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Links to Related Documents on the GDG Site

Did General Meade Desire to Retreat at Gettysburg?- Pamphlet by his son George Meade.
"The Pipe Creek Line: An Overview" By Ronald R. Church
Pipe Creek Line map from Edward J. Stackpole's They Met At Gettysburg
Pipe Creek Circular
Historicus Letters
Meade's Official Report

The Pipe Creek Circular
Meade's Execution Order
Meade's Council of War

I suggested the Pipe Creek Circular as a topic simply because I was rereading Stackpoles They Met at Gettysburg the other night and found the topic interesting.

"The 'Pipe Creek Circular' written late on the night of June 30 and based on the reports of his engineers, directed that, if and when the circular was made effective the Army would form a line of batle along the general line of the creek with the left at Middleburg and the right at Manchester. The map shows that this position would cover the main routes to Baltimore and Washington, and the important railroads running to the same ciies, with the added advantage that Parr's Ridge-Dug Hill Ridge would furnish an excellent reserve line to fall back on in case of need" (Stackpole 91-92).

Stackpole is somewhat sympathetic to the circular, calling it as good as hedge as could be devised at the moment; however, he also points out that this order fit in with the whole array of Meade's hesitant reactions to Lee, that every move was designed to get Lee out of Pennsylvania and back into Virginia, "without a fight if possible, and this theme continued to dominate as Lee retreated southward after the battle, Meade's slowness in pursuit furnishing the final evidence" (92).

I like Stackpole's analysis. I do think Meade was being extremely cautious before, during, and after the batle. But was that bad? The man had just been rousted out of bed two days ago and given an army that had been licked and was looking to get licked again. Meade was looking to fight on his own terms in a defensive position. He got what the position he wanted at Pipe Creek at Gettysburg. I prefer Meade's hesitancy to Hooker's arrogance at Chancellorsville and Burnside's foolhardiness at Fredricksburg. After all, Meade got The Army of the Potomac the victory that was desperately needed to keep northern hopes alive. No one else had or would, except Grant.

Finally, I quote brother Bob on the topic. If Longstreet had prevailed and convinced Lee to move to the right on the second day, Meade could have fallen back to his Pipe Creek Line and protected Washington, he likes to say. Brother, check the map. If Lee moves to the right, it is too late to get to Pipe Creek and old Abe is spending November 19 in Libby Prison.

Dennis

Finding it hard to get too worked up over the Pipe Creek Circular

From: lawrence@arthes.com (Robert W Lawrence)
Subject: pipe creek

The so called "Pipe Creek" contorversy started on july 5, 1863. On that day Genearl Sickles(who would later attack Meade using the pseudoname "HISTORICUS" arrived in Washingto D C. He received an important visitor that day-Abraham Lincoln. According to Lt Col James F Rusling, who was present at the meeting, "He (Sickles) certainly got his side of the story well into the Presidents mind and heart that Sunday afternoon"

Per Harry Phanz, in "Gettysburg the Second Day, "his" side of the story was that "Meade had not intended to concentrate his army at Gettysburg and that on July 2, even after his army was concentrated there, Meade still intended to withdarw it from the Gettysburg position"(Gettysburg the second day, p437.)

This scenario, of , course ignores the July 1 midnite meeting with Slocum, Howard and SICKLES.At this meeting the decision was made to make a stand at Gettysburg-Meade could not have been clearer. Upon getting a favorable report from his generals on the position they held he said"I am glad to hear you say so , gentlemen, for it is too late to leave".(Tucker, High Tide Gettysburg, page 200) Had Meade intended to leave it would have been much more logical to do so on the night of July 1 than the afternoon of July 2(in fact some of the Confederates on Culps hill thought just that-they mistook the sound of wagons arriving to fortify cemetery hill as the enemy being in retreat.)

Although I beleive it is hard to make a case that Meade intnended to fall back to the Pipe Creek Line AFTER the events of July 1 I think it is highly probable he would have done so had Ewell thought it "practical" to take Cemetery Hill the afternnon and evening of July 1. In that case I beleive we would today be participating in the "Pipe Creek" discussion group!. There is also little doubt that the Pipe Creek Circular did slow down the concentration of the Union army on July 2. However, one can not blame Meade for this-the circular was probably good strategy given what he knew when he wrote it on June 30. Another one of those great "what If's" is what the effect had been had Reynolds received the circular prior to heeding Bufords call.

