A few weeks ago, someone asked for resources for the cavalry fights prior to Gettysburg. If you still need them, here they are:
BRANDY STATION
Beck, R. Mc. "General JEB Stuart at Brandy Station, June 9, 1863." JUSCA, 44, May-June 1935: pp. 5-10
Borke, Heros von, and Scheibert, Justus. THE GREAT CAVALRY BATTLE OF BRANDY STATION, 9 JUNE 1863. Winston Salem, NC: Palaemon, 1976. 143 p. E475.51B67.
Davis, George B. "The Cavalry Combat at Brandy Station, Va., on June 9, 1863." JUSCA, 25, (1914): pp. 190-198.
Downey, Fairfax. CLASH OF CAVALRY; THE BATTLE OF BRANDY STATION. Gaithersburg, MD: Butternut, 1985. 238 p. E475.51D745.1985. Reprint of 1959 ed.
Fleek, Sherman L. "Swirling Cavalry Fight." AMERICA'S CW 2, (Sep 1985): pp. 42-49
Ford, Charles W. "Charge of the First Maine Cavalry at Brandy Station." in WAR PAPERS (MOLLUS, ME, Vol. 2). Portland, ME: Thurston, 1900. pp. 268-289. E464W35v2.
Gallagher, Gary W. "Brandy Station: The Civil War's Blodiest Arena of Mounted Combat." BLUE & GRAY MAG 7 (Oct 1990): pp. 8-20, 22, 44-56.
Hall, Clark B. "The Battle of Brandy Station." CWTI 29 (June 1990): pp. 32-56
____. "Long and Desperate Encounter: Buford at Brandy Station." ARMOR 65 (1956): PP. 27-31.
Longacre, Edward G., ed. "A Race for Life at Brandy Station." (Henry C. Whelan, 6th PA Cav) CWTI 17 (Dec 1979): pp. 32-38.
Newhall, Frederick c. "The Battle of Beverly Ford." ANNALS OF THE WAR WRITTEN BY LEADING PARTICIPANTS NORTH AND SOUTH. Dayton, OH: Morningside, 1988. pp. 134-146. E464A6.1988.
Nielson, Jon M., ed. "The Prettiest Cavalry Fight you Ever Saw." (Account, 2nd NJ Cav) CWTI 17 (July 1978) pp. 4-12, 42.
Nye, Wilbur S. "Brandy Station, June 9: Stuart vs. Pleasanton." CWTI 2 (July 1963): p. 23
Tucker, Glenn. "Jeb Stuart Learned on Fleetwood Hill Federals Could Fight on Horseback Too." CWTI 2 (Dec 1960): pp. 5-6, 18-19.
WINCHESTER
Grunder, Dharles E. THE SECOND BATTLE OF WINCHESTER, JUNE 12-15, 1863. Lynchburg, VA: Howard, 1989. 108 p. E475.5G78.1989.
Longacre, Edward G. "Target: Winchester, Virginia." CWTI 15 (Jun 1976): pp. 22-31.
ALDIE, MIDDLEBURG, UPERVILLE
Bliss, George n. THE FIRST RHODE ISLAND CAVALRY AT MIDDLEBURG, VA, JUNE 17 AND 18, 1863. Providence, RI: RI Soldiers and Sailors Hist Soc, 1889. 56 p. E464R47ser4no4
______. "A Review of Aldie." MAINE BUGLE 1 (1894): pp. 123-132.
______. "A Rebuttlal of Captains Bliss' Review of Aldie." MAINE BUGLE 1 (1894) pp. 256-262. E511.4M352.1894.
Green, Charles O. AN INCIDENT IN THE BATTLE OF MIDDLEBURG, Va., JUNE 17, 1863. Providence, RI: RI Solders and Sailors Hist Soc, 1911. 38 p. E46R47ser7no3.
Myers, Jerry. "Shells and Saber Points." MIL HIST (Oct 1992): pp. 50-57. 88, 90, and 92. (On all three battles.)
Nye, Wilbur S. "Cavalry Actions June 17-21." CWTI 2 (Jul 1963): p. 24.
Starr, R.F.S. "The Battle of Middleburg." VA COUNTRY'S CW II (1984): pp. 18-19, 21 and 56.
I also have refererences for STUART'S RAID, CONFEDERATE RAID ON GETTYSBURG, HANOVER, and FAIRFIELD if anyone is interested.
Bill
E. Coddington's "The Gettysburg Campaign", which is probably the standard reference work on the subject, contains a full chapter devoted to Stuart's embarassment at Brandy Station. I don't remember anything about Aldie or Middleburg -however, there may be something on Hanover. By the way, Stuart's decision to head north via Aldie pretty well eliminated him from Lee's command until he rejoined the ANV on July 2nd. Although Jeb may not have known this (and may not have even considered it), going through Aldie interposed the AOP between him and the ANV with no quick way to rejoin Lee. Sorry, I don't have the ISBN number etc. but Coddington is a pretty standard and readily available volume.
Grant Troop
An excellent book IMHO is the Calavry at Gettysburg by Longacre. It describes both cavalry units prior to Gettysburg, make-up, leaders etc. Follows the battles from Brandy Station, Middleburg, Aldie etc and also follows the units during Lee's retreat. A very good source book on this subject. It is available in paperbook and you should have no trouble in locating the book. I do not have the ISBN number handy, if needed I can respond after I go home (my library is kept at home).
Pvt Marc
I forgot to mention there is an outstanding article on Buford in Gettysburg Magazine #11, p. 19-55. It covers all of the battles and skirmishes in which Buford was engaged both before, during and after Gettysburg. It also has extensive notes which are a great guide to get to the primary sources, which is what you should do if you are writing a book or article. Longacre's work is truly excellent and will give you a great overview, but you need to end up in the OR and primary manuscripts.
