LAST UPDATED 6/10/96
These archived discussions are still open for comment.
To join in write gettysburg@arthes.com
Ewell and Early failed to remain on the offensive as would Stonewall had, and by Culp's hill not being taken, the next two days would see a shift in the war. The battle would definitely have been over the first day and Meade would have had to retreat to his Pipe Creek line to await Lee. I think Lee would have gone on to defeat Meade and carry Baltimore if not D.C. Any thoughts on this?
On Mon Jan.29, Paul wrote:
<>Ewell and Early failed to remain on the offensive as would Stonewall had, and <>by Culp's hill not being taken, the next two days would see a shift in the <>war. The battle would definitely have been over the first day and Meade would <>have had to retreat to his Pipe Creek line to await Lee. I think Lee would <>have gone on to defeat Meade and carry Baltimore if not D.C. Any thoughts on <>this?
<> Harry Pfanz in his book "Gettysburg -Culps Hill & Cemetery Hill" makes the point that taking cemetery hill may not have been as easy as one might think. for one thing one must consider the problem of mounting an attack from a town. Per Pfanz(p76)"Further, in spite of Union fears to the contrary, Cemetery Hill did not look vulnerable to an assault from the town. Columns debouching from the confines of Washington and Baltimore streets would be extremely vulnerable to point blank fire from federal batteries on the Hill"
An assault up the North face was also fraught with problems. such an attack would probably begun from the "Brickyard"(three Gettysburg schools occupy this site today). The slope from here is very steep and again facing the almost certain point blank canister fire of the Union batteries. There was not enough daylight left to coordinate an attack from the southwest(probably the easiest route).
Also Lee's orders gave Ewell lots of wiggle room-again from Pfanz(p72) "In his report of the campaign , Lee himself stated he had instructed Ewell" to carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable, BUT TO AVOID A GENERAL ENGAGEMENT UNTIL THE ARRIVAL OF THE OTHER DIVISIONS OF THE ARMY"(emphasis mine).
My personal opinion is the hill could have been taken BUT given the problems he faced and the ambiguity of the orders he received I think Ewell is not as culpable in this situation as he is often made out to be.
As to the question of what if they had taken the hill-I agree that the battle of Gettysburg would have ended then and there BUT again only two of the Unions seven Corps had been mauled. Meade already had an excellent fall back position scoped out(The Pipe Creek Line). I think had Cemetery Hill fallen you would belong to the Pipe Creek Discussion Group and we would be studying the pivotal union victory at Pipe Creek. IMO a defeat of the Union on day 2 or day 3 would have caused far more problems for the Union than a defeat on day 1.
Robert Lawrence
Bob:
You are exactly right on this. The key here is that Ewell received several orders over the course of the day specifically instructing him not to bring on a general engagement until Longstreet came up. Only at the last moment did Lee send the discretionary order telling Ewell to take the hill if practicable, a poorly worded order at best. This discretionary order was not specific in its direction, and probably left Ewell confused. Add in the mess of trying to launch an attack through the town, with Union batteries bristling atop Cemetery Hill, and I doubt whether it could have succeeded if it had been ordered.
Eric Wittenberg
Eric et al..
One must not forget this was Ewell's first engagement as a Corps Commander...I
know I sound like a broken record when I get on here stating this...but
perhaps he was a little
unsure etc...although the information regarding the approaches is
outstanding...and perhaps eventually was want determined the outcome....
Re: discretionary orders....
So lets chew this up....a challenge??
Best..
Hi Eric,
In a message dated 96-01-30 01:21:16 EST, you write:
>One must not forget this was Ewell's first engagement as a Corps
Commander...I
>know I sound like a broken record when I get on here stating this...but
>perhaps he was a little........
Not at all true. Ewell performed brilliantly a few weeks before at
Winchester. He was not a newcomer to command.
Steve Haas
In a message dated 96-01-30 19:11:20 EST, Steve wrote:
>>One must not forget this was Ewell's first engagement as a Corps
>Commander...I
>>know I sound like a broken record when I get on here stating this...but
>>perhaps he was a little........
>
>Not at all true. Ewell performed brilliantly a few weeks before at
>Winchester. He was not a newcomer to command.
>Steve Haas
Hi Steve...
I apologize if I am wrong....it is through great discussions that we learn eh?
I received this fact from the Encyclopedia of The Civil War, Historical Times
Illustrated, Patricia L. Faust, ed. 1986, under Heading-- Ewell, Richard
Stoddert., page 249:
Steve I realize you said that my statement was not true...Which part of it?
In reference to Winchester on the 14-15 June if memory serves me....enroute
to Gettysburg Ewell's forces greatly outnumbered and overcame the weak
Federal position. Now I admit Ewell AND his men had performed like a fine
tuned clock...perfect
tactically...however I believe it was not a great test of his Corps skills and
I would only call it a minor victory (with all due respect to the Commander)
any victory is a positive one...and therefore his first engagement as a Corps
Commander...I concede...
First I derive from the above quote that Old Baldy was out of action for
almost a year..
he was indeed a Brig Gen when he went down and served with distinction...
BUT...he had been away for a protracted amount of time and was given command
of the II Corps approximately 1 month (or less) before the ANV began their
move Northward...
did get his whistle wet with the Winchester scrimmage...however....
