LITTLE ROUND TOP
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Last updated 6/7/96
Bill Cameron has submitted an Order of Battle for Little Round Top that is helpful in following this discussion.
From: Alexander Cameron
I know you are familiar with the popular account of Warren going
to Little Round Top and finding only a signal station. Warren wrote
"...so I requested the Captain of a rifle battery just in front of
Little Round Top to fire a shot into these woods. He did so, and as the
shot went whistling through the air the sound of it reached the enemies'
troops and caused every one to look in the direction of it. The motion
revealed to me the glistening of gun barrels and bayonets of the enemy's
line of battle..." He continued, "...the discovery was intensely
thrilling to my feelings and almost appalling."
John J. Pullen in THE
TWENTIETH MAINE, tells the story about like most modern authors. Pullen
wrote "Acting on a sudden inspiration, Warren sent word down to a
battery..."
So, Warren rides down to Little Round Top and sees it occupied by a
signal station. Now those folks had been down there for several hours
and had been reporting troop movement west of the station to Meade's
headquarters by flag signals on several different occasions. The
officer in charge of the station was James Hall who was Hancock's Signal
Officer. Hall had reported on two occasions, troops moving to his right
(Longstreet's countermarch) and he also had reported troops going to his
left (Law going into positioN) The messages are in the O.R. It seems
obvious to me that they would have told Warren about it. I was poking
around at MHI and found a signal corps reunion pamphlet. In it was a
description of Hall going down to LRT in the 1880's and telling his side
of the story. It is also published in J. Williard Brown's SIGNAL CORPS
U.S.A. IN THE WAR OF THE REBELLION. According to Brown, Capt. Hall had
a difficult time trying to convince Warren there were Confederate troops
opposite the position, " While the discussion was in progress the enemy
opened on the station, The first shell burst close to the station, and
the general, a moment later, was wounded in the neck. Captain Hall
then exclaimed, 'Now do you see them?' " So I guess that was the
"sudden inspiration"!
BTW, Don Stivers just completed a new painting of Capt Hall and the
other Signal Officers on Little Round Top. I had the pleasure of being
the technical advisor and got to write the narrative which goes with the
print. It was quite an experience. He just sent me a photo of the
painting and it is beautiful.
Bill
From : Dennis
Subject: Must ALL of our myths go??
I was pretty secure with the "Warren to the Rescue" scenario until Bill posts a note quoting Hall of the Signal Corps saying that that Warren had to be dragged kicking and screaming into the belief that there were rebs in them woods. And that Warren only "discovered" them when they FIRED at HIM!!! Not as the story goes when he ordered Smith to fire a round over the woods on Seminary Ridge and saw their muskets gleam in the sun as theyturned instinctively to watch the shell. Ah, what a nice story.
What do you make of this, Bill? It flies in the face of every other account that I have read. IMHO the myth is closer to reality than Hall's report.
BTW, I looked in the OR's and the messages from LRT certainly support the assertion that the Signal Corps had been observing Confederate movements. Still that does not substantiate the account by Hall that the Confederate batteries fired at Warren to get his attention. I have to agree with Harry Pfanz who admits the Waren story is romantic, yet finds no reason to disbelieve it.
Interesting post. Thanks.
Dennis
****************************
ROUND TOP MOUNTAIN SIGNAL STATION, July 2, 1863 - 11:55 a. m.
General BUTTERFIELD:
The rebels are in force, and our skirmishers give way. One mile west of Round Top signal station, the woods are full of them.
JEROME,
Lieutenant, Signal Officer.
From: alexander.cameron@smokeys.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Chamberlain's Wound/Letters
From: benedict@ns.moran.com (Benedict R Maryniak)
Subject: Warren had the rank
A general on the army commander's staff, Warren had the clout to act on his
observation of Longstreet's divisions massed to pounce on a
lightly-defended flank. He clearly wasn't the first to glimpse 14,000
Johnnies in the woods east of the Eburg Rd, fronted by several batteries.
But anyone less than a corps commander would have had to see Sickles, and,
just then, dastardly Dan was neither available nor receptive. Warren was
also in a position to realistically expect field commanders to answer his
requests for help and thereby ignore their original orders. After what that
little twit Sheridan did to him, Warren at least deserved a few statues.
From: CSVZ07A@prodigy.com TERRY MOYER
Subject: Warren on LRT
For Bill Cameron:
Before I start I want to say that I understand that you shared the note
from James Hall as an interesting perspective on the Warren and the
Confederates-in-the-woods story. You only told us what Hall wrote and
didn't put any interpretation of your own on it. So when I talk about how
believable these statements are, I am referring to Hall's opinions and not
arguing points with you as a supporter of Hall.
Your Warren vs Signal Corps story is very interesting. When I first read
what you wrote I was dismayed by it, for the same reasons Dennis talks
about in his myths letter. I thought about it for a while and then decided
that I would still like to trust in the account I am most familiar with.
General Warren's narrative of events on Round Top is well known and was
well known in the 19th century. I am not so widely read as to be
omniscient, but as far as I know, no one else who may have been present on
that day wrote anything that publicly disputed Warren's account. It is
entirely possible that a signal corpsman may not have heard Warren issue an
order to fire a round from Smith's battery into the confederate woodline.
But, I think a number of people would have noticed a shell bursting over
Warren's head, wounding him in the neck, and a surprised look appearing on
his face!
The problem is, no one CAN really know what happened in all of the
controversial moments of the fight. Guess that is why Gettysburg and the
Civil War in general is so interesting; trying to decipher the whys and
wherefores of events.
For myself, I always like to have at least two corroborating sources to
cite if I am ever brave enough to venture an opinion that something did or
did not happen at Gettysburg - and I do that only rarely! I am a neophyte
to the Civil War. I only began studying it intensively about 4 years ago
(actually, I specialize in Gettysburg). I live only 80 miles from 'the
burg' and am able to visit it frequently, and Gettysburg is what first
caught and focused my interest in the Civil War.
How does all this relate to Warren and Little Round Top? When I visit the
field with friends, and tell them about the battle, I don't like to spout
nonsense. I am very conservative in the stories I tell about the battle,
and I usually will not say anything about an aspect of the fight unless I
can back it up with good evidence. So, after reading your interesting note
about Warren on Little Round Top, I have to ask myself whether I must now
reconsider telling the story about Warren and the glistening Confederate bayonets?
For now I say no. One thing I have learned by studying Gettysburg is that
'old soldier' stories abound; details of events almost always changed over
time and the with the retelling of tales. If there is any evidence to
support Hall's version of events I would welcome seeing it. Lacking a
second source for Hall's contention, I would like to contrast a part of
your note with a quote from the Gettysburg magazine #1 (on page 39). First,
Hall's story:
I was poking around at MHI and found a signal corps reunion pamphlet. In
it was a
description of Hall going down to LRT in the 1880's and telling his side of
the story. It is also published in J. Williard Brown's SIGNAL CORPS U.S.A.
IN THE WAR OF THE REBELLION.
(note; as I read this, this is not two sources, it is the same account
published in two places?).
According to Brown, Capt. Hall had a difficult time trying to convince
Warren there were Confederate troops opposite the position, " While the
discussion was in progress the enemy opened on the station, The first
shell burst close to the station, and the general, a moment later, was
wounded in the neck. Captain Hall then exclaimed, 'Now do you see them?' "
So I guess that was the "sudden inspiration"!
This second quote is from the Roy Marcot article "Berdan's Sharpshooters at
Gettysburg", #1 pg. 35. Mr. Marcot is not a big fan of Berdan and is
attempting to show how reunion speeches after the war tend to diverge
somewhat from the strict path of truth...?
"First, it should be understood that Berdan left no wartime written record
of 'his discovery of Longstreet at Gettysburg.' In fact, it was not
mentioned until he proclaimed it in a battlefield reunion speech in the
late 1990's. Extracting key segments from these late-in-life speeches, one
could find Berdan uttering such puffery as:"
"About 11 a.m. on July 2nd, I approached General Sickles [they probably
never met that day] about sending out a reconnaissance, which was
immediately approved. I recall that I was some 300 yards ahead of my men
[pure fiction, not supported by his longstanding history of cowardice on
the battlefield] and I was mounted tso as to see over the
undergrowth...Rather than withdraw and risk losing the Round Tops [rhetoric
of an old man lusting after glory he never received in actual combat]. I
gave the command: 'Follow me, advance firing,' although outnumbered 20 to
1. [This quote was, we believe, never uttered or recorded prior to this speech!]"
I present the above quote to bolster my contention (desire, wish?) that
Hall's story may also contain elements of ... faulty recall... of events.
Finally, as my last comment on the topic I think that it has to be noted
that regardless of HOW Warren became aware of the Confederate presence in
the woods, his action to bring defenders to the threatened position is his
most important contribution to the story of the saving of Little Round Top.
(I agree with Benedict Maryniak's "Warren had the rank" letter).
By the way Bill, I am amazed by and extremely envious of the mountains of
primary material you have accumulated in your library. I am new enough to
Civil War studies that I have not had a lot of time to devote to
contemporary writers of history books. I have read the entire Time-Life
series to get an overview of the war, but my main focus has been on primary
source reading. I want to get the story first hand. My biggest obsession
with Gettysburg books right now is tied up with collecting the reports of
the various state monument commissions to Gettysburg. I have the fairly
easy to get _New York at Gettysburg_ and _Pennsylvania at Gettysburg_
reports, as well as the harder to get (but not impossible) Maine and
Michigan reports. The Maryland commissioner reports are the rarest in my
collection. I am on the look out for any of the other state commission
reports (New Jersey, Vermont, etc) and if you (or anyone else reading this)
knows someone who is willing to sell or trade one of these
books I sure would like to hear about it!
I also have two versions of Prof. Michael Jacobs _Invasion of Maryland
and Pennsylvania_ books, a Bachelder tour book, Bate's History, Millers'
Photographic History, etc. What are the favorite items in your collection?
Terry
From: alexander.cameron@smokeys.com (Alexander Cameron
Subject: Warren on LRT
For Terry Moyer
Wow! A very lucid comment on Warren and Hall. These things are very
interesting to me and I like to look at them and put them in my
Gettysburg "bag". As to whether or not I believe it is not that
important to me. If I left you with the impression that I do not
believe that Warren had Smith's battery fire a round, I did not intend
to. My "beef" with most LRT story tellers is that they do not reconize
that Warren would have getten information from the signallers. He
talked to them and even have them instructions. My opinion is that he
had Smith fire a round to verify what the singallers told him. As to
the Hall story, it probably contain some hyperbole. I'm sorry but I am
not sure I got the point on Berdan. I will go back and read what you
wrote. However, Berdan's foray was against Anderson's Division of
Hill's Corps. It was also observed by the Signal Corps but that was a
different Signal Officer. Arron Jerome (Buford's Signal Officer)
spotted them and signaled it to Butterfield at the headquarters. It is
in the OR 27,1,3.pp.488. Anyway, since you have Gettysburg Magazine,
take a look at volume 8. I have an article in it titled "The Saviors of
Little Round Top". It will do a better job of explaining my position as
to who did what to garrison the hill. I am a Warren fan but you will
see that I think that a number of people should get credit for getting
troops on the hill. I also have signal articles in 3 and 4 as well as
previously unpublished diary of a young signal sergeant I edited for
vol 10.
