps held the far right. On the evening of July 1, the Third Corps had marched in from Emmitsburg. Two brigades, P. Regis DeTrobriand's and George C. Burling's, had stayed in Emmitsburg in response to Meade's orders. David B. Bimey's Third Corps division arrived in the early evening and went into bivouac on the lower end of Cemetery Ridge. A. A. Humphreys' division did not arrive until midnight, when it joined Bimey.28
The rest of the Army of the Potomac was racing to assemble. Most units had been on the road, making forced marches day after day, and the toll in stragglers and fatigue was obvious.29 Around sundown, the Second Corps' lead elements halted on the Taneytown Road, south of Little Round Top. The rest of the Second Corps did not come up until midnight, when it also bedded down. The Fifth Corps was approaching on the Hanover Road. Its commander, Maj. Gen. George Sykes, halted the corps about five miles east of Gettysburg to allow an approach in the morning.30 By midnight all the Union soldiers were resting on the field, or the roads near it, except the Sixth Corps, which was still well down the Baltimore Pike, tramping hard on what would become a legendary march.31
Meade estimated that the Army of Northern Virginia had about 11,000 more men than the Army of the Potomac.32 He had to assume that the entire Confederate army was at Gettysburg. However, with the Army of the Potomac still scattered, Meade felt there was a critical imbalance. He knew that there were large numbers of Confederates to the northwest, north, and northeast. Few soldiers had been seen to the west, an area characterized by wooded stretches and low ridges, ideal for concealing bodies of troops.33 He knew that A. P. Hill's corps formed the Confederate right, opposite the northern part of Cemetery Ridge. The Confederate left threatened the Hanover Road east of town. Particularly troubling was Edward Johnson's division, of Ewell's corps, which wound around the Union right and threatened his rear and the all-important Baltimore Pike. Richard S. Ewell's corps was also to his front, and James Longstreet's corps was arriving. If Lee was marching Longstreet's corps around the Union right and Longstreet secured his position before Meade could prepare his line, then the Army of the Potomac was in trouble.34
Meade faced the difficult and dangerous task of concentrating his army in darkness in the face of the enemy.35 His immediate problem was to deploy available forces to meet a Confederate offensive. The murkiness and the immediacy of the expected onslaught complicated the task of moving units. It was clear to Meade that he could not gather and deploy the entire army before the coming assault. Therefore, he had to anticipate the attack's location and organize available forces to meet it. If Lee gave him time, he could re-deploy his units on the field and position arriving elements to improve the precarious Federal situation. Buying time was crucial. It would give Meade the daylight needed to post his divisions, but this same daylight would help Lee position his soldiers and expedite the Confederate attack.36
It seemed a crisis was at hand. The senior officers felt it. Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz, commanding a division in the Eleventh Corps, looked north from his position on Cemetery Hill. He believed that neither army was ready. "But . . . the Confederates were readier than we were. There was a rumor that Lee's army was fully as strong as ours... and, from what we saw before us, we guessed that it was nearly all up and ready for action. We knew, too, that to receive the anticipated attack, our army was, although rapidly coming in, not nearly all up.''37
General Hunt felt the crisis was close.
The morning was a busy and in some respects an anxious one; it was believed that the whole Confederate Army was assembled, that it was equal if not superior to our own in numbers, and that the battle would commence before our soldiers were up. There was a gap in Slocum's line awaiting a division of infantry, and as some demonstrations of Ewell about daylight indicated an immediate attack at that point, I had to draw batteries from other parts of the line... to cover it until it could be properly filled.38There is little doubt that in the hours around dawn, Meade's attention was on his right flank. There were sound reasons for his giving priority to the right. The immediate motivation was the expected Confederate attack. Another basis was the disconnected placement of, and the combat losses in the Union formations positioned to receive the assault. A compelling reason was that the disordered Union right covered the Baltimore Pike. Meade decided that the Confederates would strike his right and drive into the gap between the First and Twelfth Corps. This threat demanded immediate attention.
Before Meade began moving units, three corps held the Union line. On the far right, Williams' division of the Twelfth Corps was breaking its bivouac near the Baltimore Pike.39 The large gap that worried Meade and Slocum, separated Williams from James S. Wadsworth's division of the First Corps. Wadsworth's fought-out division held Culp's Hill. To its left, the Eleventh Corps occupied the high ground on East Cemetery Hill and along the north side of Cemetery Hill. John C. Robinson's and Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday's divisions of the First Corps were on the other side of the Eleventh Corps. They continued the Union line, which wrapped around Cemetery Hill and started south along Cemetery Ridge. Down Cemetery Ridge, the Union line faded. At the south end of the Ridge, Geary's Twelfth Corps division resumed the line and anchored it on Little Round Top. In addition, the Third Corps, minus DeTrobriand's and Burling's brigades, was camped near Cemetery Ridge. John Buford's cavalry division, along the Emmitsburg Road, covered the left flank.
As critical as the situation was on his right, Meade was also concerned about the Union center. The Eleventh Corps had a poor reputation as a fighting organization and had done nothing to improve it on July 1.40 The Eleventh Corps also split the First Corps, making command of that corps difficult. If that were not enough, there was a complicating factor with the First Corps. Maj. General Doubleday had assumed command of the corps after Reynolds' death. He had led it with stubborn aggressiveness, maintained its cohesion, and hurt the Confederates badly.41 But late on July 1, Hancock had reported to Meade that "Howard says that Doubleday's command gave way.''42 Even before hearing the inaccurate report, Meade was considering replacing Doubleday. Meade thought Doubleday slow and liable to confuse the important and the trivial. The day before the battle began Meade had asked about Maj. Gen. John Newton, commander of the Sixth Corps' Third Division, as a replacement for Doubleday.43 After receiving Howard's report, Meade ordered Newton to replace Doubleday and assume command of the First Corps. Newton arrived on the field sometime after 8 o'clock in the morning, and Doubleday returned to his division.44 As word of their new commander spread among the First Corps, the soldiers became upset that Meade had selected an outsider to command them. They considered it an affront to themselves and to Doubleday.45 The new day saw the devastated First Corps feeling itself insulted and with a new commander unfamiliar with, and unfamiliar to the corps. These factors made the First Corps' effectiveness in the upcoming fight questionable.