.... enlighten me as to any testing engagements he encountered prior to GB as
a Corps Commander...not ever having served in a Military capacity it is my
perception that there is a huge difference between a Brig Gen and a Corps
Commander....again if I am mistaken pls
correct....but I do not look at Winchester as the stuff that makes Corps
Commanders...
Steve: I am not shy...if I am incorrect...please follow-up...again it is
knowledge and opinions that we forge is it not? Factual or otherwise...
Humbly...
In a message dated 96-02-01 12:49:11 EST, Paul wrote:
> I still remain
>convinced that Culps' Hill could and should have been taken by Old Baldy.
>Ewell's' performance at Winchester gave Lee false hope that he found another
>Jackson and expected Ewell to act in accordance to the Jackson style.
Paul...
Sorry for the broad generalizations...not meant in a callous way!!
Best..
It seems the general wisdom that had Ewell pressed his attack
vigorously on the 1st his men would have taken either or both Cemetery
Hill and Culp's Hill. Jackson woulda, Ewell shoulda, Trimble, Gordon,
and Early said he coulda.
To GDG,
Ewell's performance as a division commander had been noteworthy. In fact all
the way up to Carlisle, Ewell had made most of the decisions instantly, by simply
answering "yes" or "no". I also think Ewell had made a decision on July the 1st.
That was to wait it out. His men might have broken down, organization wise. Yet
didn't he realize if he did not take that hill, many more men would die if he
attacked later ? I think that's what got Trimble and other subordinates peeved
is that Ewell chose to wait it out. They were used to Jackson's quick orders
with or without direction form the high command.
Paul Macomber
Paul,
I have always been under the impression that Richard Ewell was very
bent-out-of-shape at his recall from Harrisburg by Lee. On his march
towards Cashtown he received another message from Lee informing him
he could move towards Cashtown or Gettysburg "as circumstances
might dictate," without letting Ewell know where the Union forces were.
Ewell also took the message from A.P. Hill (informing him of his movement
towards Gettysburg) very badly, and wondered if he was now getting
orders from Hill as well.
>From what I have read it seems Richard Ewell was in a real snit when
he hit town. I would say his greatest failure was that in his sulking mood:
he was only going to follow the letter of the law from all future orders
from Lee, and would especially avoid acting on orders ending in "as
circumstances might dictate." Lee's suggestion that Ewell storm
Cemetery Ridge, "if practicable," would fall in this category.
He was in good company...most of the other Rebel Brass were having
bad hair days that week.
John Carter
I must say I still disagree with you Mike, Ewell had Rodes and Early. Johnson
was coming up from the C'burg Pike. IF they attacked around Culps Hill, I think
it could have had ended up in confederate victory. I may be wrong, but I do
think the Culp's Hill signal station had not been established, eliminating the
possibility of Culp's Hill becoming a beacon for union reinforcements. Wasn't the
XI corps near Culp's, the guys that had run when Jackson attacked
Paul Macomber
I'd weigh in to say that Ewell couldn't have taken Cemetary Hill the
night of July 1, and would would have been a poor general if he had
tried.
The most important point is that the earliest he could have begun
forming up for attack was 5:00; his attack on the 11th Corps began at
3:00, and the town wasn't cleared until 5:00.
Assuming, then that Ewell began forming for attack at 5:00, assuming he
could have gotten the troops together in the confusion of the town of
Gettysburg, formed them for attack at the edge of town, 6:00 is the
earliest he could have begun an attack.
General Hancock stated in his report that by 5:30, any attack on his
position would have failed. He had plenty of troops by then, entrenched
cannon and a good position.
Ewell would have failed in his attack if he had tried.
Furthermore, there was much skirmishing on Ewell's left flank, as
Williams' division of the 12th Corps was making its way around to
Culp's Hill. There was Union Cavalry on that flank also. Ewell didn't
know at all who was out there, and was rightly suspicious of the action
there. No general would launch an attack with unknown numbers of enemy
on his flank. Ewell was no fool. He would have been wrong to attack.
Ewell was not a great Corps leader, and he made many mistakes at
Gettysburg; his biggest was listening to Early and refusing to move to
the Confederate right flank, at Lee's suggestion. Not attacking
Cemetary Hill was one of his better decisions.
Steve Haas
>>Coddington in his book GB campaign suggest that there was a very small
>window of opportunity for Ewell on 7/1 between 3 and 5 pm for Ewell to "Take
>that hill.". He was not positioned to seize the opportunity, Lee`s orders
>were vague, It was the first time Ewell had to make a decision on his own.
>No one doubts that Jackson would have stormed the hill.Jackson wasn`t
>available, of course. Coddington lays the responsiblily on Lee for the hill
>not being taken as Lee was there to see the importance of "taking that
>Hill." Thus imho Lee sealed his fate at GB as no one on 7/2 was every going
>to be able to take Culp`s Hill and Lee again failed to recognize the
>importance of taking LRT what ever the cost on 7/2. However GB was a moot
>issue after 5pm 7/1 and there was no doubt in few AONV generals mind the
>cost of not taking that hill.
As long as we're keeping the godlike but one-armed Jackson alive
and in command, why not turn command of the newly created third corps
over to Albert Sidney Johnston?
