LAST UPDATED 2/18/96
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Has anything been written about what Lee's follow up plan was should Pickett's charge have been successful? Did he ever say how many of his men did he expect to make it safely to stone wall? Once they got there, were they supposed to turn left toward Cemetery Hill or right towards Little Round Top? Once they got there, who was going to support them (Rhodes?)? Or were Longstreet and Early supposed to attack each end at that point? Or did Lee just think the Union would retreat in mass confusion at that point?
Dave Powell
It might be interesting to look at Bragg's follow up to the Chickamauga breakthrough or better still, at Meade's follow through of his victory at Gettysburg. Was there ever an equivalent of what would have been Picket's breakthrough under Lee?
John
The nearest thing I can think of to an imaginary breakthrough by Pettigrew-Pickett-Trimble is the real breakthrough by the Army of the Cumberland on Missionary Ridge. There, a true rout ensued, and a fairly vigorous pursuit, though one that was eventually stymied by Cleburne's blocking force.
Of course, this ignores vast differences. Bragg's line on Missionary Ridge was not backed up by anything substantial. By contrast, the portion of the Cemetery Ridge line assaulted on July 3 was defended by only a small fraction of Meade's Army. Tens of thousands of troops--Most of V Corps, all of VI, for instance--stood in reserve and were, in fact, coming up when the collapse of the assault removed the immediate need for them. Thus, the idea of a "breakthrough" by P-P-T is in many senses illusory.
There's the larger point--and here, Chattanooga, as well as Chancellorsville and Gettysburg illustrate this--that it was very difficult, given the limitations on mobility and control of a large CW army, to follow up a decisive tactical victory with an action to "annihilate" the routed enemy. Victors, in these circumstances, were almost as disorganized as vanquished. The only more-or-less successful actions of this kind I can think of are at Nashville--and even here, the Army of Tennessee simply disintegrated, rather than being "enveloped", and Appamattox, where the ANV had been reduced to a rump organization and where the great Sheridan drove his forces relentlessly until they got into position to block the retreat.
Very few CW commanders really understood the strategic limitations of even the most unequivocal success on the tactical scale. Lee didn't. Grant did, which is why he is the true strategic genius of the war. Of course, Grant also understood how tactical stalemate or even loss (Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor) could be turned into strategic success.
In a message dated 95-12-17 09:38:16 EST, you write:
>> >It might be interesting to look at Bragg's follow up to the Chickamauga >breakthrough or better still, at Meade's follow through of his victory at >Gettysburg. Was there ever an equivalent of what would have been Picket's >breakthrough under Lee?
> >John
Grant in April of '65, or Thomas after Nashville are successful examples of a pursuit. However, both men commanded substantial advantages over their opponents.
Bragg at Chickamauga, of course, thought he _lost_ the battle, and mounted no pursuit at all. To bad for the South, because an effective pursuit could have inflicted severe damage on the Union army.
Meade's own example has some extenuating circumstances, I think. Given that
he was new to the command, that his most trusted and aggressive Corps
commanders were down, and that the army had taken a fearsome beating, he
chose not to pursue. Hindsight likely tells us that this was a mistake, but
at the time, Meade made a reasonable choice, I think.
Remember, Lee's army was not disorganized. It held it's position on the field
another day, and then withdrew in good order. Meade had one unscathed corps,
the 6th, and had at least 3 corps that were unfit - 1st, 3rd, and 11th. Even
directly after Pickett's charge, Lee had plenty of formed infantry with
massive artillery support. those cannon were out of long range ammo, but had
full limbers of canister. Any counterattack would have been paid for in heavy
doses of Union blood.
Dave Powell
If you will read Griffith's book--the section on bayonet charges--and then read the eyewitness accounts of Pickett's Charge, I think you will agree with me that PC meets the textbook definition of a bayonet charge, as taught in 19th c military theory. Thus their goal was to pierce the Union line and then fan out as the reinforcements came up. Thus they moved at a specified clip(quickstep)(an engineer later measured it exactly, though from the Pettigrew-Trimble wing), without firing, until they got within about 250 yds, at which point they began to run.
Let's try this one on for size....if John Reynolds is in command of the Army of the Potomac, and not George Meade, is the outcome of the battle any different? Specifically, does Reynolds order a counterattack after the repulse of Pickett's Charge?
Personally, I suspect that he would have....
Eric J. Wittenberg
Hancock would have attacked. This much is clear. He did not want to leave the field after he was wounded until after the counterattack. He said so. That's not what I'm interested in.
What I want to explore is what would Reynolds have done? I understand that he turned down the command...there were very specific political reasons for that. This is a "what if". Reynolds was far more aggressive than Meade, and I think that the nature of the fight would have been very different indeed had Reynolds been in charge. What do the rest of you think?
Eric J. Wittenberg
Eric wrote: > Specifically, does Reynolds order a counterattack after the repulse of Pickett's >Charge?
> Personally, I suspect that he would have....
Eric,
He might well have. However, I'm not sure such an attack would have been all
that wise.
Why? well, there's about 6-7000 CSA infantry yet uncommitted in position to
receive such an attack. Not, I admit, such an overwhelming force as to
preclude success, but remember that they are supported by something like 80+
CSA cannon who have no more long range ammo, but ALL have full allowances of
short-range canister. Given that arty firing canister in close-range defense
work is the most effective ACW use of that branch, I'd hate to be in that
Union attack. Not saying it's impossible, mind you, just that it seems too
often taken as a cake walk...
Dave Powell
Greetings...
On the subject of why Meade did not immediately counter attack.... I understand all the reasons Meade gave to the Congressional Inquiry (well I should say I know the reasons ..understand??)... But in my simple mind I have another of my simple questions
Why was it that Lee and Longstreet so diligently prepared for a counter attack at least until it was more than obvious that it was not forthcoming... I found myself defending all of Meade's reasons most especially the lack of intelligence as to whether the ANV was re-grouping vs. retreating but as I continue to study I find the above situation fairly consistent--save add for the utter disbelieve or suspension of disbelieve that so few soldiers were returning...
BTW, on the Charging vs walking issue...Did not Lothero A. have his men
charging the last 1/3 of the distance or is my mind wandering--again
Best..
Folks,
A fellow Scout leader has asked me lately if there has been discussion of the
mental state of Southern troops that participated in Pickett's Charge. He noted
that these troopers were all veterans and stated what they were about to try
(marching a mile across open ground while the Union cannon devastated them) yet
they attacked anyway.
This shows a great deal of faith in Marse Robert and their other commanders.
Thoughts?
Dave N
To Dave N.
Pickett's Charge gets all the press, the result of years of "Lost
Cause" historiography and Lee-worship.
But let's not forget:
The advance of the 6th Wisc. on the Railroad Cut
Why men do this sort of thing for reasons good and bad is the eternal
mystery of our species.
N. Levitt
I suggest that we begin this thread with a definition of a few terms.
Faith, courage, tenacity, stupidity (seriously - was that charge only for
the stupid or only for the faithful brave?). There may have been another
element that I can only try to explain and that may, indeed have never
happened in the ACW.
Those of us who were in Nam will remember that there comes a time when you
just don't give a damn whether you make it or not. You get so tired, so
disgusted with the machine that you're enveloped in that any way out is good
enough. Death is a way out. Could the soldiers of the Confederacy involved
in that charged had some of that attitude? My guess is that they did not.
Desertion was so easy that the choice of death was absurd at best. But was
there something in the psyche (I just gotta learn to spell!!!) that made
them go. Perhaps Shelby Foote had it right in the "Civil War" PBS series.
He said something like "It would have taken more courage not to go than to
go". Did peer pressure drive them? We read so much about honor when we
read about the war. Did a sense of honor drive them?
John
Interestingly, I just read a part of Foote's narrative on Pickett's Charge
addressing that. One section was quite intriguing and moving and revealing:
Pat Ellington
A quote most of you have probably encountered, by Lt John E Dooley, Co C,
First Virginia Volunteers (shot in both thighs and captured July 3 1863;
exchanged February 24, 1865), from his postwar recollections:
"We rise to our feet, but not all. There is a line of men still on the
ground with their faces turned, men affected in four different ways. There
are the gallant dead who will never charge again; the helpless wounded,
many of whom desire to share the fortunes of this charge; the men who have
charged on many a battlefield but who are now helpless from the heat of the
sun; and the men in whom there is not sufficient courage to enable them to
rise . . ."
"Some are actually fainting from the heat and dread. They have fallen to
the ground overpowered by the suffocating heat and the terrors of that
hour."
Ben Maryniak
Thanks to Benedict for the quote. Good to be reminded of the lack of
glamour in the whole dismal affair.
To another matter related to Ben, his article on the first shot is well
worth reading. As a resident of DuPage County, Illinois, I count myself
in the Marcellus Ephrium Jones camp.
John Schuurman
GDGers - This is a bit long but I wanted to address a couple of current
threads with quotes I've gleaned from regimentals and other publications.
TARGET PRACTICE (from a Yankee perspective)
According to First Lieutenant Ambrose Gwinnett Bierce of the Ninth Indiana
Volunteers, " . . it is the business of a soldier to send his ounce and a
quarter of lead hissing toward the enemy - it is also his habit if he is a
good soldier." Confronted by the scenes of battle and gripped by a tumult
of his innards, an infantryman could load and fire his rifle correctly only
if he had long experience in its use. But he was expected to gain all of
this experience on the battlefield, by what could be called a process of
accretion. Each engagement he survived was a step towards his competency as
a rifleman. The regimental history of the Thirty-Fifth Massachusetts
Volunteers, published during 1884, summarized this process well with the
explanation that, "men learned the use of their weapons in battle or by
stealth."
Some newly-organized units were said to have recruited experienced riflemen
who had been familiar with firearms in civilian life, but most contemporary
journals and diaries describe opposite situations. An example of the former
can be found in the history of the Ninth New Jersey Regiment, which states
that the men drew Springfield rifles during November, 1861, in their camp
of organization at Trenton, and "a range was immediately established for
target practice. Many men were able to hit the bull at 200 yards and 500
yards, having been accustomed to the use of the rifle from boyhood." The
chronicler of the Fourteenth New Hampshire echoed the majority, however, in
his portrayal of shooting practice - an activity which he dubbed one of the
"wonderful events" of army life because it rarely took place. "Quite a
number of the men had never fired a gun in their lives; and several of
them, when commanded to fire, would shut their eyes, turn their heads in
the opposite direction, and blaze away." This son of the Granite State went
on to say that he and his comrades became acquainted with using their
rifles through "a course of undergraduate guard-duty."
Civil War infantrymen spent interminable periods at close order drill which
had a tactical function, but the closest that most of them came to
routinized shooting practice was endless repetition - without ammunition -
of Hardee's drill to "load in nine times."
To assist regimental commanders in teaching their men to shoot, the War
Department republished Willard's System of Target Practice during 1862, but
officers obviously lacked enthusiasm for this phase of instruction in the
art of war. Willard's system called for a three-month training period which
included sighting & aiming exercises using blank cartridges, and target
range firing of ball cartridges - "live" ammunition - by individuals, by
detachments, & by full company. Range shooting began with targets six feet
high & twenty-two inches wide at a distance of 150 yards, and the distance
was increased in 100-yard increments with wider targets until reaching a
maximum of one thousand yards with targets six feet high & twenty-two feet
wide. The War Department had to be asked for the permission, as well as the
ammunition, to conduct practice shooting - requests were frequently denied
and, when allowed, trainees were allotted ten rounds per week.
In some cases, a poorly-conducted practice at firing could be worse than
none at all. Orson B Curtis pictured just such a situation in his 1891
history of the Twenty-Fourth Michigan Regiment. "On the 25, 26 and 27 of
September, the regiment was drilled in sham fighting, which accustoms the
men to the sound of their own guns in action. On the first day, Peter
Euler, of G, was shot in the leg. On the next day, a man's face was filled
with powder. On the third day, a soldier shot off his ramrod, which struck
Orderly Sgt Dodsley, of H. These accidents terminated this manner of
drill."
Some brigades in the Army of the Potomac implemented a schedule of range
shooting during the early spring of 1864. Although this is commonly
construed to have been in preparation for Grant's drive on Richmond, there
was another factor that motivated the target practice. When General Meade
learned that, at Gettysburg, many men had loaded their rifles two or more
times without ever firing them, he reacted to this news by ordering that
every rifleman was to fire ten rounds under supervision of an officer. The
fact that such an order came from an Army commander after more than two
years of war indicates that "basic training" was defined in terms varying
greatly thoughout his force.
A memorable anecdote concerning the military's casual approach to practice
shooting appears in The Old Eighth: A History of the Eighth Regiment of New
Hampshire Volunteers. During March of 1863, Eighth New Hamsphire Captain
John M Stanyan decided that his company could benefit from some practice at
shooting. The Captain reminisced about how "he had, as a boy, handled a
rifle considerably," boasting how diligent practice got him to the point
where he could hit a turkey at over two hundred yards. "Then we used to
load at the muzzle altogether, with great care, molding our own bullets,
using nicely greased 'patches' and exactly measuring our powder; even then,
in the firing, the slug balls would turn and go off in strange tangents;
then the turkey was happy. At Indian Village, Louisiana, we got a board
about the size of a man and set it up with one end resting on the ground at
the bank of the bayou. In a couple of days, the ball cartridges that had
been teased for, came. The company was called out on line and remarks were
made to the effect that the piece should be held level in aiming, also that
the trajectory must be taken into account, for, although we had a score of
good shots in the company, a large number thought that the bullet went from
the gun straight as a string to the mark. Vain delusion! for the rifle
ball fell forty inches in traversing five hundred yards. Well, each man was
to make his best record, so the first man stepped forward and fired. His
ball made the dirt fly a little to the right of the target, when lo! the
figure of a badly scared man jumped out from behind the board and yelled
out 'Blankety, blank, blast ye! why don't ye let a fellow know that you was
goin' to sho-ot?' When it was seen that the man was lucky enough not to be
hit, all hands roared. It seems that Charley Hale, our fifer, wanted a
retired and shady place in which to read unmolested and behind that board
looked to him to be a nice spot for quiet contemplative peace."