At dawn, a New England private reported that mist covered the ground between the armies and the skies were cloudy. By 10 o'clock, except for an occasional cloud, the sky had cleared. The sun had burned off the mist and full summer sunshine bathed the area. Opposite the Union center, cattle grazed in the fields, roosters crowed, and birds sang in the trees.46 Most of the Union soldiers had little time to observe this pastoral scene. Meade was moving the army.
His first act was to move Geary's division from the far left to plug the dangerous gap on the right.47 Williams' division crossed Rock Creek and swung north, perhaps attempting to link with the Fifth Corps out on the Hanover Road.48 These two moves countered the anticipated attack into the gap and placed the two Twelfth Corps divisions next to each other, easing Slocum's command problem. Moving Geary did not mean Meade was vacating the left. The Third Corps was in the area, and Meade had made it clear that Sickles was to form a line along Cemetery Ridge, to include the areas previously held by Geary.49
As Meade realigned his right, Union soldiers had arisen and were marching on the roads leading to Gettysburg. The first to appear were soldiers of the Second Corps. They had only a short march up the Taneytown Road and arrived relatively fresh. Meade intended the Second Corps to fill what had become a hole on the Union left, between the forces on Cemetery Hill and the Third Corps. The Second Corps' move onto Cemetery Ridge was delayed when firing broke out opposite the Union center. The Second Corps maneuvered behind the center in reserve until Meade determined that no attack was taking place. It then relocated on Cemetery Ridge, replacing Robinson's and Day's First Corps divisions. These two divisions shifted into reserve behind the Eleventh Corps. After they left, the Second Corps connected with the Eleventh Corps at Ziegler's Grove and then extended along Cemetery Ridge to a point near the George Weikert house, where it connected with the Third Corps.50 These actions added strength and density to the left. They also improved the center by pulling two weakened First Corps divisions out of the line.
Following the Second Corps onto the battlefield was the Artillery Reserve. It had been camped near the Second Corps, about five miles south along the Taneytown Road. Four of its five brigades took position in the army's rear around dawn. The Reserve took advantage of the interior lines, placing itself to support quickly any part of the Union position. By late morning, the final artillery brigade and ammunition trains had arrived and were available for the army's use.51
Next to enter the field was the Fifth Corps. Before 8 o'clock, the divisions of James B. Ames and Romeyn B. Ayres marched in on the Hanover Road. They were initially placed across Rock Creek in order to extend the Union right. Samuel W. Crawford's division, which had been trailing the rest of the Fifth Corps, was still marching on the Hanover Road.52
Meade had acted to strengthen his entire line, right to left. Dawn was growing, but the attack the Federal commander and his generals on the Union right had expected had not come. Meade considered taking the initiative by attacking. The idea was that, once the Sixth Corps arrived, the Fifth and Twelfth Corps would strike on the right. The purpose of the offensive would be to disrupt the expected Confederate attack and secure the use of the critical roads on the Union right. These roads must have been on Meade's mind. Crawford's Fifth Corps division was still on the Hanover Road and the Sixth Corps was on the Baltimore Pike.53 To investigate the avenue for a Union attack, Meade told Slocum and Warren to reconnoiter the ground in front of Culp's Hill. The prompt response was that the ground was very rugged, exposed, and would surely disrupt any Union advance. It was also becoming apparent that the Sixth Corps was still some distance from the field. Meade abandoned the idea of an attack and decided to remain on the tactical defensive. He would reevaluate this decision when the Sixth Corps arrived and when he had a better idea of Lee's intentions.54
Meade resumed shuffling units to improve his defensive position. His right, consisting of one Twelfth Corps and two Fifth Corps divisions, was well across Rock Creek, east of Wolf's Hill. This posture may have been appropriate for an assault from the Union right, but it was overextended for a defensive posture. So Meade formed the barb of the wellknown fishhook by bringing the two Fifth Corps divisions and Williams' Twelfth Corps division back across Rock Creek. Williams fell in on the right of Geary's division and planted his right flank on Rock Creek. In addition, Williams was reinforced. An unattached brigade commanded by Brig. Gen. Henry H. Lockwood entered the field from the Baltimore Pike. The brigade had been assigned to the Twelfth Corps, and it joined Williams.55 After the Fifth Corps crossed Rock Creek, Meade placed it on the Baltimore Pike, in reserve.