Bill Cameron
Wittenberg's article in Gettsburg Magazine #11 is indeed a good piece of work and Longacre's book on cavalry in the Gettysburg campaign is the best-written, but Robert O'Neill's "The Cavalry Battles of Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville - Small But Important Riots June 10-27 1863" is far and away the best treatment of the pre-Gburg cavalry activity. He even includes pictures & directions which help you find your way around the area today (though the pictures are quite muddy). It's available from HE Howard Inc, PO Box 4161, Lynchburg VA 24502.
Ben Maryniak
Michael,
Buford came in from Fairfield, PA. They had came through Boonborough,
Cavetown, Monterey Springs and encamped near Fairfield on June 29. On June
30, they moved out toward Gettysburg having left Merritts Brigade in reserve
at Mechanicstown (Thurmount MD). They detoured to the south toward
Emmitsburg and then on into Gettysburg. [OR 27, I, p. 926]
Bill
Michael,
Glad to help any way I can. Buford was under Pleasonton during the whole
campaign. He was heavily involved in the cavalry actions at Brandy Station,
Aldie, Upperville and middleburg where his orders were to seek out and
engage the Confederate cavalry and later to flank the Confederate cavalry's
left and to reconnoiter (I am really simplifying the hell out of a very
involved campaign). On the 28th of June, he was under orders to support the
right wing of the army (he was to cover the right wing's left flank) which
was under Reynolds (Reynolds was commander of the Right Wing which had the
1st, 3rd, and 11th Corps). Buford probably consulted with Reynolds on the
30th. So.. he had the mission to support Reynolds. Now in modern military
jargon, you could argue that Reynolds had operationl control of supporting
forces but Pleasonton probably wouldn't want to hear that. Pleasonton had
ordered him to hold Gettysburg "at all costs".
I think I said in the other post (at least I meant to) that Buford came in from Fairfield, detoured TOWARD Emmitsburg and then came into Gettysburg. I don't think he got all the way to Emmitsburg.
Buford had quite of bit of intelligence as to Confederate positions on the night of the 30th. At 10:40 P.m. he sent a messate to Pleasonton telling him that A.P. Hill's corps was massed back of Cashtown and that the picketts were in sight of each other. So he was aware of Hill.
Bill
I am still confused about the issue of where Bufords brigades were stationed July 1. Gamble was to the west of town in between McPherson's and Seminary Ridge, Devin was to the north of town. But where was Buford's third brigade under Wesley Merrit?
Moderator's Note: Meritt was not yet up on Day One.
I am involved with a gaming group that is playing the new game, "3 Days of Gettysburg." This is a regimental level simulation of the campaign.
I am looking for info on the positions of each of Devin's and Gamble's units from about 7:30am to 10:00am of the first day. What sources have this detail? Anyone on the list know?
Thanks...
Bill Christenhr
gwjchris@ix.netcom.com
Bill,
I can give you brigade positions with some regimental information
(relative positions).
Col. William Gamble wrote that he was alerted by the officer commanding his pickets [8th Illinois] that the Confederates were approaching. This was at 8:00 a.m. on the 1st. Buford ordered Gamble to assemble. Gamble wrote, "My brigade - consisting of the Eighth New York, Eighth Illinois, three squadrons of the Third Indiana, and two squadrons of the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, about 1,600 strong, with Tidball'ls battery, Second U.S. Artillery - was placed in line of battle about 1 mile in front of the seminary, the right resting on the railroad track and the left near the Middletown or Fairfax [Fairfield] road, the Cashtown road being a little to the right of the center, at right angles with the line. Three squadrons, part dismounted, were ordered to the front, and deployed as skirmishers to support the squadron on picket, now being driven back by the enemy's artillery and skirmishers. Our battery of six 3-inch rifled guns was placed in battery, one section on each side of the Cashtown road, covering the approaches of the enemy, and the other section on the right of the left regiment, to cover that flank... In a short time we were, by overpowering numbers compelled to fall back about 200 yards to the next ridge, and there make a stand. [OR 27, 1, p. 934]
At nightfall on June 30, the pickets were located on Herr Ridge with videtts along the Chambersburg Pike [8th Ill.]. The brigade line was on McPherson's Ridge from the Fairfield Road to the Chambersburg Pike. The order from north to South was 8th New York, 8th Illinois, and the combined companies of the 3rd Indiana and 12th Illinois. [Eric J. Wittenberg, "John Buford and the Gettysburg Campaign" GETTYSBURG MAGAZINE vol 11, Morningside]
The pickets were strengthened on Herr Ridge by Buford to a force of several hundred . They came in contact between 8 and 9 a.m. The Herr Ridge line was held by Gamble until he was forced back to Belmont Schoolhouse Ridge about 200 yards to the east. From there they fell back again after about 30-45 minutes to McPherson's Ridge along the banks of Willoughby Run. Gamble had been engaged for about two hours by then. [Wittenberg, p. 41]
Col. Thomas Devin wrote, "On the morning of July 1, the pickets of the First Brigade, on the road to Cashtown, were driven in... and the Second Brigade was ordered to prepare for action, and form on the crest of the hill on the right of the First Brigade. I immediately formed as ordered, with my right resting on the road to Mummasburg, and deployed a squadron of the Sixth New York to the front and left as skirmishers, dismounted, and connecting with those of the First Brigade , at the same time connecting by skirmishers and vedettes with my pickets on the three roads on the right leading toward Carlisle, thus establishing a continuous line from the York road, on the extreme right, to the left of the First Brigade, on the Cashtown Road. ...I was ordered to retire gradually... [this happened at about 10:15, awc] This I effected in successive formations in line to the rear by regiment..." [OR 27, 1, p. 938-9]
Devin's regiments were positioned south to north in the following order, 3rd West Virginia, 6th New York, 9th New York, and the 17th Pennsylvania. [Wittenberg, p. 40]
As you know, Merritt's Brigade was in reserve near Mechanicstown [now Thurmont] Md.