INFANTRY "STEPS" - Not that anything happened by the book, but these are
the paces as defined by military manuals of the time. Common Time = Steps
are 28" in length at a pace of 90 steps per minute. Quick Time = Steps are
28" in length at a pace of 110 steps per minute. Double Quick Time = Steps
are 33" in length at a pace of 165 steps per minute.
The distance from Seminary to Cemetery Ridge is a tad more than 1300 yards.
At the outlandish best, an attacking infantry force could be expected to
cover 100 yards per minute for no more than 1500 yards. The successful CW
commander sought to carry in his head an index of speed at which his own
and his opponent's units could move across the space separating them, the
distance from each other at which their fire would prove effective, and the
mutual loss they were likely to inflict.
THE RIFLE
Ben Maryniak
Ben ended an excellent post with this......
> The South simply bled
>itself to death in the first three years of the war by taking the tactical
>offensive in nearly 70% of the major actions.
Ben cites Grady and McWhiney's _Attack and Die_. An excellent book. Below
are some of the figures given in it showing the results of Lee's love of the
tactical offensive. The South simply could not afford this type of "victory?"
Seven Days
Second Manassas
Sharpsburg
Fredricksburg
Chancellorsville
Gettysburg
BTW, Grady/McWhiney get a little unhinged at times in tracing the
love of tactical offensive to ancient Celtic roots. Kind of a Highlander
theme that you might find floated on alt.flame.war.civil, but not in a
scholarly work. I think it has held the book back from being recognized for
its first rate analysis of the tactical offensive. Too bad.
Dennis
After watching the movie Gettysburg, there is one thing that has always
puzzled me. Why didn't the Confederate soldiers run or at least jog when
they attacked the union center on the third day? If I had been there, I
would of wanted to run (probably in the other direction).
In a message dated 96-01-09 20:24:23 EST, Kip wrote:
>
>After watching the movie Gettysburg, there is one thing that has always
>puzzled me. Why didn't the Confederate soldiers run or at least jog when
>they attacked the union center on the third day? If I had been there, I
>would of wanted to run (probably in the other direction).
>
Kip,
the distance is something like a mile. any units running across that
distance would be exhausted and incapable of fighting once they got there,
not to mention the impossibility of holding formation while running.
Dave Powell
If only to state the obvious, it was a bloody hot day.
David Wieck
Now, Dave Powell did beat me to the punch on the distance (a mile) and the
difficulty of holding formation, but the key is why they needed to hold
formation, and has to do with WBTS tactics.
1) Since ammunition was considered rather expensive, few soldiers were ever
allowed target practice. As such, an infantryman could fire his musket a few
hundred times over several years, but rarely with any accuracy - after all, it's
hard to tell exactly where YOUR shot in a volley goes, and you probably ain't
watching it real close anyway.
2) Due to the slow rate of fire of a musket (don't recollect exact rate, but
it's no M1 or M16), it's short range and general inaccuracy, many muskets had to
be massed to provide effective fire. [Of course, this was slightly out-of-date
reasoning, as weapons were becoming more accurate and thus had greater effective
ranges.]
3) Units generally opened fire at 100 yards or less. The first volley was always
the most effective, as everyone fired at once. As such, officers would hold
their regiment's fire to cause a greater impact.
4) As such, WBTS commanders wanted their units to form in lines 100 yards or
less from the enemy, fire a volley and, if practicable, rush the enemy line,
break it and send the enemy packing.
For this reason, staying in formation was critically important in the attack.
Units could, and did, double-time march in assaults, but, over long distances
and under heavy fire, unit cohesion becomes problematic.
Hope this helps a little, Kip. For the few years I've been studying this war,
I've always had to force myself to remember that they operated from a completely
different perspective due to the technology and, more importantly, the
Napoleonic concepts of war. (as laid out by Jomini?? someone help!)
If anyone can help me flesh this out with a few facts, it'd be appreciated,
since all this is off the top of my head (not that I want to lose anything from
the top of my head...
Dave N
Rate of fire--3 rounds/minute. In practice, often less (else a unit would be
out of ammo in 2 minutes).
Actually, sort jogs to combat were part of the Zouave tactics but only 100-200
yds (I think). No where near a mile. Recall too that morning PT wasn't part of
the routine then as now.
I recommend _Battle Tactics of the Civil War_. The author, whose name escapes
me, is a professor at Sandhurst (the British West Point).
Thad Humphries
The author's name is Paddy Griffith. He also wrote a shorter
illustrated paperback that is often found at NPS Visitor Centers -
"Battle in the Civil War: Generalship and Tactics in America
1861-65". A quick way to get a grasp of Civil War tactics.
To Dave N:
Until something better comes along, the standard work on this is Paddy
Griffths: "Civil War Battlefield Tactics" (Yale)
Norm Levitt
The other main reason for holding formation (besides massing fire, as so ably
pointed out in prior posts) was to retain command control. A disorganized
unit was just a mob, soon destined to be sent running back in confusion. It
took discipline and cohesion to sustain the momentum of an attack and take
ground, and the only method for doing this was by holding formation.
This really holds true for all armies in all times: modern formations simply
use dispersed tactics, because they no longer need to mass men to mass fire.
However, the fire team wedge is no less a command control formation than a
battleline - both exist to retain cohesion.
BTW, beware of Griffiths book _Battle Tactics_. While it certainly goes a
long way towards explaining ACW tactics, he also reaches some rather shaky
conclusions about firepower and the effects of rifling that I think are
off-base. He is essentially a Napoleonic scholar, and tends to see things in
1815 terms.
Dave Powell
Subject: Cannonade
A puzzlement to me has always been the ineffectiveness of the
Confederate cannonade on July 3. I have several questions in this regard
that neither Coddington nor Stewart settle to my satisfaction - or maybe
they do but I am too dense to get it. By a rough guess 7000-8000 rounds
were fired by Alexander's guns in the span of an hour and a half at an
area no larger than an acre. Yet they had remarkably little effect.
David Wieck
It's always been a puzzle to me why Lee thought the bombardment would
be any more effective than it was. If anything, his pre-war expertise
was in siting and placing of guns (as in the Mexican War).
To try to answer Mr. Wieck's questions.
1) The placement of Pendleton's guns (exxcept at Alexander's end of
the line) was not optimal (why didn't Lee supervise this more
closely?) but even if it had been, most of the guns would have been at
very long range and shooting transverse to the Federal line, rather
than enfilading it.
2) There was some converging fire--mostly on Cemetery Hill, and it
knocked out quite a few guns; trouble was, the Federals had plenty of
reserve guns that were available to be brought up as soon as the
barrage stopped and the charge started to form up (and why didn't Lee
think about this as well?)
3) After a few rounds from both sides, visibility was wretched, as
Wieck notes. Could guns have been re-sighted blind to make up for the
creep in their elevation? What does Alexander say? But this wouldn't
have solved the main problem of the inconsistency of CW era field
guns, so far as range is concerned.
4) There's no mystery as to why the cannonade was so ineffectual
against infantry. If you've got a line enfiladed, your bound to hit
something; firing transversely, you're lucky to hit anything. The
same situation holds in battleship warfare, where range is so much
trickier than direction, which is why battleship admirals are so
intent on "crossing the T".
5) Solid shot is a hit-or-miss affair, mostly miss. It becomes more
effective against an opponent in or behind woods, because of the
flying splinters and boughs that go all over the place when a shot
goes through. The Confederates forming up for the charge were in or
behind woods; the Federals weren't. So the confederate infantry was much
harder hit, despite the lower volume of Federal fire.
6) Cutting the fuse to the right length on shell or case shot was a
tricky art; under the best of circumstances, a lot of ordinance went
off too early or not at all. But a lot of the Confederate ammo was
old and didn't go off at all.
7) This was the black-powder era. A shell from a field piece simply
didn't have all that much punch--nothing remotely resembling the
deadliness of a WWI shell with a high-explosive warhead. The killing
range of a shell was small, and a little protection went a long way if
you were on the receiving end. Recall: there were no shell-holes at
Gettysburg.
8) The confederate organization insisted on forming batteries with two
or three kinds of gun. (Again: Why did Lee allow this?). Thus, if
one pair of guns ran out of ammo or had their caissons blown up, they
couldn't use the stuff their nearest neighbors were using.
9) Lee's guns were never run forward to support the infantry once the
charge started. They might have been useful at canister range; but
apparently, guns and men were too beat up to do this in time.
A note on canister: A field battery directing fire on advancing,
unprotected infantry at close range (<500 yds) was a very different sort of animal than a battery firing long range stuff. Canister against infantry at close range was more-or-less like a machine gun nest in WWI, provided there was enough shot and the crews were well-trained and steadfast. Which is why one reads of unaided batteries holding up the advance of several regiments of infantry for 10 or 15 minutes.
So to sum up: the great bombardment was inevitably a great Son et
Lumiere show with predictably small military effect; and again, the
great question is: why did a commander of Lee's acumen place such
great faith in it? Longstreet sure as hell didn't, and neither did
Alexander.
Norm Levitt
I agree with Norm's points and would like to chime in with a couple more.
Lee didn't supervise the artillery very much because he didn't know that
much about it. Remember, he was the guy that stood on the ramparts of Ft.
Pulaski in Georgia and assured its commander that the Union forces on Tybee
Island couldn't breach his walls with artillery at that range.(1 mile) It
only took a few hours of bombardment to prove him dead wrong. Rifled
artillery and its uses were still a very new science, and Lee was primarily
an engineer and cavalryman.
Secondly, the Union line was on the crest of a ridge. It is nearly
impossible to land a shell or make it burst exactly on the crest.
Undershooting or overshooting is likely in this situation, even with good
visibility and fuses. The Confederate gunners had neither. Alexander
frequently complained about the quality of Confederate cannon fuses. If you
want an example of the difficulty of this type of shooting, go out and try
to hit the exact ridge line of your roof with a tennis ball. You'll see how
hard it is to land a shell directly on a ridge.
Tom Clemens
Excellent point about the tennis ball.
Stewart in his book on Pickett's Charge has a excellent chapter on the CSA artillery
(mis)placement and (mis)use.
paul....
The tennis ball analogy is a false one. One of those machines
that serves up balls for practice is more apt, but with that you can home
in very nicely on a small area and hit it with regularity. More to the
point, Cemetery Ridge is hardly comparable to the ridge line of a roof.
It has no sharp crest - in fact it hardly has a crest at all. It is
hardly a ridge. It is flat, at the end of a low rise, and doesn't begin
to drop off sharply for some distance beyond. It held 5000 troops and
considerable artillery with room to spare.
To some extant you may be right with the analogy about the machine, but,
those machines can be pre-set, cannons cannot. After every discharge the
guns must be repositioned after the recoil, re-aimed and reloaded. All of
this disrupts aim. Not only reaimed, but reaimed in an environment of smoke,
(yours and theirs), which limits visibility, noise and confusion, and the
discomfort, (fear?) of incoming fire. In short, Civil War cannons,
especially the smoothbores, were not that precise, and could only be as
precise and the gunners aiming them, and those gunners had major
distractions. Assuming that they got all of that right, then you need
reliable range and timing accuracy of the fuses to do the job properly, and
the reports show that the Confederates were frustrated by the failure of
these fuses time and again.
I agree that Alexander did very little to achieve enfilading fire, however
given the unusual circumstances of his command of the bombardment, (Walton
was senior to him) could he have ordered the movement of all of the guns?
Or even a major portion of them? Could he order the fire of the 2nd Corps
guns on Oak Hill or near the town? I think he was given an impossible job,
and his dispatches reflect that feeling.
Tom Clemens
>On Tue, 16 Jan 96 20:49:45 -0500, Harry Hunt wrote:
><>What was Lee thinking?? You would think after Fredericksburg that any attack
><>on troops behind good earth works, that an frontal attack would be out of
><>question. I have been to Gettysburg on a very hot day in August looking
><>across the open mile thinking to myself no way just to much to over come
><>to break the Union lines. Not enough of ever thing for that kind of
><>attack. I would have to tell Marse Robert sorry not today.
><>
>Not only did Lee not learn the lesson neither did Grant (witness Cold
Harbor) or the generals in WWI(which is why a million died at the Somme.)
Grant learnt the lesson, he entrenched and nine months later was victorious.
Forget the Somme - the Brits have a fixation which distorts their view.
The casualties were caused by artillery and were made much worse where the
assaults failed and wounded were left out in no-mans-land. The problem
of WW1 was not breaking the front line, that was easy but breaking
through the line of battle to the green fields beyond.