Since the Fifth Corps was directly south of the Twelfth Corps, on the Union right, it is often concluded that it was in reserve for the right. However, its location and the advantage of interior lines made it the army ready reserve. It could move quickly to any point in the Union lines.56 For example, Maj. Gen. George Sykes, commander of the Fifth Corps, was notified in mid-morning to be prepared to support the Third Corps with a brigade.57
During the early morning, the staff filtered up the
Taneytown Road. Meade selected the Widow Leister's small, white house,
directly behind Cemetery Hill, for army headquarters. As the Federal personnel
assembled and began to function, command of the army became increasingly
efficient. Throughout the morning, the sense of crisis remained, and the
Union staffers continued to prepare urgently for the overdue Confederate
attack. By 8 o'clock, the staff had located the headquarters of all the
corps commanders except Sykes, who was on the move, and Sickles. By mid-morning
Meade's organization was in place and in full operation.58
Early in the morning, the signal corps established stations at headquarters
and on Little Round Top. By mid-morning, signal officers located additional
stations on Power's Hill, East Cemetery Hill, and Cemetery Hill. At 11
a.m., Capt. Lemuel B. Norton, chief signal officer, reported that all the
corps commanders were in contact with headquarters.59
Map 2
As the morning progressed, Meade's attention shifted from his right and center to his left. For four or five hours, Meade and his staff had worked frantically to realign the right. Around 8 o'clock the general had completed his dispositions there. The Baltimore Pike was covered. Union formations occupied the high ground, and the soldiers were digging in. The Fifth Corps formed a strong reserve. The center was also nearing completion. Union forces occupied East Cemetery and Cemetery hills and were forming along Cemetery Ridge. All that remained was linking the Second and Third Corps, and the arrival of the Sixth Corps.60
With the right and center in hand, the left merited attention. The Third Corps had been quiet all morning. Sometime between 6 and 9 a.m., Meade decided to visit Sickles and review the Third Corps' situation. For some reason, the general determined instead to send Capt. George Meade, his son and aide. Captain Meade returned from the Third Corps to report that, not only had the corps not deployed, but that Sickles was not sure where it was to extend. General Meade's reaction was instantaneous and sharp. He directed Captain Meade to return to the Third Corps immediately with specific instructions on its location. On the second trip, Sickles told Captain Meade that he was deploying at that moment in accordance with his commander's orders. He also said that he was still unsure of where his left flank was to be positioned.61
Between 9 and 10 o'clock General Meade's overall dispositions were complete. Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg's cavalry division covered the right flank along the Hanover and Low Dutch roads. Its videttes reached nearly to the Twelfth Corps' position along Rock Creek. H. Judson Kilpatrick and his cavalry division were moving to the right from Abbottstown, about six miles north of Hanover. Williams' division of the Twelfth Corps was anchored on Rock Creek near McAllister's Mills. Geary's division was on his left and followed the slope up Culp's Hill. Wadsworth's First Corps division was on the summit of Culp's Hill. From Wadsworth's left, over East Cemetery Hill, up to Cemetery Hill, and turning south along its contour to Ziegler's Grove, were the Eleventh Corps divisions of Adelbert Ames, Carl Schurz, and Adolph Von Steinwehr. Robinson's First Corps division was posted in reserve immediately behind Cemetery Hill, and Day's division, also in reserve, was formed on his left, reaching to the rear of Hays' division of the Second Corps. Hays', Gibbon's, and John C. Caldwell's divisions formed the Second Corps' line. The Third Corps had finally deployed. Humphreys' division had contact with the Second Corps and Birney's division had its left on or near Little Round Top. Buford's cavalry division was to the front and the left of the Third Corps and the Round Tops, along the Emmitsburg Road. The army reserve consisted of two divisions of the Fifth Corps, behind the Union right, and the Artillery Reserve, east of Power's Hill.62 DeTrobriand's and Burling's brigades arrived to join the Third Corps. At 10:30 a.m., the last brigade of the Artillery Reserve and the ammunition train reached the field.63 Around noon, Crawford's Fifth Corps' division arrived and marched directly to a bivouac near the George Musser farm.64 The soldiers on the field rested and waited for the Sixth Corps.65
The morning wore on and no serious fighting developed. As in all armies, the staff was not idle. Army headquarters ordered each corps commander to provide a sketch of his corps' position, the road network in the corps' area, and the location and strength of the Confederates to their corps' front. Naturally headquarters wanted the sketches immediately. It also assigned a staff officer to each corps' command center. The officer was to provide current information to army headquarters on the location of the corps' headquarters; the positions of its batteries, infantry, and trains; and the roads in the corps' area.66
Around 10 o'clock in the morning, Sickles arrived at army headquarters. He found Meade and told him that he was still unsure of the line the Third Corps was to hold. Meade took Sickles outside, pointed to Little Round Top, and told Sickles that was where the Third Corps' left flank was to be. Meade also stated that the Third and Second Corps were to be joined. Sickles probably confirmed that the two corps had been linked for an hour or more. Meade had now given Sickles orders to post his corps at least four times. He had provided general orders at midnight at the gate house; very specific orders came in the form of Captain Paine's drawing; Captain Meade had relayed his father's orders again earlier that morning; and now at his meeting with Meade, Sickles' orders came straight from the commanding general; Sickles literally had his orders pointed out to him. The meeting ended and Sickles asked if Meade could spare General Hunt to help him position the Third Corps' artillery. Meade agreed.67
The Confederates had not attacked where or when Meade had expected. On the other hand, they were not idle. The pastoral scene reported earlier in the morning had changed. "Long lines of skirmishers were stretched out on our center and left, where in the green meadows the Blue and the Gray confronted each other. Here and there along the line little puffs of smoke curling up and drifting away in the thin blue vapor told that the skirmishers were firing upon each other. Occasionally a lightning-like glimmer on the opposite hills showed the reflection from the burnished arms of the enemy, who were moving into position.68
One reason that Meade believed a strike was imminent was the amount of Confederate activity on his right and center. Major skirmishing had broken out in front of Cemetery Hill around 6 o'clock in the morning and lasted for two hours. This skirmishing had caused Meade to divert the Second Corps and employ it as a reserve during its move to Cemetery Ridge.69 A little after 7 a.m., Thomas H. Ruger's brigade of Williams' division, Twelfth Corps, became involved in skirmishing on the extreme right. The engagement became serious enough that the Fifth Corps sent infantry and artillery units to support Ruger. For an hour or so, then, the skirmishing on the Union right was intense and widespread.70 Later that morning, when General Hunt was with Sickles in the Third Corps' area, artillery fire on Cemetery Hill interrupted his visit. Hunt, an experienced artillery commander, interpreted the exchange as an attack, and left Sickles to ride toward the firing.71