BTW, the "There's the devil to pay" quote that is attributed to Buford
when Reynolds came riding up is also from a signal officer. It was in a
letter and a manuscript written by Arron Jerome. Lots of folks think
that one is "bull". Again, interesting stuff.
My favorite orginal book is the regimental history of the 118 Penn.,
the Corn Exchange Regiment. My GGGrandfather's regiment. I have lots
of unpublished signal stuff. I have been very lucky to have several
folks send me stuff after they read the Gettysburg Mag. articles. I
also have several diaries. I wish I was only 80 miles from Gettysburg.
I was up there for several years (assigned to Fort Rithie MD) but am now
in Texas. Again, I enjoyed your comments.
Bill
From: alexander.cameron@smokeys.com (Alexander Cameron
Subject: Warren had the rank
For Benedict Maryniak:
Agreed! What is important is what Warren did after he discovered
Longstreet's divisions. He did not stop until he had sufficient troops
on the hill. He used his aides (3 lieutants) to go for help and when he
needed more, he went himself. One of the folks who receives little or
no credit for LRT is George Sykes. When Warren's aide, Ranald
Mackenzie, asked Sickles for help he was refused. Mackenzie then found
Sykes and Sykes is the one who sent for a brigade. That brigade ended
up being Vincent's. Warren had a lot of help.
Anyway, you are right. Warren had the rank
.
Bill
From: CSVZ07A@prodigy.com ( TERRY MOYER
Subject: Re: Warren on LRT
Bill,
I am familiar with your 'Saviours of Little Round Top' article in GB mag
#8. I enjoyed it very much. I also read the Signal Corps articles and
thought that they were heavily researched and insightful. I especially
liked the LRT article though, as it is one of those articles that kind of
'stuck out' and left an impression on me after reading it.
Great magazine, I have every issue. I am still struggling to find the
time to make it through issue #13. Anyway, the point of the Berdan quote in
my last message:
I was attempting to show that there was a precedent of 'misremembering'
details of battle action during reunion speeches. You mentioned that the
source of Hall's version of events was a reunion speech given in the 1880s
(?). Berdan's speech was also given at a reunion in the 1880s and Mr.
Marcot was implying that Berdan's speech contained many 'inaccuracies'.
I never thought of the idea that the presence of confederates on Warfield
ridge may have been well known and conveyed to Warren by the signallers. I
always mentally pictured him spotting them with the binoculars he is
holding, there on LRT :-) But as you, and I believe Bob Lawrence point out,
it makes a good deal of sense that Warren was alerted to their presence by
others. It is the neat idea that Warren thought of firing a cannon bolt
over the heads of the confederates that I would hate to give up on. What a
guy, what a great idea.
The Corn Exchange regiment is one of my favorites also (sorry if I sound
repetitious but I have a lot of 'favorites' at Gettysburg - especially
favorite monuments). I first came to recognize them by their 2d position
monument near Bigelow's first position. You've got to love that name... the
Corn Exchange Regiment. The first time you see it you think "What the heck
does that mean?" Then I read Eric Campbell's "Baptism of Fire" article
about Bigelow, where he mentions the 118th moving through the woods near
the battery, as the confederates broke through at the Peach Orchard. That
along with having seen their 2d position marker right beside Bigelow's,
made me take notice of the regiment and locked them into my mind.
One day I was hiking up the side of Big Round Top and came across a
really cool looking monument I had never seen before, mounted on a big ol'
rock. Sure enough, it's the 118th Penna. So, the regiment has 3 monuments
on the field, plus there is a genuine recruiting poster for the 118th Corn
Exchange regiment, displayed in the NPS visitor center museum. Lot's of
representation of the regiment at Gettysburg to make you take notice of
them. Do you have any of your GGGfather's C.W. memorabilia from the regiment?
I have a letter from Bigelow, it came with one of the books in my
Gettysburg collection _The Peach Orchard_ written by Bigelow. A veteran
from the 13 Mass Inf was apparently the original owner of this copy of the
book and he wrote Bigelow a letter with a question about the book, to which
Bigelow replied. Nice talking to you. Terry
From: alexander.cameron@smokeys.com (Alexander Cameron
Subject: Warren on LRT
Terry,
Good point on Berdan. I have a bad habit of jumping on the keyboard
too soon sometimes. With the program I am presently using, I can't
window back to the msg I am answering. I am going to get a real live
internet account at first of the month and I can't wait. I am email
only off a BBS right now and about to run Dennis nuts because it is
failing a lot.
On the 118th, my Great Grandfather, Fred Links, was a member of the
regiment. He was captured at Cold Harbor and survived Andersonville.
So, my wife and I found all three 118th markers. We found the on the
loop first, then the one near Trostle's, and my wife, eager to find the
third one, hiked up BRT and found it on the big ol' rock. However, she
found a black snake first and her solo monument hunting came to a
screeching halt. I have the poster but haven't framed it yet. Not sure
where I would put it. I have my walls covered with CW prints and Army
stuff.
Thanks for the comment on the LRT article. It is my favorite also.
On the issue of out of the way places, do you know the name of the
little avenue off Confederate Avenue that ends in a cul de sac with
Berdan's monuments? I can't remember it and can't find my park map.
Bill
From: ATWF68A@prodigy.com (MS EILEEN M MURPHY
Subject: Re: Gettysburg Trips/Signal Stations
FOR BILL CAMERON:
Bill,
Like Terry and Dennis, I'm also a Gettysburg Magazine fan and have
every issue published. In fact, I re-read your articles this past
weekend. Great stuff!
I enjoyed your last post about the signal station locations at
Gettysburg, too. Not in the least boring!!! Let us know when you're in
the area again so we can beg you for a signal station tour!!!
I've been doing a little signal station exploration of my own here at
Manassas. Last spring I unsuccessfully tried discover the location of
Confederate Captain E. P. Alexander's signal tower that was used in
detecting Irvin McDowell's flank march against Colonel Evans' left. Modern
day Signal Hill is now a residential area of new housing developments and
the locals don't quite know what to make of avocational historians! : - )
I may continue my search in the fall once the foliage is less of a challenge.
Just out of curiosity, what were the reasons given by Cope for denying
the request for a signal corps 'full blown statue' on the same rock
occupied by the Warren statue? (Tired of my questions, yet? : - )
Eileen Murphy
Manassas, VA
From: "David G. Clark"
Subject: Little Round Top Defences
Hello !
I have been lurking around this site for a while and enjoying it very
much indeed. I am a Civil War buff out in California, and am very
envious of you Eastern ( and Southern ) folks who can get to the
battlefields more often than I.
Last fall, my wife, son and I made our first visit to the region, and
our day at Gettysburg was especially memorable. On Little Round Top, we
evesdropped on a talk given by a Colonel Millet, a CMH holder from the
Korean War. He was addressing a group studying the life and writtings of
J.L. Chamberlain. His observations on leadership, bravery and the
hallowed ground of the Little Round Top moved all who heard him.
I have a question to put to the group, on July 2nd, we hear that the
Round Tops were unoccupied until G.Warren saw the need and basically
grabbed troops moving up and caused them to take the positions needed.
Why had the Union commanders failed to occupy such an obviously key
strong point? I read something recently that suggested that a unit had
been assigined but did not obey their orders. Can anyone shed some light
on this?
From: CSVZ07A@prodigy.com ( TERRY MOYER)
Subject: Re: Little Round Top Defences
Hi David,
I was hoping that someone else would jump into the breach to answer your
question as to why LRT was undefended by Union forces during the afternoon
of the 2d days battle. Since I have seen no postings to answer your
question, I thought I would take a stab at it.
At the close of the first day, the 1st and 11th Corps had retired south
of the town and formed a horseshoe shaped defensive line. This line
extended from the northern portion (closest to town) of Culp's Hill and
continued to the north and west, reaching the base of and continuing up the
slope of East Cemetery Hill - that area near the gatehouse that today
contains the equestrian statues of Hancock and Howard (and all those fine
cannon and lunettes).
The line then followed the contour of the Cemetery Hill bending back upon
itself as it traveled to the west and south of East Cemetery Hill. The line
passed through what is now the area of the National Cemetery and ended in
the area of Ziegler's grove, where the current day visitor center and
cyclorama building sit. This area (near the visitors center) is the
northern extremity of Cemetery Ridge.
On either flank of the infantry line just described, the two brigades of
Buford's cavalry were posted to watch for and guard against possible
Confederate attack on that quarter. The full scale retreat of the first and
eleventh corps began around 3:30-4:00pm. and the line just described was
organized as the troops arrived in the reserve position established by
General Steinwehr on East Cemetery Hill, say between 5 and 7 p.m. That was
the situation as the first elements of other corps of the Army of the
Potomac began to arrive on the field.
The importance of the round tops to the southwest, on the union left, was
recognized almost immediately. Units of the 12th Corps were the first to
arrive, at about 5 pm on July 1st. These units were hastily placed on the
flanks of the line just described. One portion of the 12th corps under
General Williams was sent to Wolf's Hill (to the right of Culp's Hill) and
the other portion under General Geary was placed on Little Round Top. These
were extended infantry positions, there were no troops between the 12th
corps on Wolf's Hill and the 1st Corps infantry on Culp's Hill. Likewise,
for a time, Geary was by himself, sitting down around the Round Tops while
the rest of the infantry line was up around the cyclorama bldg. Naturally
the cavalry was still out there, doing their job and protecting this thin
infantry line.
During the night the 3d army corps began to arrive and was placed in the
area immediately north of Little Round Top and south of Ziegler's grove. As
you can see, the Cemetery Ridge line is starting to be filled in and become
more deserving of the name of 'line' of battle. That same night the 2d
corps moved up the Taneytown road (the road just behind Cemetery Ridge) and
camped so that they were within marching distance of Gettysburg the next
day. The 5th Corps also is within marching distance and would arrive
around 10 am the next morning and go into reserve.
As July 2d dawns, General Meade evaluates his line and begins to form and
strengthen it. He gives orders for the 2 divisions of the 12th Corps to
leave their far flung positions and unite at and extend the union line
across Culp's Hill to Rock Creek. This removes Williams from Wolf's Hill
and it also gives marching orders to Geary to evacuate Little Round Top.
This Geary is reluctant to do without troops of the other corps first
occupying the position.
General Sickles, commander of the 3d corps is given the order by General
Meade to occupy the area from Little Round Top and northward to the area of
the George Weikert house. The 2d Corps will fill in the gap along Cemetery
Ridge by connecting with the left of Robinson's division of the 1st corps
in Ziegler's grove and extending down towards the Round Tops to connect
with Sickles and the 3d corps.
Meade has the Cemetery Ridge line all filled out. It connects to the
troops in the cemetery and from there to Culp's Hill, and on the left of
the cemetery it extends all the way down to Little Round Top.
