The 69th Pennsylvania
And
The Defense of The Angle
July 2 & 3 1863
D. J. Gallagher Company (Philadelphia, 1895)
p. 17
"…..During our encampment here [Harrison’s Landing] new clothing was issued, which was greatly needed, as the men of the Sixty-ninth, just previous to going into the battle of Savage Station were ordered to place their knapsacks in a pile in the woods until after the battle, which they did, but they never recovered them, hence all their clothing was lost by order. The government in this case treated the men very meanly by charging them for the clothing they had drawn to replace that so lost…."
Battle of Glendale, 1862
"….. Another heavy attack broke McCall’s center and sent
the fugitives shamefully through our ranks. Our line was advanced, and
Colonel Owen, Sixty-Ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, unsupported, pursued
the victorious rebels back over the ground through which they were passing
and crowned the crest of the hill where McCall had lost his artillery.
Gallant Sixty-Ninth! The line followed this noble example, and McCall’s
position was held and the enemy discomfited…."
pp. 138-140
The Battle of Glendale
"…[McCall’s Pennsylvania Reserve Division] were placed in line of battle between two divisions of the Third Corps, Hooker to the south and Kearney to the north. In effect, they were "corseted" between two comparatively fresh formations. Longstreet and A. P. Hill assaulted this line with their usual verve, the first attacks falling in the gap between McCall’s left and Hooker’s right by Kemper’s Virginians. The left brigade of the Reserves was driven back.
In the gap were emplaced two Union batteries commanded by Captains Otto Diederichs and John Knieriem. The gunners who were working these pieces did not wait for the Virginians to get too close, but fled through the ranks of the infantry backup, which happened to be the 69th Pennsylvania. The Philadelphia Irish were led to their position by Sumner himself. Sumner turned to Hooker and said:
The Confederates came on in renewed strength and the first waves appeared on the crest of the hill. With no word of command, the 69th stood up and leveled their weapons. A smashing volley stopped the Johnnies and through the billowing smoke came Colonel Owen’s men up the slope with the bright steel of their bayonets winking in the sinking rays of the sun. Some of the Confederates stayed to cross bayonets with the Irish, but most turned and ran back across the cleared field, through the swamp, and into the woods from whence they came. Joe Hooker, looking to his right, saw a great, sprawling mass of men disappear over the crest of the hill, and, wondering, rode over to see what was going on. Where the 69th had formed there was not a living soul. Hooker did not forget them when he wrote his report:
Meanwhile the enemy’s attack had grown in force and violence, and after an ineffectual effort to resist it, the whole of McCall’s division was completely routed, and many of the fugitives rushed down the road on which my right was resting, while others took to the cleared fields and broke through my lines from one end of them to the other, and actually fired on and killed some of my men as they passed…Following closely upon the footsteps of these demoralized people were the broken masses of the enemy…until they were checked by a front fire of the Sixteenth Massachusetts Volunteers and afterward by a diagonal fire on their right and left flanks from the Sixty-Ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers….
After great loss the enemy gave way, and were instantly followed with great gallantry by [BG Cuvier] Grover, at the head of the First Massachusetts Regiment, while the Sixty-Ninth Pennsylvania Regiment, heroically led by Owen, advanced in the open field on their flank with almost reckless daring.
As Colonel Owen has rendered me no report of the operations of his regiment, I can only express my high appreciation of his services, and my acknowledgements to his chief for having tendered me so gallant a regiment."
A Brief History of the 69th Regiment Pennsylvania
Veteran Volunteers, by Anthony W. McDermott,
D. J. Gallagher Company (Philadelphia, 1895)
p. 20
"…A curious feature in this battle was that, while we were driving the rebels across a corn-field toward the "Dunkard’s Church", a part of French’s division (the Third Division, Second Corps), composed almost wholly of new troops, was being driven back by a body of Texans; so close were the flanks that the left flank of our brigade almost rubbed against the left flank of the rebels. Our brigade-line instinstively halted, expecting an order to change front and pour into the Texans, which would have resulted in the complete capture of that rebel force. Why Gen. Howard permitted this opportunity to pass is beyond conception. With two lines of battle in front of us, we might easily have been spared for the short time it would have taken us to defeat, if not annihilate, this force on our flank passing to our rear. Gen. Howard possibly thought it his duty to obey the order he received; but here was a period where discretion could be used to such advantage that we would have shortened the battle, given to our arms a more complete victory, inflicted greater losses upon the enemy, and at the same time won an imperishable name for himself and the Philadelphia Brigade, but Howard ordered us to forward, and we had to obey, though with great reluctance…"
[The Confederates then attacked the brigade from the rear, necessitating a fast retreat by the right flank under a crossfire, with heavy losses in a very short time.]
pp. 257-258
Arrest of Owen
"…At Thoroughfare Gap a very significant event took place for the Philadelphia Brigade in the Second Division of the Second Corps. The new division commander, Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, a West Pointer with three brothers in the Confederate forces, had conceived an intense dislike for the commander of the Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. Joshua Owen. The Second Brigade had not been engaged in the fighting at Chancellorsville, having spent its time guarding bridges, so Gibbon had no personal knowledge of Owen’s worth in battle. Evidently, what Gibbon saw of the erstwhile Philadelphia lawyer in camp did not inspire him with confidence.
The commander of the Philadelphia Brigade was placed under arrest and removed from command. George Stewart, in his fine work Pickett’s Charge, advanced the idea that "Paddy" Owen being Irish, was, no doubt, a great one for the bottle, and this led to his downfall. A sound enough theory, except that Owen was born in Wales and only owed his nickname to the fact that he had been the colonel of the 69th Pennsylvania before being promoted in the fall of 1862.
Owen’s replacement was a real, live, West Point graduate, Alexander Stewart Webb, with long and distinguished service on the staff and in the artillery. Recently, he had been made brigadier general of volunteers and arrived at headquarters of the army just as Hancock was casting about for a successor for the hapless Owen. "Because I knew the man" Hancock seized on Webb and hurried him off to the Philadelphia Brigade…"
pp. 257-258
Arrest of Owen
"...Over in the Second Division of the Second Corps, there was a tremendous personality clash between Col. Joshua Owens, the Welsh-born commander of the 69th Pennsylvania, and his lieutenant colonel, Dennis O’Kane. It ended with O’Kane being tried by a court-martial presided over by none other than Winfield Scott Hancock. The case was summarized by Special Order 109;
[O’Kane was found not guilty on two counts, one being absent from his regiment while it was on picket duty, and the second that he was drunk and had words and "an altercation" with Owen.]