I really do not think Lee had any choice but to attack on the third day. I
do not think ANV would have succeeded but I think it could have been much closer if
Lee had planned the battle in the same meticulous way he planned the
withdrawal. It was not just the Union position that decided the day it
was other things such as not appreciating how bad Heth's troops suffered on
the first day, the coordination of the attack with Ewell and the artillery.
Anthony.Staunton@pcug.org.au
Lee was thinking that if the artillery did its work well, eliminating or at
least reducing the guns on Cemetery Ridge, and the cavalry did its work well,
got in the rear and either cut off the Federal retreat or attacked in the rear
of the center just as Longstreet's men hit the center, and that Longstreet's
first wave did its work well, piercing the center, the reinforcements
would break the center and roll up the lines toward Cemetery Hill. We keep
forgetting the Pickett's Charge was not simply a few thousand men making a
suicidal assault against an impregnable position.
There was a seminar last year on the ACW that was reported on NPR's All Things
Considered (if any are familiar with this, I'd be interested in finding its
papers). Anyway, NPR did a follow up interview with one researcher who presented
a paper that said, essentially, that Lee wasn't as good a general as many make
him out to be. He pointed out that Lee mostly fought 2d or 3d string quality
commanders like McClellan and that Pickett's Charge was just Lee being Lee. He
noted that in the Seven Days, Lee frontally attacked and McClellan obliged by
pulling back, even when he held all the ground at the end of the day. So, says
the researcher, we're too hard on Burnside--he did what Lee did at Gaines Mill,
it just didn't work this time around. Also, as others have pointed out,
Burnside did a masterly withdrawal back across the Rappahannock.
I haven't been to Gaines Mill, and Fredricksburg is too built up to grasp the
situation 1st hand so I don't know how good that parallel is. Also, I don't
think Lee got all his daring from Jackson, though Jackson features prominently
in Lee's better maneuvers, 2d Manassas Campaign and Chancellorsville.
I like Shelby Foote's remark, "Pickett's Charge is the price the Confederacy
paid for having R.E. Lee as its commander."
Thad Humphries
The ANV had driven the AOP out of good earthworks at Chancellorsville
on the day after Jackson's wounding. Frontal attacks had worked before and
would work again. When they worked, they worked very well; when they did not
work one left the dead piled in windrows.
A good point that should be borne in mind. Lee had seen the success of
Gaines Mill. Unfortunately for his men he forgot about Fredericksburg.
Other generals had the same problem; they had seen or experienced one
success against what looked like a good position, and kept trying to
repeat it.
Jim Epperson
On Tue, 16 Jan 1996 23:53:52 -0500, you wrote:
<>Lee was thinking that if the artillery did its work well, eliminating or at
<>least reducing the guns on Cemetery Ridge, and the cavalry did its work well,
<>got in the rear and either cut off the Federal retreat or attacked in the rear
<>of the center just as Longstreet's men hit the center, and that Longstreet's
<>first wave did its work well, piercing the center, the reinforcements
<>would break the center and roll up the lines toward Cemetery Hill. We keep
<>forgetting the Pickett's Charge was not simply a few thousand men making a
<>suicidal assault against an impregnable position.
<>
Actually it was a suicidal charge against an impregnable position. Lee didn't
realize it at the time but in hindsight that is exactly what it was.
lawrence@arthes.com
Robert W Lawrence writes:
> Actually it was a suicidal charge against an impregnable position. Lee didn't
> realize it at the time but in hindsight that is exactly what it was.
To paraphrase Shelby Foote, "There was scarcely a trained soldier there who
didn't know it was a mistake, except Robert E. Lee and George Pickett... But
who's going to say, 'Marse Robert, I ain't going out there.' Nobody had that
much courage."
Thad Humphries
On the second day a Florida Brigade had reached the crest of Cemetery
Ridge. The position was hardly impregnable.
> On the second day a Florida Brigade had reached the crest of Cemetery
> Ridge. The position was hardly impregnable.
Having taught for seven years at the University of Georgia, I have to
object to this post, in a light-hearted sense, by pointing out that it
was Wright's Georgia Brigade, not the Florida brigade of Lang, that
claimed to reach the crest of Cemetery Ridge.
On a more serious note, I have always understood that this claim by
Wright is disputed. His report describes the terrain he scaled in terms
that would do justice to Little Round Top, and the reports of the men he
was fighting indicate that he did not get as far as he thought. I would
appreciate the comments of others.
Having said all this, Mark's conclusion is correct, that the position was
not impregnable. If Pickett had made his attack in that degree of force
on July 2nd, late in the afternoon, it probably would have succeeded.
But to launch the attack as an isolated assault -- in that context the
position was close to impregnable.
Jim Epperson
Wright's report is very seriously disputed. The Army War College essentially
regards it as fatally flawed. Wrght was likely very confused as to the extent
of his penetration into the line, and one should also bear in mind that his
advance was made at dusk, in the middle of a very confused action, and
against a position stripped of defenders to go support Sickles' stupidity.
Vastly different conditions than those of Pickett's Charge, and hence
immaterial to the actual prospects of success on July 3rd. Lee, of course,
may well have taken Wright at face value, with all the ramifications that
indicates.
Dave Powell
On Tuesday, January 16, 1996 11:53 PM, MattR78@aol.com wrote:
>We keep forgetting the Pickett's Charge was not simply a few thousand men making a
>suicidal assault against an impregnable position.
Very true, Pickett's Charge didn't occur in a tactical vacuum, despite that "popular" history fails to cover any of the other things going on at the time.
I don't wonder, though, if you haven't thrown up one of Lee's weaknesses as a commander. Lee in his less effective engagements (his campaign in West Virginia comes to mind) seems to have depended on too complex plans that required many disparate maneuver formations to converge or strike the enemy at nearly the same time. Given the distance between Stuart's cavalry and the divisions used in the attack, and the problems the ANV had in coordinating attacks throughout the battle, it seems unlikely for the attack as a whole to have succeeded. Throw in Longstreet's opposition to the attack and the history (as I understand it) of inaccurate CSA artillery at long ranges, and it makes me ask, "What was Lee thinking?"
Doug Miller
In a message dated 96-01-16 22:00:35 EST, Bob wrote:
>Not only did Lee not learn the lesson neither did Grant (witness Cold Harbor)
>or the generals in WWI(which is why a million died at the Somme.)Basically no
>one wanted to believe that the Napoleonic tactic of massed infantry against
>fortified positions did not work in the days of rifled guns.
Not quite - that's too facile an explanation.
In hindsight, it is always easy to tell that an idea is passe, or unworkable.
At the time, however, commanders were faced with a conundrum - how to close
and attack. Command control and fire control of the time demanded mass
formations. Effective offensive tactics required both of these things to
succeed. The problem, then was how to overcome tactical drawbacks of the
massed attack without losing the requirements of offensive tactics in
general. In fact, this very question was something virtually every army in
the world struggled with in WWI, and finally solved after vastly greater
slaughter than the ACW.
You should also remember that some frontal attacks worked. Fredericksburg,
for example is an absolutely horrendous example to draw large conclusions
from, because it was not just flawed in concept, but in execution as well.
F'burg was a series of individual brigade and divisional attacks against a
frontal position, and would have been regarded as a rank stupidity at by the
greenest of Napoleonic officers.
The real problem was that neither the problem nor the solution was as self
evident as we see it, looking back on it from 125+ years.
Dave Powell
On Wed, 17 Jan 1996 18:30:34 -0500, you wrote:
<>
<>You should also remember that some frontal attacks worked. Fredericksburg,
<>for example is an absolutely horrendous example to draw large conclusions
<>from, because it was not just flawed in concept, but in execution as well.
<>F'burg was a series of individual brigade and divisional attacks against a
<>frontal position, and would have been regarded as a rank stupidity at by the
<>greenest of Napoleonic officers.
<>
<>The real problem was that neither the problem nor the solution was as self
<>evident as we see it, looking back on it from 125+ years.
<>
I believe the solutions were self evident-several of the solutions were out in
effect by the end of the war(massive entrenching for instance). The problem, in
my view, was the stubbornness of the old army officers reluctant to give up the
tactics and traditions they learned in school. How else can you explain not only
massed infantry attacks but also cavalry charges in WWI? The cases of successful
frontal assaults on a well fortified position were few and far between in the
Civil war. For the life of me I can not understand how the same Robert E Lee who
sat on Maryes Heights watching that ill fated attack could order such an
assault.
lawrence@arthes.com
Lee and Sickles: what a start to a post!!!!
No, this message is not to lump them, but to comment on their joint membership
in the human race (although this and participation in the War may be about
the only two things they had in common).
I have greatly enjoyed the postings on both the Lee line and the Sickles
line; they share one common thread: both the move from Cemetery Ridge by
Sickles and the attack on the ridge by Lee were dumb moves, no matter how
some seem to rationalize them.
However, in defense of Lee, I am convinced that his health played an
important role in his decisions at Gettysburg. Despite his deification, he
was human. Norm has taken the line that he was not a particularly great
general based on kill ratios; his work at Chancellorsville and elsewhere
refutes this. But as Foote aptly says, his decision on the third day was a
bad one, and every experienced soldier knew it.
Sickles was human too, which meant that not even he could screw everything
up. He had to get something right, which is why he apparently did
reasonably well at Chancellorsville. However, his true nature was
revealed in ludicrous decision to ignore orders and advance ahead of the
army, jeopardizing its position.
Ken Miller
Jim Epperson writes:
>But to launch the attack as an isolated assault -- in that context the
>position was close to impregnable.
Again, it was not supposed to be an "isolated assault." See Stuart's report;
Richard Anderson's report; A.P. Hill's report; Alexander's books. There was
supposed to be artillery support, cavalry coordination, and large numbers of
reinforcements.
Do you really believe this? Was Lee STUPID? I think not. I think he
remembered Fredericksburg and did all he could to see that it wouldn't happen
in Pennsylvania. Then his subordinates--Longstreet, Pendleton, and
Stuart--failed to carry out his plans.
Please give citations for anyone who said he thought before the charge that
it would fail, other than Longstreet. It will be a very short list.
On Wed, 17 Jan 1996 22:36:37 -0500, you wrote:
<>Please give citations for anyone who said he thought before the charge that
<>it would fail, other than Longstreet. It will be a very short list.
<>
For starters-
Porter Alexander "Fighting for the Confederacy", Page 252
Wofford to Lee in response to his question about the probability of reaching the
crest of cemetery ridge on July 3(Tucker, "High Tide at Gettysburg" p337)
"No, general I think not"
lawrence@arthes.com
The point is that the -plan- was significantly different from what actually
occurred. "What Lee was thinking" is not the same as "what happened."
Dave Powell writes:
>The real problem was that neither the problem nor the solution was as self
>evident as we see it, looking back on it from 125+ years.
This is the first rule that a historian or one seeking the truth about
history, must not only remember, but adhere to: in order to understand the
past, you must try to understand it on its own terms, as those who lived then
understood. Thus Pickett's Charge must be understood as those who planned it
understood it, not as those who lived through it, or those living 130 years
later understand it. It was most certainly not a suicidal charge.
On Wed, 17 Jan 1996 MattR78@aol.com wrote:
> The point is that the -plan- was significantly different from what actually
> occurred. "What Lee was thinking" is not the same as "what happened."
I'm not sure this is true. There are claims that Hood and McLaws were
supposed to participate, but those claims are easily refuted. Alexander
was supposed to send some guns forward, true, and did not because of some
ammo replenishment foul-ups, but that is about it for deviation from the
plan as far as I know. Oh, yes, perhaps Wilcox's supporting column was
poorly handled. But I would really like to hear what Matt is thinking
about when he refers to "the plan."
Jim Epperson
James F. Epperson
>
> I'm not sure this is true. There are claims that Hood and McLaws were
> supposed to participate, but those claims are easily refuted...
I would think so! Hood was badly wounded the day before and his division very
cutup. I thinks McLaws men were pretty mauled, too, but I'm not sure.
Thad Humphries
On the topic of frontal attacks please note that in the fall of 1864
the ANV delivered several successful frontal attacks in the area west of
Petersburg. By "successful" I mean the attack captured the position targeted
and inflicted more casualties than they sustained. Reams Station is one good
example.
On Thu, 18 Jan 1996 09:14:16 -0500 (CDT), you wrote:
<> On the topic of frontal attacks please note that in the fall of 1864
<>the ANVa delivered several successful frontal attacks in the area west of
<>Petersburg. By "successful" I mean the attack captured the position targeted
<>and inflicted more casualties than they sustained. Reams Station is one good
<>example.
<>
Were these "frontal attacks" preceded by a march of over a mile over open ground
under heavy artillery fire and against a position fortified by 20,000 plus men?
Robert W Lawrence
On Wednesday, January 17, 1996 10:36 PM, MattR78@aol.com wrote:
Have you considered that perhaps the reason the orders weren't carried out was because the plan was fundamentally unworkable? No, Lee wasn't stupid, but during this battle he wasn't his typical self, either. There is a marked pattern of detachment from what was actually happening on the field in Lee's actions on the 2nd and 3rd.
Doug Miller
Matt R wrote:
>The point is that the -plan- was significantly different from what actually
>occurred. "What Lee was thinking" is not the same as "what happened."