Sickles (3d corps) does not like the position he has been assigned. He is
slow to occupy Round Top. Geary (12th corps) does not want to leave until
there are troops to occupy the position, but eventually he has no choice
but to abandon the position in obedience to orders.
Sickles sends to Meade for clarification of his orders regarding the
position that his corps is to assume. After a morning of foot dragging
Sickles decides that he likes a small ridgeline surmounted by a peach
orchard, in his immediate front, to the position that Meade has assigned
him. Sickles convinces himself that a loose interpretation of Meade's
orders permits him to occupy the ridgeline about a 1/2 a mile in front of
the rest of the Army of the Potomac and he marches his entire Corps out to
that ridgeline. Sickles bends his line at the Peach Orchard and tries to
stretch it in the direction of the round tops, but there are just not
enough men in the corps to reach, and his line stops on top of Devil's Den.
The rest, as they say, is history.
By the way, here is an excerpt of Gearys report from the O.R.s:
"...not finding General Howard, I reported to Major-General Hancock,
commanding Second Corps, who informed me that the right could maintain
itself, and the immediate need of a division on the left was imperative.
By his direction, upon this threatening emergency, I took up a position
on the extreme left of the line of battle, as the enemy was reported to be
attempting to flank it, and cavalry were already skirmishing in front of
that position. At 5 p. m. this movement was consummated, and my line
extended at that time from about half a mile west of the Baltimore turnpike
to the left of the First Army Corps, to a range of hills south and west of
the town, which I occupied with two regiments of the First Brigade. These
hills I regarded as of the utmost importance, since their possession by
the enemy would give him an opportunity of enfilading our entire left wing
and center with a fire which could not fail to dislodge us from our
position. This line was held by the Fi
rst and Third Brigades. The Second Brigade, with two pieces of Battery K,
Fifth U. S. Artillery, pursuant to orders from Major-General Slocum,
was detached during the march to take position in reserve in the immediate
left of the turnpike, about 2 miles from Gettysburg. No attack was made
upon me at either point, the speedy formation of the line on the left
frustrating the enemy`s design, which would, if successful, have proved
disastrous to the entire position. The command rested on their arms during
the night. At 5 a. m. on the 2d, having been relieved by the Third Army
Corps, in obedience to orders from Major-General Slocum, the division was
placed on the right of the center of the main line of battle, east of the turnpike."
... [Culp's Hill] ... hope this answers your question.
Terry Moyer
From: FrankAnton@aol.com
Subject: LRT Battle:When did it end?
I attended a seminar on Little Round Top last spring. One aspect I didn't get
clarity around was when the battle actually ended that day. The movie and
Chamberlain's own writing infers that the battle ended with his daring charge
which occured around 6:30PM that July 2nd. It did conclude the battle on the
southern part of LRT, but apparently Gen Crawford on the northern slope of
LRT lead some PA reserves in a charge down the hill toward the wheatfield
trees just before sunset which would have been nearer to sunset or 8:30 -
9:00 PM, but JLC's charge occurred around 6:30 PM. So fighting around LRT
was still going on after JLC's charge, but I don't know the intensity. Little
Round Top is deceivingly small, but each side of the hill apparently has its
own story to tell.
Can anyone comment on the timing and the withdrawl of confederates July 2nd,
1863? I haven't found much on Crawford's Charge either.
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Frank,
Crawford's attack continued until dark according to O.O. Norton, [ADLRT,
p. 249]. This would have been about 8:25 p.m. [Wright, James R., "Time on
Little Round Top", GBM 2]. Here is a rundown on times from Wright's article:
- 5:45 Confederates scaled west face of LRT and hit right of Vincent's line.
Colonel Vincent was hit. 140th New York took position on right of line.
Rice assumed command.
- 6:00 Attack extended to the left. 20th Maine engaged.
- 6:15 Left wing of the 20th Maine engaged.
- 6:45 Chamberlain ordered the charge to wheel forward and to the right.
- 7:00 The Confederates had been swept from the front and fighting had
diminished to long range fire.
- 7:29 The sun dips to South Mountain and dusk begins.
- 8:00 Detachments were sent out in front of Vincent's Brigade to gather arms
and the wounded.
- 8:25 The area is in total darkness.
Bill
From: lawrence (Dennis Lawrence)
One thing the above article "Time on Little Round Top" did for me was to
answer a nagging question about what time it realy was "back then."
"All times cited are standard time, not our present daylight savings
time. One hous should be added to cited times to represent the daylight
savings time familiar to us." Page 51, GBM 2
If after a hard day of battle field stomping you want to relax at LRT
when the shadows are the same as July 2, 1863, showtime is about 6:00 P.M..
Houck's Ridge is a nice place for cocktail hour above the natural
ampitheater of the Valley of Death.
Dennis
From: ENordfors@aol.com
Greetings Bill...
Yes I agree with all corrections to my post on LRT.... I will make certain
to type slower and think harder....lesson well learned ....perhaps the biggest
lesson learned was that indeed one will never know the impact of an alternative
action unless it happens...in most any situation!
I do have one area that I have always found hard to envision....was LRT
a tactical anchor? My impression was that it seemed like it would be most
easily cleaved away and beat back if that would be how it would be played
out...but indeed you are right we will never know the impact on decisions
made and actions followed...makes one think doesn't it!! Actually I have
been sitting here for 20 minutes thinking of several scenarios and the ramifications
to such possibilities....Boy one could go crazy trying to alter the past
on paper (keyboard )
Thank you very much...
All the Best for a Safe and Healthy New Year..
Ed....
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Hi Ed. I've been having email problems and I got 98 messages tonight. If
you don't hear from me for a while, I've got problems again. I'll address
your points.
>Greetings All:
>Al is probably tired of discussing this point, however, facts do bear
>going over.
>Oh before I start this is not a Mainer defending JLC, rather, a Mainer
in
>search of the truth.
>LRTs flank attack lasted approx 90 minutes...occurred around 5pm (correct
>if wrong)..approx 3 hrs to dark from the beginning of the engagement.
Who
>would know went it ended as the retreat and round-up took a good deal
of
>time...
The 20th Maine became engaged about 6 p.m. and the fight continued until
about 7 p.m. However, times are very tough to nail down here.
>Facts: not one Commander on LRT above the rank of Captian
remainded unharmed..
>20th ME, 140th NY, 44th NY, and 83rd Penn...all had in the wave type
>motion taken heavy hits...the 16th Michigan had retreated 300 yards
and at
>the apex of the fight I think (opinion and pls argue if you like)
Yes, they were pretty beat up. I would have to check on the issue that no
one above the grade of Capt. remained unharmed. How about Rice, Spear, Elliot?
You may be right here but I don't think so. Glad to see you no longer have
the 16th Michigan resting! hehe
>Col Rice was more in charge of the whole Brigade...no slant
to Woodward ...
>and thus is argued that the state of LRT et al was worse than it should
>have been given the physical landscape and the numbers...
Yes, command had devolved to Rice. Not sure of your point here.
>Lets not forget the 20th Me Co B and the 2nd US Sharpshooters...behind
the
>wall with few casualities...
Yes, but pretty much out of the fight until Oates fell back
>Now the reality of the situation...the 47th Ala took extremely
heavy loses
>in its first assault...there is no question that BOTH the 47th and 15th
>Ala fighters were fighting under incredable conditions...tired, no water,
>low on ammunition, heavy loses, and very low moral...I have no doubts
that
>Oates right could have broken the 20th Me left...but what impact...not
to
>repeat my old post but what impact would it have had...depleted 15th
>ranks...would some argue that support could have come from 44th or 48th
>Ala..or 4th Ala...Law's Brigade as a whole had been hard hit...2nd US
>sharpshooters did the better part of the Brigade no help in harrassing
them..
>What of the Texans..could they have come up?? I do not know the condition
>of the 4th and 5th Texan units but do not read that help could have
been
>significant from them...thus we are left with a broken Corp defending
a
>broken agressor....
Ed, it is very hard to say what would have happened if the 20th had given
way. I would like to see your references as to low morale. It is true that
Oates had not "watered" his men but a lot of that stuff was written
by Oates to "explain" why he fell back. If Chamberlain had fallen
back it is entirely possible the Confederates would have swept the hill.
I don't think they would have been in any condition to exploit that success
but I think it is very possible they could have held LRT until nightfall.
The Texans had made numerous courageous attacks on Vincent's center and
right. If they had seen Oates roll up the 20th and 83rd, they might well
have attacked again. It's really hard to say but LRT would be difficult
to defend with Oates rolling up the flank. yes they were tired but success
breeds energy.
>My original post stating I thought LRT of little Militiary
significance is
>still intact....
Ed, please listen carefully here. It doesn't make a hoot whether or not
you or I think it had "Military significance", the point I am
making is that Meade thought that it did. That is a hard, fast, cold fact.
I don't think Meade would have just set there and waited for the Confederates
to make the next move. He thought it was key to success and he might have
fallen back or he might have tried to retake the hill. Regardless, it would
have influnced the battle.
>with Hazlett's guns in place and able to engage at night
You most know something about Civil War artillery employment that I don't.
>and Weed with reserves (which unit(s) I can not recall)
I do not think
>once flanked the left could have been held adequately...emotionally
yes it
>opens a lot of possibilities...but practically I do not see it...
Again, the issue here is what Sykes would have done in the little time he
had before total darkness. There were a few dusk attacks at Gettysburg but
they all petered out as total darkness fell. If Oates had taken the hill,
it would have been very late. My opinion is that it would not have been
retaken on the 2nd.
>If anyone disagrees then fire away...help me develop sound
opinions and
>ideas based on facts...
It is a fact that Meade thought that the position was key. What he would
have done about it is speculation. He could have decided to fall back to
Pipe Creek but I tend to think he would have tried to retake the position
on the morning of the 3rd.
>I just do not see LRT as a possibility to
>Longstreet and calling any advance null...certainly it would have given
>Lee/Longstreet more options...but would they have been tangible...I
was
>trying to picture 6 to 8 guns on LRT in suppost of Picketts march...
Again, if Law had taken the hill, I don't think there would have been a
"Picketts march"
>I have been duely corrected to a figure of 2 guns only being
able to be placed
>there...
Yes, that came from the battery commander (only two guns were effective
in firing upon Pickett's Charge).
>with Meade pushing as you can only think he would have...5th
Corp
>and all...I see little realistic hope for a success at LRT...
Sorry for repeating myself, but the issue here is whether of not Sykes could
have organized an attack to retake LRT on the 2nd. It's possible but I don't
think he would have.
>I stand ready to debate in the spirit of getting Bill's
Blood pressure up
>...hi Bill...
Ole Bill's blood pressure is just fine. Let me restate my position. I think
that if Oates had been successful, it may well have changed the outcome
of the battle because it would have changed the order of things.
>Ed.... Fire away...
Ed, make sure you get your driveway cleared in the morning. For me, I think
I'll wear a short sleeve shirt in the morning. Texas. I love it!
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Doug wrote:
>An interesting argument Bill, and one I think quite plausible.