Hope this helps
Bill
First, Bill Christen, more on the Cav:
At Dawn, Gamble was encamped near the Seminary, just west of town, and Devin was encamped just north of the College along Mummasburg Rd. Both Devin and Gamble had strong patrols and pickets out, so that maybe a third of their strength was deployed in an arc from the Fairfield Rd. to York Pike. By 7:30, Gamble was in line astride the Chambersburg Pike, while Devin was almost certainly in movement from his campsite to the fields north of Gamble where he eventually fought. Devin's line was substantially in place by 8:00 a.m. or so, but not before. Gamble definitely had strong pickets out as far as Herr Ridge, and initial firing began there (or on Belmont Schoolhouse Ridge. Martin goes into great detail about finding the "first shot," a piece of trivia that doesn't interest me, I confess. I'm more interested in when Heth ran into significant opposition - that seems to be along Herr's or astride Willoughby Run.)
By 10:00 a.m., Both brigades were astride Chambersburg Pike, Gamble to the South of it, and Devin to the north. They were falling back under pressure, and the I Corps was reaching the scene.
Meritts' brigade took the brunt of the fighting at both Brandy Station and at Middleburg and Upperville. This is critical to understanding why they were not with Buford at Gettysburg. Also, these troopers were the Regular cavalry--those most reliable and most likely to stand and fight if necessary. At least at the beginning of the battle, the Army of the Potomac's trains were in the area of Emmittsburg because Meade intended to fall back to the Pipe Creek defensive position. Who better to guard the trains than the Regulars? Also, Devin's men were freshest--they had done the least fighting over the course of the campaign, so it made sense for them to be at the front.
Kilpatrick wasted men's lives. My post yesterday is indicative of that. I will gladly discuss that with anyone who is interested.
Finally, it occurs to me that there has never been a full treatment of the dismounted cavalry vs. infantry engagement on the area which is today called South Cavalry Field. Logancre, in his typical utter lack of tactical detail, spends only one page on an action which lasted for over an hour. It's a shame that he has no grasp on tactics, because the 1986 cavalry book is a ghost of what it could have been. In any event, I want to rectify the lack of detail regarding this forgotten fight, especially since Farnsworth's charge is finally getting the attention it deserves (see the current issues of Gettysburg and Blue & Gray magazines). To that end, I intend to write an article on South Cavalry Field, but am not finding a lot of good material. Can anyone help?
I have the obvious sources, such as the OR's, the Bachelder Papers, and the regimental histories of the 2nd U.S. and the 6th Pennsylvania. Any suggestions about primary sources will be greatly appreciated.
Thanks.
Eric J. Wittenberg
With respect to Kilpatrick, the worst choice he made with respect to Farnsworth was in ordering a mounted, as opposed to dismounted, charge. Likewise, ordering Merritt's Regulars to attack dismounted on the South Cavalry Field, which is ideal ground for mounted operations, was a foolish move. Had the roles been reversed, and had a properly supported mounted attack on the South Cavalry Field been executed, the Regulars might have rolled up the flank of the Confederates.
I'm really not a Kilpatrick fan, but that's another story for another day.
Eric J. Wittenberg
>The death of Buford in December brought a great loss to the Army of the
>Potomac. His promotion to Major General was backdated to July 1, 1863.
>(Was Congress too busy to approve a field promotion???) I have two
>questions concerning this:
>
> a) Why was this promotion never given until his death?
> b) What officer nominated Buford for the promotion..Hancock?
>
>Any help on this would be appreciated as I have no idea to the answer of
>these two questions.
Longacre, in his new biography of the general, claims that Stanton put thru
the appt at the behest of Lincoln, as a deathbed promotion.
Interesting for speculation is the fact that first Rosecrans, then Sherman,
both requested that Buford be transfered west to serve as Chief of Cavalry
for the Army of Tennessee. Had he lived, it is possible that Sherman's
Cavalry would have been led by Buford against the likes of Wheeler and
Forrest.
Dave Powell
I have a theory as to the slowness of the promotion. First, Buford was a
Southerner by birth, being from Kentucky. In Stanton's book, this made his
loyalty suspect. Second, he was John Pope's hand-picked, favorite
cavalryman, and the War Department, and especially Stanton, were still
reeling from the Pope debacle. Anyone closely associated with Pope was also
very suspect (how many of Pope's officers achieved high command in the A of
P? not many....). I believe that the combination of these two factors is
what kept Buford from being promoted until he was in a position where no
harm or damage could result from his promotion. Once that happened, the
promotion came through in a matter of an hour or two. Funny, eh?
I hope that answers the question.
Best regards.
Eric Wittenberg
In response to the question of who recommended Buford for promotion just
before his death. On page 61 of "The Devel's To Pay " by Michael Phipps &
Jphn S. Peterson it is stated that " General Stoneman initiated the proposal
that Buford be promoted to Major General, ..." There are no notes in this
small volume to indicate the source of this information. I recommend this
book to anyone interested in Buford, it's packed with interesting
information.
Paul Domer
Since Eric Wittenberg is now in the group. (He wrote the Buford article in
GB Mag 11. ) I might address a question to him and everyone else about
Buford's retirement on Day 2.
Longacre is pretty hard on Buford for this move. He says that
Buford's men weren't in too bad a shape considering the fight the day before
and had no business retiring. He singles out Buford rather pointedly.
Forgive the paraphrase, the book is in the library again.