A good recently published book on Pickett's Charge is "Pickett's
Charge: Eyewitness Accounts," edited by Richard Rollins. Along with 176
different accounts of the action, grouped into nine different sections,
Rollins writes a compelling introduction in which he argues that,
basically, Pickett's Charge as executed was not Pickett's Charge as
planned.
He notes that to study the charge, one must understand it as an
extension of the strategic plan of the Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania
and the battlefield events of July 1 and 2.
He goes very in-depth with his analysis and it would take up too
much space to reiterate here. If there is a graph that sort of sums up his
thinking, it is this: "On the tactical level the specific elements of
Pickett's Charge began taking shape on the evening of July 2nd and
continued to evolve in the minds of Lee and his subordinates until the
Charge took place. The military operation, as conceived on the evening of
the 2nd, changed considerable on the morning of the 3rd. During its
execution several of its major components failed, were altered by the
events of the moment, or never took place. The result was an attack that
varied significantly from what was planned, or what was ordered."
Available in paperback. Also had a fold-out map that plots the
position of each of the eyewitnesses on the battlefield.
Brian Bennett
>Jim epperson writes:
>
>Do you really believe this? Was Lee STUPID? I think not. I think he
>remembered Fredericksburg and did all he could to see that it wouldn't happen
>in Pennsylvania. Then his subordinates--Longstreet, Pendleton, and
>Stuart--failed to carry out his plans.
>
Surely we are not talking about Lee's folly as executed by Pickett, et al.
Can that be blamed on Longstreet or Pendleton or Stuart? I Don't think so.
I agree with you that Lee probably did not forget about Fredericksburg.
Perhaps "failed to consider" is a better way to think about
Lee/Fredericksburg/Gettysburg. Or perhaps he did consider it and made a
common mistake of military commanders. Perhaps he just overestimated his
troops while underestimating his enemy's.
John Blair
The Reams Station attack covered over 400 yards of open ground to
assault Hancock's Corps which had constructed trenches and breastworks. Heth
made the attack capturing 9 cannon, 3100 small arms, 12 flags, and 2000
prisoners. Federal killed and wounded numbered about 600. Total Union numbers
were about 8000 with 16 guns. Peagram's Artillery Battalion provided a 30
min pre-assault bombardment. The attack was made by Heth and part of Wilcox,
supported by Hampton's cavalry. C.S. casualties were termed "light."
We don't need to get into an extended discussion of Reams Station here --
(it is especially uncomfortable to the spirit of WS Hancock ;-) -- but
there are important differences to that action which render it a poor
parallel to Pickett's Charge.
The Union position at Reams was a squared-U around the station area.
The Rebels attacked the base of the U. The line was poorly laid out and
there was high ground that allowed the Rebel artillery to fire at the
backs of the men on the arms of the U. Consequently there was a great
deal of panic, and the green troops that constituted the bulk of II
Corps at that time broke and fled. At least, that is how I remember
reading of it in a couple of places.
The key differences are the quality of the defenders and the enfilade of
the defensive lines. Those are tactical advantages which can indeed
negate entrenchments. Lee did not have either of those on July 3rd.
I think Lee simply over-estimated his men. It has for a long time been
my view that Pickett's Charge was the ironic and tragic result of Lee's
humility. Lee's character would not allow him to think that he had
defeated Hooker at Chancellorsville; he preferred to believe that (a) God
had willed it; and (b) his men were indeed better than the Federals.
With those two hypotheses it is easy to believe that something like
Pickett's Charge might work.
Jim Epperson
On Thu, 18 Jan 1996 MBRADLEY@MSCC1.MSCC.CC.TN.US wrote:
> There also seems to be to be an assumption that the AoP had fortified
> itself quite well at G/burg. Is it not true that its field works were rather
> scattered and, in many places, non-existent?
Actually, the "fieldworks" were mostly non-existent by 1864 standards,
certainly in the area of the Charge. The stone wall would serve as a
natural breastwork, of course, but the notion that Pickett was making an
attack against lines like existed at Petersburg is indeed false. There
was no abatis that I am aware of, for instance.
The biggest terrain problem was the long stretch of open ground which
was swept by a lot of good artillery.
Jim Epperson
Final comment on Reams Station. The Union position was not as weak,
nor the Confederate position so strong, as Prof. Epperson presents it. Hancock
had defended the position quite well until Heth arrived.
On Thu, 18 Jan 1996 MBRADLEY@MSCC1.MSCC.CC.TN.US wrote:
> Final comment on Reams Station. The Union position was not as weak,
> nor the Confederate position so strong, as Prof. Epperson presents it. Hancock
> had defended the position quite well until Heth arrived.
This doesn't gainsay what I said, though, that the success of the attack
was due in large part to the greenness of the defenders and an artillery
enfilade effect, neither of which were present in Pickett's Charge.
> At G'burg, the artillery bombardment was more effective than some
> comments have made it seem. Remember, some Union infantry were so enfiladed
> they crossed the stone wall in the cemetery area to take shelter on the
> Confederate side, feeling safer there.
The cemetery is not near the designated point of attack, though. Lots
of Union soldiers were forced to scamper all over hell and back to avoid
the cannonade, but they were on the reverse slope of the Ridge and were
not the troops that Pickett et all were going to be engaging. This
doesn't make the cannonade effective; in fact, it is evidence of its
ineffectiveness.
> Recent comments on this list have also pointed out that Pickett was not under direct >artillery fire the entire distance, the ground rolls and there are many places where troops >were partially or wholly sheltered for at least part of the time.
But most, if not all, of that occurred at long range. As the men closed
in the guns had a free field of fire. And the swales in the ground did
not hide the fact that an attack was coming. The point of broken ground
close up to the point of attack is that it shields the defender from
knowledge of the attack that is about to break upon him. This was the
point with Upton's attack at Spotsylvania, and Longstreet's attack at
Chickamauga. At Gettysburg everyone and his mother-in-law knew the
Rebels were coming and where they were coming from. The attacking
formation was large enough that I don't think it was ever entirely
hidden from view, so the artillery always had targets to fire upon.
> As to Lee having confidence in his men, why should he not have?
I didn't mean to imply he shouldn't have had confidence in his men; my
point was that he let what happened at C-ville convince him they were
close to invincible. That's too much confidence.
> If Lee attributed these victories to God rather than to his men then we
> can say Lee felt God would grant his arms victory again. But, Calvinism did
> not lead one to feel that such blessings came unaided. It was the role of the
> human element to take all preparations and to exert themselves to the fullest
> if such divine blessings were to be expected. In short, thinking victory came
> from God would not lead Lee to assume he could be lazy or sloppy.
Again, I never said this. I think it did lead him to believe more
strongly that God was on his side, hence that a difficult task which he
assigned to his army would have more of God's help. The issue is not
that Lee made mistakes in the planning of Pickett's Charge; the issue
is that in ordering the attack at that time and place he bit off more
than his men could chew.
For example, I might someday decide to write a textbook on my research
specialty in mathematics. This is a task clearly within my abilities,
but I might well do a poor (lazy or sloppy) job. On the other hand, I
might also decide to write a textbook in macro-economics, about which I
know damned little. In this case, I could be as dedicated and careful
as possible, but the result would likely be a disaster.
BTW, I don't think Lee was a Calvinist; he was a high-church
Episcopalian, which I think is something different. But that is a minor
issue.
Jim Epperson
In a message dated 96-01-18 07:37:05 EST, you write:
>
>I would think so! Hood was badly wounded the day before and his division
very cutup. I thinks McLaws men were pretty mauled, too, but I'm not sure.
>
Losses in both divisions ran to between 40 and 50 per cent. In later years,
the anti-Longstreet gang made some effort to claim that they should have
attacked, but this seems to be pure fabrication. The original stuff makes it
pretty clear that they were considered too cut up for offensive action.
Dave Powell
In a message dated 96-01-17 23:11:13 EST, you write:
>Again, it was not supposed to be an "isolated assault." See Stuart's
>report; Richard Anderson's report; A.P. Hill's report; Alexander's books. There was
>supposed to be artillery support, cavalry coordination, and large numbers of
>reinforcements.
Large numbers of reinforcements...?
Anderson was tasked with supporting the advance with two brigades. Strength,
about 2000 men. Name another infantry organization that was ordered to
support that attack. I can find none.
Dave Powell
In a message dated 96-01-17 22:44:15 EST, Matt wrote:
>
>Do you really believe this? Was Lee STUPID? I think not. I think he
>remembered Fredericksburg and did all he could to see that it wouldn't
>happen in Pennsylvania. Then his subordinates--Longstreet, Pendleton, and
>Stuart--failed to carry out his plans.
>
Oops. Lee gave the orders for Pickett's charge. Hard to argue that it was
really someone else's flawed execution that made it a FUBAR of the worst
order...
Dave Powell
Lee probably thought little about tennis balls or golf swings when
he ordered the Confederate cannons to neutralize the Federal artillery
before the assault. Surely Lee knew exactly what the chances of such a
cannonade had of succeeding.
Either 1) Lee was unrealistic in his expectations
At any rate, Alexanders' failure to neutralize the fire of the
Federal batteries is the chief cause of the failure of the assault.
Dennis
Brian writes....
>
> A good recently published book on Pickett's Charge is "Pickett's
>Charge: Eyewitness Accounts," edited by Richard Rollins.
I love this book - I don't leave home without it. As Brian says
anyone who is interested in the conversations about whether the attack was
flawed or poorly executed should read his introduction. Those who think
Stuart was an integral part of the attack will find Rolins squarely in that
corner. But even better, anyone who likes to just sit and look across the
field from either side from any position will find a excellent first hand
account in this book.
The part of the intro that I find most interesting is his contention
that the charge was a bayonet charge (xxii-xxii). Rollins says these are
the characteristics of a bayonet charge.
1) Troops would be told to fix bayonets
It seems to me that the above would apply to almost any advance made
by Confederates in the direction of the enemy, Archer - Day One; Hood - Day
Two, etc. The crucial difference between these charges and a bayonet charge
would be, say, sticking somebody with a bayonet at the end of the charge???
Rollins admits that the biggest drawback to his theory is that
there is not one written order or report of one that supports his contention.
Can anybody supply evidence that there was large spread usage of
bayoneting in the hand to hand combat at the angle - that it was indeed the
primary means by which Lee thought he could take the position?
Dennis
To Dennis:
How the hell could Alexander (who had de facto command only of
Longstreet's guns) have "neutralized" the Federal batteries? There
was plenty of Fed. Artillery in reserve. There could even have been
more had not Hunt been overcautious (he withdrew many of his guns to a
reserve artillery park a couple of mile behind the line). Obviously,
the Federals had far too many guns to be "neutralized" a battery at a
time. Moreover, as we know, the batteries that hammered Pickett,
Pettigrew and Trimble from Cemetery Hill were brought up after the
barrage, as were a number of other batteries further down the ridge.
Again, the question must be: What the hell was Lee thinking?
Norm Levitt
To respond to a prior post, there was no contact at all between
Stuart's cavalry and the 6th Corps infantry. By the way, I stand firmly
behind what I said earlier about Stuart's role in supporting Pickett's Charge.
There's been a lot of discussion about grand assaults which parallel
Pickett's Charge. The best analogy I can come up with is Fitz-John Porter's
assault with the Fifth Corps at the Deep Cut at Second Manassas. In many
ways, it was far worse than what Pickett's men faced. The march was as
long, with 12,000 men compacted into a very small area with an incline which
was much steeper, an 18 gun battalion of Confederate artillery was
enfilading Porter's men the whole way, and the oblique forced Porter's men
into a much more compact area than that faced by Pickett. The charge was
worse, and was every bit as much a bloody failure as Pickett's Charge. For
those who are interested, read John Hennessy's superb Return to Bull Run.
Thus, Marse Robert's decision to send Pickett forward was one which
had several prior examples (Deep Cut, Fredericksburg) to demonstrate that
direct frontal assaults were bound to fail.
Eric Wittenberg
At 10:36 PM 1/17/96 -0500, you wrote:
>
>Do you really believe this? Was Lee STUPID? I think not. I think he
>remembered Fredericksburg and did all he could to see that it wouldn't happen
>in Pennsylvania. Then his subordinates--Longstreet, Pendleton, and
>Stuart--failed to carry out his plans.
>
Longstreet did just about everything he could do. Stuart, as I recollect,
was to carry out a diversionary attack on the Federal rear, but it was meant
to be more of a nuisance than a major threat to the Federal rear. Ewell's
attack on the Federal right at Culp's Hill had petered out by the time of
the bombardment, and I do not think that he had any troops left that had not
been beaten up over the three days.
Lee was plagued by illness, perhaps, but his major problem was the lack of
an adequate staff. His staff was minuscule when compared with that of his
enemy, or even his subordinate commanders. Before Gburg, with Jackson and
Longstreet working together, he did not need a large staff. After the death
of Jackson, more of the planning and logistical load fell on Lee's staff
because of the mediocrity of his subordinates. This resulted in lack of
coordination among units (the 2nd and 3rd days), unfortunate situations like
Johnston's reconnaissance, and other omissions and miscues (artillery ammo
and guns sent to the rear on 3rd day).
To Dennis:
Funny thing about bayonets.
In his generally excellent "Gettysburg" book, Kent Gramm makes note of
the fact that reports from field dressing stations throughout the war
(and at Gettysburg) indicate that bayonet wounds were quite rare--less
than 5% of casualties, as I recall. Gramm makes the (to me
outlandish) suggestion that that was because most bayonet thrusts
were instantly fatal!! Unlikely, to say the least.