And finally, in spite of what revisionist history you might hear from others in this group with the last name of Lawrence I never advocated that the Conferderate army move around to the right-even if they had they would have had to contend with a circle of forts and 100,000 union soldiers before being able to put Lncoln in libby prison.!

Bob

From: PhilosCook@aol.com (aka Ben Maryniak)
Subject: Pipe Creek

Pipe Creek was a contingency devised by Meade. Every competent commander has a set of "what ifs" and ways out - Meade's centered around Pipe Creek. He hit on Pipe Creek as the best way to answer his only specific instructions at that time, which were to cover Washington & Baltimore. Along Pipe Creek, Meade could bring Hooker's army together, lined up from mountain to mountain as a barrier to the only route to DC.

As to its effect on morale, only the corps commanders were aware of a Pipe Creek plan at the time of the battle at Gettysburg.

The keys to the Pipe Creek position were/are * the roads which fan out toward Big Pipe Creek from Westminster MD * the Western MD Railroad line that connected Baltimore to Westminster * the army of militia under Darius Couch (they were emergency soldiers, but they were still another AoP-size force that could hold Lee while Meade struck from another side.

For what it's worth, AoP Artillery Chief Henry J Hunt was the only officer to have travelled the entire length of the proposed line and he was impressed. Hunt's the same guy who crabbed at Yankee battery cmdrs for excessive firing on July 3 - he kept reminding them of the cost per shell. JEB Stuart rode smack through it, passing through Union Mills on June 30. The traditional Union Mills story has the original settlers -- Shriver family -- divided North & South and living on either side of the road. One side parties with JEB while the Union sympathizers watch from their house, then the tables turn when the V Corps arrives.

Hancock is credited with talking Meade out of any thought about falling back to Pipe Creek on the night of July 1 - it would have been a mess with divisions moving in oppositeb directions through the dark, and it might have looked like a retreat.

To Meade's credit, he junked his well-developed Pipe Creek contingency because of the war meeting on the eve of July 2. Without an argument, he reshuffled his whole plan based on that vote by his commanders.

For the best view of Dan (he'd be on the OJ defense team if he was alive today) Sickles' postwar behavior, see Rick Sauers' "Caspian Sea of Ink - The Meade-Sickles Controversy."

From: Dennis
Subject: Pipe Creek - snake & jackal

Steve and Brendan refer to the fact that Meade was unfairly pilloried by his enemies over this innocuous order. It was Butterfield (that snake) and Sickles (that jackal) who loved to beat up Meade to cover the scent of their own droppings on the field. Here is an example of how they performed as a tag team to rough up Meade thirty years later, July 3, 1893.

The speaker at the dedication of the 12th and 44th (the castle) monument on Little Round Top is Dan Sickles (that jackal), he is introduced by Dan Butterfield (that snake) They are talking about Sickles' move to the front on the morning of July 2nd. A move which Meade did not want undertaken:

Snake: It is proper I should say in presenting the Commissioner of the State of New York, that we have acted upon the suggestion that nothing should be said here that would give rise to any comment or controversey. blah, blah, blah... I shall not tell you why the field was not occupied earlier. I shall only tell you that it was not the fault of General Sickles. He insisted upon its occupancy at its earliest hour.

(More blather and digressions and then the jackal rises on its haunches)

Jackal: (crap & BS & regurgitations)...General Meade did not expect an attack from the enemy on that part of the field...again, and again I sent them (messages) over to headquarters calling attention to the fact that double our numbers were already massed for the attack in this direction. Now more than that I do not care to say. I choose to say it here and now because I say it in the presence of Tremaine and Moore and Butterfield, Butterfield being chief of staff, and Tremaine and Moore my principal staff officers (they hunt in packs) and they can confirm what I state. I quite agree with General Butterfield in his desire to avoid on this occasion any remarks calculated to provoke controversey."