More fighting occurred that morning. Several Confederate columns were observed moving to the Federal right. Artillery engaged them and diverted their movement.72 Another series of sharp clashes occurred and lasted all morning. A common tactic was for Confederate skirmishers to lie in the grass and crops, then suddenly rise and advance with a shout. When they neared a Union detachment, Union artillery would drive them off. Southern observers watching this exercise would then note the location of the Union batteries.73 During the morning and most of the afternoon, First Corps officers reported skirmishing and occasional artillery fire in their area. In particular, the Confederates directed continuous artillery fire at a nearby Federal battery.74 This counter-battery fire was prevalent throughout the day.75 About 6:30 p.m., ten Confederate cannons located on Benner's Hill, northeast of Cemetery Hill, began counter-battery fire. An hour's firing drove the Confederate guns left of their first positions, where they tried to resume firing. Again, Union artillery drove them off.76 The entire Second Corps front was involved in exchanges at one time or another. Several observers noted heavy skirmishing mixed with artillery exchanges in front of Alexander Hays' division, on the far right of the Second Corps.77 The engagement there escalated, as artillery fire supported a Confederate advance that drove in Union skirmishers and captured the Bliss barn. A battalion from the 12th New Jersey recaptured the barn, but a second Confederate advance drove them off in turn. The rest of the 12th New Jersey and the 1st Delaware advanced and retook the barn, but abandoned it at the onset of a third Rebel advance.78
Participants noted that the Southerners began probing the Union lines from right to left, as far south as the Third Corps' position.79 Skirmishers and artillery were principally active on the center and right, but the left was also being tested. All morning the Union left, around the Emmitsburg Road, was fairly quiet. As the day wore on, Confederate inquiries increased. Birney posted Col. Hiram Berdan's 1st U. S. Sharpshooters to cover the front and left flank of his division. They experienced infrequent fire, but noted heavier shooting to the north. Buford's cavalry, screening the far left, skirmished with the Confederates all morning.80
Meade was riding the lines on the left again. During late morning, he rode down Cemetery Ridge and probably out as far as the Jacob Weikert house, east of the Round Tops.81 Around midday, General Hunt saw Meade and Sickles talking near the Peach Orchard.82 In the afternoon, Meade showed up at Alexander Webb's brigade, John Gibbon's division, Second Corps. He ordered Webb to discern if there were Confederates in the woods opposite his position. Webb sent a skirmish company across the fields into an area probably north of Spangler's Woods. They confirmed that the woods held Rebels in force.83
Skirmishing and artillery actions provided Meade with information about Confederate intentions along the Union front. He also received reports from observers at the Signal Corps stations. In mid-morning, Meade had Signal Corps messages on Confederate infantry, artillery, and cavalry moving from the Union center to the right. In addition, large Confederate infantry formations were reported to the right with smaller forces seen to the center. Around noon, Confederate activity was reported west of Little Round Top. Confederate skirmishers were seen a mile from the Little Round Top, advancing directly east.84 At 1:30 p.m., a huge Confederate column was reported moving to the Chambersburg Pike from the Union far left.85
There were surely contradictory and inaccurate reports also arriving at headquarters. At 12:30, a message that must have raised eyebrows came in from the station on Cemetery Hill. It reported that wagons were burning south-southeast of Cemetery Hill. The observer ventured to deduce the cause by saying "... I think that our trains are being destroyed.''86
Later in the afternoon, glimpses of the Confederate buildup to the left were seen, and reports continued on Confederate activity to the right. About 4 o'clock, the only Confederate infantry visible from Little Round Top was on the far left, moving left.87 At 4:30, the station on Cemetery Hill reported Confederate skirmishers at the base of Culp's Hill. Infantry formations were seen to the northeast of Cemetery Hill and two concentrations of artillery were observed to the northeast and northwest of it. Shortly after that, Confederates were seen in force, one mile west of Little Round Top, driving in Union skirmishers.88 Longstreet's attack had begun.
A remarkable event, one that had considerable impact on the left, happened before noon. Meade had issued Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, commander of the cavalry corps, standing orders to cover continuously the Union front and flanks with his cavalry. Buford's cavalry division was the screening and reconnaissance force for the left, and it had been skirmishing since early morning. Later that morning, Buford asked permission from Pleasonton to return his command to Westminster to refit. Meade approved the move and directed Buford to escort the army's trains to Westminster. Meade assumed that cavalry, either part of Buford's command or replacements from David Gregg or Judson Kilpatrick, would continue to cover the left.
About noon, Sickles, and perhaps others, informed Meade that Buford was leaving and there were no replacements.89 Meade immediately sent two messages to Pleasonton. The first stated that Meade had not authorized the flank to be abandoned and that patrols and pickets must be maintained to the far left. The second message simply stated that Meade expected Buford to be replaced. About an hour later, Pleasonton directed Gregg to send a regiment to the left as quickly as he could.90 But no cavalry arrived until late that evening, well after it could be of use.91
Buford took more than cavalry with him. An attached battery of the 2d U. S. Artillery had just set up to fire on Confederates driving in skirmishers. It was ordered to pull out with Buford.92 Buford also took his signal officer with him. The officer had been operating the station on Little Round Top. His departure left headquarters without observers on the left until Captains Norton and Taylor arrived and re-established the station.93 Buford's withdrawal was a pivotal event. It exposed the Union line to a flanking attack and it allowed Longstreet's brigades to move to their assault points without detection. It would have also been helpful to have had the firepower of 2,500 cavalrymen available to meet the Confederate attack.94 Meade was quickly aware of Buford's departure and he reacted immediately. He reminded Pleasonton that he had ordered him not to let such a situation develop. He then gave specific instructions to have cavalry replace Buford.
Even with the loss of the cavalry, there were reconnaissance options available to the Union commanders. After noon Sickles sent a force of U. S. Sharpshooters and the 3d Maine infantry across to reconnoiter the woods on Seminary Ridge. They encountered a Confederate brigade and engaged it in a sharp fight. Driven back, they reported that a large formation of Confederate troops was in the area of Pitzer's Woods, moving south.95
How did Meade perceive the Confederate threat in midafternoon? Skirmishing and signal station observations revealed that the Confederates were in motion on both the left and right. Meade had expected a Confederate attack all morning, but it had not come. Perhaps Lee was planning to move around a Union flank and get between Meade and Washington or Baltimore. Whether Lee chose a direct attack or a turning movement, Meade still expected a battle. The growing activity on his left clearly concerned Meade.