Since I argue, stubbornly if not brilliantly, that Ewell could
never have taken Cemetery Hill, I'll add that Jackson could have done no
better on the 1st. He might well have sat in his tent and contemplated
his navel, as he had done before (all right, I'm speculating about the
navel). Surely his men could have fought no more effectively for him
than they did for Ewell, which was awfully well on this day.
It's all part of the having-it-both-ways school of thought: Hill
was at fault for bringing on a general engagement (being too aggressive)
but Ewell was at fault for not being aggressive enough.
As for Jackson, and as brilliant as he was at times, all this
attribution of genius to him is giving me a Krick in the neck!
Hehe, David. Bob and Bobby Lee K. appreciate the plug, I'm sure!
Sean Dail
>>
>>Norm Levitt
>>
>>
>
>I agree Norm - I specifically excluded them in follow-up posts. Greene's
>sector was about the best defended on the entire line.
>
>Dave Powell
>
>
Culp's Hill was the strongest line on the field. Without the breastworks,
could it have been taken?
I believe the answer is still no. The rocky slope and woods made
the Confederate attack line treacherous. (BTW I think the woods are much
thicker there now than 1863)
The Union line made excellent use of the contours of the hill, and
the ability to move men and supplies up and back in at least a portion of it
was a great advantage.
The confusion of the night attacks also made it dificult for the
attacker.
Even with the loss of several brigades on July 2nd to stumble toward
the center, the Union line was strong. The Confederate breakthrough was
negated simply by tucking in the flank at the base of the hill.
The breastworks saved lives, but I believe the Union would have
turned back the assaults without them.
Dennis
Dennis,
Dave Powell
I was just briefing through Bachelder last night to review the 12th corps'
performance at Gettysburg once Slocum finally got there. Williams (Bachelder
Vol 1 pp. 63-70) blasts Meade's official report of the battle.
Who is right Meade or Williams? Did anyone else have a problem with Meade's
report?
p.s. Williams also states he was invited to the "council of war" on the
evening of July 2.
David Butchin
Greetings,
The command structure of the Twelfth Corps was complex at
Gettysburg. Here is my interpretation of Pfanz'z interpretation:
Slocum saw himself as the "wing commander" of the Fifth and Twelfth
Corps. This was a result of a contingency Meade had inserted in the infamous
"Pie Creek" circular. This meant that Williams would command the Twelfth and
Ruger command the First Division. Colgrove commanded the Third Brigade. But
to avoid a question of rank, Lockwood operated the Second Brigade as a
separate command, leaving Ruger with only two brigades.
Since Williams was the commander of the Twelfth Coprps, he attended
the "Council of War" oops, I mean the party at the Officer's Club on July
2. He remarked to Slocum that he probably didn't need to be there; he asked
Meade who told him to stay, but later wrote he thought it was strange he did
so. Apparently Meade did not realize Slocum considered himself a wing
comander. Williams voted to stay in position and await another attack at
this meeting.
As far as William's criticism of Meade, Pfanz descrine Williams as a
capable officer who was bitter at seeing others promoted over him. He
blamed this on the West Point club and prejudice against fighters from the
western theater. What he wrote of Geary touches on the issue of official
reports. "Geary always claimed all the fighting. You should not place the
least reliance on his Oficial Reports unless confirmed by others. Almost
every official report is full of unintentional errors and mistakes, but
Geary's is full of premeditated & wicked lies - They were written soley for
his own exultation without the least regard for facts." (Pfanz - Culp &
Cemetery - p. 440).
Dennis
david
jim
Unfortunately, Slocum is proof of the flaws in the seniority system.
Anyone in high command who refuses to assume command when he is entitled to
it by rank, like Slocum, is, in my opinion, a worthless officer. This puts
him in a league with another great military mind, Gideon Pillow, who also
refused to assume command when duty required him to do so.
Slocum was so cautious, so self-centered, and unwilling to take
initiative that he refused to support an attack across the Rappahannock by
Buford in August 1863 which blocked Buford's way and cost the lives of some
of his men. Buford was so frustrated by this that he asked to be relieved
of command in the AofP. Two weeks later, he was still fuming about it. In
a personal letter to his old, good pal Burnside, Buford wrote that in his
opinion, "the same faults still exist among corps commanders as have always
been...too much apathy, too much cold water." Buford was specifically
referring to SLocum when he wrote this. Does this tell you anything?
Eric Wittenberg
>
>I should explain my POV on defensive works - in the early stages of the war,
>breastworks were either ignored entirely, or used extensively, seemingly at
>whim. For instance, both Lee and Mac entrenched to the eyebrows in front of
>Richmond, yet at Sharpsburg, virtually no southern troops made any effort to
>fortify - tho they did take natural cover. Then, a few months later, at
>Fredericksburg - Lee constructed the most elaborate fieldworks of the war up
>to that time.
>
>At Gettysburg, use of improved positions had yet to become standard - Greene
>told his men to fortify in _defiance_ of his corps commander's orders, for
>pete's sake. Again, little by way of effort was expended in improving the
>Cemetery Ridge line. This dichotomy has always fascinated me.
>
This is exactly right. Most commanders at the time of Gettysburg felt that
entrenchments were useful for siege operations, but not for the open
campaigns of 1861-1864. Much of this comes from the long-standing belief
that soldiers in entrenchments lost the aggressive fighting spirit, or
"elan", necessary to conduct the Napoleonic type of warfare practiced in the
first three years of the war. In fact, entrenching tools were not even
carried as part of a regiment's equipment in the first few years of the war.