1) Wouldn't the person to blame be Pleasonton, not Buford?
2) Was Buford's command in need of refitting or not?
And while I am at it my favorite unanswerable question: Did Lane
form that Hollow Square or not, Eric?
Dennis
I was asked whether Buford's men needed to be refitted on July 2,
and whether Longacre is fair in taking him to task for leaving the
field in the middle of large battle. I was also asked to address the
question of whether the Confederates formed square on July 1.
With respect to Buford leaving the field, it must initially be
stated that I am no fan of Ed Longacre's. I find his work sloppy and
devoid of thoroughness, particularly in the area of primary source
research. I will be glad to elaborate on this further if anyone wants
to e-mail me privately.
Having spent more than four years studying John Buford's life in
preparation for writing this biography I'm working on, I feel that I
have insight into him that few others possess. It is well known that
John Buford was considered to be the A of P's best cavalryman. No less
than John Gibbon has written, "JOhn Buford was the best cavalryman I
ever saw." One thing that has become clear to me is that this man was
a fighter. He was never, ever one to shy away from a fight, and
Longacre's insinuation that he left the field in a fit of cowardice
offends me deeply. Yes, it is true that Buford's men had been
constantly campaigning since the beginning of SToneman's RAid, and it
is also true that his men had bourne the brunt of the fighting at both
Brandy Station and Upperville, and that they had suffered as a result.
Nevertheless, they had been rearmed during the advance north, and were
relatively fresh, even though they had suffered on July 1. These men
were ready, willing, and able to continue fighting. The afternoon
phase of GAmble's fight on July 1 is ample evidence of this.
The truth is that Buford received a peremptory order to leave. On
the morning of July 2, Pleasonton sent the decisive order to Buford.
It is quoted verbatim in one of the footnotes to my article in
Gettysburg Magazine, so I won't bore you with the full text. However,
the beginning of the order is very enlightening. It begins, "THe major
general commanding directs me to order you...." If that's not a
peremptory order, I don't know what is.
Remember, the decision to stand and fight at G-burg was not made
until the night of July 2. UNtil that time, Meade fully intended to
fall back to the Pipe Creek defensive line near Westminster, Maryland.
The majority of the A of P's wagon trains were there, awaiting the
retreat of the army. Also, one of Buford's Brigades, Merritt's Reserve
Brigade, was already at Emmittsburg, awaiting the fall back. If you
intend to fall back, and part of your best division is already there,
doesn't it make sense to order your best division commander to fall
back to take up the task of guarding the trains? Don't you want a man
that you know that you can trust to do such a vital job? This is the
true reason why Buford was ordered to leave the field. It had nothing
to do with cowardice, as Longacre implies. Also, Gregg was already in
the immediate area of the battle, and ample cavalry coverage for the
flank was available, had Pleasonton given the order.
It's worth noting that Longacre has backed off of this position in
his rather lame biography of Buford. I think it's because I took him
to task in my article.
Finally, with respect to the Confederates forming square, this is
an interesting debate. There is no doubt that the 52nd North Carolina
of, I believe, Perrin's Brigade, formed square during the afternoon
phase of July 1 in response to a feint of a mounted charge by the 8th
Illinois Cavalry, under command of Major Beveridge, from a position
along the Fairfield Road near the current township building. The rest
is not so clear. Maj. E.P. Halstead of Doubleday's staff says
unambiguously that Lane's men indeed formed square late in the
afternoon in response to the threat of a mounted charge by Gamble's
entire brigade. This is the only primary source I have found which
says this. All OR's are silent, as are accounts by some of the
cavalrymen, including Maj. Beveridge, who ought to know. I also have
an article from an 1880's issue of Confed. Vet. which states
unambiguously that Lane did not form square. It is therefore an open
question. I tend to agree with Gary Kross that it did happen, since it
is the most logical explanation of why Lane stopped his advance.
However, I disagree with him as to where it happened.
FYI, David Martin does not believe it occurred. AT his request, I
reviewed a draft of an article for him on the subject, and he firmly
believes that it did not. This, therefore, is one of my favority
Gettysburg controversies.
Thoughts?
Sorry--I forgot to mention something the earlier diatribe. My good
friend Mike Phipps, licensed battlefield guide at G-burg, and a fellow
Buford biographer, also believes that Lane's men formed square, largely
based upon the combination of the Halstead MOLLUS paper, and on the
analysis that it is the most likely explanation of why Lane stopped.
Mike and I agree on where it likely took place, which is somewhere near
the end of the stone wall used by Gamble's men during the afternoon
phase of the July 1 fighting. That stone wall begins at the
intersection of the Fairfield Road and the modern COnfederate Avenue,
at the seminary, and continuing for a quarter of a mile or so.
Eric Wittenberg
I found the following gems in OR Vol. 27, Part 3, p. 491 this morning:
Commanding Officer Cavalry Corps:
My note, written five minutes since, is a little confused, I find.
The general expected, when Buford's force was sent to Westminster, that a
force should be sent to replace it, picketing and patrolling the Emmitsburg
road. He understood that all your force was up.
Very respectfully, &c.
This dispatch was immediately followed by one from Pleasonton:
Brigadier-General Gregg,
General:
You will detail a regiment from your command to picket on the left
of our line, lately occupied by General Buford, who has been withdrawn. You
will then move your command to the north of Gettysburg, toward the
Heidlersburg Road, to ascertain if the enemy is in that position in force.
You will make these dispositions as soon as practicable, and report
the same.
Very respectfully,
Major-General, Commanding
This only further reinforces my belief that Longacre is a sloppy
historian. If I found this stuff while looking for something else,
certainly some concerted effort could have turned it up and made for
accurate history.