The more obvious conclusion is simply that, for whatever reason,
bayonets were rarely used as a weapon, even though there are frequent
reports of "clubbing muskets".
Comments?
Norm Levitt
Norman Levitt wrote:
>From what I gather, the main reason that bayonets were used so infrequently
was that it was "distasteful". As difficult as it is to convince
yourself to kill your fellow man in battle (less difficult when you
realize he is trying to kill you), it is even more challenging to
resolve to stab someone with a bayonet. I believe that even in the
20th Maine's bayonet charge, few men were actually bayoneted - someone charging
you with a bayonet can convince you rather quickly to surrender.
A Park guide told me he believed that Colonel Jeffords of the 4th Michigan
was the only Colonel commanding a regiment who was killed by a bayonet thrust
(which was followed quickly by the Confederate soldier discharging his musket -
a little "over-kill", but a tactic I remember being suggested in WWII movies
to remove the enemy from your bayonet....)
Dave N
> "The more obvious conclusion is simply that, for whatever reason,
> bayonets were rarely used as a weapon, even though there are frequent
> reports of "clubbing muskets"."
>
> From what I gather, the main reason that bayonets were used so infrequently
> was that it was "distasteful"...
Not only that, it's difficult. Every tried to learn fencing or a martial art?
Good bayonet drill is much the same. The movement are unnatural and must be
executed swiftly, accurately, against a moving and hostile adversary. However
easy it looks, it's hard when you try it. There just wasn't much practice on
this in the ACW.
> A Park guide told me he believed that Colonel Jeffords of the 4th Michigan
> was the only Colonel commanding a regiment who was killed by a bayonet thrust
> (which was followed quickly by the Confederate soldier discharging his musket -
> a little "over-kill", but a tactic I remember being suggested in WWII movies
> to remove the enemy from your bayonet....)
Another reason it wasn't done often. The human body enfolds itself over the
blade and it can be extremely difficult to remove. I understand this from what
I've read and what my father told me. A career NCO, he used to fascinate us
with tale of WWII and Korea. But only once do I recall him talking about
killing. We were young and asked. He got very sad and described a time in Italy
where he shot a man point blank in the forehead and, so after, bayoneted one
in the chest. He had to stand on the body and wrench hard to pull it out. The
tone of his voice and the look on his face ensured we never asked about that
again.
Thad Humphries
In "Attack and Die", McWhiney and Jamieson spend several pages discussing
bayonet use. Quoting from the OR, they mention several battles in which at
least somewhat significant fighting with bayonets occurred: Frayser's Farm,
Spotsylvania, Kennesaw Mtn, Jonesboro, etc.
Pat Ellington
>The more obvious conclusion is simply that, for whatever reason,
>bayonets were rarely used as a weapon, even though there are frequent
>reports of "clubbing muskets".
>
The bayonet is generally conceded to have been the least-used weapon in the
Civil War. The Federals, with stricter uniform regulations, kept their
bayonets and used them on sentry duty and parades. They may have even used
them in anger in some cases (notably Upton's assault at Spotsylvania). Most
Confederates, however, with the possible exception of the Stonewall Brigade
early in the War, used every opportunity to "lose" their bayonets as just
one more unnecessary weight on a long forced march. They thought, and
correctly so, that every ounce of extra weight slowed them up and/or tired
them out. The officers generally went along with this because they were
more concerned with straggling than the possibility of a need for the
bayonets. Besides, the successful use of the bayonet requires constant
training exercises (I never could get the hang of the thing), and just about
precludes the rapid reloading of the rifle. Clubbing the musket would be my
choice, as it was for most of the ACW troops.
Jack Kelly
In a message dated 96-01-20 08:11:14 EST,Dave wrote:
>The line Lee ultimately held was far too long for his available troops. I've
>mentioned the failure of Ewell to mount a solid attack on the evening of the
>2nd as a significant failure for the CSA command, and the length of his line
>was likely the main reason: Ewell devoted too much of his command to holding
>ground, and was unable to mass sufficient force, for any offensive options.
>In fact, all of 2nd Corps' (CSA) actions on July 2nd and 3rd bear this out -
>never was Ewell able to put more than one division into combat at a time.
Dave..
Ed...
On the liength of Lee's line:
This is another of those mysteries of Lee's Gettysburg thinking that
remained unexplained. What the hell was Ewell's left doing bent round
the fishhook, at least on July 3rd? Why didn't Lee just shorted his
front after the reverses of the morning of the 3rd? At that point,
certainly, he must have had a map in front of him, which surely would
have shown what a nightmare position he was in, facing a larger force
that had beautiful interior lines and secure flanks.
While we're on the subject, why didn't he see what Grant saw: When
you have an extended line of several miles, the first damn thing you
do is run telegraph lines around the perimeter, down to the division
level, so you can see what the hell is going on and keep your
subordinates in synch. This seems completely obvious; why wasn't it
done? Even if materiel wasn't at hand, why didn't Lee see the need
for beefing up his staff and couriers, even if it meant drafting them
on the spot from other units?
Mysteries, mysteries.
Norm Levitt
There have been some good points made about the length of Marse Robert's
line. Further, there have been some good points made about Ewell's failure
to attack properly on the second due to the length of his line.
Allow me to add some insight. Part of the reason why Ewell's line
was extended too far out on the left was due to the presence of David M.
Gregg's cavalry division in the area near East Cavalry Field. Remember that
Allegheny Johnson did not have the services of the Stonewall Brigade for the
attacks on July 2. Why not? There's a very good reason. The Stonewall
Brigade was pinned down on Brinkerhoff's Ridge, engaged in a fight with the
dismounted troopers of Gregg's Division.
We all know that the Stonewall Brigade was one of the best and
hardest-fighting of all of the Confederate infantry units.
Query: If Gregg's men do not tie up the Stonewall Brigade, and if
these men are available for Johnson's assaults on Culp's Hill, does the
addition of this tough, veteran brigade tip the scales in favor of the
Confederates on Culp's Hill? Perhaps then the length of Lee's line is not
too long. Perhaps it does not become an issue at all. If so, the entire
outcome of the battle changes.
Although little know (and for those who are interested, I commend
you to Paul Shevchuck's work in the first issue of GB magazine) about the
fight at Brinkerhoff's Ridge, and although it is not that interesting in
terms of tactics, this small engagement turned out to be a crucial element
to the development of the Battle of Gettysburg.
Just some food for thought....
Eric Wittenberg
In a message dated 96-01-20 09:20:07 EST, Norm writes:
>
>While we're on the subject, why didn't he see what Grant saw: When
>you have an extended line of several miles, the first damn thing you
>do is run telegraph lines around the perimeter, down to the division
>level, so you can see what the hell is going on and keep your
>subordinates in synch. This seems completely obvious; why wasn't it
>done? Even if materiel wasn't at hand, why didn't Lee see the need
>for beefing up his staff and couriers, even if it meant drafting them
>on the spot from other units?
Well, Norm, Lee - unlike Grant - had neither the time nor the field telegraph
units to go around erecting such a set-up.
However, as to couriers - a good point. The ANV was forever understaffed
compared to it's counterpart, and Lee, who set up his military family, should
bear much of the blame for this. On the other hand, as far as I've read, Lee
never sent any officers to urge on Ewell on the evening of July 2nd, or even
investigate the extent of that officer's attack. If no direction from the top
exists, more couriers in the system are not likely to solve the problem...
Dave Powell
In a message dated 96-01-20 08:39:12 EST, Ed wrote::
>I totally agree with this statement...Question: Is this not the logical end
>result of an Army that devotes itself to an entire defensive campaign? Then
>changing without coordination, etc. would lead to these type of deficiencies?
Ed,
I'm not sure of the direction your taking, here. In fact, I think the ANV
could be characterized as an army that had plenty of experience with the
tactical offensive, and quite successfully on occasion.
To be sure, deficiencies did exist. I think they were organic to the
structure and laissez-faire attitude of Lee's command style, not the
outgrowth of some excessive defensive bent.
Dave Powell
In a message dated 96-01-20 10:22:52 EST, Eric wrote:
>
> Query: If Gregg's men do not tie up the Stonewall Brigade, and if
>these men are available for Johnson's assaults on Culp's Hill, does the
>addition of this tough, veteran brigade tip the scales in favor of the
>Confederates on Culp's Hill? Perhaps then the length of Lee's line is not
>too long. Perhaps it does not become an issue at all. If so, the entire
>outcome of the battle changes.
I think that the real problem with Ewell's line is getting involved at Culp's
Hill in the first place. Once there, troops had to be diverted to
Brinkerhoff's Ridge to protect what was Johnson's rear, given the orientation
of his front vis a vis the Federal line on Culps. Might it not have been
better to anchor Ewell's line no further than Benner's Hill? Certainly a line
using the reverse slopes of Benner's would have the added benefit of arty
support. While fighting in the woods around Culp's Hill, the CSA 2nd Corps
Guns were all but wasted.
To answer your direct question, though, Eric, I don't think Walker's Brigade
would've tipped the scales that much. Once plunged into the woods, tactical
control went to hell, and tended to disorganize attacks more than defenses.
I'd rather have used this brigade on E. Cemetery Hill on the night of July
2nd, where even a small attack met with some success. A couple more brigades
here would have been far more valuable than lost in the trees around Culps.
Dave Powell
Dennis wrote:
>
> Either 1) Lee was unrealistic in his expectations
Tom Clemens
Please note that participants in the charge on July 3 seemed more
concerned about rifle fire than about artillery. The survivors noted that they
still felt able to break the Union line when they arrived within rifle range.
I think the decisive factor was the flanking fire delivered by, I think, a
Vermont unit.
You said:
On to Pickett's Charge, There are many reference's to the question as to
"Was this a folly?", in the Historical Papers. Lee's adjutant states in a
memo that he believes that success would have been there had the plan been
faithfully carried out. Pickett was never intended to go in unsupported.
According to Taylor, Hood or Mclaws were to have followed or supported
Pickett, and Pettigrew and Anderson were to advance. This according to
Taylor was the design of Lee. Obviously it did not happen this way.
Furthermore, Colonel Allan of Ewell's staff stated "There was nothing foolish
in Pickett's charge had it been executed as designed. Again we are talking
of coordination of attack. It is obvious to me that these men felt if the
attacks had come off as designed, in coordination, they could have won the
battle.
But they did not and that's why we get to have these wonderful discussions.
Could the ANV won the battle and the war, probably not. There was just too
much Northern fire power in that area. Could they have scared the crap out
of them for awhile. I think the answer to this is yes.
Mike VanHuss
> Please note that participants in the charge on July 3 seemed more
>concerned about rifle fire than about artillery. The survivors noted that they
>still felt able to break the Union line when they arrived within rifle range.
>I think the decisive factor was the flanking fire delivered by, I think, a
>Vermont unit.
>
No doubt about it, the rifled musket still ruled the battlefield. That
does not mean that artillery fire was superfluous. The intention to drive
off Union guns by cannonade of the ridge would allow the Confederates to
approach the position with fewer casualties and formation intact to deliver
counterfire. If the bombardment were intense enough, it might even reduce
the number of infantry units there to oppose the Confederate advance. There
are incidents during the war of units retreating or changing position due to
artillery fire. Cemetery Ridge might have been one of them had the
circumstances been more favorable to the Confederacy. As you correctly
point out, it didn't work out that way, but that does mean it was
preordained not work out at all.
Tom Clemens
Could Pickett's Charge have been repelled with artillery only?
"McGilvery always stoutly maintained that had General Hancock not
interfered and had Hazzard reserved his fire, the enemy could not have got
a handful of men through the crossfire which Hazzard and he would have
poured over the open field in front of the second corps." Hunt in
Bachelder papers v II , 827.
Or, was the infantry all that was needed to repel the attack?
The obvious answer is that it took both, but in view of the Hunt/Hancock
feud over artillery and the controversies involving the infantry units at
the Angle, I thought there might be some useful topics in this issue.
Dennis
Since I haven't been around for maybe four months, I think I will reintroduce
myself. My name is Paul (Douglas) Macomber. I am a reenactor with the 69th NYSV
and 7th Virginia. Now to elaborate on your post, the Vermont unit was the 16th
Vermont. While the 13th Vermont poured in volley after volley. The 16th moved
from behind the 13th and flanked the 24th Virginia of Kemper's brigade. The 24th
scattered and unable to continue broke off. The 16th about faced and fired
right into Col. Lang's Floridians.
Paul (Doulgas) Macomber
The units that see receive the least attention are the Vermonters. After
reading Howard Coffin's FULL DUTY, I began to study with interest Vermont's role
in Gettysburg, I then found out that I had two ancestors, Patrick Marr Johnathan Marr(Johnathan was wounded during Picketts charge)who fought with the
16th Vermont, Co.A.
Some interesting notes I found:
-The First Vermont Brigade participated in "Death March" to Gettysburg. The
16th spent the night on picket duty on the night of July 2nd and 3rd in front of
Hancocks line.
-The 16th attacked Kempers flank in the famous flanking attacking, then
about-faced and attacked Lang's Floridians.
Some of the recent discussion about Pickett raised an interesting issue. I
read somewhere (I don't remember where) that Pickett may have stayed too far
behind his troops during the charge. Yet in the movie Gettysburg, he seems
to be fairly close to the action. Not knowing anything about battle
formations, I don't know where he should have been. Anyone know anything
about this?