…What had happened was a little more complicated. O’Kane’s wife and daughter came down to visit him [at Harper’s Ferry]. As they were riding in a carriage near the camp, Owen, who was apparently drunk, rode his horse in a violent manner close to the team of horses drawing the carriage. When he persisted in this maneuver O’Kane asked him to desist. Owen persisted in this risky maneuver, frightening both women and calling O’Kane an "Irish son of a bitch," whereupon O’Kane had pulled Owen from his horse, and so the court-martial. Matters were probably a bit strained in the mess of the Philadelphia Irish after that…"
AAG, 2nd Division, 12th Corps
BG George S. Greene’s Staff
The Bachelder Papers
pp. 294-295
"…. A third time advancing, the rebels became hotly engaged on our front. At this time a Penn. Regt. (the "California Regiment" so called) {i.e., the 71st PA] appeared in the rear of our position conducted by Capt. Craig Wadsworth [AAG to Buford]. With this officer I rode up to the right of our line, directing the Colonel to hurry forward and selected their position.
The regiment, however was very slow in coming up, and
again [I] rode back to hurry them up. They finally advanced and went into
the trenches giving three loud cheers as they reached them. These cheers
were answered by a few scattering shots from the right front, by which
I do not think any injury was inflicted. A few shots were also fired, I
think, by the regt., which immediately, to my astonishment, rose up and
retreated in line, apparently without panic or disorder. Riding up to the
Colonel, I found that he had ordered the retreat, saying that he would
not have his men murdered, that he had lost several men by the fire, etc.,
which I believe to be untrue. I urged him forward but he informed me that
he had received orders to return to his corps and he thereupon marched
to the rear to the sound of the enemy’s guns. The men and officers appeared
plucky enough and much mortified at the conduct of the Colonel, whose name
I believe to be Smith [Robert Penn Smith]. In the mean time the attack
was hotly pressed by the enemy who now appeared in some force in the works
deserted by the 1st and 2nd Brigades and more recently
occupied by the California Regiment, ands fell upon the right flank of
the 137th NY………."
HISTORY OF THE PHILADELPHIA BRIGADE, by Charles H. Banes
J. P. Lippincott & Company (Philadelphia, 1876)
p. 186
"….The Seventy-First, under Colonel R. Penn Smith, was
ordered to move at the same time as the One Hundred and Sixth [sent to
Howard on evening of 2 July and placed on the right of the Baltimore Pike,
near Rickett’s Battery, where it remained for the rest of the battle] and
reinforce General Greene. By some misunderstanding, Colonel Smith, in attempting
to go into position, found himself in the presence of a strong force of
the enemy, and owing to the darkness and want of familiarity with the ground,
Lieutenants Davis and Boughton, with Adjutant Hutchinson and sixteen of
the men actring as skirmishers, were taken prisoner. After this, Colonel
Smith assumed the resposibility of rejoining his brigade, which he did
before daylight…"
Official Report of Col. R. Penn Smith, Seventy-First Pennsylvania Infantry
No. 106, O. R. – Series I – Volume XXVII/1 [S#43] – Gettysburg Campaign
General Webb Makes Himself Known
pp. 257-258
Arrest of Owen
…The Philadelphia Brigade was hardly on the road on June 29 when General Webb had an officer’s call sounded. He surveyed with distaste the dusty, bearded men who answered. "I presume you are officers since you attend the Call. There are but few of you whom I am able to recognize as officers as you have no insignia of office except your swords." There is little doubt that the officers gazed back at Webb with stupefaction. The Army of the Potomac had learned by hard experience that the Confederate sharpshooters could tell officers easily if they were so foolish as to wear the shoulder straps of their rank. As a result few did. Now here was a spic-and-span bandbox soldier fresh from the staff telling combat veterans how to appear. And there was no doubt Webb was in earnest. The next time he encountered his officers they had better be suitably accoutered…..Webb was not yet done…"
pp. 257-258
Arrest of Owen
"…On the next officer’s call, Webb told his subordinates
that there was too much straggling in the brigade. Stragglers were to be
arrested and brought to him; he would shoot them like dogs. Whether or
not this was an empty threat, it is a notable fact that there were but
twelve stragglers in the brigade after the news was passed around the following
day….."
pp. 296-297
[Letter of Alexander Webb to Gov. Curtin of Pennsylvania
August 11, 1863]
" …The next few weeks after the battle Webb got to know more about the 69th Pennsylvania, even in its reduced complement. It was his first experience with Irish soldiers and he found there was much about them that was different. On August 11, he wrote a letter to Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania:
I would especially call the attention of your Excellency to the fact, that it is impossible to govern "Irish Regiments", when the officers do not belong to a more intelligent class than that of which Murdoch Campbell, Lieut. [Charles] McAnally, and Lieut. [Charles] Fitzpatrick 69th Regt. P.V. are typical. I shall do all in my power to get rid of these disorganizing stumbling blocks.
Lieut. Fitzpatrick has tendered his resignation.
Your obdt servt
Alex. S. Webb
O. R. – Series I – Volume XXVII/1 [S# 43] - Gettysburg Campaign
(July 12, 1863)
"…By command of Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, commanding division,
this brigade was put in position at 6.30 a.m. on the 2d, on Granite Ridge,
on the right of the division, its right resting on Cushing’s battery (Battery
A, 4th U. S. Artillery) and its left on Battery B, 1st
Rhode Island Artillery, Lieutenant Brown commanding. The Sixty-Ninth Regiment
was placed behind a fence a little in advance of the ridge, the remaining
three regiments of the brigade under cover of the hill in rear….."
