July 1 - XI CORPS LINE

The XI Corps line was completely untenable once Devin's cavalrymen were driven off by the friendly fire of Wiedrich's battery atop Cemetery Hill. This left the flank completely uncovered. If you have ever walked the XI Corps line, and stopped at Barlow's Knoll, you will look out toward the York Road and see that, once the flank was left uncovered, there simply was no stopping Early's men, and no way for XI Corps to hold that position. It was untenable.

The better position would have been along the Almshouse. That was good ground with an anchorable flank. It also would not have been on Early's direct line of march. This position could have been held.

Eric Wittenberg

Ed - There's nothing to indicate that Howard (or anyone else with clout) had foresight about placing XI troops to connect with the I Corps' right. As the XI Corps line developed north of town, everyone became transfixed by the CSA artillery fire coming from Oak Hill and I feel they "leaned" (without orders to that effect) to face that elevation. There was a specific, stated intent to eliminate the gap between I and XI, but, as you might expect, no one was sent/told to command the gap area. The Schimmelfennig/Von Amsberg regiments simply tried to get as close as they could to the First Corps' line (the 13th MVI position on the Mummasburg Road), and they pretty much accomplished this. The 45th NYV and 157th NYV were positioned along the Mummasburg Road. The I-XI gap never seemed to be the object of a Confederate exploitive attempt, however. Rodes obligingly bashed away at the Oak Ridge position of Robinson's division of I Corps.

There was impromptu I-XI collaboration in dealing with O'Neal's Alabama brigade. The 45th NYV of Schimmelfennig's brigade whacked away at O'Neal's left while Paul's I Corps brigade took him on in front.

Your observation that Barlow moved ahead of the Almshouse line is part of that XI "lean" toward the CSA artillery on Oak Hill. Bayard Wilkeson's battery went out ahead of everybody, leap-frogging sections until he deployed on Blocher's knoll. Supports went to his - uh - support, and pretty soon the division was aligned toward the northwest. It's my guess (and only a guess) that the CSA artillery fire coming from the northeast, from Early, didn't make much of an impression because it was arriving along with the fire from Oak Hill.

My understanding of Early's attack on Barlow is that it initially struck the "front" of XI line as it leaned toward Oak Hill. Gordon's Georgians were across Rock Creek and fighting with the Buckeyes in Blocher Woods (if you stand on the knoll alongside the 153rd PA's stone(d) bugler, that fighting would have been ahead of you as well as to your left) BEFORE the thrust from a more-easterly direction that swept bluecoats from Blocher's/Barlow's knoll. This happened so quickly, however, that I'm really splitting hairs.

I don't think that - when the fight was developing - Oak Hill "looked" like it was firmly in CSA hands, because of the threatening Yankee presence on Oak Ridge. Further, Dilger's & Wheeler's batteries were very close to Oak Hill and looked to be in good position to damage the CSA guns arrayed there.

There are too many personal accounts to deny that XI was receding, if not off the field, before Robinson's men were off of Oak Ridge. Doubleday seemingly gave up baseball and devoted his free time to castigations of XI Corps for betraying I Corps by leaving their backs unguarded.

Ben Maryniak

i agree with Eric on the Almshouse line, it could have been held....particularly if Coster's brigade had been ordered up quicker to prolong the line to the right AND if Barlow hadn't taken Von Gilsa's brigade out to Blocher's Knoll. Coster's brigade was too small and arrived too late at the 'brickyard' to stop the onslaught of Avery and Hays. Howard had ignored a number of requests from Schurz to bring up reinforcements from Cemetery Hill. I believe Scott Hartwig and David Martin in their writings have shown that the IX Corps was actually defeated in detail because of the faulty positioning of the Corps by Howard, Schurz, and Barlow. Early was able to coordinate his attack on the IX Corps positions to bring more men at the point of attack than the Federals ...even though the total numbers engaged were actually pretty close. i'm new to the board and very impressed by the intelligence scholarship and civility of the group.

jim martin

From: "Michael D. VanHuss"
Subject: Re: XI Corps Line

Ben, Eric and Ed,

I think you all have some good points here. First and foremost command and control on the 11th Corps line was virtually non-existent. Barlow moved way out in front of where he was supposed to be. I don't think this was necessarily a lean but more of a "There is some high ground let's go get out of the way of these shells" and without specific orders otherwise and no one there to make sure this was the correct placement away he went. I think this single move lead to the eventual rout of the 11th corp. Based on this Krzyzanowski moved forward in what was supposed to be support but by this time it was to late. Seeing his position Barlow realized he really screwed up and send forward Wilkeson. Here is where I think Jones' Battery did its damage silencing Wilkeson's battery although not without a fight from Wilkeson. At this point I don't think the guns on Oak Hill were engaged very heavily with Barlow's boys. They were too busy getting mangled by Dilger and Wheeler's guns.