Kip,
>During the advance, the division commander should be in
>the center of the "box" formed by this formation.
Which from a command and control standpoint is pretty much the argument
that Stewart promotes.
Kathy Harrison - the chief historian of the GNMP - gives evidence in the
article 'Where was Pickett during Pickett's charge', that Pickett was
somewhere in the vicinity of the Wentz house (near the Peach Orchard and
millerstown/wheatfield road). Kathy is an excellent researcher and her
opinion always carries heavy weight. Actual evidence pinpointing the
location of Pickett during the assault, as Kathy herself points out in her
article, is a great rarity. Some accounts even place him behind the
Confederate line on Seminary Ridge (ala the infamous 5 forks shad bake).
There is a picture accompanying Kathy's article that shows what a great
view of the battle line, including Wilcox's command, a position at the
Wentz house would give. Having no incontrovertible evidence to put forth to
bolster my claim, all I can say about my opinion is that I 'like the idea'
of Pickett being in the area of the Codori house. It seems to me to be the
most reasonable place for him to have been to exercise control of his command.
Terry Moyer
In an age of "radio-less" communications, the ideal location for a Civil War
division commander would be a "central" location, behind his lead brigades
and to the front (initially anyway) of any reserve brigades. In this
location, he would have the clearest view of the action and be able to send
his couriers more directly to any of his brigade commanders. Any division
attack formation with more than a two-brigade front was generally asking for
trouble because the division commander simply could not see and control that
wide a formation. In the same vein, it usually meant trouble if the
supporting battleline was not also of the same division. So if a division
consisted of three or four brigades, two would form the first line of
battle, and the remaining brigades would form a second battleline or
reserve, ideally. During the advance, the division commander should be in
the center of the "box" formed by this formation. Longstreet was generally
very careful when preparing for an assault that the formations allowed for
the greatest control by his division commanders.
Hope this helps.
----
Michael R. Brasher, President
Folks,
BTW, Kathleen Georg Harrison wrote "Where Was Pickett During Pickett's
Charge" in Civil War Quarterly, Volume XI. I got my copy from Terry Moyer.
As usual, Kathy does an excellent job on this subject.
Bill Cameron
SOLDIER OF THE SOUTH; General Pickett's War Letter to His Wife
Arthur Crue Inman, ed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Dated, July 3, 1863 (p 53-58)
Can my prettice do patchwork? If she can, she must piece
together these penciled scraps of soiled paper and make out of them,
not a log-cabin quilt, but a wren's nest, cement it with love and
fill it with blue and golden speckled eggs of faith and hope, to
hatch out greater love yet for us.
Well, Sallie, the long, wearying march from Chambersburg, through
dust and heat beyond compare, brought us here yesterday (a few miles
from Gettysburg). Though my poor men were almost exhausted by the
march in the intense heat, I felt that the exigencies demanded my
assuring Marse Robert that we had arrived and that, with a few hours
rest, my men would be equal to anything he might require of them. I
sent Walter with my message and rode on myself to Little Round Top to
see Old Peter, who, I tell you, was mighty glad to see me. And now,
just think of it, though the old war-horse was watching AP Hill's
arrack upon the center of Hood and McLaws of his own corps, who had
struck Sickles, he turned, and before referring to the fighting or
asking about the march, inquired after *you* my darling. While we
were watching the fight, Walter came back with Marse Robert's reply
to my message, which was in part: "Tell Pickett I'm glad he has come,
that I can always depend upon him and his men, but that I shall not
want him this evening."
We have been on the *qui vive*, my Sallie, since midnight; and as
early as three o'clock were on the march. About half past three,
Dary's pistol signaled the Yankees' attack upon Culp's Hill, and with
it's echo a wail of regret went up from my very soul that the two
brigades of my old division had been left behind. Oh, God!--if only
I had them!--a surety for the honor of Viginina, for I can depend
upon them, little one. They know your soldier and would follow them
into the very jaws of death, and he will need them--right there, too,
before he's through.
At early dawn, darkened by the threatening rain, Armistead, Garnett,
Kemper and your soldier held a heart-to-geart pow-wow.
All three send regards to you, and Old Lewis pulled a ring from
his little finger, and, making me take it, said, "Give this little
token, George, please, to her of the sunset eyes, with my love, and
tell her the 'old man' says since he could not be the lucky dog he's
mighty glad that you are."
Dear old Lewis--dear old 'Lo,' as Marguder always called him,
being short for Lothario. Well, my Sallie, I'll keep the ring for
you, and someday I'll take it to John Tyler and have it made into a
breast-pin and set around with rubies and diamonds and emeralds. You
will be the pearl, the other jewel. Dear old Lewis!
Just as we three seperated to go our different ways after
silently clasping hands, our fears and prayers voiced in the "Good
luck, old man," a summons came from Old Peter, and I immediately rode
to the top of the ridge where he and Marse Robert were making a
reconnissance of Meade's positon. "Great God!" said Old Peter as I
came up. "Look, general Lee, at the insurmountable difficulties
between our line and that of the Yankees--the steep hills--the tiers
of artillery--the fences--the heavy skirmish line--And then we'll
have to fight our infantry against their batteries. Look at the
ground we'll have to charge over, nearly a mile of that open
ground there under the rain of their cannister and their shrapnel."
"The enemy is there, General Longstreet, and I am going to
strike him," said Marse Robert in his firm, quiet, determined voice.
About 8 o'clock, I rode with them along our line of prostrate
infantry. They had been told to lie down to prevent attracting
attention, and though they had been forbidden to cheer they
voluntraily arose and lifted in reverential adoration their caps to
our beloved commander as we rode slowly along. Oh, the
repsonsibility for the lives of such men as these! Well, my darling,
their fate and that of our beloved Southland will be settled ere your
glorious brown etes rest on these scraps of penciled paper--your
soldier's last letter, perhaps.
Our line of battle faces Cemetary Ridge. Our detatchments have
been thrown forward to support our artillery which streches over a
mile along the crests of Oak Ridge and Seminary Ridge. The men are
laying in the rearm ny darling, and the hot July sun pours its
scorcing rays almost vertically down upon them. The suffering and
waiting are almost unbearable.
Well, my sweetheart, at one o'clock the awful silence was broken
by a cannon shot, and then another, and then more than a hundred guns
shook the hills from crest to base, answered by more than another
hudred--the whole world a blazing volcano--the whole of heaven a
thunderbolt--then darkness and absolute silence--then the grim and
gruesome, low-spoken columns. My brave Virginians are to attack in
front. Oh, God in mercy help me as He never helped me before!
I have ridden up to report to Old Peter. I shall give him this
letter to mail to you and a package to give you if--Oh, my darling,
do you feel the love of my heart, the prayer, as I write that fatal
word 'if'?
Old Peter laid his hand over mine and said:--"I know, George, I
know--but I can't do it, boy. Alexander has my instructions. He
will give you the order." There was silence, and his hand still
rested on mine when a courier rode up and handed me a note from
Alexander....
...I closed my letter to you a little before three o'clock and
rode up to Old Peter for orders. I found him like a great lion at
bay. I have never seen him so grave and troubled. For several
minutes after I saluted him, he looked at me without speaking. Then
in an agonized voice, the reserve all gone, he said:
"Pickett, I am being crucified at the thought of the scarifice of
life which this attack will make. I have instructed Alexander to
watch the effect of our fire upon the enemy, and when it beings to
tell he must take the reposibility and give you the orders, for I
can't"
While he was speaking a note was brought to me from Alexander.
After reading it I handed it to him, asking if I should obey and go
forward. He looked at me for a moment, then held out his hand.
Presently, clasping his other hand over mine without speaking he
bowed his head upon his breast. I shall never forget the look in his
face nor the clasp of his hand whin I said--"Then, General, I shall
lead my Division on." I had ridden only a few paces when I
remembered your letter and (forgive me) thoughtlessly scribbled in the
corner of the envelope, "If Old Peter's nod means death then good-by
and God bless you, little one," turned back and asked the dear old
chief if he would be good enough to mail it for me. And he took your
letter from me, my darling, I saw tears glistening on his cheeks and
beard. The stern old war-horse, God Bless him, was weeping for his
men, and I know, praying too that this cup might pass from them. I
obeyed the silent assent of his bowed head, an assent given against
his own convictions--given in anguish, with reluctance...
Your sorrowing
To Heather Peake:
Thanks for posting the Pickett letters.
FWIW, I think they should be read with a great big salt-shaker at
hand. They have all the earmarks of having been cooked up, or at
least heavily edited, post-bellum. For one thing, we find Pickett,
who supposedly has just come up from Chambersburg with his division,
using the standard names "Culp's Hill" and "Cemetary Ridge"; it's
unlikely that he'd know either, especially given that "Cemetary Ridge"
was not in use until after the battle, when it was invented for
the express purpose of giving a name to the position of the Federal
line. As we all know, it's hardly perceptible as high ground to the
casual eye.
Am I right in assuming that the "originals" of these letters don't
exist?
It's an interesting document, though, if one is interested in post-war
mythmaking. But who knows how reliable it is as evidence of what Lee
and Longstreet thought and said.
Norm Levitt
The Pickett letters are forgeries, concocted by Sallie. Gary Gallagher has
demonstrated this and produced the definitive paper that was published
several years ago, I believe, in the North Carolina Historical Review.
-- Dave
Yesterday after I posted the Pickett letters, I wrote Dennis
about there authenticity, and I think I should have posted it to the
whole group. So I'll remedy that now.
From what I can find out, these are authentic, but heavily
edited. Sallie Pickett undoubtedly did some cut and paste jobs on
the originals, and was particularly careful to omit her beau's less
than gallant obvervations of Marse Robert. The editor of the book,
no doubt, inserted what had become commonplace names like "Little
Round Top," etc, by the 1920s, but that the Confederates probably
would not have known at the time.
Still, before we invalidate them as a historical source, let's
take a second look, if anyone is interested. Compare it to
other eyewitness reports of the encounter. Does Alexander have
anything of the scene in his memiors? Moxley Sorrel in
"Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer"? Longstreet himself
in "Manassas to Appomattox"?
Also, all letters, journals, etc, are subjective. Strong of
feelings and opinions and somewhat loose with
fact. That said, can we accept these as an accurate reflection of
the feelings Pickett may have had during the countdown to the charge,
and does that increase their historical value?
Heather
Hi Heather
>That said, can we accept these as an accurate reflection of
>>the feelings Pickett may have had during the countdown to the charge,
>>and does that increase their historical value?
I think their value is the "color" they add to the Gettysburg story. There
is more to studying Gettysburg than historic fact. Gordon meeting Barlow,
Warren looking at glistening bayonets, and Pickett writing love letters
before his charge are all part of the Gettysburg experience. That's not
unimportant. As to their historical value, I don't think they have any.
You can't tell if you are reading about Pickett's feelings, or what Sallie
thought he was feeling, or what Sallie thought he should have been feeling,
or what some editor thought would look good and sell books. A lot of this
stuff is "Strong of feelings and opinions and somewhat loose with fact" but
these letters are clearly "made up" and as such, serve to demonstrate what
can be done to "history" with a pen.
They are however, fun to read and again, interesting.
Thanks for posting them.
Bill
Ed...
From: Dave Navarre <73613.1150@compuserve.com>
From: Norman Levitt
The charge of the 1st Minn.
Farnsworth's Cavalry charge
Not to mention:
Hood's assault at Franklin
The Army of the Cumberland at Missionary Ridge
Burnside's AoP at Fredericksburg
And also;
The Somme, Ypres, Verdun, Gallipoli, the Kursk Salient, Leningrad,
Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Charonaea, Thermopylae, Dien-bien Phu, Agincourt
(and I'm not singling out any particular side for any of these).
From: jblair@roanoke.infi.net (John Blair)
From: GaTechFan@aol.com"Some managed to steal a look at the ground ahead, and like their officers
they were sobered by what they saw. One such, a Tennessee sergeant from Fry's
brigade, walked forward to the edge of the woods...and was so startled by the
realization of what was about to be required of him that he spoke aloud,
asking himself the question: 'June Kimble, are you going to do your duty?'
The answer, too, was audible: 'I'll do it, so help me God,' he told himself.
He felt better then."
(Foote, Vol. 2, pp537-538[paperback]).
From: benedict@ns.moran.com (Benedict R Maryniak)"When you rise to your feet as we did today, I tell you the enthusiasm of
ardent breasts in many cases ain't there, and instead of burning to avenge
the insults of our country, families and altars and firesides, the thought
is most frequently, Oh, if I could just come out of this charge safely how
thankful would I be!"
From: jschuu@ix.netcom.com (John Schuurman )
And then again, the fields of glory and the stories of valor that
happened in such a context mean even more.
From: benedict@ns.moran.com (Benedict R Maryniak)
In a recent television interview, 1988 Olympic shooting champion Silvia
Sperber was asked how she had prepared for the 24th Summer Games in Seoul,
where she won a gold medal in women's "smallbore standard rifle"
competition. Sperber said that, during the four months leading up to the
Olympics, she had fired five hundred rounds every day. I lowered the
morning paper to get a look at this West German, because it dawned on me
that her sixty thousand training shots amounted to one-ninetieth of the
5,400,000 rounds of small arms ammunition estimated to have been expended
by the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg. No more than twenty percent -
probably far less - of that army had any sort of shooting practice before
their first actual combat.