Report of Brig. Gen. Alexander S. Webb, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade
O. R. – Series I – Volume XXVII/1 [S# 43] - Gettysburg Campaign
(July 12, 1863)
"… Brown’s battery was, in the course of the day, moved to the front of the Sixty-Ninth Regiment. It remained at this point until the assault at 6.30 p.m. …
…In the morning, Capt. John J. Sperry, of the One Hundred and Sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, was sent out with Companies A and I of the Seventy-second Pennsylvania Volunteers, and A and B of the One Hundred and sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, to skirmish and to watch the movements of the enemy…."
THE HISTORY OF BATTERY B, 1ST RHODE ISLAND LIGHT ARTILLERY, by John H. Rhodes
Snow and Farnham (Providence 1894)
pp. 200-203
"..General Sickles advanced the Third Corps to the front, about two o’clock P.M., thus making a gap, and leaving the Second Corps exposed on its extreme left flank with only Battery B to fill the space. While the Third Corps was engaged, at Devil’s Den and Peach Orchard, in a struggle for possession of Little Round Top, the guns of Battery B, at four o’clock were advanced to the right and front, a few hundred rods, to a ridge in front of the main battle line of General Gibbon’s (Second Division of Second Corps) left front, known as "Godori’s field". On reaching the position Lieutenant Brown ordered us "in battery" at once, and we opened fire upon a rebel battery which had obtained a good range upon General Meade’s headquarters. After a well-directed fire, of a few moments, the rebel battery could hold out no longer and withdrew, our fire made it so hot for them that they did not even send us a parting salute.
The following will explain Battery B’s position more clearly: General Gibbon’s line at this place, ran nearly parallel to the Emmitsburg road; we were on General Gibbon’s left flank, on a slight ridge in Godori’s field, between his line and the road at an angle of about 45 [degrees]. The battery’s left was nearest the road with the right extending back to within one hundred yards of the main line, at the stone wall, facing nearly northwest, our line of fire, therefore, was diagonally across the Emmitsburg road toward and to the left of the Lutheran Theological Seminary. The battery had been thrown forward toward the Godori house, by orders from General Gibbon, in order to get it out of the way for a time while he was trying to cover his left flank, which had become exposed by the abrupt advance of the Third Corps which caused a gap in the main line. The Fifteenth Massachusetts and the Eighty-Second New York regiments lay along the road beside the fences…."
Snow and Farnham (Providence 1894)
pp. 200-203
"…Shortly after we had ceased firing on the rebel battery a large force of the enemy was seen coming out of the woods, on our left flank, moving to the road in the direction of the gap. At first we mistook them for our own men, supposing that the Third Corps was falling back to its old position; but when we commenced to receive their fire and heard that well-known "rebel yell, as they charged for our battery, we were in doubt no longer, but sprang to the posts at the guns ready to receive them. The force of the enemy proved th be General Wright’s brigade of General Anderso’s division, making for a gap between the second and Third Corps.
The enemy were in solid front of two lines of battle. As our artillery fire cut down their men they would waver for a second, onlt to soon close up and continue their advance, with their battle flags flying in the breeze, and the barrels of their muskets reflecting the sun’s dazzling rays. The violent forcing back of General Humphrey’s division of the Third Corps, brought destruction upon the force under Col. George H. Ward, consisting of his own regiment, the Fifteenth Massachusetts, the Eighty-Second New York, Lt. Col. Huston, and Battery B under Lieut. T. Fred. Brown. As the enemy (Wright’s brigade) advanced a desperate resistance was made by this little band, which was far overlapped on their flanks, and at last compelled to retreat.
…Lieutenant Brown ordered the battery to change front left oblique and to then begin firing four second spherical case shell.
By the change of fronts, only the left and centre sections (four guns) could be brought to bear effectually on the advancing enemy, while the right section shelled the woods. By their exposed position the battery received the concentrated fire of the enemy, which was advancing so rapidly that our fuses were cut at three, two, and one second, and then canister at point blank range, and, finally, double charges were used. Then came the order "Limber to the rear," and shouts from our infantry, "Get out of that, you will all be killed." From the batterymen it was "Don’t give up the guns."
During this time the enemy was advancing and firing by volleys. Having failed in their attempt to secure the gap [stopped by the charge of the First Minnesota], their objective point now seemed to be the capture of the battery, but, as we were well supported by the Sixty-Ninth and One Hundred and Sixth Pennsylvania boys, we succeeded in retiring with four pieces leaving two on the field, the horses having been killed.
In retiring, the battery came under a heavy enfilading fire from the wing of the flanking foe, which had overlapped us, and many of our men and horses were wounded before we could retire behind our line of support, for only one piece at a time could go through the narrow gap in the stone wall which afforded breastworks for our infantry.
The drivers of the sixth piece were forced to halt as they approached the gap, it being partially blocked by two pieces, the third and fifth, trying to get through at the same time. As a consequence one of the horses, on the sixth piece, was killed and another wounded causing such confusion that the drivers were forced to abandon their horses and the cannoneers their gun. The enemy were right upon them, and they sought safety by lying down, or making for the gap, from each side of which streamed a vivid flame sending forth messengers of death to the foe.
When the order was given, by Lieutenant Brown, to limber to the rear, Sergt. Albert Straight waited and had his piece , the fourth which was loaded, fired before he repeated the order, and, in consequence two of his horses were shot making it impossible to execute the order. He then ordered the men to look out for themselves, leaving his gun in position on the field.
…The other pieces, which reached the rear of our battle line, got in battery at once and opened fire again upon the advancing foe, but soon stopped to enable our infantry to charge them. Then came a struggle for the possession of those two guns. The gallant Sixty-Ninth Pennsylvania, backed by the One Hundred and Sixth, held their ground, and advancing, with the brigade on the charge, drove the foe back and held the guns. When the rebels were finally driven back across the Emmitsburg road, we withdrew our two pieces from the field to the third position occupied by the battery. After the charge the brigade fell back to the wall, its old position on the ridge.
Owing to the loss of men and horses the fifth and sixth pieces were sent to the rear, where the reserve artillery was parked, while the serviceable horses and men were put into the other four detachments making them complete.
Our casualties of July 2nd were one officer wounded (Lt. T. Fred. Brown), three men killed, seventeen wounded, and one taken prisoner. …Making a total of 22.
