From the Louisville Courier-Journal

It may be said that the battle of Gettysburg was unpremeditated. Gen. Lee's aim was to induce Meade to attack him. Orders had been given to concentrate at Gettysburg, but positive instructions had been given not to bring on a general engagement. Gen. Stuarts cavalry, after crossing the Potomac, had become detached from the main army; Gen. Lee was deprived if its valuable services until the evening of July 2, and the position of the enemy was not fully known until Gen. Hill came upon them on the evening of July 1 in force at Gettysburg. He pushed them strongly, and they retired after some resistance to Cemetery Hill. It has always been the belief of all the officers of Hills corps that if they had been free to push things  on the evening of the 1st of July they could have driven the enemy from his position on the hill and have secured it themselves. In the battles of the 2nd and the 3rd, had that been done, the Confederates would have been on the defensive in a position almost impregnable. It was not considered best to risk a general engagement in opposition to positive orders on the evening of the 1st, and the golden opportunity was lost. On the night of the 1st Meade moved his corps up from Pipes [sic] Creek , which was his chosen battle-field, and occupied Cemetery Hill in force. The contest of the 2nd of July resulted  on the whole in favor of the Confederates, though Meade was not dislodged. That the result was not decisive is accounted for in various ways by the members of the different corps, and it is controversy not to be entered on here. It may be said there was strange want of co-operation between the different commanders, which has never been clearly explained, and the different attacks made on the enemy's line were not sufficiently supported. It was the determination of Gen. Lee to make a combined attack on the morning of the 3rd. E.P. Alexander, Colonel of Artillery, commanding a battalion of six batteries attached to Longstreet's corps, was placed by Gen. Longstreet in command of all his artillery on the field of action, which gave him exceptional opportunities for observation, and attached unusual interest to his personal narrative of the battle. Gen. Alexander, now Vice-President of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, was asked to give the Courier-Journal an account of the battle of the 3rd.
 

"I cannot do better, "said Gen. Alexander, "than repeat in substance my answer to some inquires propounded by the Count de Paris relative to the cause of Lee's defeat at Gettysburg.  This paper was written several years ago, when the events were somewhat more fresh in my mind than now, and I will give it with very few alterations.

My command, with the greater portion of Longstreet's corps, was in camp at Chambersburg from Saturday, June 27, to Tuesday, June 30, and on the latter date we moved in the direction of Gettysburg about 10 miles and about 2 p.m. encamped at a small village called Greenwood. Gen. Lee was in camp very near us during the same afternoon.  On Wednesday July 1, we (the reserved artillery) remained in camp all day, and heard nothing of the battle which was begun at Gettysburg until about dark, when orders were received to march at 2 A.M. on the 2nd for Gettysburg.  Pickett's division of infantry had been left be[hin]d at Chambersburg; Hood's and McLaw's divisions had been marched  before us, and when we took the road at 2 A.M. (my battalion, 26 guns, and the Washington Artillery, 10 guns, I think, forming the reserve) we had a clear road and bright moonlight, and saws nothing of the infantry. About 8 or 9 A.M. we reached the vicinity of the field, the guns were halted in a wood, and I reported in  person to Gens. Lee and Longstreet, who were together  on a hill in rear of our lines. I was told we were to attack the enemy's left flank, and was directed to take command of my own battalion, Cabell's battalion, (with McLaw's division), 18 guns; Henry's battalion, (with Hood's,) 18 guns, leaving the Washington Artillery in reserve, and to reconnoitre the grounds and co-operate with the infantry in the attack. I was especially cautioned in moving to avoid exposing them to the view of the signal station of the enemy, on Round Top Mountain. I do not remember seeing or hearing anything at this time of Longstreet's army, nor did I get the impression that Gen. Lee thought there was any unnecessary delay. I had just arrived, and knew nothing of the situation, and my instructions were to reconnoitre the flank to be attacked, and to choose my own positions and means of reaching them. This duty occupied me, according to my recollection, one or two hours, when I rode back and conducted my battalion in person to the school-house on Willoughby Run. At one point the direct road leading to this place came in sight of the enemy's signal station, but I turned out of the road before reaching the exposed part, and, passing through some meadows a few hundred yards, regained the road without coming in sight, I then went about hunting up the other battalions which were attached to the infantry, in order to give them all their positions for opening the attack.

