July 1, 1863

There was no battle action or battle-related troop movement on the site on this day of the battle. All battle activities occurred north and west of the town of Gettysburg.

July 2, 1863

There was no battle action on the site on this day of the battle. The center of the Union line of defense was anchored on Cemetery Hill, about half a mile north of the proposed visitor center tract. The army used the high ground of Culp's Hill to the east on which to deploy its right flank and Cemetery Ridge to the west on which to deploy its left flank. The Baltimore Pike (between Culp's Hill and Cemetery Ridge) would be used by General Meade to move troops, cannon, ammunition and supplies throughout the remainder of the battle and the occupation of Gettysburg by the Union Army of the Potomac.

The only infantrymen to come close to the site on this day, however, were those of Geary's Division of the XII Corps. They crossed the fields north of the proposed site and today's Hunt Avenue en route to Culp's Hill. They had been bivouacked in the vicinity of Little Round Top on the night of July 1-2 and had left there in the early morning hours, following the Taneytown Road northward before turning eastward to take new positions on the Union right flank.

The extreme northern edge of the tract was associated with a long line of Union artillery which occupied a front that extended as far northward as Cemetery Hill through much of the non-battle hours of July 2. At one time this line consisted of 47 guns. The northern edge of the tract was probably occupied by the extreme right flank of this long artillery line. Before daylight on July 2, General Meade ordered his artillery chief, General Henry J. Hunt, to tend to the artillery needs of General Henry Slocum, who was then defending the right flank of the Union army at Culp's Hill. Slocum was fearful that the Confederates would take advantage of a gap in his line and was anticipating an immediate attack on his front. This anxiety may have been caused by heavy skirmishing in the direction of the Hanover Road and along Rock Creek at the base of Culp's Hill. His apprehension had caused him to solicit Meade for either additional infantry support or support from the artillery branch. Meade responded by directing Hunt "to make the necessary arrangements to meet the emergency." Hunt thereupon assembled an impressive line of defense that went unchallenged throughout the day. Muhlenberg's entire XII Corps artillery brigade was ordered to Slocum's assistance. However, because Muhlenberg discovered that "the density of the growth of timber, the irregularity and extremely broken character of the ground" at Culp's Hill would prevent his guns from taking position in the infantry battle line. His 20 guns deployed instead on the west side of Baltimore Pike and commanded the gap in Slocum's line (in the direction of the A. Spangler farm buildings). Hunt meanwhile brought 15 guns of Osborn's XI Corps artillery brigade from Cemetery Hill and another 12 form Fitzhugh's reserve brigade to join the left of Muhlenberg's line. By 8:30 AM the 47 guns were in place, but soon thereafter the gap on Culp's Hill was filled with infantry and breastworks were thrown up. Confederates did not attack and the threat diminished. Before noon, Osborn's 15 guns were recalled to the cemetery heights. Muhlenberg's guns remained throughout the afternoon, guarding the XII Corps center but never becoming engaged. (Five guns were sent to the summit of Culp's Hill to engage Confederate batteries on Benner's Hill during the late afternoon, but no guns along the Baltimore Pike battle front were ever engaged at this original position.) By 6:00 PM the guns in this line had all been moved elsewhere on the battlefield, using the Baltimore Pike to reach their assigned objectives. (Sources: ORs, vol. 27, part 1, pp. 773, 232-233, 871, 749, 892, 895-896, 870. 756.)

July 3, 1863

There was no battle action on the site on this day of the battle. The site remained behind and between the defensive lines of the Union army.

The only military unit to cross the tract on the morning (8-11 AM) of July 3d was the cavalry brigade of J. Irvin Gregg. Gregg had been ordered from his bivouac area on the Baltimore Pike at White Run to move towards Gettysburg, and take position in the vicinity of General Meade's army headquarters on the Taneytown Road. Gregg's cavalrymen left the pike and crossed the extreme southern edge of the tract in a westerly direction. Halting at the Taneytown Road, Gregg was met by his division commander who directed him to "proceed in the direction of Gettysburg, and if possible get into the town" to ascertain the position and intention of Lee's Confederate army. Before making much progress up the Taneytown Road, however, Gregg was met by an aid who countermanded the order and directed his brigade to move back to the Baltimore Pike and connect with the right of the infantry near Wolf Hill. (source: Bachelder troop map of July 3, 8-11 AM; letter of J. Irvin Gregg to Bachelder dated October 18, 1884).