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
Dennis, have you read the OR? Have you read the order from Pleasonton to
Buford? It says:
Sorry. I have to vigorously disagree.
Eric
I think I also added that I knew of no source of a blow-by-blow
account of Meade's actions on the 30th and 1st. Where is the smoking gun?
While I agree with your/our conclusions, I can't point to six sources all
confirming one another that what we think was most likely a contingency
plan, actually was one and nothing more. And there just has to be more to
the story (and in Meade's mind ) than simply giving Pleasanton the peremptory
(that can't be spelled right) command to move Buford out.
...AND I hope that this will not be closure for this line of
argument any time soon!
GRINingly yours,
Perhaps someone was sending me a warning by my last post not coming
through, but I'll try again (thanks for the notice, Vic.)
Dennis:
I believe you have fallen victim to the inaccuracies of
Longacre's book when you wrote:
The way I understand the move is that Meade was involved only after
the fact.
The order Eric Wittenberg just re-posted shows that Meade was
involved in sending Buford from the field.
Buford requested to go because he believed he needed to be refitted
If someone can provide me with a reference for Buford's request
above, I would be most grateful. I have read a great deal about this,
and I do not remember seeing this anywhere but in Longacre's
pitifully researched book.
I agree with those who say that Buford was sent south as part of
a contingency plan for withdrawal, but this is part of the reason why
I think Meade would have retreated, because you do not send your best
men back unless you think you might have to follow that course. I do
not think the cavalry had been as badly used as they had been on
Stoneman's raid, and I do not believe they would have asked out of
the battle. The mere fact of a contingency plan for withdrawal shows
that Meade would not have stood firm at all costs.
Best regards to all.
Hi Folks:
"As soon as Sickle's took position, General Buford's division of
cavalry was sent to the rear at Westminster, to guard the trains there."
(P.164)
Seems if he asked to be relieved Doubleday would have mentioned it.
Bill:
While I tend to accept the Jerome theory about the cupola meeting
between Reynolds and Buford, I am aware of at least one other account of the
meeting taking place in the town, near the Blue Eagle Hotel, with the two
officers then riding out to the Seminary together. This is plausible, since
Buford was so anxious to discuss the situation with Reynolds. MY friend
Gary Kross told me about this--he says it is in a letter written by one of
Buford's staff officers, and is in private hands. Never seen it myself.
Everything I know about it is hearsay.
Also, Sgt. Veil says that the meeting did not take place in the
cupola. My problem with his account is that it is so lacking in details.
It is very broad; it may have to do with the shock of Reynolds's death.
It's too bad that Capt. Stephen Weld, who wrote such a great diary,
did not address this issue. I think that it would have put it to rest for good.
My only problem with the Jerome account is that, if one reads
Jerome's correspondence to Bachelder, it is clear that Jerome had an agenda
with respect to Buford, and I have often wondered if he embellished the
story to make his hero, John Buford, look better in the historical context.
That said, I think that the level of detail, and the overall reliability of
Jerome's account indicate that he probably told the truth in his accounts,
although he may have embellished things a bit.
And that, for what it's worth, is my two cents worth.
Eric Wittenberg
Hi Eric,
BTW, would you please send me a copy of the Jerome manuscript. I'll send
you my address. I would really like a copy of it. Thanks for offering.
I'll get the other stuff together and send it to you. I'm going to wait
until I get my Brown book because I am missing some of it.
Bill
It is interesting to note that in "The Devil's To Pay" by Mike Phipps and
John Peterson and "For God's Sake, Forward" by Mike Riley, the authors have
chosen the seminary as the meeting place. Phipps and Peterson note that
while there are three different stories, the one most detailed and usually
given the most credence is the Jerome story. In the Buford book, among
unpublished sources is listed "Personal Recollections of General Buford";
Doctor G.K. Johnson. Has anyone seen this? I am not a student or great fan
of Buford so did wonder what this source actually was.
Also, in reference to Eric's remark on Jerome's version of the story and his
"hidden agenda", if we were to use that as a tool for the belief of many
accounts, we would have a difficult time deciding who to believe about many
things. In fact, in every single person's account of anything, there is
always a hidden agenda - whether conscious or not. If we believe the OR or
choose to go beyond to something written later or by someone else, we are
either accepting the participant's account or we are accepting the refuter's
account and in so doing are accepting one or the other's hidden agenda. I
think that may partially be the reason it is so easy to be a revisionist
where history is concerned. No offense intended to you, Eric, and I am not
saying I think you are wrong about anything -- just something to think about.
Nikki
Nikki:
As you may know, I am working on a Buford biography. I started this
line up, because I want the input of others. Don't worry--no offense was
taken, and I appreciate the insight.
With respect to the G.K. Johnson piece, it was a paper prepared and
read in the 1890's at the dedication of the Buford monument on McPherson's
Ridge. A group called The Buford Memorial Association was formed, and
various contributions were solicited. Dr. Johnson was the brigade surgeon
for the cavalry brigade which Buford commanded during the Second Manassas
Campaign (which, minus the 1st Michigan, became Farnsworth's Brigade at
G-burg). Johnson's paper specifically addresses Buford's role in the Second
Manassas Campaign. It may be found in a very rare volume published
privately by the Association called "Proceedings of the Buford Memorial
Association". There's some great stuff in it, if you can find a copy. The
copy we have comes from the New York Public Library. There may or may not
be a copy of it in Carlisle. I don't know. The actual dedication speech
was given by Maj. Gen. James H. Wilson, and was also published in the
Journal of the US Cavalry Association in September, 1895. This, I know
for a fact, Carlisle has a copy of, since I got my copy there. Hope this helps.
Best regards.
