In our discussions of July 1 and the collapse of XI Corps' position, we haven't yet looked at the possibility that XII Corps, under Slocum, might have been in a position to come up in time to soldify Howard's line, or at least to cover his withdrawal and that of I Corps, preventing it from turing into a rout. From what I've read, Slocum was peculiarly dilatory that day. When this is put together with he strange wanderings of most of XII Corps on July 2, it constitutes a case that Slocum might outshine even Sickles as the #1 goata on the Federal side at Gettysburg.
Good point. Slocum halted the 12th Corps around Noon at Two Taverns, which is about 2 miles from Culps Hill. He proceeded to sit there until almost 4:00 p.m., because he didn't hear the firing that afternoon. Several of his staff officers did hear it, however.
The 12 Corps could easily have been on the field by 2 or 3 PM, maybe even in time to go into line alongside 11 Corps. Another five Brigades on that line might well have secured the position.
Another thought crosses my mind. Slocum is one of those generals that seems to embody the Peter Principle. He seems to have reached his level of incompetence and remained there. Slocum was not an especially good battlefield commander, and did not have the guts to assume command of the battlefield in a crisis situation. He is, in my opinion, a good illustration of the problems associated with a seniority based command system. He's sort of an infantry version of George Stoneman--in high command due to seniority, regardless of whether that high command was earned through success on the battlefield. If Slocum had had the guts to take command of the situation on day one, promptly brought his corps onto the field in time to make a difference in the fighting, the outcome of the first day might have been very different indeed.
On the other hand, as passive as he was, perhaps it's a good thing that he didn't take command of the field....
Eric Wittenberg
Subject: Slocum
To Norm Levitt:
To some extent I agree with you about Slocum. He actually arrived on the field personally during the afternoon of the first day. He was without question the most senior officer on the field, ranking even Howard. Nevertheless, he categorically refused to assume field command of the Union forces, even though he should have done so. He also did not timely bring his command onto the field in time to make a difference. I think I agree with the assessment that he was a goat.
Eric Wittenberg
I have always been mystified by Henry Slocum's refusal to take command of the field on July 1, even though he was the senior officer there once he arrived. I have previously likened it to Gideon Pillow's similar refusal to take command of the field at Fort Donelson. There are a lot of similarities there.
Does anyone out there have any insight into this? Why he would have refused to take command when duty should have required that he do so? Was this an act of cowardice, or was he aware of his own limitations? Is Slocum living, breathing proof of the Peter Principle? (for those who aren't familiar with the Peter Principle, it states that in any heirarchy, every member will rise to his or her own level of incompetence and remain there)
I haven't studied this issue much, but am very interested in it. What does the rest of the group think about it? I've always thought that the 12th Corps could have made a very significant difference on July 1 under the right commander. Again, what does the group think about this angle?
Any and all input is greatly appreciated.
Eric Wittenberg
In fact, while not coming forward is questionable, not assuming command is not all that unreasonable from a military perspective - Many armies have a tradition of letting the commander most familier with the circumstances remain in command, not necessarily the most senior. (In it's extreme form, one sometimes finds company or battalion commanders in the WWI German army issuing orders to division commanders, for this reason.)
However, there is no reason, had Slocum come up, why he could not have placed himself under command of Howard for the good of the service. His keeping those troops away is the really questionable aspect of his decision. I'm just not sure his reasons were cowardly, however poorly thought out...
For instance, one mitigating factor is surely the order to Slocum from Meade himself, that morning, to halt and prepare to retire to the Pipe Creek line if Reynolds is forced out of Gettysburg. While circumstances evolved beyond that order by early afternoon, Slocum was not the kind of commander to undertake, on his own initiative, an advance in disregard of such an instruction.
Dave Powell
Your last point is the best one. That very fact is the one to focus on. The man was not competent to hold that command. Any competent commander with half a spine would have come to the sound of the guns, as
Esteemed member DShultz180@aol.com contributes:
Put yourself in Slocum's place on July 1st. He is ordered to prepare to retire to the Pipe Creek line by Meade in the morning.<
General's Meade and Reynolds had both agreed on June 29th to go at Lee and force a battle. Most likely in northern Maryland. Both Generals were on hand when Meade ordered Gen. Hunt and Col. Edward Warner to map out a defensive position along said Pipe Creek. This duty was not completed until the morning of July 1st. To late to be effective. The coorespondence we know as the Pipe Creek Circular was handed to Slocum about noon on July 1st in a message that read, "commence your movement indicated in the inclosed circular upon reciept of inteligence from General Reynolds." The circular simply stated that he (Slocum) proceed toward Pipe Creek and wait for developments from Reynolds, not form battle line or otherwise.