While thus engaged I came upon the head of an infantry column, which I think was Hood's division, standing halted in the road where it was in sight of Round Top. They had been instructed to avoid being seen, and, finding the road on which they  had been sent came at this point in full view of the signal station, they had halted and sent back to Gen. Lee or Longstreet for orders. For some reason, which I cannot recall, they would not turn back, and follow the tracks of my guns, and I remember a long and tiresome waiting. At length there came an order to turn back and take another road around by ‘Black Horse Tavern' and have never forgotten that name since. My general recollection  is that nearly three hours were lost in that delay and countermarch, and that it was about 4 P/M/ when Hood became engaged heavily on our extreme right flank, with Henry's battalion aiding him, while with 18 guns of my own battalion and Cabell's 18 I attacked Hooker's corps at Peach Orchard. McLaw's division was during this in the woods in our rear, our batteries firing from the edge nearest Peach Orchard, my own probably 500 yards and Cabell's 700 yards distant We were so engaged for probably an hour, when McLaws charged and carried Peach Orchard, my batteries following him closely, and going into action in and around the orchard. The firing was continued until dark.

Before daylight on the morning of the 3rd I received orders to post the artillery for an assault on the enemy's position, and later I learned it was to be led by Pickett's division and directed on Cemetery Hill.  Some of the batteries had gone back for ammunition and forage, but they were all brought up immediately, and by daylight all then on the field were posted. Dearing's battalion (with Pickett's division) reported some time during the morning. The enemy fired on our movements and positions occasionally, doing no great damage, and we scarcely returned a shot. The morning was consumed waiting for Pickett's division and possibly other movements of infantry. While forming for the attack I borrowed from Gen. Pendleton, then Lee's chief of artillery, seven 12 pound howitzers belonging to the Third Corps, under Major Richardson, which I put in reserve on a selected spot, intending them to accompany  Pickett's division in the charge, as the men and horses were fresh and  the chests of ammunition were full.

About 11 A.M. the skirmishers in A.P. Hill's front got to fighting for a lane in between the lines, and the artillery on both sides gradually took part, until the whole of Hill's artillery in position, which I think was 63 guns, was heavily engaged with about an equal number of the enemy's guns for over half an hour; but not one of the 75 guns which I then had in line was allowed to fire a shot, as we had at best a short supply of ammunition for the work laid out. In this connection, note that the number of rounds which is carried by each piece in its limber and caisson is, including canister, between 130 and 150, about enough for one hour and a half of rapid firing. I am very certain our ordinance trains did not carry into Pennsylvania a reserve supply of more than  100 rounds per gun additional, and I do not believe they had over 60 rounds to a gun. I have not seen the figures, but I was myself Chief of Ordnance of the Army from August 1861 to November 1862, and was very familiar with the extent and capacity of ordnance trains. When nearer Richmond we seldom had a reserve of over 50 [?? could be 60 but context makes this unlikely]  rounds per gun, the difficulty of transportation always limiting us to the strictest economy in its use and in the trains devoted to its carriage. Gradually the cannonade just referred to died out, as it began, and  the field became nearly silent, but writers have frequently referred to ‘that cannonade preceding the assault' as having been begun at 11 o'clock, and lasting some hours, being misled by this affair.

About 12 M. Gen. Longstreet told me when Pickett was ready he himself would give the signal for our guns to open, (which signal was to be two guns from the Washington Artillery, near the centre of our line,) and meanwhile he desired me to select a suitable position for observation, and to take with me one of Gen.. Pickett's staff, and exercise my judgment in selecting the moment for Pickett to advance. I selected the advance salient angle of the wood in which Pickett's line was now formed, just on the left flank of my line of 75 guns. While occupying this position, and in conversation with Gen. a. R. Wright, commanding a Georgia brigade in A.P. Hill's corps, who had come out there for an observation of the position, I received a note from Gen. Lonstreet, which I copy from the original in my possession:

        Head-Quarters, July 3, 1863
Colonel: If the artillery fire does not have the effect to drive off the enemy or greatly demoralize him so as to make our efforts pretty certain, I would prefer you should not advise Gen. Pickett to make the charge. I shall rely a great deal on your good judgment to determine the matter, and shall expect you to let Gen. Pickett know when the moment offers.
Respectfully,      J. Longstreet
  Lieutenant-Colonel [sic]
 To Col. E. P. Alexander, Artillery.'

This note at once suggested that there was some alternative to the attack, an placed on me the responsibility of deciding the question. I endeavored to avoid it by giving my views in a note, of which I kept no copy, but of which I have always retained a vivid recollection, having discussed its points with Gen. A.R. Wright as I wrote it. It was expressed very nearly as follows:

General: I will only be able to judge of the effect of our fire on the enemy by his return fire, for his infantry is but little exposed to view and smoke will obscure the whole field. If, as I infer [??] from your note, there is any alternative to this attack, it should be carefully considered before opening our fire, for it will take all the artillery ammunition we have left to test this one thoroughly, and if the result is unfavorable we will have none left for another effort. And even if this is entirely successful it can only be so at a very bloody cost. Very respectfully,

  E.P. Alexander, Colonel of Artillery

To this note I received the following reply: the original is still in my possession:
 