He had already ordered Buford's replacement. He next directed the Fifth Corps to begin shifting west toward Cemetery Ridge, where it could more quickly support the Second and Third Corps. The Sixth Corps was finally approaching, and Meade decided to place it on the right, where the Fifth Corps had been.
By mid-afternoon, how had Meade met his obligations as a commander? He understood and was acting to obey his orders to cover Baltimore and Washington. He had the Baltimore Pike well-covered. If the Confederates did not attack, he anticipated Lee attempting a turning movement to threaten one of the two cities. Meade intentionally adopted the defensive posture that the terrain favored, and he deployed into a fishhook to create interior lines. His commanders all expected and awaited a Confederate attack. He brought order to the initial haphazard deployment of the army. He reunited divisions of the same corps, moved two weakened First Corps divisions into reserve, and systematically strengthened his line from the far left to the far right. The army staff, including the Signal Corps, was in full operation. Meade was not sure of Lee's specific intentions, but he was aware of dangerous activity on both flanks. To cover probable attack areas, he had two First Corps divisions in reserve on his center and was moving a corps into reserve on each flank.
So far Meade had been confronted by three unexpected events. First, when his army was least organized and weakest, Lee had not attacked. Meade seized this opportunity by racing to restructure and reinforce his lines. Although sensitive to his right and center, he used the time to create strong positions all along his front. Second, Sickles had been tardy in deployment and obstinate in not understanding orders. Meade kept repeating them until Sickles affirmed that he understood and would carry them out. Third, Meade acted to counter Buford's withdrawal by immediately ordering Pleasonton to replace Buford's cavalry.
At 3 o'clock, Meade called a meeting of the corps commanders to discuss his decision to move the Fifth Corps to the left and to place the Sixth Corps in reserve on the right.96 While waiting for the commanders to arrive, Meade summarized his analysis and actions in a message to General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck. In the message he told of activity on both flanks and said he expected to fight a defensive battle. He reassured Halleck that he would keep the Army of the Potomac between Lee and Washington.97
Meade was reading Lee's intentions pretty well. Lee intended to attack on both flanks and had hoped to attack earlier in the day. Unfortunately, Meade was unaware of Sickles' intentions. After multiple clarifications of his orders, Sickles had deployed the Third Corps on the southern end of Cemetery Ridge. Birney's division formed a line from Little Round Top and up Cemetery Ridge until it connected with Humphreys' division. Not all Birney's units were on the ridge. Besides skirmishers pushed up to the Emmitsburg Road, artillery and two brigades were at least 500 yards forward of the ridge.98 Humphreys had his division massed on the crest of Cemetery Ridge early in the morning. Soon after noon, he moved to the foot of the ridge and deployed it into line of battle.99 The Third Corps remained in place until about two o'clock, generally on the line directed by Meade. Then Sickles ordered a general advance to positions that Sickles decided were preferable to those ordered by Meade. Humphreys objected. He discovered that the unit on his right, Caldwell's division of the Second Corps, had no corresponding orders to advance. If Humphreys advanced he realized he would break contact with Caldwell and the Second Corps. Sickles told him to advance as ordered.100
Sickles did not inform anyone of his decision to move forward. He certainly did not tell Meade. He did not inform his neighbors, Caldwell, the adjacent division commander, or Hancock, the adjacent corps commander.101 Surprised, Gibbon, the commander of the Second Corps' Second Division, reacted in a professional way by trying to keep contact with the Third Corps. He ordered two regiments - the 15 th Massachusetts and 82d New York - of Brig. Gen. William Harrow's brigade forward in an unavailing attempt to cover the Third Corps's right flank.102
Sickles was absent at the beginning of the 3 o'clock corps commanders' meeting with Meade, and no one there knew about his forward movement. During the meeting, one of Warren's staff arrived at headquarters with the information that the Third Corps was more than a thousand yards out of position. The news visibly upset Meade. He promptly ordered Sykes to rush the Fifth Corps forward onto Cemetery Ridge. Sickles finally arrived at headquarters, and Meade met him. Meade ordered Sickles to return to his corps at once and put it on the Cemetery Ridge line. By then, the visitors and staff at headquarters could hear firing on the left.103 Longstreet had launched the long-awaited Confederate attack, and the time for preparation was over. The time for battle had begun.