Eric Wittenberg
Nikki and Eric,
Bill
Bill:
The answer is yes, it is. I have heard several different variations
of it, including "The devil's to pay". However, it does come from Jerome's
account, which you will shortly have a copy of.
Best regards.
Eric
In her book on Chamberlain, In the Hands of Providence, Alice Rains
Trulock mention it as an old shipbuilding term, "There's the devil to
pay and no pitch hot." (p.16) Her citation appears to page 8 of Elias
Spears' "Regiment" -- but a quick scan of other footnotes doesn't tell
me what that is short for. Where was Buford from and could that be the
same origin for the quote?
Thad Humphries
Thad:
John Buford was born in Versailles, Kentucky, part way between
Lexington and Frankfort. AT the age of ten or so, his family moved to Rock
Island, Illinois, where he spent the balance of his childhood. His
appointment to West Point was from Illinois.
I have no idea where this expression came from. It is commonly
attributed to Buford.
Eric Wittenberg
Tom,
Bill
Tom Desjardin
John Bachelder's "Hour by Hour" maps of the battle show Buford's
cavalry in the Valley of Death between the Wheatfield and Plum Run
on the 4:30am and 9am maps. Candy's Brigade of Geary's Division
is in place resting its left on the Wheatfield Road on the
northern slope of LRT (where the 5th Maine's left flank marker now
rests). The rest of Geary's Division reaches toward the north.
The 9am map shows the 3rd Corps with Birney massed between the VOD
and the Trostle House (with Buford still in VOD). The closest he
shows Birney to LRT at 9am is near the George Weikert House.
There are no maps after 9am until 4pm.
Bachelder's maps are by no means infallible, but most of his
errors are slight in terms of positioning (a hundred yards or so
off). I don't know that he ever misplaced a whole division.
Tom Desjardin
But before getting to what I uncovered, let me inform you briefly of my biases.
First, the more I learn about Buford, the more I like and admire him -
especially given the frustrating bureaucracy and frequent mediocrity with
which he had to work, day in and day out. I've come to expect excellence in
his decision making ability and in his execution of his plans and orders. I
expect him "to make no mistake on Lee's front".
Second, I've done a lot of reading in my primary field, computer based
Information Systems. This, coupled with my research and graduate studies
generally, has made me very suspicious about commonly accepted FACTS.
Believe me, most of our computer systems are based on unfounded opinions and
midnight guesses...that's why they all run so welllllllllll and are so easy
to useeee.
Now to the FACT(?) as generally presented: Buford and his 2,700 cavalrymen
spent the night of July 1, 1863 in the protected Plum Run Valley between
Houcks ridge, Devils Den, Little Round Top, and the Wheatfield road after
their splendid performance that morning and afternoon.
This FACT has never made sense to me. What became known the next day as
"The Valley of Death" just never seemed to me to be the intelligent place to
locate a cavalry division, especially
(1) given that the right flank of the Confederate army was 2 miles away
west and SW of Gettysburg in and beyond McMillans woods;
(2) all the men and horses placed together in a congested, trap-like area
such as the proposed location would make any defensive or offensive actions
very awkward, if not downright difficult.
(3) why give up one of the cavalry's main advantages, flexibility and
maneuverability just to sit in a swamp (it had been raining for days and I'm
certain the ground was quite soggy); and
(4) much better ground for cavalry offensive/defensive deployment was only
3/4 of a mile away along a relatively flat plain from the Peach Orchard (3/4
mile in advance of the III corps) to about a mile down Warfield ridge to
South Cavalry Field.
I always believed that deployment on this better ground would protect the
left flank of the AOP (and cover the Round Tops). Pickets and vedettes
another mile or two beyond the Emmitsburg road, would provide plenty of
warning to Mead that a possible flanking movement or other dangerous
Confederate activity might be under way. [ This role was of course later
undertaken by the 1st USSS and the 3rd Maine about 11am by a cautious
Sickles (see, I can too say something nice about the man) after Pleasanton
removed Buford to guard the trains.]
A year ago, I was examining the Cope maps at the GNMP library that (as I
understand it) were carefully derived from the Bachelder maps. I saw that
one of the maps placed Buford's cavalry in the swampy Plum Run valley. I
somehow managed to collar the renowned Scott Hartwig and asked him for
clarification. He seemed as puzzled as I was (surely only a kind, generous,
self-effacing gesture for a civilian like myself). Then he pointed to the
Peach Orchard - South Cavalry Field and Wheatfield area and said that he'd
always believed that Buford had been posted out there, and not at the foot
of LRT as plainly indicated by the blue lines on the map before us.
Scott's answer satisfied my first bias, so I was sure that Buford, the
pretty Superb himself, would naturally adopt this deployment so that he
could agree with me 130 years later. There was no need for further
investigation. On my research trip Wednesday, Tom Desjardin easily burst my
bubble when he reminded me that (1) watering the horses after that day's
action was very important and (2) that the Plum Run valley was an excellent
spot for this after the rains of the previous week. Now I had two excellent
answers - at least one more than I needed or wanted to have.
Anyway, now for the good part. From the regimental files at GNMP library:
The two brigades that Buford had with him at this time were led by
Gamble and Devin. Their regiments were:
I found brief descriptions of the battle and their role in it from men of
the Eighth Illinois, 12th Illinois, and the third Indiana. I was only
allowed two hours in the Library, so there might still be additional
documents and first person recollections that I missed. Interestingly, the
library had no regimental histories for these eight regiments, just a few
pages in the files for these three of eight.
The cavalryman from the 8th Illinois remembered: "The morning of July 2nd
broke upon the two armies lying as quiet as though they were friends. Much
of our infantry had arrived during the night, a council of war had been held
[now how did he know that?] and all were preparing for a desperate struggle.