      Head-Quarters, July 3 1863
Colonel: The intention is to advance the infantry, if the artillery has the desired effect of driving  the enemy's off, or having other effect such as to warrant us in making the attack. When the moment arrives advise Gen. Pickett, and, of course, advance such artillery as you can use in aiding the attack. Respectfully,

   J. Longstreet,
   Lieutenant-General Commanding
To Col. Alexander

    This letter again placed the responsibility on me, and I felt it deeper, for the day was rapidly advancing (it was 12 M., ) and whatever was to be done was to be done soon.  Meanwhile I had been anxiously discussing the attack with Gen. Wright, who said the difficulty was not so much in reaching Cemetery Hill or taking it--that his brigade had carried it the afternoon before-but that the trouble was to hold it, for the whole Army was massed in a sort of horse shoe shape and could rapidly re-enforce the point to any extend, while our long enveloping line could not give prompt enough support. This somewhat reassured me, as I had heard it said that morning that Gen. Lee had ordered ‘every brigade in the Army to charge Cemetery Hill,' and it was certain that the question of supports had had his careful attention. Before answering, however, I rode back to converse with Gen. Pickett, whose line was now formed or forming on the road, and, without telling him of the question I had to decide, I found that he was entirely sanguine of success in the charge, and was only congratulating himself on the opportunity. I was convinced that to make any half-way effort was to insure failure, and that if our artillery was once opened, after all the time consumed in the preparation for the attack, the only hope of success was to follow it up promptly, with one supreme effort, concentrating every energy we possessed into it, and my mind was fully made up that if the artillery opened Pickett must charge. After the second note from Gen. Longstreet, and the interview with Pickett, I didn't feel justified in making any delay. But to acquaint Gen. Longstreet with my determination, I write him a note, which I think I quote verbatim as follows:

'General: When our artillery fire is doing its best, I shall advise Gen. Pickett to advance.'

     It was my intention, as he had a long distance to travel, that he should start not later than 15 minutes after our fire opened. About this time, to be sure, Richardson, with his seven 12-pound howitzers, should be promptly on hand. I sent for him to come through the woods, and be ready to move ahead of Pickett's division  in the advance. To my great disappointment, I learned, just as we opened fire, and too late to replace him, that Gen. Pendleton had sent four of his guns, without my knowledge, to some other part of the field, and the other three had also moved off and could not be found Probably, however, the presence of the guns at the head of this column would only have resulted in their loss, but it would have been a brilliant opportunity for them, and I always feel like apologizing for their absence.

    It was 1 P.M. by my watch when the signal guns were fired, the field at that time being entirely silent but for the light picket firing between the lines, and as suddenly as an organ strikes up in church the grand roar followed from all the guns of both armies. The enemy's fire was heavy and severe, and their accounts represent ours as having been equally so, though our rifle guns were comparatively few and had very defective ammunition.  As an illustration, I remember that the casualties in my own battalion (26 guns) were about 147 men and 116 horses in the two days' action, and about 80 per cent. of the wounds were from artillery fire. Gen. A.S. Webb, United States Army, who commanded a brigade on Cemetery Hill, told me after the war that a Federal battery, coming into action on the Hill, lost from our artillery fire 27 out of 30 horses in about 10 minutes. Average distances, I should suppose, were about 1,400 yards. We had some casualties from canister.

    I had fully intended to give Pickett the order to advance as soon as I saw our guns had their ranges, say in 10 or 15 minutes, but the enemy's fire was so severe that when that time had elapsed I could not make up my mind to order the infantry out into a fire which I did not believe they could face for so long a charge in so hot a sun, tired as they already were by the march from Chambersburg. I accordingly waited in hopes our fire would produce some visible effect, or something turn up to make the situation brighter, but 15 minutes more passed without any change in the situation, the fire on neither side slackening for a moment. Even then I could not bring myself to give a peremptory order to Pickett to advance, but feeling the critical moment would soon pass, I wrote him a note to this effect: ‘If you are coming at all you must come immediately, or I cannot give you proper support; but the enemy's fire has not slackened materially, and at least 18 guns are firing from the cemetery itself.' This note, which, though given from memory, I can vouch for as nearly verbatim, I sent off at 1:30 P.M., consulting my watch. I afterward heard what followed its receipt. from members of the staffs of both Gens. Pickett and Longstreet. Pickett, on receiving it, galloped up to Gen. Longstreet, who was not far off, and showed him the note. Gen. Longstreet read it and said nothing. Gen. Pickett then said: ‘General, shall I advance'? Longstreet turned around in his saddle, and would not answer. Pickett immediately saluted and said: ‘I am going to lead my division forward, Sir,' and galloped off to put it in motion; on which Gen. Longstreet  rode out alone to my position. Meanwhile, five minutes after I sent the note to Pickett the enemy's fire suddenly slackened materially, and the batteries in the cemetery were limbered up and withdrawn. As the enemy had such abundance of ammunition and so much better guns than ours that they were not compelled to reserve their artillery for critical moments, (as we almost always had to do,) I knew that they must have felt the  punishment a good deal, and I was a good deal elated by the sight. But to make sure that it was a withdrawal for good and not a mere change of position or relieving of the batteries by fresh ones, I waited five minutes, more closely examining the ground with a large glass. At that time I sent my courier to Pickett with a note: ‘For God's sake come quick; the 18 guns are gone!' and going to the nearest guns I sent a Lieutenant and a Sergeant, one after the other, with messages to the same effect. A few minutes after this, Pickett still not appearing, Gen. Longstreet rode up alone, having seen Pickett and left his staff, as state. I showed him the situation, and said I only feared I could not give Pickett the help I wanted to, my ammunition being low and the seven guns under Richardson having been taken off. Gen. Longstreet spoke up promptly: ‘Go and stop Pickett right where he is, and replenish your ammunition.' I answered that the ordnance trains had been nearly emptied repairing the expenditures of the day before, and not over 20 rounds to a gun were left--too little to accomplish much-- and that while this was being done the enemy would recover from the fire which we were not giving him. His reply was: ‘I do not want to make this charge. I don't believe it will succeed. I would stop Pickett now, but that Gen. Lee ordered it,' and other remarks showing that even then he could easily have been induced to order Pickett to halt.

