2. W. W. Blackford, War Years With JEB Stuart (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993, reprint of 1945 edition), p. 223.

3. James Longstreet; From Manassas to Appomattox (Secaucus, New Jersey: Blue and Grey Press. 1985, reprint of 1904 edition), p. 342.

4. Mark Nesbitt, Saber and Scapegoat (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1994), P. 12.

5. H. B. McClellan, I Rode With JEB Stuart (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1958), p. 336.

6. Charles Marshall, "Events Leading up to the Battle of Gettysburg," Southern Historical Society Papers, 52 vols. (Richmond Virginia: Southern Historical Society, 1895) 23:205-229. This article presents the extensive criticism Marshall leveled at Stuart, and despite several factual discrepancies, represents the overall "anti-Stuart" position.

7. United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 70 vols. in 128 parts (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), series 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, p. 913. Hereafter cited as OR, all references are from series I unless noted.

8. Ibid., p. 915.

9. Ibid.,

10. Ibid., p. 923.

11. Nesbitt, Saber and Scapegoat, p.65.

12. Ibid., p. 67.

13. Richard D. Hooker, ed., Maneziver TVarfare: An Antholog@, (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1993), p. 42. Mission orders are those that define the objective, but leave the means of obtaining it up to the dccision-makers on the scene. Since the early 1980's, reformers among both the Army and Marine Corps have been advocating exactly this kind of looser command style,, with some success. It is a concept designed to give subordinates room to use their own initiative, and encourage flexible tactical thinking at lower command echelons.

14. McClellan, I Rode TVith JEB Sti4art, p. 3 15. McClellan makes it clear that the original plan was likely Mosby's. as reported in an article Colonel Mosbv wrote in the Philadelphia TVeekly Times, December 1 5, 1 877. Stuart's official report doesn't mention Mosby, but circumstances indicate that he was likely the original author.

1 5. The OR missives, quoted in full above, speak to this-Lon-street explicitly states so in his cover letter forwardin- Lee . s June 23rd correspondence.

16. McClellan, I Rode With JEB Stuart, p. 318.These orders are quoted in full further on. See note 74 below.

17. Blackford, War Years With JEB Stuart, p. 222

18. Beale, George W. Campaign" Southern Historical Society Papers, 52 vols. (Richmond, Virginia: Southern Historical Society, 1909) 11:321.

19. Nesbitt, Saber and Scapegoat, p 65; McClellan, I Rode With JEB Stuart, p. 336. McClellan points out that Lee could expect Stuart to be out of contact for the same time frame-three to four days.

20. Nesbitt, Saber and Scapegoat, pp. 70-7 1.

21. Blackford, War Years With JER Stuart, p. 223.

22. OR, vol. 27, pt. 3, p. 693.

23. Ibid.

24. Blackford, War Years With JEB Stuart, p. 223.

25. Ibid., p. 224.

26. Emory Thomas, Bold Dragoon: The Life of JEB Stuart (NewYork: Harper and Row, 1986), p. 242.

27. McClellan, I Rode With JEB Stuart, p. 326.

28. Ibid., p. 327.

29. Blackford, War Years With JEB Stuart, p. 225.

30. Ibid., pp. 225-228. Blackford describes the Hanover action in considerable detail.

31. Thomas, Bold Dragoon, p. 245,

32. McClellan, I Rode With JEB Stuart, p. 330.

33. Ibid.

34. Beale, "A Soldier's Account of Gettysburg," 11:323.

3 5. McClellan, I Rode With JEB Stuart, p. 33 1.

36. Blackford, War Years With JEB Stuart, p. 228.

3 7. Ibid.

3 8. Edward G. Longacre, The Cavalry at Gettysburg (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), p. 197.

39. McClellan, I Rode With JEB Stuart, p. 332.

40. Mosby, John S. Mosby's Metnoirs (Nashville. Tennessee: J. S. Saunders, 1995, reprint of 1917 edition), p. 214.

41. Ibid.

42. McClellan. I Rode With JEB Stuart, p. 323.

43. Edwin Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study, in Col?imand (Dayton, Ohio: Mor'ningside Press, 1983, reprint of 1968 edition), p. 170.

44. McClellan. I Rode With JEB Stuart. i). 33 1.

45. Beale, "A Soldier's Account of Gettysburg," 11:323.

46. Woodford B. Hackley, The Little Fork Rangers: A Sketch of Company "D " Fourth Virginia Cavalry (Richmond, Virginia: Dietz Printing Co., 1927), p. 86.

47. McClellan, I Rode With JEB Stuart, p. 327

48. Blackford, War Years With JEB Stuart, p. 225.

49. Elwyn H. Edwards, ed., Encyclopedia of the Horse (London: Octopus Press, 1977), pp. 180-182.

50. McClellan, I Rode With JEB Stuart, p. 323, 326. He notes that Westminster was the first time they had abundant provisions for both man and horse.

51. Ibid., p. 325.

52. Busey and Martin, Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg, p. 194.

53. Longacre, The Cavalry at Gettysburg, p. 15 1.

54. Busey and Martin, Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg, p. 194. All the strengths given here arc from the June 30th estimates, and represent what are likely the best estimates of strength for the command. Cavalry operations were highly fluid, and horses broke down often, meaning that actual "ready for duty, equipped" strengths would fluctuate substantially from day-to-day in active operations. If not exact, these figures certainly give the closest basis for comparison we have.