If Laws had held LRT at nightfall, and Longstreet had been able to throw
Pickett in on the Union left, do you think it at all possible that Meade,
even if he had attacked, could have re-taken it?
>I also wonder if perhaps Meade, believing LRT to be so key, and seeing
the drubbing Sickles Corps took, wouldn't have decided that a withdrawal
wasn't the appropriate course of action on the night of July 2nd. After
all, the AOP would have been essentially flanked, and from Meade's perspective,
at least, threatened with destruction the next morning. Thoughts?
>Doug Miller
>The Reser Miller Group, Inc.
>http://www.rmgi.com/
Doug, Sorry I didn't get to this quicker. It came in last night with 97
other messages and I just went to bed!
>If Laws had held LRT at nightfall, and Longstreet had been
able to throw Pickett in >on the Union left, do you think it at all possible
that Meade, even if he had attacked,
>could have re-taken it?
Yes, I think they could have retaken it the next morning but there would
have been a hell of a fight both on LRT and on the line across Plum Run
Valley. Meade had a lot of resources that he could have brought to bear.
However I think it would have been a pretty general fight on the Union left.
However, it is possible that the Confederates could have held it. It's just
hard to say.
>I also wonder if perhaps Meade, believing LRT to be so key,
and seeing the drubbing >course of action on the night of July 2nd. After
all, the AOP would have been
>essentially flanked, and from Meade's perspective, at least, threatened
with
>destruction the next morning. Thoughts?
This is even more difficult to call. It has to be based on your opinion
of Meade. Mine is quite high and I tend to think he would have attacked.
It is possible he would have fallen back to Pipe Creek but I don't think
so. If you read Gibbons account of the Council of War on the 2nd (B&L)
and try to imagine what would have happened if they had lost Little Round
Top, I think Meade would have had several Corps Commanders urging him to
retake it. I am also influnced by Meade's testimony before congress. But
again, he might have taken the conservative approach (many think he was
overly conserative anyway) and moved his army.
Sorry for the delay.
Bill
From: Doug Miller
On Monday, January 08, 1996 12:53 PM, Alexander Cameron[SMTP:acameron@tcac.com]
wrote:
> My opinion is that if the 20th had given away, Law would
have seized the
>hill and held it until morning. I think there would have been a fight
on
>the Union left on the morning of the 3rd. It also believe that it would
>have changed the battle. Lee and Longstreet might have not suffered
quite
>the losses they did with Pickett's Charge and other options would have
been
>available.
An interesting argument Bill, and one I think quite plausible. If Laws had
held LRT at nightfall, and Longstreet had been able to throw Pickett in
on the Union left, do you think it at all possible that Meade, even if he
had attacked, could have re-taken it?
I also wonder if perhaps Meade, believing LRT to be so key, and seeing the
drubbing Sickles Corps took, wouldn't have decided that a withdrawal wasn't
the appropriate course of action on the night of July 2nd. After all, the
AOP would have been essentially flanked, and from Meade's perspective, at
least, threatened with destruction the next morning. Thoughts?
Doug Miller The Reser Miller Group, Inc.
http://www.rmgi.com/
From: bennettb@sgenva.cc.geneseo.edu (Brian Bennett)
I am a recent enlistee, having lurked on the archives page for some time.
Little Round Top and the 140th N.Y. are my main areas of interest and research.
In reading the archived discussions of LRT, I have to admit disappointment
(bias on) on the lack of discussion in regards to what people other than
JC did on Little Round Top. (bias off)
I have noticed several references in the debate to James Wright's "Time
on Little Round Top" in Issue 2 of the Gettysburg Magazine. I fully
understand that any timetable has its limitations as to precision, but there
is one guesstimate that I have always been puzzled by and would certainly
welcome comments on. That is the timing of the 20th Maine's defense and
the 140th's reinforcement of Vincent's left.
Wright gives the time of the 140th's arrival on LRT as 5:45; the 20th Maine
engaged at 6:00 and the famous bayonet charge/right wheel at 6:45. Wright
does not include his estimation of when the rest of Weed's Brigade (146th
NY, 91st PA, 155th PA) arrived on LRT, but it was certainly no later than
15-20 minutes after the 140th was engaged.
The rest of Weed's brigade was only lightly engaged (146th: 28 casualties;
91st: 19 casualties; 155th: 19 casualties), many caused by the same sniper
fire from the Houck's Ridge/Devil's Den area that killed Weed and Hazlett.
So basically there were three fresh regiments on Little Round Top, some
(according to the Wright timetable) 20-25 minutes before the 20th Maine
was down to its last cartridges.
The reason that I have a problem with this part of the timetable is because
I find it hard to believe that for that long a period of time no one thought
to use any of those three regiments to reinforce Chamberlain. The fighting
on the right of Vincent's brigade pretty much ended upon the charge and
deployment of the 140th and probably would have slowed down the line from
that point toward Chamberlain. This would mean that while Chamberlain was
desperately fighting to hold the left ("you understand, you are the
left of the entire army") there were three relatively unused regiments
from Weed's brigades holding the western slope, but against no visible enemy.
Despite the chaos (I know the line from Chamberlain's sergeant in "Gettysburg:"
"Vincent's hit, Weed's hit, Hazlett's hit" - basically everyone's
dead and no one knows we're here) I have trouble thinking that no one would
have checked on the status of the 20th Maine and moved reinforcements (if
they were indeed on hand) to that point. (That raises another interesting
questions for a Chamberlain afficianado -- did he request help or reinforcements
from anyone other than the 83rd Pa.?)
My thinking on the matter is that the deployment of the 140th and the bayonet
charge happened closer together, perhaps no longer than 15 minutes apart.
Pfanz mentions no particular timetable, but suggests this; he also notes
that the flank attacks on both ends of Vincent's line happens in the third
Confederate assault. After butting their heads against Vincent's center,
they finally tried to overlap the flanks.
On a related note: over the past two years I have worked with a Rochester
artist who was commissioned by the Col. Patrick Henry O'Rorke Memorial Society
to paint a scene featuring O'Rorke and the 140th on LRT. If anyone is interested
in any information on the prints, feel free to contact me via e-mail.
Brian Bennett
bennettb@sgenva.cc.geneseo.edu
From: Scott_Hartwig@NPS.gov (Scott Hartwig)
A few things we know for (fairly) certain. The 20th Maine's fight with the
15th Alabama started (and thus ended) some time after the fight on the right
of Vincent's brigade (incl. the 140th NY). For themost part, our modern
concept of time is irrelevant in the discussion. The best we can do is try
to place one event before another with a reasoned estimate of time in between
the two events.
Ponder this: Col. Oates stated that he came to on top of BRT on July 2,
and started down the far side of the hill just as darkness fell. This would
have been within one half hour of the last shot between his regiment and
the 20th on LRT.
It got dark on the southern side of BRT this past July 2 at approximately
9:15pm. This means the fight ended at appx. 8:45pm. By most realistic guessing,
then, you would have to be on LRT at about 7:15pm (today) to be there at
the same "time" the fight began in 1863.
Tom Desjardin
GNMP
From: Scott_Hartwig@NPS.gov (Scott Hartwig)
There are some key flaws in a lot of people's logical reasoning regarding
the seizure and holding of LRT by the forces of Law and Robertson on July
2 and subsequent effects thereof.
1) By the time the exhausted forces of Hood's division could have reached
the summit of LRT more than three brigades of infantry were within a few
hundred yards of the summitt (Fisher, Weed, Vincent) and 16,000 men of the
6th Corps were exactly 1/4 mile away. No one has sufficiently explained
how less than 2,000 fought out Texans and Alabamians could have withstood
those odds.
and...
2) Even if they had...the most artillery that can be placed on LRT facing
the Union line as it appeared on July 3 (even in the best conditions) is
8 guns. Hardly enough to "destroy" the Union army since the 140
guns applied at the Union center on July 3 were not successful at it.
A lot has been made of Meade's statement to the Committee on Conduct in
1864 when he stated that had the CSA held LRT on July 3 he would have left
the field. Most who use this statement in support of various arguments fail
to recognize that he would have first tried to take it back.
Also, in the most ideal conditions - which never occur during battles -
BRT can hold maybe 6-8 guns. Remember, a field artillery piece needs about
a 15 ft. x 15 ft. square flat platform to function effectively.
Tom Desjardin
GNMP
From: lawrence@appsmiths.com (Robert W Lawrence)
On Thu, 18 Jan 1996 09:00:28 -0500, you wrote:
> There are some key flaws in a lot of people's logical reasoning
> regarding the seizure and holding of LRT by the forces of Law and
> Robertson on July 2 and subsequent effects thereof.
>1) By the time the exhausted forces of Hood's division could have
> reached the summit of LRT more than three brigades of infantry
> were within a few hundred yards of the summitt (Fisher, Weed,
> Vincent) and 16,000 men of the 6th Corps were exactly 1/4 mile
> away. No one has sufficiently explained how less than 2,000 fought
> out Texans and Alabamians could have withstood those odds.
However that assumes that Meade KNEW there were only 2,00 men defending
that hill. If Oates has overun LRT Meade would have been faced with a night
attack over unfamiliar terrain, uphill, and against a force of indeterminate
strength. It does seem probable he would order an attack to take a hill
he left ungarrisoned for most of the day. Given these circumstances he could
very well have waited until morning so as to reconnoiter the position.
By morning the south could have had a line anchored on one end on LRT, up
through the peach orchard and down seminary ridge anchoring to the north
on oak Hill. by reckoning that's a preety good line.
Robert W Lawrence
lawrence@arthes.com
From: Dave Navarre 73613.1150@compuserve.com
From: Robert W Lawrence, INTERNET:lawrence@appsmiths.com
"By morning the south could have had a line anchored on
one end on LRT, up through the peach orchard and down seminary ridge anchoring
to the north on oak Hill. by reckoning that's a preety good line."
-- Certainly would have been in Sickles' eyes.
From: DPowell334@aol.com
In a message dated 96-01-18 14:41:01 EST, Bob wrote:
>By morning the south could have had a line anchored on one
end on LRT, up
>through the peach orchard and down seminary ridge anchoring to the north
on
>Oak Hill. By reckoning that's a preety good line.
Except for one small problem - the open flank around the south of BRT. A
morning attack on the 3rd by part of 6th Corps, say, could create a serious
flank situation.
The problem with holding that long a line would be troops. Now Lee is really
extended, in effect trying to defend a line that's almost a complete circle
around Meade's interior position. In terms of military Geography, that's
a nightmare.
Dave Powell
From: lawrence@tyrell.net (Dennis Lawrence)
>In a message dated 96-01-18 14:41:01 EST, Bob wrote:
>>By morning the south could have had a line anchored on one end on
LRT, up
>>through the peach orchard and down seminary ridge anchoring to the
north on
>>Oak Hill. By reckoning that's a preety good line.
Dave Powell replied.....
>Except for one small problem - the open flank around the south of BRT.
A
>morning attack on the 3rd by part of 6th Corps, say, could create a
serious
>flank situation.