Tools were part of the siege train and carried by the few engineering
detachments in the AOP. After the terrible losses of the 1864 campaigns,
Grant was forced to go to entrenchments, I think, not so much from concern
for losses as the fact that the old AOP had melted away.
At Gettysburg, entrenchments were noticeably missing except on Culp's Hill.
After GBurg, the soldiers generally took matters in their own hands and
threw up some kind of entrenchments at every opportunity, such as the
Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor.
Regards,
Hi Dennis,
You wrote:
>
>KellyDF@aol.com wrote
>
><>Culps Hill and South Cemetary provided good defensive
><>cover at the expense of actually being able to look down range and seeing
><>your opponent; and not seeing one's opponent gives him an opportunity to
><>maneuver and pick his point of concentration which you can only respond to
><>after he has commited his forces and shown his hand.
>
>I find this an interesting point.. There were two signal stations on Gulp's
>Hill. How effective were they in informing Union commanders of Confederates
>in their immediate front? Bill Cameron - are you there?
I don't have the orignal post (KellyDF) due to the fact I've been down for
days and on top of that, my Eudora mailer just crashed!
The primary signal station on Culps Hill was really on the spur where
Slocum's statue is today. It served as a communications station with a flag
line to Meade's headquarters. Consequently, it was of little value looking
to the immediate front. There was a second postion, probably on the crest,
but I am not sure where it was located exactly. Lieut. Holland was the 12th
Corps Signal officer and there is not a lot in the OR showing his traffic.
There was a lot of intelligence reported from Cemetery Hill by the Signal
officers. There is this one which probably came from Cemetery Hill near
Meade's headquarters:
S. Williams
There is this one:
Captain, Norton:
One regiment rebel infantry has just coe out of the woods into a field....
THe enemy's sharpshooters are in the woods at the foot of this hill....
N. Henry Camp
General Meade:
JAS . S. Hall
And there was also this one:
General Butterfield:
Numerous fires, apparently from the burning of wagons south-sougheast from
here. A wagon train can be seen in the same direction. I think our trains
are being destroyed.
Babcock
Bill
Finally...I hear the cheers...had Lee with or thru Ewell had his Cav'y
telling him what
they were up against...the day may have ended differently....even given
Pfanz's excellent description of the terrain....
Ed..
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
I also agree with Bob that Ewell is not as "culpable" as many think.
However, if Ewell is not to be blamed for exercising his discretion on the
matter, why are we blaming Lee for giving him that discretion. I would not
think that it would be all that unusual for an army commander who was not on
site to give a discretionary order to a corps commander who was. Seems to
me that's what corps commanders do. Exercise their discretion. After
receiving the "if practicable" order delivered by Taylor, Ewell sent Lieut.
Smith back to Lee to tell him that they wanted Hill to cooperate and Lee
sent Smith back with instruction for Ewell to do what he thought best and
Lee further told him that Hill would do what he could. [Pfanz, pp. 72-76] I
can't find anything that would lead me to believe that Ewell was "confused".
He decided not to take the hill based on the situation as he saw it. Seems
to me Lee gave him discretion and he exercised it. If you don't think it
would have succeeded, I'm not sure what the problem was with Lee depending
on Ewell to make the decision. You must think he made the right one and if
that's the case, what's wrong with Lee giving him the latitude to make it.
As to the order being poorly worded, Lee, Ewell and Taylor all remembered it
differently. I'm not sure it is germane in that Ewell communicated with Lee
through Smith after having received the order. It seems that Lee was pretty
specific in his communication through Smith and even gave Smith his glass to
observe the hill in order to make sure they were talking about the same
situation.[Pfanz]
BTW, on another subject, have you read what Meade and Sedgwick thought
about pursuing Lee through Fairfield and the mountain gap? [Meade's
testimony, JCCW] They both sure thought it would be a good place for Lee to
conduct a defense. I'm not sure what the problem is with narrow gaps if you
are the defender. If I was the pursuer, I'd have a problem with them! :)
Bill
From: SteveH7645@aol.com
From: ENordfors@aol.com
>Rockford, IL"....Losing a leg at Groveton, Aug 1862, Ewell was equipped with a wooden one
and returned to duty 23 May 1863 as a lieutenant general to replace Thomas J.
"Stonewall" Jackson in command of the II Corps. Though riding was difficult,
"old Bald Head," an affectionate nickname given Ewell by his men, was an
active campaigner from Gettysburg to Spotsylvania Court House, even though he
was wounded twice..."
Now looking beyond this Shen. Valley engagement to GB 2 weeks later...I
think..
Ed...
From: ENordfors@aol.com
Ahh a hint of an opinion....do you think Winchester was a significant victory
for Ewell or a little win (given that in War all wins are wins
In reference to the Jackson Style....I think there is no question but what
Jackson and Longstreet provided the good Gen Lee with an excellent range of
opinions and battle styles from which he could make his decisions...Jackson
the all out "Kill em men, Kill em All" offensive talent and Longstreet the
"let them fight us on ground of our choosing"
defensive style...quite a range...and I do not see Ewell even in this
range...save for perhaps the middle...the non-committed area....
Ed...
From: ajackson@oyez.law.upenn.edu (Anita Jackson-Wieck)
But...