55. OR, vol. 27, pt. 3, p. 913. Technically, Stuart had command over Jones and Robertson from the time of their arrival at Fleetwood in early June, and this order on the 22nd directed him to take charge of Jenkins. Imboden seems to have remained technically independent, but this hardly mattered before July, given that Imboden was operating on what amounts to an independent mission on the western flank of Lee's army.

56. McClellan, I Rode With JEB Stuart, p. 319.

57. OR, vol. 27, pt. 3, pp. 867-868.

58. TRADOC is the army acronym for Training and Doctrine Command, that branch of the army responsible for establishing common tactical procedures and setting baseline performance standards for the various combat arms.59. Ibid., i). 927.

61. Paul M. Shevchuk, "The Wounding of Albert Jenkins, July 2nd, 1863," The Gettysburg Magazine, no. 3 (July 1990):55.

62. Douglas Craig Haines, "R. S. Ewell's Command June 29-July 1, 1863," The Gettysburg Magazine, no. 9 (July 1993):20. In Jenkins' defense, the failure to get the orders to retire was certainly more Ewell's fault and quite illustrative of the low regard with which Ewell had come to hold his cavalry.

63. Shevchuk, "Albert Jenkins," P. 57

64, Ibid., p. 56.

65, Jenkins' actions on July Ist seem to be a forgotten chapter in the Gettysburg story, and have produced some wildly conflicting accounts. At odds with the above is Longacre's account of the actions undertaken by Jenkins' command: Longacre has Jenkins retiring leisurely to Petersburg, Pennsylvania-York Springs today-where he and his command spent a quiet night on June 30th. They only discoved that a battle was being fought on the afternoon of the I st after a large lunch and some boastful conversation with a local gentleman. While this anecdote seems to cast Jenkins in a worse light than even the Chambersburg incident, the sole source for this story is Jacob Hoke's The Great Invasion, reported by Nye and in turn by Longacre. Shevchuk's account is based on better primary sources, and has a truer ring to it: Jenkins' men reached Petersburg late on the night of the 30th, and were up again at dawn, riding to join Ewell. Hermann Schuricht, a lieutenant with the 14th Virginia Cavalry, report ed the latter in his diary. See Longacre, The Cavalry at Gettysburg, pp. 146-7; Shevchuk, "Albert Jenkins," pp. 56-7.

66. OR, vol. 27, pt.3, p. 770.

67. Busey and Martin, Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg, P. 198.

68. Ibid., pp. 198-99.

69. Joseph H. Crute, Units of the Confederate States Army (Midlothian, Virginia: Derwent Books, 1987), p. 368.

70. Ibid., p. 392.

71. The destruction of the Baltimore & Ohio railroad not only damaged the Union war effort, but likely interrupted any plans to bring in reinforcements from West Virginia or points further west.

72. OR, vol. 27. pt. 3. pp. 985-986.

73. Ibid., pp. 947-948.

74. A number of historians and Stuart partisans have essentially blamed Robertson-as the senior of the two-for failing to follow his @rders, or have blamed Lee for failing to use these two brigades effectively. For a representative sample of this criticism, see: John S. Mosby, "Confederate Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign. Part I," in Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel, eds., Battles and Leaders of the'Civil War, 4 vols. (New York: Thomas Yoseloff. 1956, reprint of 1888 edition), 3:252; Nesbitt, Saber and Scapegoat, pp. 68-70; Longacre, The Cavalry at Gettysburg, pp. 233-4; McClellan, I Rode With JEB Stuart, pp. 3 18-19; Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign. pp. 1 83-4.

76. Blackford, War Years With JEB Stuart, p. 229.

77. McClellan, I Rode With JEB Stuart, p. 319.

79. Ibid., p. 916.

80. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, p. 184. As one of the comprehensive secondary sources for the campaign, Coddington discusses the issue in some detail, and is representative of the bulk of historical opinion here.

81, OR, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 297.

82, Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, p. 185.
83. Beverly H. Robertson, "Confederate Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign. Part II," in Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel, eds., Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 4 vols. (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1956, reprint of 1888 edition), 3:252.

84. John S. Mosby, Stuart's Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign (Gaithersburg, Maryland: Olde Soldier Books Inc., 1987, reprint of 1908 edition), p. 198.

85. For a good look at Lee's concerns about supplying his army in the spring of 1863, see OR, vol. 25, part 2, pp. 597-8, 686-7,

697. The message from Lee to Brig. Gen. William N. Pendelton, chief of artillery, is especially illuminating, where Lee is instructing Pendelton not to bring up the horses needed to fill out teams for the artillery, since those additional animals would only starve in place, even given the reduced demand on the railroad with the absence of Longstreet and two divisions.

86. Ibid., p. 687.

87. OR, vol. 27, pt. 3, pp. 912-13.

88. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, p. 175.

89. Ibid., p. 186.

90. Ibid., pp. 222-4.

91. William N. McDonald, A History of the Laurel Brigade, Originally Ashby's Cavalry (Gaithersburg, Maryland: Olde Soldier Books, 1987, reprint of 1907 edition), p. 154.

92. Harry W. Pfanz, Gettysburg: Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), p. 33.

93. Nesbitt, Saber and Scapegoat, p. 87.

94. Longacre, The Cavalry at Gettysburg, p. 234.

95. McDonald, History of the Laurel Brigade, p. 154. The Federal force here was the 6th U.S. Cavalry, a large but inexperienced regiment detached by Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt to verify rumors of a Confederate supply train. The Confederates ambushed the 6th U.S. north of Fairfield, inflicted heavy losses, and secured Lee's flank through what would become the Army of Northern Virginia's primary retreat route after Gettysburg.