    At this moment Pickett's line appeared, sweeping out of the wood, Garnett's brigade passing over us. I left Gen. Longstreet and rose a short distance with Gen. Garnett, an old-time friend, who was killed on the charge. He had been sick, but, buttoned up in an old blue overcoat, in spite of the heat  of the day, was riding in the front of his line, and for the last time, I then galloped along my line of guns, ordering those that had over 20 rounds of ammunition to limber up and follow Pickett, and those who had less to maintain their fire from where they were. I had advanced several batteries, and parts of batteries, in this way, when Pickett's division appeared on the slope of Cemetery Hill, and a considerable force fo the enemy were thrown out, attacking his unprotected right flank. Meanwhile, too, several batteries which had been withdrawn were run out again, and were firing on him heavily. We opened on these troops and batteries as fiercely as we were able, and appeared to do them considerable damage, but meanwhile Pickett's division seemed to melt away in the blue musketry smoke, which now covered the hill.  Nothing but stragglers came back. As soon as it was clear Pickett's division was destroyed I ceased firing, saving what little ammunition was left for fear of an advance by the enemy. About this time Gen. Lee came up to our guns alone and remained there half an hour or more, speaking to Pickett's men as they came straggling back and encouraging them to form again in the first cover they could find.

    A little before this Wilcox's division had been advanced also, but I cannot recall the moment or the place I saw them, but only the impression on my mind as the men passed that the charge must surely be some misapprehension of  orders, as the circumstances at the moment made it utterly impossible that it should accomplish anything, and I thought what a pity it was that so many of them were to be sacrificed in vain. It was intended, I believe,  that Wilcox should support Pickett's right flank, but the distance that had to be traversed in the charge got such an interval between the two that Pickett's force was spent and his division disintegrated before Wilcox got under close fire. I have always believed that the enemy here lost the greatest opportunity they ever had of routing Lee's army by a prompt offensive. They occupied a line shaped somewhat like a horse-shoe. I suppose the greatest diameter of this horse-shoe was not more than one mile, and the ground within was entirely sheltered from our observation and fire, with communications by signals all over it, and they could concentrate their whole force at any point and in a very short time without our knowledge. Our line was an envelopment, and communication from flank to flank even by courier was difficult, the country being well cleared and exposed to the enemy's view and fire, the roads all running at right angles to our lines and, some of them at least, broad turnpikes where the enemy's guns could rake for two miles. Is it necessary now to add any statement as to the superiority of the Federal force, or the exhausted sand shattered condition of the Confederates for a space of at least a mile in their very centre, to show that a great opportunity was thrown away? I think Gen. Lee himself was quite apprehensive the enemy would riposte,  and that it was that apprehension, which brought him alone out to my guns, where he could observe all the indications.

    We waited on the ground we had chosen for an attack, but we were not molested. The enemy about dark sent out a skirmish line, and occasionally sent a random shot in the direction of our batteries, but no effort was made to capture us or drive us away. We were supported only by a small body of skirmishers, and preparation for a retreat went on. About 9 o'clock orders were given for us to withdraw, and in a short time all the Confederates had abandoned the ill fated field of Gettysburg, the invasion was at an end. Battle was offered next day and anxiously expected, but the three days' conflict around Cemetery Hill seemed to have satisfied the appetite for blood, and the Confederates crossed the Potomac without an action being urged by the Federal Army.