The cavalry were in line between the enemy and Round Top. General Sickles'
division was advanced across the Emmitsburg pike, and all the movements
betokened a renewal of the engagement, when it was rumored, that our
supplies were in danger of being disturbed, and General Buford's division
was ordered to protect the train. We left the field of Gettysburg about one
O'clock p.m"....IN LINE he said, not massed in Plum Run Valley. Of course
the word BETWEEN only helps us a little.
The cavalryman from the 12th Illinois wrote: "Until about 11:00 o'clock of
the second day, Buford's Cavalry patrolled the field between Seminary Ridge
on the west and Cemetery ridge on the east."
This cavalryman is clear in his mind that he wasn't sitting in swampy Plum
Run Valley.
Colonel George Henry Chapman of the third Indiana Cavalry kept a diary. The
entry for July 2, 1863 begins: "Bivouacked last night near the battlefield
on the left. Slim fare and slight cover." The words "slight cover" do not
come to my mind when I attempt to describe the Plum Run valley - "cradle"
maybe, but certainly not "slim cover". And NEAR the battlefield, (but not
on) suggests the areas south of the first day's fighting, maybe all the way
to Herr's ridge, but certainly not to LRT where no fighting had yet occurred
or which would later be ON the battlefield if reference is to the entire 3
day battle instead of the 1st day alone.
A fourth fellow who was there, JNO. Buford, six weeks later filed this
report which eventually made its way into the OR (Chapter XXXIX, page 927):
"My division bivouacked that night on the left of our position, with pickets
extending almost to Fairfield."..."July 2, the division became engaged with
the enemy sharpshooters...". McMillan Woods SW of town where Anderson's
division of Hill's corps was posted is about 2 miles from Houck's ridge.
How did the Confederate sharpshooters get to Buford if the 3rd corps pickets
and skirmishers were between Buford and the Confederates. The second quote
only makes sense if Buford was out in front of the 3rd corps (the infantry
left flank of the AOP), not the other way around.
Folks, so far, it appears to me that the majority of Buford's men were out
on the relatively flat plain from the Peach Orchard to the South Cavalry
Field area and probably out to the Eisenhower farm with patrols miles farther
beyond that. Of course we can still discuss whether 5% or 50% of Buford's
men were in the Plum Run valley, but I don't think that we can make any
plausible case for most of them being there, most of the time.
Now I'll be the first to admit that this initial research cut leaves many
questions unanswered, and I genuinely welcome anyone who can point me
towards materials that might shed additional light on this matter. WHAT DO
YOU THINK, and what facts can you contribute to clarify this problem.
It seems to me that the consequences of the existence of possibly misleading
maps is a very serious one. I'm fully aware of the Fog of War, but I
believe deep down that we can develop strategies and tools for minimizing
this type of error, or at least working with maps that incorporate the Fog
of War as a real, estimateable phenomena. What do you think?
John Leo's excellent post was way too long to copy, but it did send me
delving into the Bachelder papers.
Col. Chapman - commanding 3rd IN Cav - reports in his letter dated March 30,
1864, that the brigade "fell back across the fields to the 'heights' and some
time after dark moved into a position in the woods near Round Top and
bivouacked." (Vol. I, p-131.)
This suggests to me that they were more likely in the woods east of
Emmitsburg Road but still west of BRT - More in keeping with John's second
post. The Plum Run valley is distinctive, and would be remembered.
However, something else to keep in mind - The Plum Run Valley is fairly small
- and cavalry needs a lot of bivouac room. I doubt if both brigades could
adequately picket their horses there, without extreme congestion. Water is
certainly a consideration, but so is forage, and horses need space to eat.
Dave Powell
Dave Powell wrote:
Col. Chapman - commanding 3rd IN Cav - reports in his letter dated March 30,
1864, that the brigade "fell back across the fields to the 'heights' and some
time after dark moved into a position in the woods near Round Top and
bivouacked." (Vol. I, p-131.)
This suggests to me that they were more likely in the woods east of
Emmitsburg Road but still west of BRT - More in keeping with John's second
post. The Plum Run valley is distinctive, and would be remembered.
However, something else to keep in mind - The Plum Run Valley is fairly small
- - and cavalry needs a lot of bivouac room. I doubt if both brigades could
adequately picket their horses there, without extreme congestion. Water is
certainly a consideration, but so is forage, and horses need space to eat.
Thanks Dave for extending my report by 25%. Now we just need 4 good
references that unequivocally prove that we're wrong and we'll be all set.
Keep those cards and letters coming in folks.
My Trailhead Graphics, Inc. map shows a small wooded hill to the WSW of BRT
in what I imagine would be an excellent position for covering the AOP left
flank - the wide open, comparatively flat space along the Emmitsburg Road
for observing any Confederate activity while being behind Warfield Ridge
offered some protection from the Confederates seeing them - except of
course for Capt. Johnson who must have walked through their camp unseen and
unmolested on his way to LRT and back.
If Buford's cavalrymen were only half as active and watchful as I presume
they were, how does this influence the CAPT. JOHNSON recon mission about 5/6
am on the 2nd? I don't know where he went, but I think I know of one hill
he wasn't on...or have I missed something as large as an elephant???
David Wieck
I have been quietly watching this line unfold, trying to digest the
thread. It actually was a bit embarrassing--after more than four years of
researching the most minute details of this man's life available, I
completely neglected the issue of his role on July 2. Once I got over being
embarrassed, I decided to review my stockpile of Buford material and see what
I've got on it, and there's plenty of material to review (about three large
boxes of stuff, that is...)