This seems to emerge from a having-it-both-ways scenario. Hill
was wrong to bring on a general engagement but Jackson would have rolled
right over Cemetery Hill. 1) Wouldn't Jackson have been similarly
constrained? He might even have followed orders. 2) Jackson was very
much the girl with the curl. Had he pulled one of his Gaines Mill funks
this might be the Cashtown or Harrisburg Discussion Group.
But that's too speculative a line for fruitful thought. More to
the point, could Ewell's men have gone straight through town and up
Cemetery Hill without stopping? Of course not. Von Steinwehr was
there. 2000 men were there. Artillery (5 batteries, I think, but
someone correct me here) were there. Buford and his troopers were
there. And some 6000+ Union soldiers retreated there.
Ewell's men were badly scattered in their pursuit and by the
streets and buildings of GB. Their pursuit foundered naturally because
of these obstacles, fatigue born of hours of marching and fighting, and
separation of units from their officers. There were thousands of Union
soldiers milling about in the streets to be trapped or captured.
Organizing an assault under these conditions was a logistical nightmare.
Further, from what vantage should the attack be launched?
Cemetery Hill commands the exits from town. Troops attacking from GB
would perforce advance in columns until clear of the buildings, exposing
themselves to enfilading fire. Union artillery was unopposed by
Confederate artillery. An ugly scenario for Ewell.
If then, an attack could not be launched from town, then where?
East of GB there were few Confederates, certainly not enough for an
attack of any weight. To shift troops to this sector would have required
sending them through town - still hopelessly snarled and chaotic - or
marching them around the outskirts, still more marching for tired men,
and time-consuming as well.
This leaves an assault launched from the northwest. Buford's
troopers were deployed on the west slope of the hill and the same
artillery mismatch existed. Anderson's men had already gone to camp.
Any assault would have matched an equal number of attackers and
defenders. Again, not good for Ewell.
Cemetery Hill was, I submit, out of the question.
Culp's Hill poses its own set of problems which I propose to
offer later if I survive this engagement, but I offer this argument for
discussion now.
David Wieck
From: "Douglas M Macomber"
I also think Trimble when he saw the building fortifications on Cemetery
Hill, knew it needed to be taken. When he saw Ewell was just going to sit back
and let the Federals build Gibraltar on it, Trimble really got mad. It was this
time that let Hancock, select the good ground(Culps and Cemetery Hill,
Cemetery Ridge). Trimble, knowing the age of Jackson had passed asked to have
another assignment. I also thought Trimble was like Pickett,(glory and honor,
glory ad honor).
Many of Jackson's attacks have broken down. For example I think Chancellorsville
broke down because Jackson attacked too late, darkness fell before he pursue
the Federals.
From: JCARTE6@wpgate.gmu.edu
From: "Douglas M Macomber"
Chancellorsville. Would have been an interesting scenario.(No disrespect intended
to the XI corps, good fighters overall, terrible leaders.)
From:David Wieck
Forgive my naivete about this subject, but why does Ewell receive
such criticism for not taking Cemetery Hill on the afternoon of the 1st? I
posted a note a while back giving my reasons for thinking his men could
not have taken it. No one responded. Probably my fault. Perhaps, rather
than arguing the point in advance, I should just ask: could Ewell have
taken Cemetery Hill on the 1st? I'd like, if possible, to keep this
question distinct from the issue of whether he could or should have taken
Culp's Hill, which to me is much murkier subject.
Dave:
My opinion is that the march around Cemetery Hill, where Rhodes
either would have had to swing several miles wide, or be under fire from the
Federal guns on Cemetery Hill would have been impractical. Further, if you
read Marse Robert's orders, the attacks on the northern end of the fishhook
were supposed to be "demonstrations", with Longstreet's attack being the
main event. If this is a diversionary attack, do you subject your command
to such heavy fire, and risk their being shot up, or do you hold these men
in reserve to wait for any needs you may have? It seems to me that under
that scenario, you hold Rodes ready to support a breakthrough by Longstreet,
particularly in the area of the Bliss Farm, which saw such heavy fighting.
Eric Wittenberg
From: steveha@ix.netcom.com (Steve Haas)
From: taylord@spot.Colorado.EDU (Deb Taylor)
john weitzel
I agree. "Windows of opportunity" are made to be climbed through. I don't
think it would have taken very many men to accomplish the taking of the
hill in the time allowed, and very little effort keeping it. And it should
have been done (probably by Trimble).
Deb
From: David Wieck
From: mosby@nando.net
>
>>What about Greene's works on Culp's Hill? They certainly had a real
>>effect of Johnson's division.
From: DPowell334@aol.com
I'd agree too. Significantly, in the fighting early on July 3rd, Greene's
line had enough reserves to rotate regiments into and out of the firing line,
given men a rest and time to resupply. The strength of that reserve, above
all else, indicated that the hill was pretty secure from the size effort the
CSA was mounting.
From: LlDdd@aol.com
I thought the 12th corps did a great job at Gettysburg.
From: lawrence (Dennis Lawrence)
From: Martjim@aol.com
In "the second day at gettysburg: essays on confederate and union leadership
", edited by gary gallagher, the essay by a. wilson greene indicates that
meade apologized the williams and that no offense was meant by excluding the
accomplishments of the 12th corps....williams supposedly accepted the
apologies...slocum however continued to hold a grudge...egged on, it seems,
by meade's nemisis, dan butterfield...a fellow new yorker....
