During
the early morning hours of 2 July 3rd corps skirmishers had
been in place some 200 yards or so west of
the Emmitsburg Road from
about the Millerstown road northward, with
elements of Buford's cavalry
performing vedette duty from that road south
with some presence clear
out to Fairfield. When the decision was made
to send Buford to
Westminster MD to refit and guard the supplies
being sent there for the
AOP, army HQ did not intend that the left
flank be left unguarded as
evidenced by message traffic sent from them
to Pleasonton's HQ when the
discovery was made that a "cavalry vacuum"
existed on the flank. No
cavalry being immediately available was another
factor in Sickles move
forward since he evidenced some concern for
the Emmitsburg Road being
unguarded and the possibility that Confederate
action might block the
arrival of Federal units arriving via that
axis. In the event however, there were
no further units to come from that direction
as the last of Sickles
units arrived by 10:00 AM and turned off at
the Peach Orchard and moved
to join the rest of the corps.
Earlier than
the arrival of the remaining two brigades however,
Sickles had given orders that were fairly
well complied with by their
arrival. Upon arriving at the Peach Orchard
the units found that
details had been long at work tearing down
the north-south running
fences from Cemetery Ridge out to the Emmitsburg
Road. Since fences to
your front were left intact as an impediment
for the enemy while you
remained in a defensive position, this would
indicate that at an early
hour on the 2nd Sickles had decided on the
move forward.
Once III corps
moved forward, the area south of the Peach Orchard
was protected by a skirmish line of infantry
that anchored at the Peach
Orchard and ran west of the Rose Farm buildings,
then curved around to
the Slyder Farm. Birney's division holding
the left half of the salient
that Sickles' move had created, was spread
thinly with Ward on Houck's
Ridge, DeTrobriand in the Wheatfield/Stony
Hill area, then no infantry
along a line from the Stony Hill to the Peach
Orchard. This area was
protected solely by the skirmish line running
through the fields on the
Rose Farm. In the Peach Orchard itself was
Graham's brigade with its
left refused by having, depending on the time,
two or three regiments
facing south tying into the long skirmish
line extending toward the
Slyder Farm.
From the left of the Peach Orchard
for about 400 yards along the farm
lane (now Wheatfield Road) there was at first
only Clark's battery of 6,
10 pound Parrott rifles to fill the gap. The
forward move by III corps
had given the corps an approximately 10,000
foot front to man and having
only slightly more than 10,000 effectives
to man that line meant that
dispatching about a brigades worth of men
as skirmishers left the corps
without enough men to properly man the line
and keep a reserve. Leaving
Burling's brigade as the sole reserve meant
that there were segments of
the line which were unmanned by infantry and
the section along
Wheatfield road east of the Peach Orchard
was one of these sections. To
try to plug this gap, batteries from the Reserve
Artillery were called
for and the batteries of Hart, Phillips and
Bigelow came forward to
extend the line toward the Stony Hill along
the farm lane. Graham's
right extended from the SW corner of the Peach
Orchard northward along
the road with Bucklyn's battery just north
of the Wentz buildings and
Graham's right at about the Trostle lane (present
U.S. Avenue). As the
growing evidence of the impending Confederate
assault became known, two
additional batteries were placed in the Peach
Orchard itself with
Thompson and Ames reporting.
When Hood's division stepped off
for their assault on the Houck's
Ridge/Wheatfield area the artillery along
Wheatfield Road and in the
orchard diverted a portion of their fire from
counter battery, to firing
at the advancing troops who were in a fairly
good enfilade position,
especially as the initial units of McLaws
(Kershaw and Semmes) were
concerned. The regiments in the orchard who
faced south also added their
fire against the left of Kershaw during his
advance and did some damage.
However, as the Confederate "en
echelon" attack continued to roll
north, the units in the orchard suddenly had
all the trouble they could
handle headed straight at them in the person
of Barksdale's brigade. As
Barksdale moved to the attack he rapidly drove
in the defending
skirmishers and moved quickly toward the main
line. The proximity of the
III corps line to the screen of woods on Warfield
Ridge (some 500 yards)
also had the effect of reducing the space
to cover under fire for the
attackers. The rapidity of movement aided
in reducing the amount of time that artillery fire would be bought to bear
on Barksdale's troops since as the distance closed,
the guns were limbered up and withdrawn leaving
the infantry to hold the line.
Barksdale's right unit, the 21st MS, overlapped
the point of the salient
at the SW corner of the Peach Orchard and
the great flaw in a salient
was exploited fully by the attackers.
In a salient with a sharp "corner"
in the defending line at least one
part of that line will be subjected to destructive
enfilade fire and
this is what happened as the 21st MS approached
the Peach Orchard. With
an overlap of Graham's line, the units facing
south were taken by
enfilade fire from their right and as the
21st MS advanced and swung
somewhat to its left, then Graham's units
that were facing to the west
were taken under enfilade fire from their
left as they also took fire
from Barksdale's units approaching from the
west. That combined with the
speed of advance by Barksdale meant that the
fight for the original
point of the salient would be sharp and short
with the defenders forced
out of the Peach Orchard fairly rapidly. Some
of Graham's units tried to
form a new line to face to the left (south)
against the oncoming 21st MS but
this just had the effect of moving the point
of the salient northward
along the road and each succeeding unit on
that point was enfiladed from
two directions and was unable to do little
more than slow the
Confederate advance momentarily.