Sickles had moved to a line that he felt took advantage of the high ground along two ridges that met at the Peach Orchard, one from Devil's Den and the other along the Emmitsburg Road. Certainly, Sickles' move shocked Meade. Meade had no reason to think that Sickles was going to be a problem. Meade had had no trouble conveying his orders to any other corps commander, nor did any of them have trouble understanding or complying with orders. In later testimony, Sickles was forthright in admitting that he had acted on his own and that he neither consulted nor informed Hancock or headquarters.104 Sickles defended his action as correct and as the key to Union victory at Gettysburg. The ensuing debate became known as the Meade-Sickles controversy, a rancorous dispute.105 Until he died, Sickles would maintain that Meade intended to abandon the field to Lee, had no comprehension of the terrain or the action on it, had no tactical plan, and, furthermore, ignored the left.106
This is not the place for a full examination of the Meade-Sickles controversy, but two of Sickles' assertions concern Meade's attention to his left. First, Sickles asserted he had not ignored orders because Meade gave him none. Sickles stated that Meade's orders "... were all verbal and extremely vague and indefinite ...."107 He went further by stating that the "... only instruction, general or particular, the only order of any nature or kind, that I received from General Meade on the 2d of July from daybreak in the morning until 6 o'clock in the evening..." was a confusing order to relieve Geary's division at Little Round Top.108 Sickles also maintained that he personally and repeatedly asked Meade for orders, but none were forthcoming.109 By adding that Meade had made no preparation for an attack on the Union left, Sickles concluded that, without orders in an emergency, he had the authority and responsibility to deploy his corps as he saw fit.110 Sickles' depiction of himself as a general without orders is not supported by the evidence. A contemporary general, Francis A. Walker, observed that Sickles' "... orders were explicit enough to have been obeyed without difficulty, had proper care been taken to observe them.''111
Second, Sickles asserted that the Cemetery Ridge line guaranteed defeat.112 "... [T]he direct line from Hancock's left to Round Top was a line through swale, morass, swamp, bowlders and forest and tangled undergrowth, unfit for infantry, impracticable for artillery, and hopelessly dominated by the ridge in front, which I would have surrendered to Lee without a blow if I attempted to execute the impossible order General Meade... states... that he gave me.''113
Sickles added that the terrain on the Cemetery Ridge line was suitable for the deployment of only half of his artillery and that the line was so long that the Third Corps could form only "... a mere skirmish line incapable of resisting assaulting columns."114 In contrast, Sickles saw overwhelming merit in the advanced line. It controlled the highest ground between Cemetery and Seminary ridges, covered the Emmitsburg Road and its intersecting lanes, and provided excellent artillery positions.115 Fortunately, an objective observer was present to evaluate Sickles' claim that the advanced line was superior. About 10:30, Sickles brought General Hunt to the Third Corps area to help post the corps' artillery. Sickles used the opportunity to propose a move to the advanced line. Hunt listened to Sickles' reasoning and agreed that the Cemetery Ridge line posed problems, but Hunt observed that it was the correct position to implement Meade's choice of the tactical defensive. Hunt concluded that the ".. . direct short line through the woods, and including the Round Tops, could be occupied, intrenched, and made impregnable to a front attack.116 Hunt agreed that there were benefits in occupying the advanced line, if only to deny artillery positions and screening terrain to the Confederates. If the Union were to launch an attack from the left, he saw the advantage of a shorter distance to the Confederate lines. But since Meade had decided not to attack, the advantage of a shorter distance was negated and became a disadvantage if the Confederates attacked. Occupying the advanced line would also create the tactical weakness by forming a salient. Most importantly, taking up the advanced line would stretch the Third Corps over a distance twice as long as the Cemetery Ridge line.117
After presenting his case to Hunt, Sickles asked for Hunt's permission to advance. Hunt refused and reminded Sickles that only Meade, the army commander, had the authority to approve an advance. When Hunt next saw Meade, he reported that Sickles' proposed line had merit, but that he did not advise occupying it. The advanced line' s critical weaknesses were that it would disrupt the army's defensive posture and would demand massive reinforcement. Since the Sixth Corps had not arrived, the reinforcements would not be available. Hunt also advised Meade to personally inspect the advanced line before approving Sickles' move.118 Walker' s appraisal of Sickles' decision to move forward is concise and cogent. He observed that "There can be no question that he both made a mistake in point of judgment and failed properly to subordinate his views and acts to the instructions of his commander."119
How, then, do we evaluate the criticism of Meade's conduct on July 2? The criticism seems to have two principal components. The first is that Meade neglected his left. Was he so mesmerized by his right that he ignored his left? Clearly not. Meade undoubtedly was focused on his right during the hours of dark and early dawn. The right was the most vulnerable area in his lines and Confederate activity in front of it presaged an immediate attack. However, Meade made good use of the unexpected gift of time. He rebuilt and reinforced his right. He then moved the focus of his attention to the center. By early morning he completed his dispositions there, and was working to strengthen his left. We know that he left headquarters and rode through the left at least twice. During one ride, he became personally involved in giving tactical directions. He placed the Fifth Corps and the Artillery Reserve so they could take advantage of interior lines to reinforce any part of the battlefield. Meade acted immediately to order Pleasonton to replace Buford. Finally, in his message to Halleck, Meade documented his appraisal that a Confederate attack on his left was probable. Rather than conclude that Meade paid little heed to his left, it would be more accurate to conclude that Meade paid attention to his entire line east as time and danger directed. In short, he paid considerable attention to his left.
The second component of criticism is that Meade did not properly supervise Sickles. Was it reasonable for Meade to predict that Sickles would disobey orders? Was it reasonable to anticipate that Sickles would compound his misdeed by not telling Meade that he had marched away from his positions? Probably not. Meade repeated his orders to Sickles at least four times, once face to face. Sickles told Meade's staff that he would deploy as ordered. Other corps commanders discovered no ambiguity in their maps or orders. Sickles' own division commanders seemed to understand their role within the Third Corps' assigned position. Birney's initial deployment was within the scope of Meade's intentions. Humphreys had a good grasp of his position and the implications of leaving it. It is clear that any ambiguity was in Sickles' attitude toward the orders, not Meade's wording of them.
There is a corollary to the criticism that Meade did not properly supervise Sickles. The corollary is that, even before 2 o'clock, Meade should have been aware that Sickles was moving forward of Cemetery Ridge. It is prudent to recall Civil War tactics before sanctioning this criticism. Commanders seldom deployed units immediately into line of baffle. More commonly, they massed reserve formations in the rear and threw other units forward. These forward units, of up to brigade size, might demonstrate, feint, protect skirmishers or batteries, or just feel the water.120 A contemporary observer of Sickles' line would not have been surprised to see batteries and large infantry formations well forward of the main line. He would conclude that, until about 2 o'clock, the Third Corps was deployed generally along Cemetery Ridge. After 2 o'clock, no one would have concluded that Sickles was anywhere near the Cemetery Ridge line, where Meade had clearly and repeatedly ordered him to be.
One can argue that a commander is ultimately responsible for all the actions of his subordinates. On that basis, any commander can be evaluated and found negligent. Did Meade allow Sickles too much independence and provide too little supervision? If Meade believed that Sickles was an average corps commander with understandable orders and the means to carry them out, then Sickles had ample supervision. If Meade believed that Sickles might ignore his orders and conceal his disobedience, then Meade allowed Sickles improper leeway. It seems reasonable that Meade could not be expected to anticipate Sickles' unique method of observing orders he did not like.