…During the engagement our caissons, with a full compliment
of men and horses, were parked in the rear of the reserve line of infantry
of the corps, and remained undisturbed. It was owing to this circumstance
that the battery was enabled to take part in the battle of July 3rd
with four guns fully equipped. ….[T]he command was turned over to 1st
Lieutenant William S. Perrin…".
O. R. – Series I – Volume XXVII/1 [S# 43] - Gettysburg Campaign
(July 12, 1863)
"… The enemy made the assault of the 2d at about 6:30 p.m. Their line of battle advanced beyond one gun of Brown’s battery, receiving at that point the fire of the Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers and that of the Seventy-First Pennsylvania Volunteers, advanced to the support of the Sixty-ninth; also that of the One Hundred and sixth and Seventy-second Pennsylvania Volunteers, which had previously been moved to the left, by command of Major-General Hancock….They [the enemy] halted, wavered, and fell back, pursued by the One Hundred and sixth, Seventy-second, and part of the Seventy-first Pennsylvania Volunteers. The One Hundred and sixth and Seventy-second Pennsylvania Volunteers followed them to the Emmitsburg Road, capturing and sending to the rear about 250 prisoners, …."
Letter of Anthony W. McDermott to Colonel John B. Bachelder
June 2, 1886
THE BACHELDER PAPERS
pp. 1406-1409
"…..Shortly after daylight on the morning of the 2nd, the regiment moved from the bivouac {a wood on the Taneytown road about 1-2 miles away] to Cemetery Ridge, and relieved the 90th Penna. of the 1st corps, our line of battle was formed immediately on reaching the ridge, behind a stone wall, about two feet high, and on the decline of the slope, facing the enemy, and a short distance from the crest of the ridge, our right resting within 15 or 20 paces of an angle of the wall that receded a short distance to the rear, left resting on an opening, or gateway through the wall. To the rear of the left of the right, was a cluster, or rather several small clusters of trees, these you have described to me as being the cluster not famous as the objective point in Pickett’s advance upon our lines, while in rear of right center, midway between our line of battle and the crest of the ridge was also a small clump of trees with underbrush, these are what I was led to believe was the celebrated clump. On our right was the 71st Pa. Vols. of our brigade, whose left rested at the salient angle of the stone wall, continuing along the recession, thence along the continuation. On our left was posted the 59th N.Y. The 72nd and 106th Penn., Regts. of our brigade was posted in the rear, behind that crest of the ridge and close to the Taneytown Pike, the ridge concealing them from view. Shortly after forming our line, a detail was taken from the regt., for picket or skirmish duty in the front of our line of battle and along the Emmitsburg pike. Nothing occurred during the morning in our front, except some brisk picket firing nor until afternoon, when following the rout of the 3rd Corps, which was driven past the prolongation of our line, the enemy made a furious assault upon our line [Wright’s brigade of Anderson’s and Hill’s]. To check his advance Brown’s battery, dashed through the gateway upon our left, and stationed itself in front of our centre, and poured in a raking fire to the enemy’s line; but still the enemy advanced, charging upon the battery. Brown was forced to retire, leaving one piece behind. The enemy still advanced but before reaching this piece of artillery we opened a very destructive fire which compelled his line to halt. One of their officers succeeded in reaching the gun and sat upon the muzzle, urging his men to follow. He did not remain long in that position, our bullets removed him. Our men now dashed over the wall but General Harrow who stood with our right , and Webb, who was with our centre ordered us back to our position
……The 71st Penn. was placed in our rear, but was not engaged. The 72nd and 106th also of our brigade were detailed by Gen. Hancock’s orders and sent to the aid of the 3rd Corps. After the fighting was over on our front and left, the 106th were taken from us and sent to General Howard to Cemetery Hill, where they remained until after the battle, excepting two companies that were out on picket.
Before sunset Gen. Webb had informed us that if we would
hold our position until 4 o’clock on the following afternoon, Gen, McClellan
would be in the rear of the rebels with 30,00 troops, and their defeat
would be easily accomplished. I do not know exactly why he made those representations
to us, unless that it was because of the fierce attack made upon Culp’s
Hill (12th Corps front) by Ewell’s Corps of the enemy, and not
knowing that our line curved to our rear at that point, we supposed the
enemy had managed to gain our rear, and for a time was pressing close upon
us, as the sound of the musketry fire seemed to be near.
Union Order of Battle – July 3rd
MORNING
June 2, 1886
THE BACHELDER PAPERS
p.1409
"…The morning of the 3rd passed off quietly, except the usual picket firing, sometimes very brisk and again all quiet until about noon. The troops had all finished eating their stew, or sipping their coffee, when a death-like stillness prevailed throughout the army. The sun was shining in all its glory, giving forth a heat almost stifling and not a breath of air came to cause the slightest quiver to the most delicate leaf, or blade of grass. Of that stillness you have often heard, no language of mine could cause you to imagine its reality, such a stillness I had never experienced before, nor since, and I have borne part in every engagement of the Army of the Potomac.
The sound of a Whitworth gun was the first to break that
stillness, it came from the Rebel lines and its shots passed high over
our heads, a minute or two elapsed, then there was opened a volley of artillery,
shot and shell, that ploughed through the air, ground, and over our heads.
You are already much more familiar with this terrible cannonade, than any
statement of mine could make you. I cannot state with any precision the
duration of time, this fire was kept up until lines of battle made their
appearance. It may have been but half an hour, but it certainly seemed
over an hour before the fire slackened, and the infantry appearing in three
lines of battle, and a skirmish line until our skirmishers had retired,
and after the infantry cleared the woods, their artillery appeared. No
holiday display seemed more imposing, nor troops on parade more regular,
than this division of Pickett’s Rebels. They came steadily arms at a trail,
their appearance was truly a relief from that terrible fire of their artillery;
not that it was so destructive, but the dread it occasioned, the range
seemed so low, and the air so thick with flying missiles, that we did not
enjoy any space of relief from the dread of being ploughed into shreds,
until the appearance of the infantry when the fire slackened.,,"
June 2, 1886
THE BACHELDER PAPERS
pp. 1409-1415
"…The morning of the 3rd passed off quietly, except the usual picket firing, sometimes very brisk and again all quiet until about noon. The troops had all finished eating their stew, or sipping their coffee, when a death-like stillness prevailed throughout the army. The sun was shining in all its glory, giving forth a heat almost stifling and not a breath of air came to cause the slightest quiver to the most delicate leaf, or blade of grass. Of that stillness you have often heard, no language of mine could cause you to imagine its reality, such a stillness I had never experienced before, nor since, and I have borne part in every engagement of the Army of the Potomac.