In the predawn hours of July 3, 10 guns of Muhlenberg's artillery brigade returned to the vicinity where they had been posted on July 2. The guns of Rugg's and Kinzie's batteries were placed "parallel to and on the southwest side of the Baltimore pike, almost directly opposite the center of the line formed by the Twelfth, and controlling the approach of the enemy along the ravine" formed by Rock Creek. The guns were posted "on a hill west of the turnpike and about 500 yards in rear of the intrenchments gained by the enemy." [The markers on Hunt Avenue commemorate this July 3 position but may not accurately reflect the actual position of the batteries. The marker positions are not compatible with the description given by General Geary, that they were on a "hill." There is hardly a perceptible rise of ground from the Baltimore Pike where Hunt Avenue cuts through the Spangler farm. There is, however, a much more recognizable rise to the topography some 200 feet north of said avenue. If the guns of Kinzie and Rugg were located there, north of the marked position, their fire could control most of the area from Spangler Meadow southward to McAllister's Mill. If need be, from that position, they could also cover the center of the XII Corps line beyond Pardee Field and those "intrenchments gained by the enemy."] (Sources: ORs, vol. 27, part 1, pp. 870, 828; Bachelder troop map of July 3, 8-11 AM.)

Three military units crossed the tract on the afternoon of July 3—the Union brigades of Lockwood, Shaler, and McDougall. Lockwood's Brigade left the breastworks near the summit of Culp's Hill upon orders to support troops engaged with the enemy on Cemetery Ridge (Pickett's Charge). This movement, which carried across the northern edge of the tract, occurred perhaps as late as 3:00 PM. While "on the march the order was countermanded, the enemy having been fully and finally repulsed," and Lockwood's men were back in position at Culp's Hill by 5:00 PM. (Sources: ORs, vol. 27, part 1, p. 806; Bachelder troop position maps of July 3, 1-3 PM and 5 PM.) The other XII brigade which had been ordered to support the Union left-center—McDougall's—reportedly left its breastworks between 4:00 and 5:00 PM "pursuant to orders from division headquarters." The brigade was guided by an officer from army headquarters to the "rear of the left center, near the headquarters of the commander-in-chief." Upon reaching the Taneytown Road, McDougall's brigade received word to remain in position until it received additional orders. Within 45 minutes it was ordered back to its Culp's Hill breastworks. The brigade was never deployed into battle line and its support to the Union left center was not necessary since the Confederates had been "repulsed completely along our whole line." (Sources: ORs, vol. 27, part 1, pp. 785, 794, 798, 801; Bachelder troop position maps of July 3, 1-3 PM and 5 PM.)

Shaler's Brigade of the VI Corps apparently was moved over towards Cemetery Ridge during the closing moments of the cannonade which preceded the Confederate attack. According to men in the 122d PA, they crossed the grounds between Culp's Hill and Cemetery Ridge at "almost a run" and under a "terrific fire of artillery" to get into a support position behind the Union left-center. Shaler's Brigade was the only one of the three units to not return immediately to Culp's Hill. Instead, it was directed to the rear of the Third Corps' position, near the Hummelbaugh farm buildings, and deployed in line of battle to "furnish a resisting force in case the lines in front should be unable to withstand the attack." The brigade was not engaged but remained in reserve there overnight. While in this latter position, the brigade endured an irregular fire from Confederate batteries who were dueling with batteries on Cemetery Ridge after the repulse of "Pickett's Charge." (Sources: NY at Gettysburg, p. 549; PA at Gettysburg, p. 450; ORs, vol. 27, part 1, p. 681; Bachelder troop position maps of July 3, 1-3 PM and 5 PM.)

Kathleen Georg Harrison
Senior Historian, GNMP
11/06/97