The Union left was worth a glance. Meade knew that and gave it his full gaze. He created a plan for the left and positioned the units to carry it out. He rode down it at least three times. He gathered information on the Confederates opposite it. When Longstreet attacked the left, Meade met the attack with the reserves he had positioned for just such a case. At the end of the day's battle, the Army of the Potomac had weathered intense attacks on both its left and its right. In another twenty-four hours, the army would finally win a clear victory over its nemesis, the Army of Northern Virginia. Meade's attention to his left flank was critical to that victory.
1. Harry W. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day
(Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1987),
p. 1; Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968; Revised and reprinted, Dayton,
Ohio: Morningside, 1984), p. 209, Map 1; and United States War Department,
The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the
Union and Confederate Armies, 70 vols. in 128 parts (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), series 1, vol. 27, part 3, p. 369
(hereinafter cited as O.R.).
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2. O.R., series 1, vol. 27, part 1, p. 61.
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3. Coddington, Gettysburg, pp. 209, 217-18.
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4. Ibid., pp. 535-37.
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5. This article follows events from the Union perspective.
Unless Confederate forces were known to Meade and their identity is essential
to the narrative, they will be identified in general terms.
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6. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, pp. 60,
141.
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7. Champ Clark and the editors of Time-Life Books,
Gettysburg, The Confederate High Tide (Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life
Books, 1987), p. 77.
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8. Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics in the Civil
War (Fieldhead, The Park, Mansfield, Nottinghamshire, England: Fieldbooks,
1986,), p. 13.
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9. Noah Andre Trudeau, "I Have a Great Contempt for
History," Civil War Times Illustrated, vol. 30, no. 4 (September/October
1991): 32.
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10. Coddington, Gettysburg, p. 344.
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11. Freeman Cleaves, Meade of Gettysburg (Norman,
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960), p. 146.
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12. Glenn Tucker, High Tide at Gettysburg: The
Campaign in Pennsylvania (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merriil, 1958: Revised
and reprinted, Dayton, Ohio: Morningside, 1983), pp. 237-39,245.
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13. Coddington, Gettysburg, p. 325.
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14. Ibid., p. 325; Cleaves, Meade,
pp. 138-40; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, p. 42; Tucker, High
Tide, p. 200.
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15. Cleaves, Meade, p. 141; Pfanz, Gettysburg,
p. 58.
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16. O.R., series 1, vol. 27, part 1, pp. 232-33.
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17. Ibid.; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second
Day, pp. 58-59; Coddington, Gettysburg, pp. 330-31; Cleaves,
Meade, p. 142; George Gordon Meade, The Battle of Gettysburg from
The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1913; Reprint, York, Pennsylvania: First Capitol Antiquarian Book
and Paper Market, 1988), p. 62.
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18. Henry J. Hunt, "The Second Day at Gettysburg,"
in Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel, eds., Battles
and Leaders of the Civil War, 4 vols. (New York: The Century Company,
1887-1888; Reprint, Secaucus, New Jersey: Castle, 1988), vol. 3, pp. 291-92.
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19. Clark, Confederate High Tide, p. 74; Hunt,
"Second Day," p. 293.
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20. Hunt, "Second Day," p. 293.
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21. Coddington, Gettysburg, p. 331. East Cemetery
Hill was later called Stephen's Hill after Capt. Greenleaf T. Stephens,
5th Maine Battery.
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22. Ibid., pp. 330-32, 342; Cleaves, Meade,
pp. 141-42.
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23. Coddington, Gettysburg, p. 265.
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24. Ibid., p. 326.
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25. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, p.
60.
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26. O.R., series 1, vol. 27, part 1, pp. 22-23,222.
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27. Cleaves, Meade, p. 141.
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28. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, pp.
39, 42-48.
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29. Coddington, Gettysburg, p. 247.
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30. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, pp.
52-53.
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31. Ibid., p. 79; Coddington, Gettysburg,
pp. 357-58.
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32. Coddington, Gettysburg, p. 242.
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33. Clark, Confederate High Tide, p. 75.
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34. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, p.
60; Tucker, High Tide, p. 239.
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35. Tucker, High Tide, p. 199.
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36. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, p.
58.
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37. Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz, quoted in Richard Wheeler,
Eyewitness to Gettysburg (New York: New American Library, 1987),
p. 168.
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38. Hunt, "Second Day," p. 297
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39. Coddington, Gettysburg, p. 321.
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40. Clark, Confederate High Tide, p. 74.
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41. Coddington, Gettysburg, pp. 307-08.
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42. O.R., series 1, vol. 27, part 1, p. 366.
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43. Cleaves, Meade, pp. 137, 143.
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44. Ibid., p. 143; Coddington, Gettysburg,
pp. 341-42.
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45. Clark, Confederate High Tide, p. 74.
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46. Warren Lee Goss, quoted in Wheeler, Eyewitness,
p. 170.
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47. Coddington, Gettysburg, p. 342.
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48. Ibid.; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second
Day, pp. 61-62.
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49. Cleaves, Meade, p. 142.
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50. Coddington, Gettysburg, p. 336; Pfanz,
Gettysburg: The Second Day, pp. 63-64.
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51. Coddington, Gettysburg, p. 336; Pfanz,
Gettysburg: The Second Day, pp. 76-77.
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52. Coddington, Gettysburg, pp. 333-35, 337-38;
Meade, Battle, pp. 62-63.
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53. Coddington, Gettysburg, pp. 337-38.
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54. O.R., series, 1, vol. 27, part 1, p. 758;
Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, p. 61; Cleaves, Meade,
p. 144; Hunt, "Second Day," p. 297; Coddington, Gettysburg, pp.
337-38.
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55. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, p.
62; Coddington, Gettysburg, p. 342.
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56. Clark, Confederate High Tide, p. 75; Bruce
Catton, Gettysburg: The Final Fury (Garden City, New York: Doubleday
and Company, Inc., 1974), p. 38.
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57. O.R., series 1, vol. 27, part 1, p. 592.