Some GDGers have rightly cast a jaundiced eye upon Attack & Die - Civil War
Military Tactics & the Southern Heritage by Grady McWhiney and Perry D
Jamieson, but, short of its final chapter, the book contains some good
work. I agree with the conclusion that it was the rifle that won the war
for the North - the rifle along with the refusal of Southerners to admit
until they had bled themselves nearly to death that the rifle's killing
power could check even the most courageous charges. The South simply bled
itself to death in the first three years of the war by taking the tactical
offensive in nearly 70% of the major actions.
From: lawrence (Dennis Lawrence)
Confederate 19,739 (20.7%)......... Union 9,796 (10%)
Confederate 9,108 (18.8%) ....... Union 10,096 (13.3%)
Confederate 11,724 (22%) ....... Union 11,657 (15.5%)
Confederate 4,656 (6.4%)....... Union 10,884 (10.9%)
Confederate 10,746 (18.7%) ....... Union 11,116 (11.4%)
Confederate 22,638 (30.2%) Union 17,684 (21.2%)
From: Kip Beckman
From: DPowell334@aol.com
From: ajackson@oyez.law.upenn.edu (Anita Jackson-Wieck)
From: Dave Navarre <73613.1150@compuserve.com>
From: thumphri@nafis.fp.trw.com (Thad Humphries)
From: mosby@nando.net
From: Norman Levitt
From: DPowell334@aol.com
From: ajackson@oyez.law.upenn.edu (Anita Jackson-Wieck)
1.) Why were the guns placed so as to give no cross-fire?
2.) Surely this wasn't the first time that extended firing caused
artillery to shoot long. The phenomenon can't have gone unnoticed.
That being the case, why didn't Alexander have his gunners compensate? In
that smoke they were shooting blind anyway.
3.) Why didn't Ewell's guns join in? They had nothing better to do.
4.) Were the artillery barrage highly accurate, would the assault on
Cemetery Ridge have succeeded?
If this subject has been discussed and put to rest, my
apologies. Point me at it. My apologies too for not getting the hang of
deleting my wife's name from my e-mail. Don't blame her for my ignorance.
From: Norman Levitt
From: clemenst@isx.hjc.cc.md.us (Tom Clemens)
From: Paul Esposito
From: ajackson@oyez.law.upenn.edu (Anita Jackson-Wieck)
Accurately placed fire could have swept that area of ground clear
of infantry and much of the artillery but probably not one shot in a
hundred hit it. CW Artillery was useless against entrenched positions but
it should have been effective against exposed troops, which Hancock's men
were. The "walls" those men hid behind were no more than two feet high
at any point.
Norm Levitt's point about traversing fire vs. enfilading fire is
reasonable and well-taken, but this could hardly have been a mystery to
Alexander, yet he set his guns to fire almost solely traversing the
position and made little effort to control their accuracy. (Rather like
that endless blithering by Martin Sheen, "God's will". Yes, I know Lee said
it, but he could hardly have achieved all he did if he left EVERYTHING to
God's will.) Well, Porter did, it seems. I've read Stewart's comments
on the placing of the guns and I still come back to the same question:
Why? Could Alexander have done worse if he had tried? I very much like
his writings and his even handedness in his post-war writings but in
this, his most famous action, he did rather poorly, I think.
Waiting for some incoming more well-placed than Porter's.
..
David Wieck
From: clemenst@isx.hjc.cc.md.us (Tom Clemens)
Cemetery Ridge is pronounced enough that there does not need to be a sharp
spine to it, there is very little flat space on it, and that is the problem.
Short rounds will either bury into the face, or skip over it. Long rounds
will overshoot and deflect even further away. I stand by my point, it is
tough to land a shell on the ridge every time, and the consequences of
missing are great. Perhaps to leave the tennis ball theory alone and switch
sports, if you can hit a target of a difficult pin on a sloped golf green at
150 yards with a 5-iron once, you should be able to do it every time, right?
I sure can't and I practice a lot, and look at the consequences of missing.
Even a little bit.
From: Anthony.Staunton@pcug.org.au (Anthony Staunton)
From: MattR78@aol.com
From: thumphri@nafis.fp.trw.com (Thad Humphries)
From: MBRADLEY@MSCC1.MSCC.CC.TN.US
From: "James F. Epperson"
From: lawrence@appsmiths.com (Robert W Lawrence)
From: thumphri@nafis.fp.trw.com (Thad Humphries)
From: MBRADLEY@MSCC1.MSCC.CC.TN.US
From: "James F. Epperson"
From: DPowell334@aol.com
From: Doug Miller
From: DPowell334@aol.com
From: lawrence@appsmiths.com (Robert W Lawrence)
From: kgm@rci.rutgers.edu (Ken Miller)
here will be many sons of the South who will tune in to see how anyone can
mention REL and Ole Dan in one breath...
From: MattR78@aol.com
> Unfortunately for his men he forgot about Fredericksburg.
From: MattR78@aol.com
From: lawrence@appsmiths.com (Robert W Lawrence)
"I think all military engineers who study the field will agree that the point
selected for Pickets attack was very badly chosen-almost as badly chosen as it
was possible to be:.
"Why not?", asked Lee
"Because General, the enemy has had all night to entrench and reinforce.
From: MattR78@aol.com
From: MattR78@aol.com
From: "James F. Epperson"
From: thumphri@nafis.fp.trw.com (Thad Humphries)
From: MBRADLEY@MSCC1.MSCC.CC.TN.US
There also seems to be to be an assumption that the AoP had fortified
itself quite well at G/burg. Is it not true that its field works were rather
scattered and, in many places, non-existent?
From: lawrence@appsmiths.com (Robert W Lawrence)
From: Doug Miller
>Do you really believe this? Was Lee STUPID? I think not. I think he
>remembered Fredericksburg and did all he could to see that it wouldn't happen
>in Pennsylvania. Then his subordinates--Longstreet, Pendleton, and
>Stuart--failed to carry out his plans.
From: bennettb@sgenva.cc.geneseo.edu (Brian Bennett)
From: jblair@roanoke.infi.net (John Blair)
>> Unfortunately for his men he forgot about Fredericksburg.
From: MBRADLEY@MSCC1.MSCC.CC.TN.US
Given the numbers on both sides, it seems to me that the point is
proven. Frontal attacks, even on fortified positions, did sometimes work and
when they did they produced excellent results.
It was the development of the repeating rifle and the machine gun which
made frontal attacks suicide in WW I. WBTS commanders saw them, rightfully, as
a risky but potentially useful tactic.
From: "James F. Epperson"
From: "James F. Epperson"
From: MBRADLEY@MSCC1.MSCC.CC.TN.US
At G'burg, the artillery bombardment was more effective than some
comments have made it seem. Remember, some Union infantry were so enfiladed
they crossed the stone wall in the cemetery area to take shelter on the
Confederate side, feeling safer there. Recent comments on this list have also
pointed out that Pickett was not under direct artillery fire the entire
distance, the ground rolls and there are many places where troops were
partially or wholly sheltered for at least part of the time.
As to Lee having confidence in his men, why should he not have? The
ANVa had defeated the AoP under five commanders and often at a severe numerical
disadvantage. To quote an ancestor who was at G'burg, 7th Tennessee Inf., "We
wuz proud men when we went to Gettysburg, and hadn't we the right?"
If Lee attributed these victories to God rather than to his men then we
can say Lee felt God would grant his arms victory again. But, Calvinism did
not lead one to feel that such blessings came unaided. It was the role of the
human element to take all preparations and to exert themselves to the fullest
if such divine blessings were to be expected. In short, thinking victory came
from God would not lead Lee to assume he could be lazy or sloppy. He would do
all he could first. And so he did. The result proves his all was not good
enough---this time.
From: "James F. Epperson"
From: DPowell334@aol.com
From: DPowell334@aol.com
From: DPowell334@aol.com
From: lawrence (Dennis Lawrence)
or 2) Alexander failed in his job
or 3) A combination of the two.
From: lawrence (Dennis Lawrence)
2) They would be told to move forward rapidly, holding their line
until very close to the enemy
3) They would be instructed to yell when they got close, causing
more fear
4) Finally, they would break the enemy lines with support troops
coming up
behind them, clear the area and destroy the enemy line.
From: Norman Levitt
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
From: John Kelly
From: Norman Levitt
From: Dave Navarre <73613.1150@compuserve.com>
"The more obvious conclusion is simply that, for whatever reason,
bayonets were rarely used as a weapon, even though there are frequent
reports of "clubbing muskets"."
From: thumphri@nafis.fp.trw.com (Thad Humphries)
From: GaTechFan@aol.com
On page78(paperback), however, they seem to conclude:
"Rifle fire was so destructive that it usually decided an attack before the
attackers got close enough to the defenders to use their bayonets."
From: John Kelly
From: ENordfors@aol.com
I totally agree with this statement...Question: Is this not the logical end
result of an Army that devotes itself to an entire defensive campaign? Then
changing without coordination, etc. would lead to these type of deficiencies?
From: Norman Levitt
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
From: DPowell334@aol.com
From: DPowell334@aol.com
From: DPowell334@aol.com
From: clemenst@isx.hjc.cc.md.us (Tom Clemens)
> or 2) Alexander failed in his job
> or 3) A combination of the two.
>
Put me down for #1. Lee knew little about artillery, especially rifled
guns, and expected too much from his cannoneers in this instance. Witness
Lee's observations concerning the vulnerability of Ft. Pulaski in 1861!
Alexander did the best he could under the circumstances in which he operated.
From: MBRADLEY@MSCC1.MSCC.CC.TN.US
From: "Michael D. VanHuss"
From: clemenst@isx.hjc.cc.md.us (Tom Clemens)
From: lawrence (Dennis Lawrence)"Each man in a veteran regiment like the 69th (Pa.) could deliver a
rate of two aimed rounds per minute., which meant the 69th would
theoretically deliver approximately 500 rounds per minute in their front.
But with their added firepower (rifles gathered from in front of their
position) the regiment could have delivered a minimum 700 rounds in a
matter of seconds - many of which carried 12 buckshot - and nearly 1,000
rounds a minute. And all of this massive firepower would be delivered on a
front of no more than 250 feet, guaranteeing devastating casualties upon an
enemy formation advancing over the open ground."
"It Struck Horror To Us All" Scott Hartwig, GBM #4
From: "Douglas M Macomber"
From: "Douglas M Macomber"
I wholeheartedly recommend FULL DUTY, it contains maybe 40 pages on
Gettysburg and a foreword by Ed Bearss, you can order from:
The Countryman Press,Inc.
PO Box 175
Woodstock, Vermont 05091
-When Hancock was wounded in the movie, the "colonel" with the red beard was
George Stannard cmdg. Second Vermont Brigade, the officer with the mustache
was George Benedict of the 13th Vermont. Benedict who had some surgical
knowledge helped tie Hancock's wound and stopped the flow of blood.
From: Kip Beckman
From: CSVZ07A@prodigy.com ( TERRY MOYER)
George Stewart in Pickett's Charge speculates that Pickett was in the
vicinity of the Codori Barn (this is also where the movie places him). This
position (near the Codori farm) would conform nicely to Michael Brasher's
comment that:
From: mbrasher@iconcepts.com (Michael R. Brasher)
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Let me take the opportunity to welcome Michael Brasher to the Gettysburg
Discussion Group. I will take the credit for getting him to join! :) Mike
knows more about individual regiments in the Civil War than anyone I have
ever known. I met him electronically on CompuServe a couple of years ago.
As he indicates in his signature, he is the president of a software company
and I was able to be one of his beta testers for his software program "The
American Civil War Regimental Information System". I stumbled onto his web
page the other night and got back into contact with him. Suggest you visit
his site.
Welcome Mike.
From: "Heather Peake"
New York: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1928
Letter, July 4 (p 59-62)
Soldier
From: Norman Levitt
From: "Heather Peake"
From: deicher@astronomy.com (Dave Eicher)
From: "Heather Peake"
Hi folks...
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
,
First let me say that they are interesting and I think we all appreciate
you posting them. Let's focus on your last paragraph where your wrote:
From: Brooks Simpson
On Tue, 19 Dec 1995, James F. Epperson wrote:
> I think Dave Powell continues to hit the nail on the head.
(Dave, I have
> this backyard carpentry project . . . ) Meade's four closest colleagues
> in the AoP command structure were Reynolds, Hancock, Gibbon, and
> Sedgwick. Only Sedgwick participated in the pursuit.
I would add Humphreys and Warren.
>More than anything
> else I think this contributed to Lee's escape. It is very easy for
us,
> at the distance of 130 years, to say he should have done such and so.
To
> be frank, I think a more aggressive effort should have been attempted,
or
> at least explored. But the inaction is entirely justified, to me, by
> Meade's newness to command and the loss of so many capable top officers.
I agree with Jim about the deceptiveness of armchair generalship. I also
think Meade was just plain exhausted. The fact is that the frontal assault
against Lee's position might not have been the best move in any case. Now,
had Meade been more aggressive about cutting off Lee's lines of retreat
across the Potomac, we might have had a different story, for perhaps then
he could have forced Lee to attack.