The sound of a Whitworth gun was the first to break that
stillness, it came from the Rebel lines and its shots passed high over
our heads, a minute or two elapsed, then there was opened a volley of artillery,
shot and shell, that ploughed through the air, ground, and over our heads.
You are already much more familiar with this terrible cannonade, than any
statement of mine could make you. I cannot state with any precision the
duration of time, this fire was kept up until lines of battle made their
appearance. It may have been but half an hour, but it certainly seemed
over an hour before the fire slackened, and the infantry appearing in three
lines of battle, and a skirmish line until our skirmishers had retired,
and after the infantry cleared the woods, their artillery appeared. No
holiday display seemed more imposing, nor troops on parade more regular,
than this division of Pickett’s Rebels. They came steadily arms at a trail,
their appearance was truly a relief from that terrible fire of their artillery;
not that it was so destructive, but the dread it occasioned, the range
seemed so low, and the air so thick with flying missiles, that we did not
enjoy any space of relief from the dread of being ploughed into shreds,
until the appearance of the infantry when the fire slackened.
THE CHARGE
June 2, 1886
THE BACHELDER PAPERS
pp. 1409-1415
"…Cushing had already ordered two pieces from the crest down to the wall, and were placed in our line of battle, with Company "I" the right flanking company of the regiment, and of which I was a private at the time. Those pieces done more harm in that position to us than they did to the enemy, as they only fired two or three rounds when their ammunition gave out, and one of those rounds blew the heads off two privates of the company, who were on one knee, at the time, besides those pieces drew upon us more than our share of fire from the battery that followed Pickett from the woods opposite to us, the gunners left us leaving their guns behind, hence they were useless. Poor Cushing was struck in the thighs, just previous to the arrival of those two guns on our line. During all that terrible storm of artillery, Cushing stood at the wall with one [our?] Co., glass in hands, watching the effect of each shot from his own guns, all his demands were distinctly heard by our men. He would shout back to his men to elevate or depress their pieces so many degrees, his last command, that we heard was, "that’s excellent, keep that range." A few moments after we were rising from the ground to receive the advancing infantry, one of our men called out "that the artillery officer has his legs knocked from under him," thus ending the life as cool and brave an officer as the army was possessed of…"
October 12, 1915
From WEBB AND HIS BRIGADE AT THE ANGLE
GETTYSBURG
Published by the New York Monuments Commission
(J. B. Lyon Company, Albany NY)
1916
pp.63-75
"… I was ordered, very early on the morning of the 3rd, to report with my battery to General John Newton, near Little Round Top. He then commanded the First Corps. We got our breakfast and rested until a few minutes after the Confederates opened the cannonade with about one hundred guns, and we replied with about one hundred and fifty guns.
I was then directed to a position behind the extreme right of Stannard’s Second Vermont Brigade, First Corps, this side of where the Pennsylvania monument now stands. The ride from the Taneytown Road, at the junction of the granite school house road, under that tempest of shot and shell, was thrilling, but the enemy’s fire was far too high. The position assigned us was farther awy from the breastworks than that of Pettit’s Battery B, First New York Light Artillery – commanded that day by Captain J. McKay Rorty – which was the first battery to my right. The battery on Rorty’s right was Brown’s Battery B, First Rhode Island.
We fired, deliberately, to the left oblique at the enemy’s batteries along the Emmitsburg Road, until an officer, riding at a run from the right toward our left, shouted to me as he passed: "Cease firing, hold your fire for the infantry." Before the smoke which enveloped us was entirely blown away, another officer, riding in the same fashion, called to me as he passed: "Report to General Webb at the right." I hesitated because I was under General Doubleday’s orders, directly behind the extreme right of his division, with two of the guns overlapping the left of the Second Corps. But I saw an officer standing at the copse of trees, waving his hat toward me, and I saw that the battery was withdrawing from the position at the right of Rorty’s guns and left of the trees. The officer was General Webb and the battery was Brown’s B, First Rhode Island, which wasa out of ammunition. It had been engaged in the great battle of the afternoon before, when Lieut. T. Fred. Brown, in command, was shot in the neck and fell from his horse wounded, between here and the Emmitsburg Road. I instantly gave the order: "Limber to the right, forward!" We wheeled into Brown’s position at a gallop. Then, at a glance over yonder, I saw the enemy’s skirmish line advancing from the trees with colors flying. I gave the distance and the time for the fuses before I saw that one of my six guns had passed to the right of the trees in our furious gallop. I rode there and found my gun in position for firing, within a few yards of the left gun of the battery posted there. An officer came limping down to see what was the matter and I recognized him as Lieut. Alonzo Cushing, who had been slightly wounded in the thigh, probably by a small shrapnel ball. He heard my hurried explanation, made some pleasant reply and gave the order to his left gun: "By hand to the front." As I saw his gun being pushed down toward the wall, making room for mine to fire, I turned away, and saw him no more alive. After the fight, when looking for my gun, which had disappeared, I saw his dead body lying beside a gun down at the wall. A rifle ball had hit him in the mouth, doubtless killing him instantly.
The enemy seemed to be developing three lines-their skirmish line with two strong lines following- and were keeping a splendid alignment, guiding left. We fired rapidly from our five guns; I left the gun at the right take care of itself under acting Sergeant Mullaly, a brave soldier. Presently, I saw a body of Confederates appear, topping the ridge where Alexander’s artillery was in action. It was Pickett’s division of Longstreet’s Corps, five thousand strong, which had only arrived during the previous night, and therefore had not been engaged the first or second day. They dressed their lines before advancing, and from there came on steadily in three lines at brigade front.