This one simple and timely movement by Barlow allowed Gordon to hit Barlow full force with little to no support and once a hole was puched in Barlow's line the entire position was untenable. After Barlow's line collapsed it was basically rolling up the flank. Any help that was sent after that was too little too late.

I think Eric is right if Barlow had of stayed where he was in the Almshouse line with Schimmelfennig on his left as intended the line was definitely better anchored and could have been held longer. I think also that Coster then may have made a difference. I don't think that it would have changed the course of the battle except we wouldn't have the discussion of the fighting on Cemetery Hill that night (Should he or Shouldn't he). For I think it was Howard's intention from the moment he arrived on the field to buy time and eventually fall back to the Cemetery Hill line.

I think that numbers alone on this first day were the tale of the tape. Defeat for the Confederacy on this day was not in the cards. Although we could consider that if the 11th had held would the 1st have also held. Or would it have been the 1st who broke and caused the retreat.

Mike VanHuss

From: Victor Vernon
Subject: Re: XI Corps Line

Michael D. VanHuss wrote:

Or would it have been the 1st who broke and caused the retreat. I think here is the key to your discourse. Given the number of troops engaged by both sides and the terrain involved, it was simply a matter of time before EITHER the I or XI corps would break. Lee simply had too much for the two corps on the first day.

Jack Kelly wrote:

Some time back, Bill Cameron brought up a very interesting point about warnings from Lt. Jerome to the commander of the XI Corps about large concentrations of Confederates on Howard's right flank. I had some problems with my mail server over the next several days and did not see anything more on Bill's thread.
I thought that this was a rather momentous discovery (noting the inconsistencies of date and message) I had not seen anything like this before. The lack of response to this message from Jerome certainly indicates some serious negligence on Howard's (or Schurz's) part in ignoring warnings about enemy activity in his sector. Doesn't this look a little like the Chancellorsville situation before Jackson's attack?
Regards,

Jack Kelly

Jack,

I agree, it was negligent of both Schurz and Howard - all the more so because Jerome's was only one of several warnings. Devin's Brigade of cavalry was picketing that flank, and informed higher-ups of approaching Rebs, and finally moved off when they got no support (and were being fired on by Union arty, as I recall - friendly fire is a great way to really annoy the guys on your side.) Certainly the Union commanders knew that large CSA units were to the north of them, in general.

Dave Powell

Vic:
While I can't be sure, I believe that the order of Early's brigades was Gordon, followed by Extra Billy Smith, followed by the Stonewall Brigade. As you know, Smith's brigade never really got into the fight until the third day, due to the absence of Confederate cavalry to screen Lee's left flank.

Eric

Eric,

Actually, Gordon and Hoke were the two lead brigades in Early's attack, with Hoke in support. Smith's small brigade was detached as set to watching the York Pike, mostly because Early thought Smith too excitable to be in a battle.

The Stonewall brigade was in Johnson's Division, not yet up.

As for the question of would Coster have made a difference for Barlow, I think not. For starters, Early still had Hoke's uncommitted brigade to extand on that flank, and likely still could've overlapped the Union flank. Also, not much could be done to save Barlow's position as long as Schurz's Division of 11 Corps (3/11) was going to allow Doles (from Rodes' CSA division) to shift laterally across their position to take Barlow in the other flank, which is essentially what happened.

In other words, as long as Schurz fought the 11 Corps in such a piecemeal and unsupported fashion, it was still likely to get badly defeated, even with Coster up forward at start.

What might have happened if Coster came forward, Barlow and Schurz fell back, and settled on a more compact line? That might have left Early really no option but a frontal attack with only 3 brigades, a much less enticing proposition.

Dave Powell