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
From: John Kelly
Jack Kelly
From: acameron@tcac.com (Bill Cameron)
Commanding officer Twelfth Corps:
It was probably sent by messenger.
The Signal officer reports that a heavy column of infantry is moving round
to the right, and in front of Slocum's corps.
Assistant Adjutant-General
Signal Station Near Wadsworth's Headquarters,
There is also this one:
Lieutenant, Signal Officer
Signal Station, July 2, 1863 - 9.30 a.m.
I think this one was sent from Cemetery Hill before he went down to LRT.
The enemy are moving a brigade of five regiments from in front of our
center to our right, accompanied by one four-gun battery and two squadrons
of cavalry, at a point east-southeast of Second Divisionn, Twelfth Corps,
and in easy range...
Capt. and Signal Officer
Cemetery Signal Station
Captain, Signal officer
Forgive me for being sloppy with this stuff. It is on page 487-88 of part 3
of the GB OR. Most of them have times also but I didn't bother to type them in.
From: ajackson@oyez.law.upenn.edu (Anita Jackson-Wieck)
Subject: Re: Puzzlement over Hill
This may seem an obvious thing to say but folks are stumbling over
it so I'll belabor it all the same. Cemetery Hill is not Culp's Hill.
When Lee instructed Ewell to "take that hill"..."if practicable",
he was
referring to Cemetery Hill. Ewell, in the period John Weitzel refers to
in Coddington, was considering an attack of the retreating enemy - and
they were on Cemetery Hill. When John writes that "No one doubts that
Jackson would have stormed the hill", he was referring to Cemetery
Hill.
Yet he refers to only one hill by name in his post and it isn't Cemetery
or
A.P. (Well, two, but the other is LRT.) Correct me if I'm misreading your
post, John.
As for the "window of opportunity" between 3 and 5, it's quite
a bit
smaller - more like between 4:30 and 5:30. The general retreat from
north of Gettysburg did not begin until after 4:00 PM and only two
regiments (South Carolina's I and XIV) were even in town by 4:30. As
John points out, Ewell was "not positioned to seize the opportunity.
That being the case, the window of opportunity did not truly exist! By
the time Ewell could get there Hancock, Howard, Doubleday et al. had
locked it.
This is not to say that Ewell ignored Culp's Hill. He did, after
all, send Johnson's men to occupy it. My point is that he had the more
pressing matter of whether or not to continue the battle by pressing the
Federals retreating to Cemetery Hill. When Gordon volunteered to take
the hill he was referring to Cemetery Hill as well. (I give no weight to
Gordon's offer - he hadn't even seen it at that point save from a long
way off and had no idea what awaited him. In addition, it is absurd to
think he could have taken it with the 1500 men he said would be all he
needed. Along this line, if Trimble is going to take the hill as Deb
suggests (either hill, for that matter) he's going to have to do it alone.
He had no command.
Of course, Johnson's men weren't up yet, so Ewell had no one
really to take Culp's Hill, save troops who were in town or north and
mostly west of it. That's a fairly lengthy march going around behind town
and out the York Pike, but any other route would have given the show away
to the Federals, who already had troops on Steven's Knoll and the western
slope of Culp's Hill. Troops moving on Culp's Hill by any other route
would have been exposed to devastating fire from Cemetery Hill. Ewell
would hardly have exposed his men to this kind of carnage. More likely,
he would attack Cemetery Hill directly, but even that seems doomed to
failure.
The point I'm trying to make in my muddled way is that Ewell did
not lose his mind this day and his decisions were rational and probably
correct. Further, we cannot just pass off as given that he should have
taken "that hill" unless we make clear which hill we're talking
about and
why.
David Wieck
>>Coddington in his book GB campaign suggest that there was a very
small >
>window of opportunity for Ewell on 7/1 between 3 and 5 pm for Ewell
to
"Take > >that hill.". He was not positioned to seize the
opportunity,
Lee`s orders > >were vague, It was the first time Ewell had to make
a
decision on his own. > >No one doubts that Jackson would have stormed
the
hill.Jackson wasn`t > >available, of course. Coddington lays the
responsiblily on Lee for the hill > >not being taken as Lee was there
to
see the importance of "taking that > >Hill." Thus imho Lee
sealed his fate
at GB as no one on 7/2 was every going > >to be able to take Culp`s
Hill
and Lee again failed to recognize the > >importance of taking LRT
what
ever the cost on 7/2. However GB was a moot > >issue after 5pm 7/1
and
there was no doubt in few AONV generals mind the > >cost of not taking
that hill. john weitzel >
> > I agree. "Windows of opportunity" are made
to be climbed through. I don't > think it would have taken very many
men
to accomplish the taking of the > hill in the time allowed, and very
little effort keeping it. And it should > have been done (probably by
Trimble). > > Deb
From: lawrence (Dennis Lawrence)
Subject: Darkness falls on the Hills
Greetings]
Deb writes....
>And, by the way, how dark was it at
>5:30 pm in the middle of summer?
>
I think this is a good question - and worthy of atention as we consider
various actions atdusk. The amount of light on the field varied depending
on
the features around it. In "Time on Little Round Top" - GBMAG
# 2 James
Wight says that the sun dips to South Mountain and dusk begins at 7:29.