(From New York at Gettysburg, Volume I page 340-342)

From: Bob Lawrence
Sbject: Pipe Creek

It seems we have now embarked on some examination of some of the players involved in the "Pipe Creek Contorversy" so following is some selected quotes from some of those who wre engaged in keeping the controversy alive:

Lt. Col Geo B Davis. Ist Mass Calvary-from speech given 4-5-1898:

Order of Geo Meade to Gen Reynolds on afternoon of June 30, 1863

In case of an advance in force against either you or Howard at Emmitsburg, you must fall back to that place(Pipe Creek) and I will reinforce you from >

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Transfer interrupted!

ments"This clearly contemplated a withdrawal not an advance on Gettysburg: and this view is confirmed by General Meades orders of July 1, in wich detailed instructions are communicated to several corp commandersfor a concentration on the Pipe creek line in the rear of tanneytown. This disposition of his command was not warranted by the existing situation, or by bhis knowledge of the movement of the enemy.

General Meade did not intend to fight at gettysburg, and was busy while the first day's battle was in progress , perfecting a defensive line on Pipe creek, many miles away

From the testimony of General Hancock and General Warren, and from Meade's offical dispatch to General halleck it is very clear that Meade intended to concentrate his army and await Lee's attack at Pipe Creek, but Buford,Reynolds,Howard, Hancock and warren prevetned it, although it will appear that later meade had not abandoned his plan to fight at pipe creel"

Most quoted of all is this section from the from the Pipe Creek Circular itself, this version sent to Buford at 12PM July 1

If the enemy assume the offensive, and attack, after holding them in check sufficiently long, to withdraw the trains and other impedimenta; to withdraw army from its present position, and form a line of battle with the left resting in the neighborhood of middleburg, and the right at Manchester, the general direction being that of pipe creek."

One final note-my sainted brother from the North has disputed my contention that the circular slowed the concentration of troops at Gettysburg other than, he admits, the 6th Corp. To which I reply- other than the fact Lincoln got shot the play was pretty good!

Uh, oh. My Sickles tangent pitched us into an abyss. Well, as Dan used to say - I should know better, but tell me again which woodpile the snake is in.

While Lt Col Davis, Lt Cooke, & Lt Kempster may have studied Gburg, they were not in any positions to know about army HQ, let alone regimental HQ.

In the Spring 1955 issue of Civil War History, Douglas Southall Freeman offered some basic criteria for judging the accounts given by Civil War participants:

• When was the account written? Those written at the time of a reported event are more reliable than those written "soon after." Accounts written years later are of much less worth, especially if the author is a public speaker famous for his accounts of the war. When a man tells a tale often, he tends to adorn his story with every telling, and "it becomes hard to ascertain the fabric of fact that underlies the embroidery of fancy." (God, the man could talk!)
• How old was the witness at the time of the event?
• How did the witness keep track of time during the reported event?
• Is the weather described in a report? If not, watch for discrepancies between what weather conditions might have permitted and what was observed or reported.
• Was the witness an unwitting victim of "five-day fatigue" and subject to misperceptions?
• Know the terrain where the reported event took place. In addition to water courses, pay particular attention to uphill approaches and to the amount of cover available.
• If there is conflicting testimony, follow the preponderance of evidence. Further, think about the witness. Was he in a position to see and to know? Was he in a position where he could comprehend the larger context of surrounding activity at that time? Was he considered of dependable character?
• Never depreciate the adversary.

Sidney Granger Cooke was a 19-yr-old private in Co E 147th NYV at Gburg; he was mustered as a 2nd lieutenant 2-7-1865.

Walter Kempster had been a hospital steward for the 12th NYV through 1861-62, was discharged for disability, and then served as 1st Lt Co D 10th NY Cav from June to October 1 of 1863 when he resigned.

Meade certainly did have to be talked-out of using Pipe Creek, but compare his attention to his lieutenants to others in the bozo heap of AoP commanders. "Little Mac" found Lee's own orders on South Mtn, recognized them as real, but did not act. When things were coming down around Hooker's ears at Chancellorsville, he, unfortunately, stuck to his plan. Meade changed his mind.