>The problem with holding that long a line would be troops. Now Lee is
really
>extended, in effect trying to defend a line that's almost a complete
circle
>around Meade's interior position. In terms of military Geography, that's
a
>nightmare.
>Dave Powell
Actually, except for the few hundred yards that Lee's line would have extended
up LRT from Devil's Den in Brother Bob's scenario - this WAS Lee's line
the morning of July 3. Robinson and Law at the base of BRT could have anchored
the line on LRT without extending the line any further than it was.
Now, would it have made any difference? I agree the 6th corps would not
have sat idly by and watched this deployment on the second day. Had the
situation been this at dawn of July 3, I believe Meade would have also attacked
to secure this flank just as he attacked at Culp's Hill at dawn to secure
that flank. Interior lines play hell on extended lines like Lee's.
Dennis
From: ENordfors@aol.com
Greetings Tom...
Been a few months since the wife, the kids, and I took a walk with you on
a hot, hot July Thursday (I believe) afternoon this past summer...the place...you
know... My wife...that pesty UMO grad that only got interested in the place
when she found out you had just left Orono a month or two previous to our
encounter ....
But alas to Business...
I will not detain you with details of failed attempts at stating it would
not have been Militiarily significant if Oates had been successful at breaking
the 20th ME...my day will come and I am patient......and Bill is much
more than a superior debator...
I would ask if you would elaborate on the condition of the 15th Ala unit
just before their final charge....and likewise the probability of re-inforcement
from either the 47th Ala or the Texas units...or for that matter any unit
Longstreet ultimately might have sent had he learned of a flanking being
successful...(yes Longstreet not Lee or Law)....
Thank you very much for your time..
Congratulations on your fine book, it does you credit!
Ed...
PS. Bill...I mention your name out of total respect for your patience at
pointing out flaws in my theories or statements....and the tremendous help
you have been to me overall.
From: ENordfors@aol.com
In a message dated 96-01-18 14:41:01 EST, Bob wrote:
>However that assumes that Meade KNEW there were only 2,00
men defending that
>hill. If Oates has overun LRT Meade would have been faced with a night
attack
>over unfamiliar terrain, uphill, and against a force of indeterminate
>strength. It does seem probable he would order an attack to take a hill
he left
>ungarrisoned for most of the day. Given these circumstances he could
very
>well have waited until morning so as to reconnoiter the position.
>By morning the south could have had a line anchored on one end on LRT,
up
>through the peach orchard and down seminary ridge anchoring to the north
on
>Oak Hill. by reckoning that's a preety good line.
Bob... I understand this all sounds logical but I do not agree given the
time frame...if LRT was taken it most assurdedly would have been accomplished
by nightfall...reinforcing LRT in the dark would have been no easy task...considering
LRT is still not the summit then in effect Longstreets Corp would still
not have possession of the high ground....Meade would have responded....of
this I have no doubt...and even if (unlikely but night time engagements
were ineffective at best) Meade waited until dawn...with the amount of men
he had on the summit and Hazlett's guns...LRT would not have held long...
I really hate to beat my dead horse but these Alabamians were in really
rough shape... by dawn they would still would have been to heavily engaged
to be at 100%. Of course a lot of this discuss neglects the 20th ME Co B
and the 2nd US Sharpshooters whom had been harassing the Texans and Alabamians
all day July 2nd. with very little loss to themselves....and fortified behind
a very nice stone wall (UNLIKE the 20th ME JLC walked behind) with a front
row view of LRT.. --slight assumption on my part that they would not have
moved if the 20th ME had caved--unless it was to flank the 15th Ala. and
this I assure you would have been extremely hazzardous to these beleagered
soldiers....
Bob I invite rebuttal on this point. As I have said to Bill C. I can only
learn from counter-points...and yes I am being rather stubborn about this
issue...ayuh!!
Best....
Ed..
From: lawrence@appsmiths.com (Robert W Lawrence)
On Fri, 19 Jan 1996 10:43:51 -0500, ENordfors@aol.com wrote:
>Bob...
>I understand this all sounds logical but I do not agree given the time
>frame...if LRT was taken it most assurdedly would have been accomplished
by >nightfall...reinforcing LRT in the dark would have been no easy
>task...considering LRT is still not the summit then
>in effect Longstreets Corp would still not have possession of the high
>ground....Meade would have responded....of this I have no doubt...and
even if
>(unlikely but night time engagements were ineffective at best) Meade
waited
>until dawn...with the amount of men he had on the summit and Hazlett's
>guns...LRT would not have held long...
It would have been a lot easier to to reinforce LRT after dark than it would
have been to attack it. If you look at the pictures taken of LRT right after
the battle you will see breastworks and fortification all over it-most put
up the night of July 2. It would seem reasonable to assume that was the
ANV in control of that hill that similar fortifications could have been
built and adequate troops placed on it. As far as the condition of Oates
men we of course know they were in sad shape BUT Meade did not. All he would
know is that the hill had been overrun by an indeterminate force and was
being fortified. i don't think he would have attacked at night and by morning
its a whole different ballgame.
>I really hate to beat my dead horse but these Alabamians
were in really rough
>shape... by dawn they would still would have been to heavily engaged
to be at 100%.
> Of course a lot of this discuss neglects the 20th ME Co B and the 2nd
US
>Sharpshooters whom had been harassing the Texans and Alabamians all
day July
>2nd. with very little loss to themselves....and fortified behind a very
nice
>stone wall with a front row view
of
>LRT..
>--slight assumption on my part that they would not have moved if the
20th ME
>had caved--unless it was to flank the 15th Ala. and this I assure you
would
>have been extremely hazardous to these beleagered soldiers....
>Bob I invite rebuttal on this point. As I have said to Bill C. I can
only
>learn from counter-points...and yes I am being rather stubborn about
this
>issue...ayuh!!
>Best.... >Ed..
Robert W Lawrence
lawrence@arthes.com
From: bennettb@sgenva.cc.geneseo.edu (Brian Bennett)
One thing to consider in the scenario of the Federals having to attack LRT
in an effort to retake it is that the Confederates would not have taken
Vincent's position. They would have had to deploy across the northern slope
of the hill, which did not have the spur that allowed Vincent to post a
reasonably straight brigade front on the southern slope. A curved Confederate
line on LRT would not allow for any converging fire and as with the Federals,
artillery would not be brought to bear on attacking troops.
From: bennettb@sgenva.cc.geneseo.edu (Brian Bennett)
>One thing to consider in the scenario of the Federals having
to
>attack LRT in an effort to retake it is that the Confederates would
not
>have taken Vincent's position.
In re-reading this as it was posted, it is confusing. I meant to say that
the Confederates would not have occupied the position that Vincent's brigade
did. Any Federal attack would most likely have come from the north, so the
Confederates would have had to find a defensible position on that slope
of LRT.
Brian
From: Scott_Hartwig@nps.gov (Scott Hartwig)
>In a message dated 96-01-18 14:41:01 EST, Bob wrote:
>>By morning the south could have had a line anchored on one end on
LRT, up
>>through the peach orchard and down seminary ridge anchoring to the
north on
>>Oak Hill. By reckoning that's a pretty good line.
Dave Powell replied.....
>Except for one small problem - the open flank around the
south of BRT. A
>morning attack on the 3rd by part of 6th Corps, say, could create a
serious
>flank situation.
>The problem with holding that long a line would be troops. Now Lee is
really
>extended, in effect trying to defend a line that's almost a complete
circle
>around Meade's interior position. In terms of military Geography, that's
a
>nightmare.
>Dave Powell
Actually, except for the few hundred yards that Lee's line would have extended
up LRT from Devil's Den in Brother Bob's scenario - this WAS Lee's line
the morning of July 3. Robinson and Law at the base of BRT could have anchored
the line on LRT without extending the line any further than it was.
Now, would it have made any difference? I agree the 6th corps would not
have sat idly by and watched this deployment on the second day. Had the
situation been this at dawn of July 3, I believe Meade would have also attacked
to secure this flank just as he attacked at Culp's Hill at dawn to secure
that flank. Interior lines play hell on extended lines like Lee's.
Dennis
From: Scott_Hartwig@NPS.gov (Scott Hartwig)
I'm afraid we cannot discuss this matter "on-site" today without
a canoe. Plum Run Valley is currently under 3 feet of water. With the cold
coming however, we could skate the area tommorrow.
Without pursuing a long discussion on "what if's" which always
seem to lead to a point without conclusions, let me, as briefly as possible,
offer an example of what was happening on LRT while the 20th Maine was charging
down Vincent Spur.
PLEASE keep in mind that I mean no offense and DO NOT want to appear contentious
or as a "know-it-all" -- I just wanted to pass on a perspective
that one gains having studied here for a year. The thirst for knowledge
in the group is wonderful and I just wanted to help quench it a small bit.
- Oates was nearly unconscious. He collapsed from heat stroke
during his retreat, and his brother and best friend had just been horrifically
killed in front of him. His men had marched 30 miles, climbed and descended
a mountain, and then fought uphill for at least 60 minutes...to no avail.
-The nearest regiment to him was the 4th Alabama, 200 yards away. The 47th
Alabama (all 154 of them) fought for five minutes and left the field. The
4th was so exhausted when it reached the fight that it virtually disintegrated
at the foot of LRT, with men lodging themselves behind shelter making nothing
resembling an attack.
-Command and control was non-existent in Hood's Division by then. It took
45 minutes for Hood's aides just to find Law and tell him he had to take
over the division and Law was no more than several hundred yards away.
- Two regiments of Law's brigade never really got passed Devil's Den. The
44th absolutely never reached the Valley of Death, and the 48th barely did
and very late.
- Here is a very revealing quote from Confederate Veteran magazine: (by
John Purifoy, Montgomery, AL)
[Bracketted text is mine]
[QUOTE]The greater part of the last reenforcements enumerated made their
appearance on the crest of the hill. The sight of such long lines of solid
blue masses which appeared to the Confederates as they cleared the woods
and scanned the opposite slopes [LRT] tended to paralyze their advance [from
Wheatfield to LRT]. Thirteen fresh brigades were in position before them,
besides the remnants of thirteen brigades which had been driven back. About
seventy-five pieces of artillery were in action supporting this huge mass
of soldiery. Brig. Gen. E.P. Alexander [who witnessed it] very aptly says:
"To this day there survive stories showing how the Confederates were
impressed by this tremendous display. One, still told by the guides at Gettysburg,
is that a cry was heard in the Confederate ranks, 'Have we got all creation
to whip?' And another is that the Federal commander was heard to give his
orders; 'Attention, Universe! Nations into line! By kingdoms! Right Wheel!'"
[END QUOTE]
-If Alexander and Purifoy have not completely invented these circumstances
(which are admittedly laced with 19th cent. hyperbole) then Crawford's Division
charged down the face of LRT with a huge force and, presumably, in daylight.
Since Oates remembered fighting until nearly dark, then the northern half
of LRT was firmly secured by "Nations and Kingdoms" at about the
time the 20th charged - if not slightly before.