I could see them perfectly, for there were no trees then along the wall to obstruct the view. The trees on the little knoll over there in the front have grown from stumps of small trees that were cut down there the second day. As gaps opened in their lines, when men fell under our cannon fire, they closed to their left and kept a splendid front, as described in my official report. Their direction was oblique, and it seemed that they were marching to this copse of trees, which indeed they were. The Codori house and barn hid them from my sight for a minute, and when I saw them again they were coming at a run, without regard for alignment. There was a little elevation, covered with bushes as it then seemed to me, just where yonder bunch of trees beyond the wall has grown from suckers. A few hundred of the Virginians fell down behind that brush-covered knoll and opened fire on us. But a large body of them, to their left, rushed forward in the direction of the Angle, to our right of the trees.
General Hunt was on horseback in my battery, and I was standing at the left side of his horse, when I opened with canister on the crowd lying down[emphasis added]. He soon began firng his pistol at those rushing on, exclaiming: "See ‘em! See ‘em!", when in a moment his horse fell dead under him. We extricated him and quickly mounted him on our Sergeant Van Etten’s big bay, on which he rode away toward the right of the trees, calling over his shoulder to me: "Look out or you will kill our men", meaning our infantry behind the low wall in front of my five guns; but I had no thought of firing over their heads at such close range. [Emphasis added]
Then, in a flash, our infantry behind the wall in front of my guns arose and rushed to the right through the trees, for some cause I could not see. Quite a number of them ran away through my guns. One was a captain, with his sword tucked under his arm, running like a turkey. I swore at him as he passed me. But it was a circus to hear and see our Corporal Plunkett, swearing like a pirate and prancing like a mad bull, striking at the runaways with his fists, until I saw him pick up something from the ground and smash it over the head of one of the frightened boys. It was a big tin coffeepot, the loot from some Dutch Frau’s kitchen. The blow broke in the bottom. I can still see that fellow running with the tin pot well down over his ears.
ON THE WALL
June 2, 1886
THE BACHELDER PAPERS
pp. 1409-1415
"…After getting to our feet, our Col. {Dennis] O’Kane, gave us the orders not to fire a shot until the enemy came so close to us, that we could distinguish the white of their eyes, he also reminded us that we were upon the soil of our home state, and that the enemy would probably make a desperate assault upon us, but as he knew we were at least as brave as they were, he did not fear but that we would render an account of ourselves this day, that would bring upon us the plaudits of our country, and that should any man among us flinch in our duty, he asked that the man nearest him would kill him on the spot. He went along the line speaking encouragement to all the companies.
Gen. Webb had also addressed our men on the centre and left in a similar manner, and gave them all the encouragement in his power. Those addresses were not necessary as I do not believe there was a soldier in the regiment, that did not feel that he had the courage to meet the enemy at Gettysburg, than upon any field of battle in which we had as yet been engaged. The stimulus being the fact that we were upon the soil of our own state.
When about two-thirds of the field, that lay between the stonewall and the Emmitsburg pike, had been crossed, the enemy changed his direction to an oblique march to his left, and kept this direction is as good order, as when marching directly to the front, when within about 20 yards of us we received the command to fire, our first round was fired with deliberation and simultaneously, and threw their front line into confusion, from which they quickly rallied and opened fire upon us.
The troops on our right abandoned their position which left a blank space, that Armistead was quick to take advantage of. Seeing it, he rushed through his ranks, taking off his hat and putting it on the point of his sword, he raised it for a standard, waving it he ran along our front to a point near the angle and crossed the wall, his men following him, then continued in a direction towards the clump of trees in our rear……………"
Testimony of Charles H. Banes before Battlefield Commissioners
April 24, 1890
Regarding 72nd PA Claims for Monument at the Angle
THE BACHELDER PAPERS
p. 1706
"…Q. Two of the companies of the 71st Regiment went down there [to the wall manned by the 69th Regiment]?
THE BACHELDER PAPERS
pp. 1402-1403
"……I have read a great many accounts of the brave charge, but have not noticed in any of them how so few men behind the wall made themselves so effective; we received a lesson from the charge of the 2nd of July, which was almost similar to Pickett’s only the rebs did not reach the wall, although they captured a battery about forty yards in our front, and advanced within ten feet of the wall. We charged and recaptured the battery, and took a great many prisoners, most of whom were Georgians, and the best clothed soldiers that we had ever come across on their side [Wright’s Brigade, Anderson’s Division, Hill’s Corps]. After taking care of the wounded and removing them back, we collected the guns and ammunition of the dead. This is the point I want to give you and show you what use we made of the spare guns. We selected the best and reloaded, and reclined them against the wall. The ammunition we found to contain three buck-shot and a ball, and if my memory does not fail me the ammunition had a label showing it to have been manufactured in Birmingham England, and I will guarantee it inflictec more harm upon them than upon us. We abstracted the buck-shot from the ammunition and reloaded the spare guns putting twelve to the load, and almost every man had from two to five guns loaded that were not used until Pickett got within fifty yards of the wall. The slaughter was terrible, to which act the ground literally covered with the enemy’s dead bore ample testimony.
A great many incidents happened which I could give you,
but I often think of the brave fellows that charged us and I would rather
not relate them, as for myself I was in the one position during both cahrges,
and only moved a few yards when Pickett’s braves reached the wall, and
the only time I left it, was when I lead Sergt. [Henry W.] Murray to the
rear, with both eyes shot out, and begging me to put an end to that existence
which he thought would be no longer endurable………"
June 2, 1886
THE BACHELDER PAPERS
pp. 1409-1415
"….The troops on our right abandoned their position which left a blank space, that Armistead was quick to take advantage of. Seeing it, he rushed through his ranks, taking off his hat and putting it on the point of his sword, he raised it for a standard, waving it he ran along our front to a point near the angle and crossed the wall, his men following him, then continued in a direction towards the clump of trees in our rear, and close to where Gen. Webb stood when he was trying to get the 72nd to come to our assistance, the first three companies were now ordered to change their front to protect our right and rear, these were "I", "A", and "F".