By
8:25 the area is in total darkness - p. 54
The light on LRT's face would last much longer than the light on
the
eastern side in the trees. The same would be true at the other end of the
field. Troops attacking up the open northern face of Cemetery Hill at 5:30
would be in a well lighted field. At the same time, the woods on Culp's
Hill darkened dramatically after the sun dipped.
All times are Standard.
Take Care
Dennis
From: DPowell334@aol.com
Subject: Re: Dave on Breastworks
In a message dated 96-02-19 21:23:36 EST, you write:
>
>What about Greene's works on Culp's Hill? They certainly had a real
>effect of Johnson's division.
>
>Norm Levitt
>
>
I agree Norm - I specifically excluded them in follow-up posts. Greene's
sector was about the best defended on the entire line.
Dave Powell
From: John Kelly <jkelly@argo.net>
At 08:34 PM 2/19/96 -0500, you wrote:
>I should explain my POV on defensive works - in the early stages of
the war,
>breastworks were either ignored entirely, or used extensively, seemingly
at
>whim. For instance, both Lee and Mac entrenched to the eyebrows in front
of
>Richmond, yet at Sharpsburg, virtually no southern troops made any effort
to
>fortify - tho they did take natural cover. Then, a few months later,
at
>Fredericksburg - Lee constructed the most elaborate fieldworks of the
war up
>to that time.
>At Gettysburg, use of improved positions had yet to become standard
- Greene
>told his men to fortify in _defiance_ of his corps commander's orders,
for
>pete's sake. Again, little by way of effort was expended in improving
the
>Cemetery Ridge line. This dichotomy has always fascinated me.
This is exactly right. Most commanders at the time of Gettysburg felt that
entrenchments were useful for siege operations, but not for the open
campaigns of 1861-1864. Much of this comes from the long-standing belief
that soldiers in entrenchments lost the aggressive fighting spirit, or
"elan", necessary to conduct the Napoleonic type of warfare practiced
in the
first three years of the war. In fact, entrenching tools were not even
carried as part of a regiment's equipment in the first few years of the
war.
Tools were part of the siege train and carried by the few engineering
detachments in the AOP. After the terrible losses of the 1864 campaigns,
Grant was forced to go to entrenchments, I think, not so much from concern
for losses as the fact that the old AOP had melted away.
At Gettysburg, entrenchments were noticeably missing except on Culp's Hill.
After GBurg, the soldiers generally took matters in their own hands and
threw up some kind of entrenchments at every opportunity, such as the
Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor.
Regards,
Jack Kelly
From: DPowell334@aol.com
DPowell334@aol.com says:
In a message dated 96-05-25 22:08:22 EDT, you write:
>> I concluded that the order not to
>>bring on a general engagement was still in force, and hence placed
my lines
>>and skirmishers in a defensive attitude, and determined to await
orders or
>>further movements either on the part of Early or of the troops on
my right."
>>[OR 27 (2), p. 555]
> Just another example of how NONE of the Confederate officers wanted
to
>fight on this ground. They ALL came up with good reasons why they shouldn't.
>There was a tremendous reluctance on everyone's part....Lee should have
>listened.
>Stephen Haas
>Steveh@worldnet.att.net
>steveh7645@aol.com
Rodes was simply pointing out what the armchair critics forgot when they
were
complaining about not moving on Cemetery Hill - the fact that a third of
his
division was down, three of his five brigades were so shattered as to be
ineffective - Daniel lost very heavily, and the fiascos with ONeal and
Iverson rendered those units hors de combat for the rest of the battle -
and
the rest of his command was heavily scattered by the pursuit and fighting
thru the town.
Finally, Rodes points out that the Federals were very quick to establish
a
new line on the hill - one he regarded as formidible.
Rodes' report didn't get cited much in the Early era because it contradicts
the notion that all that was needed was for one bold leader to keep going
up
the hill, and all would be won.
Dave Powell
From: Steve Haas <Steveh@worldnet.att.net>
Steve Haas <Steveh@worldnet.att.net> says:
>DPowell334@aol.com says:
>Rodes was simply pointing out what the armchair critics forgot when
they were
>complaining about not moving on Cemetery Hill - the fact that a third
of his
>division was down, three of his five brigades were so shattered as to
be
>ineffective - Daniel lost very heavily, and the fiascos with ONeal and
>Iverson rendered those units hors de combat for the rest of the battle
- and
>the rest of his command was heavily scattered by the pursuit and fighting
>thru the town.
>Finally, Rodes points out that the Federals were very quick to establish
a
>new line on the hill - one he regarded as formidible.
>Rodes' report didn't get cited much in the Early era because it contradicts
>the notion that all that was needed was for one bold leader to keep
going up
>the hill, and all would be won.
>Dave Powell
Of course. But there is a larger issue here, and that is the almost
universal unwillingness of the Confederate high command to pursue this
battle. During the entire course of the battle, Lee received excuse after
excuse from his under-officers as to why they shouldn't do what he wanted
to
do. Hill, Ewell, Longstreet; all of them objected to the assignments given
them. I wonder if there was ever such dissension in the Confederate army?
The question is why this should have been so? Besides the fact that they
all
were RIGHT, and Lee shouldn't have been attacking where he was, this army
was the one that had defeated an overwhelmingly larger Federal army at
Chancellorsville, and had just swept the Federals from the field on the
First Day.