Since these men easily threw back parts of four brigades (Anderson, Semmes,
Wofford, and Kershaw) there is certainly a good argument that they could
have thrown back what was left of Oates' regiment (barely 250 men) and the
4th and 5th Texas.
In a very tightly crammed nutshell, that is the gist of what I know of the
fight. It has been remarkably mythologized (which is fascinating in itself)
and, as you may have guessed by now, will be the subject of a book in the
reasonably far-off future.
From: lawrence@appsmiths.com (Robert W Lawrence)
On Fri, 19 Jan 1996 13:48:15 -0500, you wrote:
> I'm afraid we cannot discuss this matter "on-site"
today without
> a canoe. Plum Run Valley is currently under 3 feet of water. With
> the cold coming however, we could skate the area tommorrow.
>Without pursuing a long discussion on "what if's" which always
> seem to lead to a point without conclusions, let me, as briefly as
> possible, offer an example of what was happening on LRT while the
> 20th Maine was charging down Vincent Spur.
> PLEASE keep in mind that I mean no offense and DO NOT want to
> appear contentious or as a "know-it-all" -- I just wanted
to pass
> on a perspective that one gains having studied here for a year.
> The thirst for knowledge in the group is wonderful and I just
> wanted to help quench it a small bit.
Scott_I think you make a good case that the AoP could havetaken LRT backback
if it had been overrun but the question is would they have attacked? Did
Meade know the condition of Oates men. Did he know that they were no troops
in reserve to quickly garrison it? in hindsight we know this to be the case
but unless Meade knew it would he be willing to launch a night attack? .
I think there is a good chance he would have taken the safe course and waited
until morning.
Of course as Big Brother is fond of saying"twer ifs and buts candy
and nuts we'd all have a merry christmas"(or something like that ):)
Robert W Lawrence l
awrence@arthes.com
From: DPowell334@aol.com
In a message dated 96-01-19 18:58:00 EST,Scott Hartwig wrote:
> -If Alexander and Purifoy have not completely invented
these
> circumstances (which are admittedly laced with 19th cent.
> hyperbole) then Crawford's Division charged down the face of LRT
> with a huge force and, presumably, in daylight. Since Oates
> remembered fighting until nearly dark, then the northern half of
> LRT was firmly secured by "Nations and Kingdoms" at about
the time
> the 20th charged - if not slightly before.
Excellent post, Scott.
Also, what about the elements of 6th Corps that were moving up behind Crawford?
3rd Division, 6th Corps, took some losses in this area shortly after Crawford's
advance, skirmishing with the Rebels on the other side of the valley, and
Wright's first Division was also brought forward to act as reserve. Given
Purifoy's quote (I'll have to remember that series of unique commands: Nations
by right wheel into line indeed!) certainly at least some of 8,000 troops
were visible behind the regulars.
Dave Powell
From: bennettb@sgenva.cc.geneseo.edu (Brian Bennett)
Ed N. challenged me to my opinion on his "what if" the Confederates
were successful in their attacks on Little Round Top. I did not ignore your
request to state a position, but as I can only access this at work, I could
not reply until now. To me there are a number of issues that overlap this
"what if" thread and the "Time on LRT" thread. While
Ed wants to jump right to a scenario where the Confederates have the hill,
I think it needs to be determined when the hill was at its most vulnerable
point. The earlier the hill was taken, the better the chances for further
Confederate success. We tend to focus on what if the 20th Maine gave way,
but in all actuality because of the number of troops nearby, time of day
and condition of the Confederates, that was probably the time when LRT was
least vulnerable. Driving off the 20th Maine may not have led the capture
of LRT -- the Confederates were in no position to consolidate the gain because:
1) exhaustion 2) lack of ammunition 3) lack of available support due to
the distance necessary to reach Oates' position 4) and if (as the Time of
LRT thread strongly suggests) Weed's full brigade was already on the hill,
Oates' force would have had to deal with three fresh Union regiments.
LRT was most vulnerable when unoccupied (that's an easy one) and when the
16th Michigan began to crumble. Why?: the Confederates were in better shape
physically and in terms of ammunition, there were less Union forces in the
area to stem any breakthrough and a Confederate success on the western slope
of the hill would be easier to reinforce and/or link with the existing Confederate
line (Houck's Ridge etc.). Vincent's arrival is easily the most crucial
event in the defense of LRT; with the 140th N.Y.'s arrival perhaps more
important than the final bayonet charge of the 20th Maine.
If the Confederates did take LRT either at the outset, or at the breakthrough
against the 16th Michigan, I don't think they would have stopped at LRT.
LRT did command the center of the Federal line, but the north-south axis
of the hill made it hard to put much of an artillery front up to bear on
the position. Certainly the artillery could do greater damage on the troops
still in the Wheatfield/Peach Orchard. But in my opinion, although the Confederates
would have left troops on the hill, sitting there would do them no good.
In an extension of Lee's original plan, the Confederates would have had
to continue driving up the Emmettsburg Rd., or in this case, a parallel
route. Moving northward from LRT would have brought the Confederates in
the rear of Sickles' position, making any kind of defense hopeless.
Someone mentioned the length of the Confederates' exterior lines and that's
another reason I believe they would have had to continue to press north.
Like at Chancellorsville, when Stuart took Jackson's corps and continued
to attack, the easiest way to shorten exterior lines is to collapse the
interior lines in your front. In other words as the Confederates moved north,
the lines would shorten and connection would be made with the units attacking
in the Peach Orchard.
Would there have been enough fresh units to push on? That's hard to say.
Hood's division originally attacked in with two lines, but when the division
swung toward LRT, its front was lengthened and the reserve units had to
move into the front line in order to maintain an unbroken front. That's
a not often discussed negative of Hood's decision to basically ignore Lee's
order and swing around toward DD and LRT. It left the division with no reserves
to move to crucial attack points.
To summarize my opinions:
- LRT was most vulnerable early in the contest. If Oates had
been able to drive drive off the 20th Maine, that did not necessarily mean
the capture of LRT.
- If the Confederates did take LRT early on, the wisest thing would be to
continue pressing north to get into the rear of Sickles' position and compress
and link their own lines.
- Meade would have not had the option to attack LRT, because it would not
have been in the Confederates' best interest upon taking the hill, to just
sit there and fortify it. It's strategic value was in being an anchor for
the Federal line; for the Confederates it was a position that needed to
be taken in order to get at a soft spot on the Federal flank. If the Confederates
took the hill and pressed on, the Federals would have been in an enormous
amount of trouble. The Third Corps would have been completely cut off; the
Second and Fifth Corps reinforcements in motion would have been attacked
before even having a chance to deploy.
Along with these theories to pick apart or agree with, I leave the following
questions about LRT's defense;
- If indeed Weed's brigade with three fresh regiments was on
the hill long before Chamberlain's desperation bayonet charge, why were
they not moved to reinforce the 20th Maine? Other than a request to the
83rd PA., did Chamberlain make any request for reinforcement to the brigade
level. If he did not, was Chamberlain remiss in not communicating his dire
situation? Was Rice remiss for not checking the position (which Vincent
obviously understood as crucial) after taking over for Vincent?
- If the 20th Maine had not managed to successfully defend the hill, how
would Chamberlain's decision to send out 1/10th of his total force (Co.
B) be evaluated? Even in actual events Co. B did not do much in terms of
the final outcome other than further stampede the already-retreating Confederates.
If Chamberlain lost the position with one company of his regiment basically
out lost in the woods, how would that decision (viewed in hindsight as brilliant)
be critiqued?
The floor is open.
Brian Bennett
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Hi Brian, I sure am not certain on the position of O'Rorke. Farley may well
be right. Sometimes in cases like this where you have several participants
with different versions of the same event, I like to just present the information
from the various sources and let the reader participate in the interpertation.
That's exactly what I would do in this case. BTW, this is really interesting
stuff and I am going to put a copy of my answer on the board. Maybe we can
get some additional input.
Brian wrote:
>Bill,
> I haven't had a chance yet to gather up and study all of my
>relevant material regarding Farley's insistence that the 140th was not
at
>the head of the column.
> My original plan when I began researching the 140th was to see
>Farley's work published. But in augmenting his work, I found so much
other
>more primary material (although Farley claimed his history was based
on
>letters and diaries written during the war) that the project ended up
as a
>full regimental history. I have since returned to my idea of publishing
>Farley's work and have been slowly tracking down all of his other writings,
>correspondence, etc. regarding LRT.
> I've caught him in a few inaccuracies, so I do not hold that he is
>infallible. However his position makes him hard to impeach in regards
to
>the LRT scenario. I'm certainly interested in clarifying this. I'm sort
of
>surprised that this momentous meeting doesn't have the appeal of such
>others as Buford-Reynolds, etc.
I agree. None of the O'Rorke stuff is getting the attention it deserves.
Glad to see you working on it. Lots of Chamberlain fans don't even know
who O'Rorke was.
> My initial response to the idea that the 140th was at the
head of
>column was this: If Warren saw the troops on the Wheatfield Rd., the
head
>of the column, in this case the 140th, would have had to be in his view.
By
>the time he rode down, if the column continued to move, the 140th would
>have been farther up the road, perhaps into the Plum Run area.
Brian, it depends on if you are assuming that the troops Warren saw at the
top of the hill were Weed's Brigade. Not sure we can make that assumption.
Warren said "I rode down to the troops going out on the the Peach Orchard
Road..." I have never interperted that as Warren specifically saw Weed's
Brigade and then rode down. I have interperted it as he saw troops (and
they were a lot of troops going toward the Peach Orchard) and rode down.
He then met Weed's Brigade.
Brian continued:
>If the 140th
>was last in the column, it would make sense the Warren would have seen
the
>head or middle of the column from LRT and upon riding down, caught it
>somewheres in the middle. Guess it depends on two things: 1) the amount
of
>tree cover on LRT's eastern slope, i.e. how far along the Wheatfield
Rd.
>could Warren see; and 2) were there troops that marched in front of
Weed's
>Brigade that Warren saw.
As to your # 2), We need to identify what troops he may have seen. I have
not done that but will take a look. I believe that there were lots of troops
moving in the direction of the Peach Orchard during the time Warren was
talking to Hall near the signal station. Again, if you apply my interpertation,
Captain Marvin's account makes sense. For the benifit of the group, Marvin
wrote [to Warren], "The one Hundred and Fortieth New York Volunteers
was in front with Colonel O'Rorke in Charge of the brigade, Ninety-first
Pennsylvania Volunteers next, and One Hundred and Fort-Sixth New York and
One Hundred and Fifty-fifth Pennsylvania. I well remember your riding rapidly
down from Little Round Top as we approached it and inquiring of us..."
Warren wrote [to Farley], "My brother was the staff officer that went
with General Weed, and his recollection is the same as Marvin's Marvin kept
a journal. This recollection corresponds exactly with mine. In view of all
this, do you [Farley] think still that you were the rear regiment of the
brigade?"
As you know, Farley wrote "Marvin is all wrong..."
Brian finished:
> Interested in your views. I'll pull my stuff together this
weekend.