The enemy in our front was pouring in their shot, and Armistead’s followers were giving it to us from our right flank, Co. "I" and "A" quickly changed and moved back to the crest to get between Armistead and Cushing’s four pieces. Co. "F" seemed to either not to have received the order in time or had no desire to leave the wall hence an opening was left which let the enemy get between them and our two flanking Cos. They rushed in on the rear of our main line, and it looked as though our regiment would be annihilated, the contest here became a hand-to-hand affair. Company "F" completely hustled over the stone wall into the enemy’s ranks, and all were captured, their Capt. Geo. Thompson being killed, and theit Lt’s. wounded and prisoners. I believe this company had no representation with the regt. except those who had been on extra duty, and convelescents returned from the hospital, many of the enemy were here mingled with our own men some so close that while they struck at each other with the barrels of their rifles, they could not inflict any disabling injury.
Gen. Kemper who was commanding the enemy on our left and center, I suppose saw the shuffling on the right of our regiment rushed to the front and pressed his men upon our colors, the fighting here at close quarters was more desperate than at any other part of our line and involved Co. "C","D", "H", "E", "G". What took place here I could not see, my range of vision only took in what was on my front, but seeing the enemy rushing in to the gap between co, "A" and "F" caused me to look at their movement, when I saw the dangers that beset the regiment, or that part of it at the stone wall. I then cast my eyes on Webb, who was not far from me, and saw him giving his fruitless command, by shouting for the 72nd to come up the hill to our assistance, it was in vain.
Kemper’s men, some of whom I believe used their musket butts as clubs as well as some of our own men, as an instance, Corp. Bradley of Co. "D" who was quite a savage sort of a fellow, wielded his piece, striking right and left, and was killed in the melee by having his skull crushed by a musket in the hands of a rebel, and Private Donnelly of same Co. used his piece as a club, and when called upon to surrender replied tauntingly, "I surrender" at the same time striking his would be captor to the ground…."
Letter of Anthony W. McDermott to Colonel John B. Bachelder
October 21, 1889
THE BACHELDER PAPERS
pp. 1654-1657
"…I did not even know that company F had been almost captured until the fighting was over, that was the 3rd company in the line. I also questioned the men to know whether any portion of the regiment abandoned the wall, except companies I + A who changed their front. The men of Company D 4th company admit that when the rebels threatened their rear there was some disorder, as they were obliged to turn upon the enemy to their flank and rear and beat him back to save capture, this forced them to move a few feet from the wall. It was D company that had the hand-to-hand tussle and saved the remainder of the regiment from being enveloped, and possible capture, the 5th, 6th, + 7th companies (E, C, + H) had given way a few feet from the wall, the fear of capture had made them cautious about sticking close to the wall. The reminder of the regiment remained firm at the wall.
CONFEDERATES BREAK THROUGH
September 17, 1889
THE BACHELDER PAPERS
pp. 1627-1629
"……what I saw relative to the positions of the regiments of the Philadelphia Brigade in the fighting on July 3rd in repulsing Pickett, especially that of the 72nd Penna.
You will remember you asked me about the position of that regiment at the time "Hall’s Brigade" came to our aid. The 72nd was still in position behind the crest of the ridge where it had lain during the artillery fire previous to the charge. When my company (I) the first company of the 69th had changed front my position was on the right of the company, almost at the top of the crest, just on a line with Armistead, being closer to that Gen’l. than any other person.
I was afraid we were going to get whipped and I done on this occasion as I had done in every other fight, which was to study our rear and to know what support we might rely on when pushed. In looking towards our rear I saw the 72nd Penna. in line in their original position. Adj’t. Genl. of the Brigade Capt. Chas. H. Banes was on horse riding along the lines of the 72nd urging the men to come up to our aid and while at the same time Genl. Webb stood on the crest facing the 72nd , and of course his back to the stone wall, beggingthem to come up…."
Letter of Colonel Arthur C. Devereaux, 19th Massachusetts Infantry, to Colonel John B. Bachelder
July 22, 1889
THE BACHELDER PAPERS
pp. 1609-1610
"…. A short but I think probably sufficient statement with reference to the action of the 72nd Pa. at the repulse of Pickett’s charge would be this,
From my position in the second line I had been watching the course of events unable to make use of my own men up to the time when I saw that Webb could not sustain the shock with his front line. I saw that the 69th Pa were apparently run over, but not retreating. The 71st Pa. were giving ground rapidly.
Gen, Webb had rushed back to his second line (The 72nd Pa.) with the evident purpose of hurrying them forward to meet Pickett’s men now swarming over the stone wall. They were immovable notwithstanding Webb’s protest and appeals. Hall, finding himself overlapped did the true soldierly act by endeavoring to refuse his right and in that way show a new front to the enemy who were now passing his flank. This left a broad gap open to the Confederates. Just then Hancock came riding furiously up. I halted him, pointing to the enemy’s colors crossing the stone wall and asked permission to put my men in there. His prompt direction was "To get in G_D_ quick".
I went in on the run. Mallon, with the 42nd New York, taking up the same movement, as he stood by my side when this interview occurred between me and Hancock; and he had been substantially under my command since the middle of the afternoon of the previous day. We had to move by sharp "right oblique". His regiment being on the right of mine became by this movement in echelon a little in advance. The two regiments passed between Hall’s right and the 72nd Pa., still standing immobile.
We left them (the 72nd Pa.) in our rear when we struck the head of Pickett’s column.
We met the enemy breast to breast, sufficiently proven by the fact that one of my color bearers (Joseph H. DeCastro) knocked down the color bearer of the 14th Va. With his color staff, picked up the fallen flag and handed it to me.
As further evidence that we met (Mallon and myself) the front of Pickett’s charge, it is enough to state that I captured the first four colors of Pickett’s column as it then stood and Mallon captured another, and the bulk of those remaining alive in the enemy’s ranks (after the desperate struggle at that point) surrendered through my line.
The 72nd Pa. had not advanced when the surrender came.
I remember, how after the fight, Gen. Webb spoke so severely of this portion of his brigade to Mallon, Hall, and myself, standing together in a group at the copse of trees just after I had reformed the division line in its original position, that matter having been intrusted to me.