Brooks Simpson
From: jblair@roanoke.infi.net (John Blair)
lots of stuff cut:
>>The point is that everyone in the Confederate high command
deserves credit
>>for this defeat; save for Longstreet, perhaps, who at least counselled
his
>>commander not to do any of the foolish things he tried to do..
> I agree wholeheartedly. The ultimate cause of the Confederate
>defeat at G-burg was a complete, total (yes, I know that's redundant)
>failure of the Confederate command structure. I find it absolutely
>astonishing that Lee could conduct a massive three day battle as he
did, and
>never have a council of war. I have never seen a single account which
>indicates that Lee, Longstreet, Ewell, Hill and Stuart had a group meeting
>at any time during the three day battle. Meade had three major councils
of
>war. If that's not a failure of command, I don't know what is.
>Eric Wittenberg
What is even more amazing is that the south blamed Longstreet! The hardest
question for me to answer about the recent unpleasantness is Why does the
south so love Lee? I have some genealogical info on Lee comming (soon I
hope) if anyone is interested let me know by direct e-mail.
John Blair
From: ajackson@oyez.law.upenn.edu (Anita Jackson-Wieck)
Of Pickett's Charge Jeffrey Zirkle writes:
> The fact is they did break through. The needed reinforcements
strayed to
> the left because of battle smoke.
A hundred and fifty men across a stone wall does not constitute a breakthrough.
Those "needed reinforcements" - two brigades under Wilcox - were
badly used in the assault and would have been no match for the 13,000 reserves
- more than three brigades - Meade had positioned behind Cemetery Ridge.
A deeper penetration into the Union position would have resulted only in
more Confederates captured or killed.
David Wieck
From: Don Brazier 102651.1016@compuserve.com
>>>lee was outgeneraled. why complicate the issue
First, what was it that Meade did that demonstrated such superior military
tactics? Lee had not been outgeneraled in previous battles. At Chancellorsville
the Confederates were outnumbered 2-1 but defeated Federal forces by using
an outflanking maneuver that his corps commanders were suggesting he use
at Gettysburg. He didn't seem to remember the lessons that paid off for
him - and cost the Army of the Potomac so much - at Chancellorsville and
Fredericksburg. Instead he opted for straight out assaults that proved so
disastrous.
>>When he had tried both flanks and these attacks
>>failed, why Lee may have thought Meade had 75% of his army on the
flanks
Could he not have assumed that overnight Meade would have strenghed his
middle? Given the two-hour shelling that preceded Pickett's Charge, Meade
had time to reinforce the center of his line.
DVB.
From: Don Brazier 102651.1016@compuserve.com
>>> Longstreet in effect pouted,
>>>and did not prepare his generals sufficiently for the fighting
that they
>>>would encounter. His generals could see the doubt in Longstreet's
eyes,
>>>and this made the plan even less plausible to them.
Longstreet knew the Lee's plan was fatal and that he was sending men to
be slaughtered. Pretty hard to be upbeat in those circumstances.
>>>He couldn't attack the Federal Right,
>>>couldn't attack the left, couldn't move around the Federals,
felt he couldn't
>>>retreat, had no better position to fight....the whole idea behind
the
>>>Gettysburg campaign was to get the Federal army out into the
open where it
>>>could be defeated. Instead, the Confederates managed to get
the Federals in a
>>>perfect natural defensive position, where they couldn't be defeated.
There are always options in a battle. Lee may have felt that he could not
have have moved around the federals - he'd done it before in some pretty
unlikely circumstances - but a strategic retreat is always better than a
loss of the magnitude the ANV suffered at Gettysburg.
DVB.
From: cappz@crosslink.net (Jeffrey Zirkle)
>>Of Pickett's Charge Jeffrey Zirkle writes:
>> The fact is they did break through. The needed reinforcements strayed
to
>> the left because of battle smoke.
> >A hundred and fifty men across a stone wall does not constitute
a
>breakthrough. Those "needed reinforcements" - two brigades
under Wilcox
>- were badly used in the assault and would have been no match for the
>13,000 reserves - more than three brigades - Meade had positioned behind
>Cemetery Ridge. A deeper penetration into the Union position would have
>resulted only in more Confederates captured or killed.
> David Wieck
David,
Where were all of those 13,000 reserve forces when the charge was repulsed.
Jeff Z
From: dcl4628@ritvax.isc.rit.edu (Daniel Lane)
>>>> Longstreet in effect pouted,
>>>>and did not prepare his generals sufficiently for the fighting
that they
>>>>would encounter. His generals could see the doubt in Longstreet's
eyes,
>>>>and this made the plan even less plausible to them.
>Longstreet knew the Lee's plan was fatal and that he was sending men
to be
>slaughtered. Pretty hard to be upbeat in those circumstances.
Don I believe that any general in that situation would be have a hard time
sending his men into such a slaughter. The difference between a good general
and bad one is that the good general would find every way possible to limit
the number of casualties and to achieve the objective. Longstreet was irritated
that Lee would not heed his warnings and he did not prepare his men for
the fighting. The attacks were all uncoordinated and and unsupported. The
men fought to achieve a certain goal with no chance of retaining it because
there was no support on the other end, due to bad, shallow planning.
Sure, Longstreet knew what he had to do. Longstreet also knew what was going
to happen to his men. But he did not play the part of the strong leader
to see that his men won the day. If you were a infantryman, and saw your
commanding officer shaking his head, doubting the success a pending attack,
how confident would you be that the attack that you were about to make and
the life that you were about to risk wouldn't be in vain?
Dan
From: ajackson@oyez.law.upenn.edu (Anita Jackson-Wieck)
> David,
> Where were all of those 13,000 reserve forces when the charge was repulsed.
> Jeff Z
In reserve. They were never called upon. From Coddington, P531: "By
means of prior arrangements and good management he (Meade) thus quickly
concentrated almost 13,000 infantrymen from four different corps and every
part of his battle line, ready to relieve Hancock's men should the pressure
become too great for them, or to pounce on columns should they break through."
David Wieck
From: SteveH7645@aol.com
In a message dated 96-01-28 13:35:09 EST, you write:
> Had the breakthrough surged with the additional momentum
the reinforcements
>would have produced it is very possible the Northern Army center would
have
>collapsed. Routed soldiers do not stop to ask about numbers or casualty
>statistics they run for safety. The rest of the ANV was in position
to
>press the flanks had such a collapse have ocurred. I have to agree with
you
>the topography and the distance involved would have made it a long shot.
Quite right. But, Jeff, tell me, once Lee saw the breakthrough (and there
WAS a breakthrough), how did he expect the rest of the army to make it to
the mile between Seminary and Cemetary Hill to exploit the breakthrough?
Can you name ANY troops which were formed up and ready to go to Pickett's
assitance if he had broken through? The way the rest of the army was formed,
it would have taken an hour to get help to Pickett. By definition, the supports
have to be within supporting distance. No one was within supporting distance
of Picket.
Face it. Picket was sent out to hang. If he HAD secured a successful breakthough,
he would have had to hold on alone against the rest of the Federal Army,
while Lee and his lieutenants frantically tried to get him some help.
Lee's attack on the Third Day was one of the most mis-managed attacks during
the war, ranking up there with Fredericksburg and Cold Harbor for futility.
Steve Haas
Rockford, IL
From: SteveH7645@aol.com
In a message dated 96-01-28 13:30:06 EST, you write:
>I don't think Lee was ever out generaled, not by much atleast,
he was a
>born leader and shouldn't be recieving the critisim about his actions
at
>GB. It wasn't all his fault, and his men believed they could do it
>because Lee thought of the plan.
Oh, good. Another 'Lee was GOD' message.'
Lee was quite human, quite capable of making a mistake. He was not a great
tactical commander, and he knew it. He lost at Gettysburg. By definition,
he was outgeneraled. The opposing general came up with a better battle plan
than Lee. That is the definition of being out-generaled, as I can see.
After Gettysburg, he submitted his resignation to Jeff Davis. He knew he
had made a mistake, and was willing to take the heat for it.
Steve Haas
Rockford, IL
From: DPowell334@aol.com
In a message dated 96-01-28 13:35:09 EST, you write:
>The fact is they did break through. The needed reinforcements
strayed to
>the left because of battle smoke. Believe me the rest of the ANV was
well
>played out, and it was there turn to await the outcome of this charge.
Had
>the breakthrough surged with the additional momentum the reinforcements
>would have produced it is very possible the Northern Army center would
have
>collapsed. Routed soldiers do not stop to ask about numbers or casualty
>statistics they run for safety. The rest of the ANV was in position
to
>press the flanks had such a collapse have ocurred. I have to agree with
you
>the topography and the distance involved would have made it a long shot.
The fact is, they didn't break thru, nor were they ever close to. the reached
the front line of the Union position. Union reserves and strong defense
utterly defeated the attack.
Dave Powell
From: DPowell334@aol.com
In a message dated 96-01-28 15:45:07 EST, you write:
>First, what was it that Meade did that demonstrated such
superior military
>tactics?
A classic use of reserves and interior lines, for starters. It is generally
ackowledged that commitment of reserves is the overall commander's primary
means of influencing an action - commit them correctly, you will win. Meade
did an outstanding job here.
Dave Powell
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
At 08:26 PM 1/28/96 -0500, you wrote:
>In a message dated 96-01-28 15:45:07 EST, you write:
>>First, what was it that Meade did that demonstrated such superior
military
>>tactics?
>A classic use of reserves and interior lines, for starters. It is generally
>ackowledged that commitment of reserves is the overall commander's primary
>means of influencing an action - commit them correctly, you will win.
Meade
>did an outstanding job here.
>Dave Powell
To add to Dave's point, Meade also had highly competent subordinates (except
for Sickles, and this was obvious) who did an excellent job of micromanaging
the battle for him. His corps commanders did a far better job for him than
did Lee's. Hancock, for example, was magnificant throughout all three days.
Eric Wittenberg
From: DPowell334@aol.com
In a message dated 96-01-28 20:08:04 EST, Mike VanHuss wrote:
> Pickett was never intended to go in unsupported.
>According to Taylor, Hood or Mclaws were to have followed or supported
>Pickett, and Pettigrew and Anderson were to advance. This according
to
>Taylor was the design of Lee. Obviously it did not happen this way.
Alas, this is a good example of the problems the post-war recriminations
have generated. Taylor only made these claims much later, after the Longstreet-Early
feud had exploded full-bore. In fact, more contemporary orders show quite
clearly that Hood and McLaws were assigned a defensive role, with no intention
to attack - that's why Longstreet was assigned Heth and Pender's divisions.
Taylor knew this, almost certainly, but allowed the fury of the later confrontations
distort reality.
Unfortunately, no such supports were ever designated - or apparently even
seriously contemplated - for the main body.
This is one of the oldest myths of the charge, and has been refuted by a
number of good historians.
Dave Powell
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
At , you wrote:
> I have to agree with Norman. Cashtown and Fairfield being
excellent defensive
>positions. If Longstreet was let loose, the invasion would have still
ended in
>defeat. The AOP would wait out the ANV and Lincoln could assemble an
army in >a very short time. Leaving Lee with two options, follow that
untrained army or
>destroy the AOP. Remember General Beauregard was defending Richmond
with >25000 men.(Still don't know why Davis would even let Beauregard
around >Richmond. Considering the two hated each others guts.)
> Please reply,
> Paul(Douglas)Macomber
Having just written an article on the Battle of Fairfield, having figured
out where BUford's skirmish with Heth's guys occurred on June 30, and having
spent some time in the area around Fairfield, I disagree that it would have
been a good defensive position for Lee. The area is flat, with a narrow
valley. The mountain gap is narrow. This area was filled with high stone
walls and stout wooden fences. In short, it was not a good place to try
to shake out columns of infantry into lines of battle. I simply don't think
it was a good place for large scale cavalry operations. The truth is, as
Maj. Samuel Starr of the 6th U.S. found out, this area wasn't even especially
good for mounted operations. Too narrow, too much bad terrain.
Eric Wittenberg
From: DPowell334@aol.com
In a message dated 96-01-30 09:50:36 EST, Mike VanHuss wrote:
>Dave,
>Taylor only made these claims much later, after the Longstreet-Early
feud
>had exploded full-bore. In fact, more contemporary orders show quite
clearly
>that Hood and McLaws were assigned a defensive role, with no intention
to
>attack that's why Longstreet was assigned Heth and Pender's divisions.
>Taylor knew this, almost certainly, but allowed the fury of the later
>confrontations distort reality.
>Just when you think you have all the answers you find out you really
don't
>know squat.
Thanks for the correction. Mike, If it's any consolation, I've been in those
shoes many times.:)
Dave Powell
From: ENordfors@aol.com
Greetings Bill...
Yes I agree with all corrections to my post on LRT....
I will make certain to type slower and think harder....lesson well learned
....perhaps the biggest lesson learned was that indeed one will never know
the impact of an alternative action unless it happens...in most any situation!
I do have one area that I have always found hard to envision....was LRT
a tactical anchor? My impression was that it seemed like it would be most
easily cleaved away and beat back if that would be how it would be played
out...but indeed you are right we will never know the impact on decisions
made and actions followed...makes one think doesn't it!! Actually I have
been sitting here for 20 minutes thinking of several scenarios and the ramifications
to such possibilities....Boy one could go crazy trying to alter the past
on paper (keyboard
Thank you very much...
All the Best for a Safe and Healthy New Year..
Ed....