>Brian
I'm really glad to see you working on this. I will take some time this weekend
(got a bass tournament Saturday) to identify which troops he may have seen.
Bill
From: Brooks Simpson
Hello all:
You all know the story of Warren's flushing out the CSA attack on July 2
by having a section of Smith's battery fire into the woods (I assume that
this is represented by the two pieces in the Valley of Death facing south).
Did Warren (or anyone else) say how the folks on LRT directed the cannon
to fire?
Oh, yes, I know there's some debate over whether this was Warren's idea
or that the Signal Corps had to convince him of the impending assault--but
the question stands as asked.
Brooks Simpson
From: lawrence@tyrell.net (Dennis Lawrence)
Greetings:
The two best source for this topic on our site are 1) Bill Cameron's Signal
Corps article on the members' article page and 2) the discussion about this
that some of Bill's posts sparked - found in the file "Little Round
Top - No JLC" (or something like that) on the discussion page. The
above should not be interpreted as saying there should be no posts on the
below, just informative.
I agree with Pfanz that there is no reason to discredit Warren's romantic
rememberance, but Bill's work shows the full story of the Signal Corps activity
on July 2. They were very aware of what was going on before Warren got there.
Why no one acted on the info is intriguing.
BTW Bill's post the other day correcting the date on the Signal Corps message
on the OR was very helpful and much appreciated.
Dennis
>Hello all:
>You all know the story of Warren's flushing out the CSA attack on
>July 2 by having a section of Smith's battery fire into the woods (I
>assume that this is represented by the two pieces in the Valley of
>Death facing south). Did Warren (or anyone else) say how the folks
>on LRT directed the cannon to fire?
>Oh, yes, I know there's some debate over whether this was Warren's
>idea or that the Signal Corps had to convince him of the impending
>assault--but the question stands as asked.
>Brooks Simpson
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Brooks wrote:
>Hello all:
>You all know the story of Warren's flushing out the CSA attack on
>July 2 by having a section of Smith's battery fire into the woods (I
>assume that this is represented by the two pieces in the Valley of
>Death facing south). Did Warren (or anyone else) say how the folks
>on LRT directed the cannon to fire?
>Oh, yes, I know there's some debate over whether this was Warren's
>idea or that the Signal Corps had to convince him of the impending
>assault--but the question stands as asked.
>Brooks Simpson
Brooks,
The story of "Warren's flushing out the CSA attack" comes from
a single source, Warren's letter to Capt. porter Farley, July 13, 1872.
Everything else ever written about the "shot" comes from that
letter. Warren does not state how he sent word to the battery. In all probablilty
he either sent an orderly (there were several present) or one of his three
aides (Washington Roebling, Chauncey B. Reese or Randall MacKenzie). Warren
does not specifically state that it was Smith's Battery but O.O. Norton's
interpertation and common sense indicates that it was. Norton was not there.
It was probably fired from one of the two sections above Devil's Den. Smith
indicates that the section left in the Valley was not "Opened"
until much later after he withdrew from the top of the "hill"
above the "Devil's Cave". The section in the Valley was left "together
with cassions and horses, 150 yards to the rear". However, I cannot
be certain which section of Smith's Battery fired the round. Smith does
not mention this incident in his report. For more on this subject, see my
"Saviors of Little Round Top" in vol. 8, Gettysburg Magazine.
Bill
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Tom Desjardin wrote:
> From all evidence, Warren never gave any order to any battery
and
> his story about seeing the glint of sunlight off the bayonets of
> the CSA men is easily refutable.
> No one anywhere near a battery on July 2 ever reported firing a
> shot at his behest - something they would surely have taken credit
> for saving LRT.
> The 3:30 signal sent to Army HQ that brought Warren to LRT in the
> first place indicated a large mass of Confederates on Warfield
> Ridge - the Signal Corps knew of Longstreet's men long before
> Warren reached the hill.
> Warren was wounded in the neck by a piece of artillery shell fired
> at LRT (one of Meade's staff said he was "bleeding profusely"
and
> if this shot didn't let him know the CSA was out there he didn't
> have to wait for any "glinting".
> The whole story smacks of 19th cent. hyperbole but the clincher
> for us is that sunlight cannot reflect from where it was in the
> sky at that time off of metal near Warfield Ridge toward LRT.
> This would require a straight, uninterupted "glint" which
directly
> opposes the term "reflect".
> For a more likely version, see "The Signal Corps, USA" (by
Jos.
> Willard Brown, 1896).
> Tom Desjardin
> GNMP
Hi Tom,
This is a momentous occasion. I have been writing and talking about the
signal station on LRT since 1988 and you are the first person I have heard
defend what they did as worthwhile. Congratulations. If you have not looked
at my paper on the web site, please do so. It is a Luvaas style signal staff
ride I wrote while at the War College. There is a copy in the library at
the park. I also wrote the Hall/Warren story in to my article on the Signal
Corps in GBM 3. It is also in the "Saviors of Little Round Top"
in GBM 8.
I do have one question for you. You refer to the 3:30 message. There is
a reference to it on page 365 in Brown. Brown wrote "Capt. Hall, on
little Round Top, at 3.30 p.m. on the 2d, discovered the enemy massing upon
Gen. Sickles's left. This information was conveyed by signals to the general
in command." It is not quoted. I know that Hall wrote a report and
there are some quotes from it in Emerson Taylor's syrupy biography of Warren.
Hall's report is quoted in Taylor:
" At 3 O'clock p.m., we discovered the enemy massing his troops on
Sickles left. This was communicated to General Meade, also to General Sickles.
Soon after, General Warren, Acting Chief of Staff, arrived at our station,
and we gave him the situation. He sent an orderly to General Sickles, I
think for assistance, as he deemed the holding of this hill to be of the
utmost importance. At this time, the enemy's sharpshooters and cannoneers
were trying to drive us from our position. Why? [This part does not sound
much like a report does it? Looks like it may have been edited. Brown did
a lot of editing in his stuff also. The Furst diary got edited a bunch.
Bill] Because we commanded a view of their movements. In this they failed,
for we were not ready to go."
Brown alludes to it also. It is not in the OR. I know that there is some
Hall material at MHI but I don't think the report is there. What are you
using as a reference for the 3:30 message? Do you have access to the Hall
report or the text of the message?
I have always been a little hesitant to state flat out that Warren didn't
request the battery to fire a round. The sunlight issue is a new one for
me. I have always thought that it might be possible that after Hall told
him of the troop positions, he decided to check it for himself. Not sure
that would be all that unusual. Butterfield and some of the other folks
were a little gun-shy over signal reports at that time of the war. So I
kinda have been going on the possibility that the stories were both somewhat
feasible. It could be that he was wounded after he sent the message to the
battery. I think the "glistening of gun barrels and bayonets"
is probably hyperbole but I have never totally discounted the act of having
the round fired. BTW, I got a little lost on your difference between "reflect"
and "glint" when the term Warren used was "glistening"
[unless it's misquoted in Norton] and that's about as unscientific a term
as I can think of. But I am not arguing the point. I have just always left
it open ended. BTW, not only did the folks at the battery not recall firing
a round, none of the folks who might have ridden down there to tell them
to do it recalled it either. There is a good case for it being a tall tale.
One issue on the side of Hall's version is that he told it to Brown while
on Little Round Top on July 2, 1988. He told the story to the group and
his flagman, John Chemberlin, was also present. Bachelder was down there
with them. [Minutes of the Thirteenth Annual Reunion of the u.S. Veteran
Signal Corps Association, held at Gettysburg, Pa., july 2 and 3, 1888] Anyway,
if it was a made-up story it seems Chemberlin would have spoken up.
Anyway, it's great to see that you guys at the park are speaking up for
the signal corps! As an aside, did you see my post on the mismarked signal
message on page 488 of OR 27, part III? It is a message from Jerome to Howard
marked July 2 in brackets and listed on the same page with the messages
Jerome sent from LRT. It is really a July 1 message Jerome (Buford's signal
officer) sent from the Seminary Cupola. I think it has some value for the
study of July 1 (what do you think Eric?). Brown missed it and I have never
seen it quoted by any of the July 1 authors. Any thoughts as to whether
I am right or not?
Bill
From: bennettb@sgenva.cc.geneseo.edu (Brian Bennett)
From Steve Hanzelman:
I have read several accounts of how the 83rd extended their
line to cover Chamberlain's right. This allowed him to extend his line to his
left and perform his right wheel charge down the slope.
Good point. The 83rd gets some mention due to its connection with Vincent,
but the 44th is even more overlooked. I guess serving in the center of the line
was supposed to be easy. It's amazing (and I'm as guilty of this as anyone
sometimes) that in our rush to assign and/or divide praise among Vincent,
Chamberlain, Warren, Weed, Hazlett, et al., we forget the plain and simple fact
that it was their men that did the actual fighting. If the privates, corporals,
sergeants and junior officers in the ranks of the 20th Ma., 83rd Pa., 44th N.Y.,
16th Mich. and 140th N.Y. hadn't been skilled and tenacious, there'd have been
no glory for the officers -- Little Round Top would not have been held.
Brian Bennett
From: Steve Hanzelman (HANZELMANS@hershey.pvt.k12.pa.us)
I agree with your latest reply. The men deserve the credit for their
sacrifices on LRT that day. I also agree with what you wrote about holding the
center of the line. I believe the fighting there was just as furious as on
either flank, but the terrain lowered the casualty rate. Since the 83rd/44th
were Butterfield's twins, I am always looking for information on the 44th. If
you could point out any sources I would appreciate it very much. Hope to keep
in touch with you. Thanks again for the note.
Sincerely,
Steve Hanzelman
From: ENordfors@aol.com
Brian wrote:
It's amazing (and I'm as guilty of this as anyone
sometimes) that in our rush to assign and/or divide praise among Vincent,
Chamberlain, Warren, Weed, Hazlett, et al., we forget the plain and simple fact
that it was their men that did the actual fighting. If the privates, corporals,
sergeants and junior officers in the ranks of the 20th Ma., 83rd Pa., 44th N.Y.,
16th Mich. and 140th N.Y. hadn't been skilled and tenacious, there'd have been
no glory for the officers -- Little Round Top would not have been held.
Brian...
I agree...I did find myself snickering a little bit on the inclusion of the 16th
Michigan... while I believe they fought their best and were hit hard...were they
not rapidly re-deployed to Reserve status or to guard the rear.... Point well
taken, as in many areas of life, the underlings do the majority of the work...
and rightfully deserve the majority of the credit...especially in this
Battle..fought with as much heart and soul as skill....
Best.. Ed..
PS...apoligies to anyone if I offended concerning the 16th Michigan....not
meant as criticism...simply observation...
PPS...I generally try to give Rice a lot of credit for Commanding under
adversity (altho who didn't that day!)