As far as I can see this will cover the points that you desire to arrive at and I assure you that it gives me no pleasure to look back and remember anything of censure on the part of any of the troops engaged at that point.
But there can be no question of the facts substantially
as I relate them…….."
CONFEDERATES REPULSED
June 2, 1886
THE BACHELDER PAPERS
pp. 1412-1413
"… We poured our fire upon the enemy until Armistead received
his mortal wound; he swerved from the way in which he winced, as though
he was struck in the stomach, after wincing or bending like a person with
cramp, he pressed his left hand to his stomach, his sword and hat (a slouch)
fell to the ground. He then made two or three staggering steps, reached
out his hands trying to grasp at the muzzle of what was then the 1st
piece of Cushing’s battery, and fell, I was at the time the nearest person
to him. At the time he was struck his fall was much about the same time
that Kemper fell…"
Letter of Gen. Alexander Webb to his wife
July 6, 1863
THE BACHELDER PAPERS
pp. 18-19
"……Longstreet was in front with Pickett’s Division and
two brigades from some other division. General Armistead, Dick Garnett,
and Pettigrew were in command of brigades. As they steadily advanced I
ordered my few guns to fire and we opened great gaps on them, but steadily
they advanced in four solid lines, right on, up to my works and fence ands
shot my men when their muskets touched their breasts. Seeing two companies
driven out, all my artillery in their hands I ordered also my reserve regt.[72nd
PA] and led it myself. General Armistead (an old army officer) led his
men, came over my fence and passed me with four of his men. He fell mortally
wounded. I got one shot grazing my thigh. I stood but 39 paces from them
[??], their officer pointing me out, but God preserved me………."
LOSSES AND HONORS
40 men 78 men 16 men
January 27, 1887
THE BACHELDER PAPERS
pp. 1465-1473
[McDermott finds fault with War Department casualty figures regarding the monument inscription. Bachelder informed McDermott that he must go by War Department official figures of 129 casualties, rather than McDermott’s figures of 142.]
"….Official figures of the War Dept. and which you submitted to us for the monument
Killed WoundedMissing Total Aggregate
4 officers 8 officers 2 officers 14 officers
36 men 72 men 7 men 115 men 129 total
Figures as taken from Gen’l. Webb’s report and from which it was claimed the above was made.
Killed WoundedMissing Total Aggregate
4 officers 8 officers 2 officers 14 officers
36 men 72 men 15 men 123 men 137 total
Official report of 69th Regt. made July 3rd, immediately after the battle, to Brigade Hd Qrs.
Killed WoundedMissing Total Aggregate
6 officers 7 officers 2 officers 15 officers
36 men 76 men 16 men 128 men 143 total
Statements as made from above reports and rolls of the regiment submitted as the most correct one.
Killed WoundedMissing Total Aggregate
5 officers 10 officers 2 officers 17 officers
40 men 78 men 16 men 134 men 151 total
The last statement is the one we now ask that you will approve of. ……."
[Figures finally accepted were those from Webb’s report, with a total
of 137.]
October 21, 1889
THE BACHELDER PAPERS
pp. 1654-1657
"… When the strict truth of the details of that affair
[repulse of Pickett’s charge] come out you will know that I have not claimed
too much for my regiment. The 69th has never claimed that no
other troops came to their assistance for we always allow that Hall’s brigade
came up and were followed by the 72nd, also that the 71st
Penna. aided on our right, and the 59th N.Y., 19th
Maine, 20th & 19th Mass., 42nd, 20th
+ 82nd N.Y., 1st Minn, 7th Mich + Stannard’s
brigade all aided on our left in repulsing Pickett, but we claim that no
troops came to the wall at our position either before or after the battle
except the 71st Pa on the 2nd of July. Not one of
the 11 regiments you mention came to the wall as such at any time, notwithstanding
their official reports say so. Hall’s brigade came no furthjer to our right
than the clump of trees. My impression of the formation of the lines on
our left are that the 59th N York was on the same line with
us adjoining the left of the 69th and that of the 19th
Maine was on the left of the 59th N York while the other regiments
of the 1st + 3rd Brigade were either massed or in
lines in their rear. If I am correct aboutthose positions I would ask –
did not any portion of Pickett’s men confront their lines? In your last
letter you said that Hall’s and Harrow’s rushed up and attacked the enemy
in flank. In this I quite agree with you, they took up the flanking work
begun by Stannard and thus forced most of Pickett’s on the front of the
69th, who could never have withstood all this force if it had
not been for the shifting to our aid of Hall’s men and the 72nd
Penna to the crest of the ridge, together with the effect upon the enemy
of the fall of their leaders. You refer to the captures of men and flags,
at the stone wall, by some of these regiments, to show that they were there.
Thius is a point I want to explain particularly. No flags were captured
until the fighting had ceased. I will instance. When the two companies
(I+A) of the 69th who changed their front were returning to
the wall the ground in addition to being covered with the dead + wounded
of both sides, was thickly dotted with rebels who had thrown themselves
down and as we advanced back to the wall these men surrendered, and we
would send them to the rear and the troops behind of course seized them.
The men of course were unarmed while the officers had swords, that is the
way Capt. [Lt. Francis F.] Reynolds of the 42nd NY captured
his rebel Lieut. again. A large rebel flag stood up against the wall about
where the 1st Co. of the 69th stood (my company).
I had gotten within about 6 or 8 feet of it but was ordering rebels back
to the rear as prisoners, when a soldier ran past me seized the flag and
ran back I suppose to his regiment. I spoke to him at the time making some
remark belittling his act. I saw the figures 42 on his cap. I could have
had that flag without any trouble, and if I thought acts like that would
have brought a medal, its more than likely I would have preferred the flag
to the gathering up of prisoners. In a similar way the other flags were
gathered up…."
August 18, 1883
THE BACHELDER PAPERS
pp. 965-969
Testimony of Charles H. Banes before Battlefield Commissioners
April 24, 1890
Regarding 72nd PA Claims for Monument at the Angle
THE BACHELDER PAPERS
p. 1708
[Question concerning the dead of the 72nd PA]
"…Q. Were there not many of their men dead down at the wall?