As nearly as can be determined,
given the confusion, it was at about
this time when Sickles was wounded near Trostle's
barn and had to be
taken from the field leaving Birney in command
of a situation rapidly
going "into the tank".
With the Peach Orchard falling
to the enemy advance, the gun line
along Wheatfield Road now came under attack
from its right and with no
infantry support had no choice but to limber
up to try to save the guns.
Attempts to withdraw by prolonge were unsuccessful
but most of the guns
were bought off at great cost, with the engagement
getting close enough
to allow words to be exchanged between the
men of the 21st MS and
Clark's 2nd NJ battery. The reported exchange
being, "Halt you yankee
sons of bitches, we want those guns!", "Go
to Hell, we want to use them
yet a while!" and Clark was able to withdraw
with about 20 casualties in
the gun crews.
With the line to his right rapidly
withdrawing, Bigelow had no other
option but to follow, but he had the additional
disadvantage of
sharpshooters from Kershaw's brigade who had
gained some shelter in the
woods on the Stony hill and were using that
vantage point to fire on
Bigelow's crews. Feeling that time taken to
limber up would only expose
his men even more to the fire of the sharpshooters
Bigelow asked his
superior, Lt. Col. McGilvery, for permission
to withdraw by prolonge so
as to keep the advancing sharpshooters and
21st MS at bay until he could
reach some shelter to limber up.
Permission granted, Bigelow's unit then withdrew
some 400 yards to the
area of the Trostle buildings using a combination
of prolonge and recoil
to move the guns.
The presence of Bigelow however,
was to change the axis of attack of
the 21st Mississippi. Colonel Humphreys,
whose unit had started to
wheel to its left to pursue the retreating
men of Graham's brigade,
would realize that if he continued a left
wheel, Bigelow's battery then
would be in a position to enfilade his own
line. Unwilling to expose his
line to the destructive fire of 6 Napoleons
firing canister at close
range, Humphreys broke off from the rest of
Barksdale's brigade and set
off in pursuit of Bigelow.
As the 21st MS angled away from
the brigade the other three regiments
kept after the remnants of Graham's brigade
and advanced toward the left
flank of Gen. A.A. Humphreys line whose left
in the person of Brewster's
brigade was anchored at about the current
location of U.S. Avenue.
Barksdale having achieved a flanking position
during his initial assault
had wheeled his unit onto a northeasterly
axis and was driving that
flank in, the results of which action to be
covered later.
Bigelow with the 21st MS in pursuit,
retreated to the Trostle
buildings where the configuration of the ground
gave him some temporary
shelter from his pursuers where he attempted
to limber up to withdraw.
While in that process, he was approached by
Lt. Col. McGilvery who gave
him orders to remain in place and sacrifice
the battery, if necessary, in
order that time could be gained to construct
a new gun line some 400
yards to the rear. Emptying the caissons of
his remaining ammunition and
placing it by each gun Bigelow sent his caissons
to the rear and
prepared to sell out dearly to the approaching
Mississippians. For
approximately 30 minutes the fight swirled
around the Trostle buildings
with the gunners double shotting canister
then resorting to "rotten
shot" (case without the fuse inserted) when
the canister ran out.
Finally by moving around the right flank of
the four remaining guns (two
having limbered up and withdrawn to allow
more space) the men of the
21st MS were able to take the position. Bigelow
had lost four guns and
suffered 28 casualties among his men and of
the 88 horses in the battery
80 were killed or had to be destroyed later.
The time gained by Bigelow's stand
had enabled McGilvery to form a
new line with some of the Peach Orchard survivors
and Dow's 6th ME
battery who would throw a curtain of fire
up against the front of the
21st MS and later against the right flank
of Barksdale's other units.
However the 21st MS was able to advance in
a rush to capture Watson's
battery which stood well to the left and in
front of McGilvery's line
along the Trostle lane. Watson's position
was hidden from sight of
McGilvery's line by a finger of the woods
that lay between the units and
McGilvery was unable to observe the action.
McGilvery's line augmented
by other batteries, at times when McGilvery
could get any guns he could
lay hands, on held its position unaided by
infantry for the greater part
of an hour until the 39th NY advancing with
Willard's brigade retook
Watson's guns from the 21st MS, who by this
time had no support on
either flank, and by their own accounts were
in the process of pulling
back. A short time after that, Lockwoods brigade
from XII corps arrived
and advanced through the area of the Trostle
buildings nearly out to the
Peach Orchard and reclaimed Bigelow's guns.
So as dusk fell the crisis
around the Trostle farm buildings and lane
had passed and the Federal
line had been reestablished in the area.
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