From: bennettb@sgenva.cc.geneseo.edu (Brian Bennett)
Ed gently tweaked me about including the 16th Michigan in the list of
regiments that fought in a "skilled and tenacious" manner. I debated
when typing that if I should indeed include them and did, because they did hold
for some time on an exposed flank and one can also make the case that their
collapse was more the fault of their officers than the men. (Oliver Norton had a
field day with Welch's report in Attack and Defense.) Besides, the men of the
16th look pretty "skilled and tenacious" in Troiani's "Don't Give
An Inch." :-)
Brian Bennett
From: bennettb@sgenva.cc.geneseo.edu (Brian Bennett)
bennettb@sgenva.cc.geneseo.edu (Brian Bennett) says:
Jack Kelly wrote:
>I believe that the 20th ME and other LRT defenders actually built most
of
>their stone barricades during the night of the 2nd, after the fight.
The
>fight itself was pretty much a stand-up affair. Can someone verify my
>recollection?
The 140th NY certainly did not have time to construct any breastworks
before engaging the enemy, as they were almost immediately put into combat
once atop the hill. They reinforced the 16th Michigan down on the shelf
on
which the current marker sits, but after repulsing the Confederates were
drawn up in a line higher up on the slope, probably very close to where
the
current day flank markers for the 140th sit, as no member of the regiment
talked of any further line adjustments or movements.
Porter Farley does, however, suggest that the men took advantage of
whatever cover they could, as did the men of the 20th Maine, if I recall
correctly. Farley wrote: "Coming abreast of Vincent's brigade, and
taking
advantage of such shelter as the huge rocks lying about there afforded,
the
men loaded and fired, and in less time than it takes to write it the
onslaught of the rebels was fairly checked, and in a few minutes the woods
in front of us were cleared except for the dead and the wounded."
The rock walls built by members of the 140th (identified as such in one
of
the photos in Frassanito's "Gettysburg: A Journey in Time,") were
built
later during the evening of July 2, after the fighting had ended, as Jonas
Esely, a member of Co. G, would write in 1911, when he penned his
"Recollections and Reminiscences of Camp and Field During the War from
1861
to 1865." (unpublished, 64-page hand-written manuscript):
"We had to build some kind of breastworks for our protection the next
day,
there were plenty of stones there, both large and small, and as I had some
experience in building walls or fence, the men brought me the stone and
I
built the breastworks which stand this day on the side of Little Round Top.
We had loop holes in the wall to fire through, and by daylight when the
enemy began to fire it was high enough to afford us fair protection."
(Spelling and punctuation corrected for clarity)
Farley also notes that the walls afforded them protection from Confederate
sharpshooters during the evening of July 2 and the morning of July 3: "but
after the fight [of July 2] was over and we had secured pretty good shelter
behind the rocks on the western slope their cannoniers [Hazlett's Battery]
were much exposed and many fell by the bullets of the sharpshooters, who
seemed swarming in the tree-tops and behind the rocks over in the direction
of the peach orchard."
Brian Bennett
From: Jeff Hubbard <jhubbard@nwlink.com>
Date: Tue, 21 May 1996 18:15:54 -0700
Subject: What IF E. Law took Little Round Top?
Jeff Hubbard <jhubbard@nwlink.com> says:
Hello,
I'm interested in people's opinion to a "what if" circumstance.
If Law's Brigade DID
successfully take Little Round Top from Col. Vincent on the 2nd, would it
have proven to be the
deciding factor in the Battle of Gettysburg? Would no more fighting have
ocurred there? I know
this may sound obsurd, but I'm not so sure Meade would have pulled out...Although,
the
Confederates would DEFINITELY have a better position than what historically
happened, would it
win an ALL-OUT victory for the South?
Being the Southern sympathizer that I am(growin' up in Texas), I would
like to say that
Lee would have scored another smashing victory, and if followed by a vigor
pursuit, might have
won the war(as so does history). But this question has been gnawing on
me for awhile now. I'm
not saying that it wouldn't happen(the possibilities ARE endless), i.e.
the Army of the Potomac
DID have a psychological disadvantage to Lee's Army of Northern Virginia(that's
common
knowledge...who wouldn't after the whoopins' they had at the hand of Lee...)
A general rout may
have followed.
But...the numbers seem to tell another story. Hood's Division was well
spent, and would
be...holding that hill. McLaws pushed forward and fought valiantly, but
at great loss to HIS
Division. On the other side...Sykes V Corps took some losses, but could
easily retreat and
reform alongside Sickles. Also, Sedgwick's VI Corps was coming up fast
along the Baltimore Pike.
With Sykes AND Sedgwick joined together, they could mount a counter-offensive.
Meade didn't
attack on the 2nd, but he never had to. Given the importance of Little
Round Top, and the
greater numbers Meade enjoyed, I say he would have probably attacked Lee(example...Culp's
Hill
early on the 3rd). Third, with the great Artillery Reserve sitting in good
range of LRT, and
such a perfect target it was(i.e. it would be easy to see where the shells
were hitting...and
MANY guns were just sitting there!) It may have proved to be a killing zone(or
least a "hot
pocket" for Longstreet's men).
The Confederates had little reinforcements coming up, yet the Union was
being reinforced
continually. The only MAJOR reinforcements Lee would have had to give to
the defense of LRT, was
Pickett's Div., who couldn't be in position until way after nightfall.
It's also possible that
Stuart would move south and assist. It WOULD be a strong position, yet
not invulnerable.
Would Meade sense defeat and run away? Would Lee have another notch on
his belt? I'm
not so sure. Any suggestions, opinions, or attacks are greatly welcome.
Who knows, I may have
missed something here completely.
Gratefully yours,
Jeff Hubbard
"Oh, the pleasures of hindsight...how it makes geniuses out of mere
men."
From: acameron@tcac.com (Bill Cameron)
acameron@tcac.com (Bill Cameron) says:
Hi William,
This "what if" has been bounced around here before but it is
usually "what
if Oates had defeated Chamberlain" which is a bit more focused than
the
above. Anyway, I think you might be selling Meade a bit short with the
"plans for a retreat" comment. As you know Meade's Pipe Creek
contingency
was used against him by his detractors until they practically had him
pulling stakes before a round was fired. Based on his conduct of the
battle, I think that if Law had occupied LRT, Meade would have taken it
back.
To me the issue is what effect would the occupation of Little Round Top
have on the face of the battle and I believe that it would have changed
things significantly. I don't think there would have been a "Pickett's
Charge" if the Confederates had held LRT on the morning of the 3rd.
I
believe the battle would have continued on the Union left. Lots of people
here will point out that Meade had the resources to retake the hill which
he
did. They will also point out that Oates' men were hot, tired, thirsty
and
low on ammunition which they were. However, the Oates - Chamberlain fight
was late in the day and it is hard to say what would have happened if
Chamberlain had been forced from the hill and the rest of Vincent's Brigade
had Confederates on their front, flank and rear. I have always thought
that
there was a decent chance that the hill could have been occupied by Law
until the next morning when I believe that Meade would have taken it back.
But I also believe that Lee and Longstreet would have employed Pickett on
the Confederate right and we would be studying a different battle.
Bill
From: William_Howard@prodigy.com (MR WILLIAM R HOWARD JR)
William_Howard@prodigy.com (MR WILLIAM R HOWARD JR) says:
If LRT found itself with a strong Confederate contingent, I
think Meade would have left the field, as indeed he had plans for a
retreat, anyway. Whether this would have won the war, that would
depend on the will of the Union to keep fighting. As was finally
realized when the parole system was abandoned and the Union started
keeping its confederate prisoners, there were just to many human and
other resources for the Union to lose the war as long as they did not
lose their resolve. So, the question as I see it is: would the Union
have lost its will to fight after losing the battle of Gettysburg?
Of course, the only answer is: perhaps.
-William Howard
From: "John A. Leo" <johnleo@erols.com>
"John A. Leo" <johnleo@erols.com> says:
HI FOLKS,
I think we need to work through the scenario were LRT is taken by
the Confederates. Its not to hard to develop a capture scenario - for
example Ward's brigade collapses 10 or 15 minutes sooner and Weed's brigade
shows up 10 minutes later. We'll keep the 16th Michagan rush to the rear
as
a nice finishing touch. So now the Confederates have LRT despite the 20th
Maine's efforts.
We MUST leave the 20th Maine in the scenario so TOM can earn his PHD.
But now what can they do with it? LRT terrain is just not a great
point for a Confederate attack to originate from. Its much better suited
for defense than attack, and the Confederates weren't on the defensive.
BY 6:00pm, reminants of the 3rd & 5th Corps were blocking the
roughly equal number of Confederates but the 6th Corps was mostly rested
by
then and ready to add their numbers to the equation. The Confederates can't
attack up the Cemetary Ridge flank now that the AOP is alerted to the
possibility and ready to meet it.
We've already established that Rittenhouse could only fire two of
his guns in the general direction of Cemetary Ridge when Longstreet's second
assalt took place. So given two Confederate guns on LRT, how much harm
could they really do to the AOP? The Federals could have fired a dozen
guns from mid or northern Cemetary Ridge to pulverize LRT and drive away
the Confederates artillery that would have been annoying them.
I seems to me that the capture of LRT would have been unpleasant
and
uncomfortable for the Federals, but I don't see how it compells them to
retreat. Maybe the worst consequence would be denying the Tanytown road
to
Federal Communications. Possibly, LRT could have provided cover for the
Longstreet flank attack, but I'm not certain, in part because Lee would
have
been stretched thin. On the other hand, the Federal's shorter defensive
line might have proven easier to defend.
A similar situation developed in the Wheatfield. The Wheatfield
was
lost after a tremendous amount of bloodshed from capture and recapture on
both sides. But what profit did the Confederates finally gain by its
possession? What would the Federals have gained by taking it back and
finally keeping a portion of Sickle's weak line?
This scenario needs to be filled out with more details. I welcome
everyone to contribute to its success or downfall on its merits.
John Leo
From: DPowell334@aol.com
Too much has been made of Meade's prediliction to retreat, I think - by
July
2nd Meade had committed to fighting at Gettysburg, and done a masteerful
job
of concentrating his forces there. Butterfield and Sickles tried to magnify
the Pipe Creek contingency into a craven desire to run, staved off only
by
their own heroic actions. I find that argument holds little water.
Remember, Meade was the one with the uncommitted reserve in this area -
by
7:00 p.m., Meade still had an entire division of 6th Corps - as yet unblooded
- positioned around LRT in order to provide a final defense of that region.
I
firmly believe that Meade would have committed them to retaking the position,
and that they had the strength to do it.
Any attacker is at his most vulnerable at the moment of taking his objective.
Law's men - given their state of exhaustion, losses, and lack of support,
would have been highly vulnerable to a rapid counterstroke.
Dave Powell
From: DPowell334@aol.com
Taneytown Road was important, though likely not as critical as the Baltimore
Pike would have been. However, unquestionably, Meade would have needed
Taneytown Rd to move some of his own force - congestion, don't ya know -
and
to deny it to Lee as well. If Meade did manage to withdraw the whole force
via Baltimore Pike, it would pull him too far east to cover the western
approaches to D.C. In any case, a strong case would be make that it would
be
a critical aspect of either a stand firm or withdrawl strategy.
Dave Powell