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58. Ibid., p. 202; Coddington, Gettysburg,
pp. 332-33; Meade, Battle, p. 65.
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59. Bill Cameron, "The Signal Corps at Gettysburg,"
The Gettysburg Magazine 3 (July 1990): 10.
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60. Coddington, Gettysburg, pp. 342-43.
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61. Ibid., pp. 343-44; Pfanz, Gettysburg:
The Second Day, pp. 82-83; Cleaves, Meade, p. 145; and Tucker,
High Tide, p. 237.
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62. Meade, Battle, pp. 63-65; and Coddington,
Gettysburg, Map 2.
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63. Coddington, Gettysburg, pp. 335-36.
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64. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, p.
62.
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65. Meade, Battle, p. 67.
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66. O.R., series 1, vol. 27, part 1, p. 487;
Coddington, Gettysburg, p. 338.
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67. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, p.
93; Coddington, Gettysburg, p. 344; Meade, Battle, p. 67;
George Gordon Meade, "The Meade-Sickles Controversy," letter from Meade
in Johnson and Buel, Battles and Leaders, vol. 3, p. 414.
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68. Warren Lee Goss, Recollections of a Private
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell and Co., 1890), cited in Wheeler, Eyewitness,
pp. 170-71.
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69. Coddington, Gettysburg, p. 333.
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70. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, p.
62.
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71. Hunt, "Second Day," pp. 302-03.
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72. Ibid., p. 233.
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73. Coddington, Gettysburg, p. 385.
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74. O.R., series 1, vol. 27, part 1, pp. 336,
338-40.
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75. Meade, Battle, p. 67.
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76. O.R., series 1, vol. 27, part 1, p. 233
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77. Ibid., pp. 368-70, 391,447.
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78. Ibid., pp. 464-65.
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79. Ibid., pp. 400, 498.
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80. Roy Marcot, "Berdan's Sharpshooters," The Gettysburg
Magazine 1 (July 1989): 35.
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81. Cleaves, Meade, p. 143; Tillie Pierce
Alleman, At Gettysburg: What a Girl Saw and Heard of the Battle
(New York: W. Lake Borland, 1889), cited in Wheeler, Eyewitness,
p. 173. Tillie Pierce, a young girl, reported that soldiers identified
Meade as a general officer who had stopped at the Jacob Weikert house for
water late in the morning.
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82. Hunt, "Second Day," p. 303.
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83. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, pp.
69-70.
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84. O.R., series 1, vol. 27, part 1, pp. 486-87.
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85. Ibid., p. 488; Cameron, "Signal Corps,"
p. 10.
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86. O.R., series 1, vol. 27, part 1, p. 488.
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87. Cameron, "Signal Corps," p. 13.
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88. O.R., series 1, vol. 27, part 1, pp. 488-89.
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89. Ibid., pp. 927-28; Pfanz, Gettysburg:
The Second Day, p. 97; Meade, Battle, p. 68; Cleaves, Meade,
p. 146; Coddington. Gettysburg, p. 351.
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90. O.R., series 1, vol. 27, part 1, p. 490.
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91. Ibid., pp. 976-77, 1058-59. Neither Gregg
nor Kilpatrick mention any orders to support the Union left. However Lt.
Col. William E. Duster, 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry, one of Gregg's regiments,
reported that he had been pulled out of line about noon and ordered to
report to Pleasonion. When he arrived ai Pleasonton's headquarters, an
unnamed source informed him that ``. . . there being sufficient cavalry
at that point," his regiment was to return to Gregg. About 9 o'clock that
evening, Doster's regiment was again ordered to report to Pleasonton. This
time the regiment was posted on the Union left. It is possible that Doster's
regiment was the intended replacement for Buford, but that a mix-up at
cavalry headquarters returned it to the right.
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92. Ibid., p. 1032.
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93. Cameron, "Signal Corps," p. 11.
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94. Coddington, Gettysburg, p. 352.
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95. Marcot, "Berdan's Sharpshooters," pp, 37, 39.
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96. Coddington, Gettysburg, p. 345.
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97. O.R., series 1, vol. 27, part 1, p, 72;
Cleaves, Meade, p. 147.
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98. O.R., series 1, vol. 27, part 1, p. 482;
Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, pp. 86-88.
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99. Cleaves, Meade, p. 147.
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100. O.R., series 1, vol. 27, part 1, p.
234; Meade, Battle, pp. 69-70; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second
Day, pp. 102-03.
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101. O.R., series 1, vol. 27, part 1, pp.
529-31.
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102. Ibid., pp. 416,419.
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103. Cleaves, Meade, pp. 147-48; Pfanz, Gettysburg:
The Second Day, p. 140; and Meade, Battle, p. 69.
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104. Cleaves, Meade, p 144; Coddington, Gettysburg,
pp. 348-51.
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105. See Richard A. Sauers, A Caspian Sea of
lnk: The Meade-Sickles Controversy (Baltimore, Maryland: Butternut
and Blue, 1989).
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106. Daniel E. Sickles, "The Meade-Sickles Controversy,"
comments by Sickles in Johnson and Buel, Battles and Leaders, vol.
3, pp. 415-19.
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107. Sickles, "Meade-Sickles," p. 419.
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108. Ibid.
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109. Ibid., p. 416.
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110. Ibid., p. 419.
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111. Francis A. Walker, "Meade at Gettysburg," in
Johnson and Buel, Battles and Leaders, vol. 3, p. 409.
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112. Sickles, "Meade-Sickles," p. 418.
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113.Ibid., p. 417.
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114. Ibid.
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115. Ibid.
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116. Hunt, "Second Day," pp. 297, 302.
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117. Ibid., pp. 301-02; Pfanz, Gettysburg:
The Second Day, p. 96.
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118. Hunt, "Second Day," pp. 302-03.
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119. Walker, "Meade at Gettysburg," p. 409.
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120. Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil
War (New Haven, Connecticut; Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 155,
168-69.
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