Bye 12:30 Slocum received another despatch confirming Reynolds' engagement at Gettysburg. Several messages from Howard soon followed, reaching Slocum by 1:30 p.m., asking for help at Gettysburg. Slocum finally responds at 3:30 by informing everyone that he is indeed 1 mile east of Gettysburg. This is Williams' (Ruger's) Division.
Almost all of Slocum's subordinants from the 1st Division who turned in reports for july 1st were amazed that Williams was called back from Brinkerhoff's Ridge by Slocum. The last of Howard's rout through town was clearly seen." There is more to the story of how Hancock's ordered Geary to deploy, and send his artillery support to Cemetery Hil, finally forcing Slocum to make a move.
If not slow, he was very close to insubordinate.
Respectfully D.Shultz
.Well, he couldn't have been insubordinat, because he had no one to be insubordinate to- he was commanding the right wing, and Howard had no authoriety to command Slocum<
You are correct that Howard was junior to Slocum, however there are many reasons to be arrested for insubordination while serving the army during war time. The first is disregard to military regulations, general orders, and the code of conduct before the enemy. Military regulations was the life blood of the Civil Wars regular army officers, at least the ones who kept their swarn oath. At the height of the cannonade on July 3rd, Gen. Meade rode into the cemetery and chastized Osborn for his rapid firing, telling him that it was against army general orders and military regulations to run out of ammunition during a battle. Osborn's disregard could well have been interpeted as insubordination to general orders and military regulations, as Meade stated.
This is just a point ofone type of insubordination. Reynolds placed Hall in an overly exposed position on McPherson's Ridge on july 1st, leaving him orders to hold at all costs. Hall eventually pulled out without receiving "official orders" to do so, which is against army general orders and military regulations for a field battery when supporting infantry.
Was this insubordination? If McPherson's Ridge would have been overrun and secured by the Confederates at that time, Hall may well have been brought up on charges of "insubordination," and used as an escape goat. This of course did not happen so we will never know.
I personally believe Slocum allowed his personal feelings and reasoning to overide his military logic on the afternoon of July 1st. I also think he didan outsatanding job of handling his Corps, as well as the right wing, after he got untracked. Besides that, he was the hero who relieved Hancock. Hurrah!
Respectfully DShultz
In a message dated 96-12-05 01:49:42 EST, you write:
<< personally believe Slocum allowed his personal feelings and reasoning to overide his military logic on the afternoon of July 1st. I also think he did an outsatanding job of handling his Corps, as well as the right wing, after he got untracked. Besides that, he was the hero who relieved Hancock. Hurrah!
Respectfully DShultz
Dave,
I agree, there are many kinds of insuborddination. My point, however, was that Slocum was not insubordinate because he was *following* an order he had just recieved, to halt and prepare to retire in case 1st and 11th Corps fell back and uncovered Two Taverns. He was following a lawful order, not disobeying one.
I do agree that he made the wrong decision, but to advance to Gettysburg would have required him to exercise personal initiative - in effect go beyond his existing orders. Given your points about how much ACW officers were bound by the "book," I would think you would agree that it was much more difficult for Slocum to violate the halt order than not.
This is, I suspect, also why Slocum received so little opprobrium for the 1st of July. While Meade might not have been satisfied with Slocum's response to the first day's battle, he would have had a tough time making a case to relieve (or courtmartial, as Eric said) Slocum for following an order...
Dave Powell
For instance, one mitigating factor is surely the order to Slocum from Meade himself, that morning, to halt and prepare to retire to the Pipe Creek line if Reynolds is forced out of Gettysburg. While circumstances evolved beyond that order by early afternoon, Slocum was not the kind of commander to undertake, on his own initiative, an advance in disregard of such an instruction.
Dave Powell
I think Dave has hit the precise reason why Slocum did not advance. Put yourself in Slocum's place on July 1st. He is ordered to prepare to retire to the Pipe Creek line by Meade in the morning. He almost surely heard early on that Reynolds was down, and the Gettysburg line was, at best, a patchwork of Buford's cavalry and the I Corps, later the I and XI Corps. I think, under the circumstances, Slocum was correct in staying where he was in view of Meade's orders.
Regards, Jack Kelly