I'm wondering if the loss of Jackson, and his possible effect on the battle,
was not so much what he would have done on the first day, but the effect
he
had on Lee. Jackson and Lee had a unique chemistry, a synergy, if you would;
they seemed to have the same vision. Lee and Jackson as a TEAM might have
figured a way to win this battle. Jackson may have disuaded Lee from the
proposed attack on the second day by coming up with an improvement on Lee's
plan that would have worked; Longstreet only came up with unacceptable
alternatives. Jackson WORKED with Lee. Maybe Jackson WOULD'T have attacked
Cemetery Hill on the night of the first; that is not so much an issue as
what he WOULD have come up with.
Stephen Haas
Steveh@worldnet.att.net
steveh7645@aol.com
From: DTCLEM@aol.com
DTCLEM@aol.com says:
I, too, think this quote is manufactured because something very similar,
"Oh
for an hour of Dundee!", at the Batle of Killecrankie Pass in the First
Jacobite Uprising in 1715.
Dennis Clemente
From: "James F. Epperson" <epperson@s10.math.uah.edu>
"James F. Epperson" <epperson@s10.math.uah.edu> says:
Yesterday being Friday, I left the office early to do some avocational
research in the library, and came across (quite by accident) an
interesting article that bears on the oft-discussed topic of Jackson and
what might have happened had he been at Gettysburg.
The article is in Civil War History, issue #2 for 1995, pp. 161-167, and
is written by Peter Carmichael: "'Oh, for the presence and inspiration
of Old Jack': A Lost Cause Plea for Stonewall Jackson at Gettysburg."
One of the more highly regarded Confederate memoirs is that by Henry Kyd
Douglas (I RODE WITH STONEWALL), and it is here that we find one of the
more compelling "we wish Jackson were here" anecdotes. According
to
Douglas, on the night of July 1st, his good friend Sandie Pendleton --
also a former staff officer to Jackson, now Ewell's chief of staff --
stated "with much feeling" the now oft-quoted line, "Oh,
for the presence
and inspiration of Old Jack for just one hour." Douglas places this
as occuring after Ewell had determined not to advance on the Federal
positions south of the town.
Essentially, Carmichael's article makes a strong case that Douglas
invented the anecdote. His case is based on a letter from Pendleton
written soon after the battle, from the Confederate positions along
Antietam Creek which they took up during the retreat/pursuit phase. The
letter is an interesting account of the battle, contains some interesting
statements which go a long way towards showing the unreliability of
eye-witness accounts (he states that Rodes and Early took the hills south
of town on July 1st, but had to retire for lack of support!), but is most
important in the way he assigns blame: No where in the letter does he
express the wish that Jackson had been present, and at its very end he
directly ascribes the blame for the defeat to General Lee.
Now it is of course possible that Pendleton said what Douglas ascribes to
him and then simply did not make a similar statement in this letter
(which appears to have been written to his mother, although there is no
salutation). However it seems doubtful that he would have stated that
the blame "must & should fall on Gen. Lee" without then saying
something
about Jackson not being there, if, in fact, he thought that Jackson's
absence was a crucial element of the Confederate defeat.
I find this very interesting, which is of course why I am posting it here.
Jim Epperson
From: Chance93@aol.com
Chance93@aol.com says:
I haven't read the "Civil War History" article Jim cited, but
his post
provides an opportunity to discuss a point often overlooked amid the emphasis
on Early's Svengali-like influence on Ewell and Trimble's lurking
presence---Robert Rodes was there too, and a very active player on July
1 (if
not on July 2!). In his report, he gave the following explanation for why
he
did not "order another attack" that first day:
"The troops, being greatly exhausted by their march and somewhat
disorganized by the hot engagement and rapid pursuit, were halted and
prepared for further action. I did not change their position materially,
nor
order another attack, for the following reasons: 1st, in the midst of the
engagement just described, the corps commander informed me, through one
of
his officers, that the general commanding did not wish a general engagement
brought on, and hence, had it been possible to do so then, I would have
stopped the attack at once; but this, of course, it was impossible to do
then; 2d, before the completion of his defeat before the town, the enemy
had
begun to establish a line of battle on the heights back of the town, and
by
the time my line was in a condition to renew the attack, he displayed quite
a
formidable line of infantry and artillery immediately in my front, extending
smartly to my right, and as far as I could see to my left, in front of Early.
To have attacked this line with my division alone, diminished as it had
been
by a loss of 2,500 men, would have been absurd. Seeing no Confederate troops
at all on my right; finding that General Early, whom I encountered in the
streets of the town within thirty minutes after its occupation by our forces,
was awaiting further instructions, and, receiving no orders to advance,
though my superiors were upon the ground, I concluded that the order not
to
bring on a general engagement was still in force, and hence placed my lines
and skirmishers in a defensive attitude, and determined to await orders
or
further movements either on the part of Early or of the troops on my right."
[OR 27 (2), p. 555]
I find the style of this passage to be strikingly similar to the explanation
given in Rodes' Chancellorsville report for why he turned corps command
over
to Stuart. I, therefore, have always felt that the wording was very
carefully considered and reviewed--and should be given more attention than
it
usually is. Is there a subtext hidden here? And if so, what and why?
A discussion of this would be most welcome. I've been pondering it for
years!
Lynn