Anyway, my research supports John Leo's findings. I think that
while some portion of Buford's command, perhaps a regiment or two, was in
the Valley of Death, I firmly believe that most of it was in the area that
is today known as South Cavalry Field, and further, that a portion of it
lapped over into the area where Farnsworth's Charge occurred. Some of these
men were probably over in the area south of Pitzer's Woods, perhaps near the
modern Texas and Alabama monuments along Confederate Avenue. Therefore, it
is, in my opinion, very likely that Capt. Johnson's recon simply didn't run
into Buford's command because it was over a different part of the field. In
other words, there's a good reason why Johnson missed Buford's command; most
of it was on a different part of the field.
Therefore, kudos to John Leo for some fine work. In fact, I sent
John a private e-mail and asked if he would mind sharing some of his stuff
with me. John graciously agreed to, and I am going to work on rectifying my
oversight with this stuff when I visit G-burg, and USAMHI in Carlisle next
month. If I come up with anything good, or anything which repudiates what
John found, I will gladly pass it along. Until then, though, I am going to
assume that John is correct. Even after living with John Buford as a major
portion of my life over these four years, I still find stuff about him which
fascinates me all over again, and this is one of those occasions.
Thank you, John.
Eric Wittenberg
Someone asked for some guidance with respect to Devin's command on the early
morning hours of July 2. I believe it was Barry (sorry--I had to change
computers and could not transfer the message).
I tend to take everything that Longacre says with a major grain of
salt, since I have found so many errors in his work. However, this is one
time that he is correct. You asked about the reliability of his sources.
The two regimental histories he cites--Cheney's regimental of the 9th New
York and Hall's regimental of the 6th New York--are both quite good (in
fact, copies of them are on the desk in front of me as I type this). I
would consider them to be very reliable.
These men went out on a recon very early on the morning of July 2,
and encountered Confederate pickets in Pitzer's Woods. They began
skirmishing there, and were joined by contingents of Berdan's sharpshooters.
These men remained in place, under fire, until relieved by the move forward
of the III Corps infantry after Sickles made his move. I don't believe that
these men camped in this area. Rather, it's clear that they were there on a
recon mission ordered by either Devin, or more likely by Buford himself.
The simple fact is that Buford (and the rest of the AofP's high
command) knew darned well that the Confederates were on Seminary Ridge in
force. This meant that they were also on the western side of the Emmitsburg
Road in great force. The only real question was, where was their flank? I
firmly believe that these two recons were intended to cross the Road, feel
for the Confederate flank, and report back to Buford. They got pinned down,
and may never have fulfilled that mission. But, they did succeed in finding
the flank, and took a few casualties to show for it.
I hope that this helps.
Eric Wittenberg
Susan & Eric Wittenberg
Oops, I forgot to mention...the recon of the 9th New York, led by Capt.
Benjamin Coffin, actually captured a black man who was reported to have been
a servant of one of Longstreet's staff officers. The black man reported
this fact to the New Yorkers. Therefore, at least some portion of Buford's
command had actual knowledge of the presence of Longstreet's Corps on the
field as early as 5 a.m on the morning of July 2. If this information had
been used properly, it could have made a major difference in preparations
for the coming Confederate attack, much like Buford's recon at Second Manassas.
However, there was a serious breakdown in the command structure of
the AofP's Cavalry Corps that day, as evidenced by the fiasco of ordering
Buford's Division away from the field without insuring that Gregg or
Kilpatrick were in place. One of two things happened: (a) either Coffin's
men got pinned down and never reported, or (b) the intelligence got lost in
the shuffle and never got forwarded. Regardless, it's another one of those
fascinating what-if's.
Hope this also helps.
Eric Wittenberg
In a message dated 96-03-11 14:38:17 EST, John Leo wrote:
When the Johnson Recon stuff was extant a couple of months back, this was the
aspect of the trip that bugged me the most - How did Johnson miss an entire
Division of Cavalry? If they were camped in Plum Run Valley, it would have
been absolutely impossible to have missed them - there is no room to tuck
that many men out of the way, and his route (Johnson's) claimed to go almost
to the top on the west side of LRT.
On the other hand, if Buford were to the south of Devil's Den and west of
BRT, were I think it more likely, Johnson still would have had to move right
thru the center of this encampment too, because he claimed to have left LRT
by passing south of Devil's Den, and then due west to Emmitsburg Road.
Either way, it's a conundrum.
Dave Powell
Eric:
The order was issued around 11 a.m. on July 2. Buford and his
command actually mounted up and left the field at about 1 p.m. Hope that helps.
Eric Wittenberg
Steven Cassel wrote:
Also, a note - when things got hot (129 degree heat
index July 15) here this summer I would tell the folks
at the desk that I was on my way to do my program on
Medium Round Top. It was a joke at the time but there
is a third hill, south of BRT at Rt. 15 that is
approx. between the Round Tops in terms of elevation.
Tom Desjardin
The maps I have show a hill West by Southwest of Big round top, but this
hill is west of plum run.
Vic
Susan & Eric Wittenberg
Hi, GDG.
I am asking for help, again. Recently, I have gotten interested in
the whole idea of people writing criticisms of commanders, etc. anonymously.
As a prime example, I cite to Historicus, whom we all seem to acknowledge
was Daniel Sickles. In the course of my research, I have come across two
other pseudonymous writers whom I would like to try to identify.
The first wrote under the pen name "Truth". I hear rumors that this
was John Gibbon. Does anyone know about this? Anybody know why he chose to
write anonymously?
The other was "Anchor". Anybody know who Anchor was, and why he
chose to hide behind a pseudonym?
Anchor turns up rather extensively in my Buford research, and had an
intimate knowledge of Buford's actions, so I suspect that he may have been
one of Buford's staff officers. Any input can help clarify the book, so I
would greatly appreciate any insight anyone can provide.
Thanks in advance.
Eric Wittenberg
Tom wrote:
Hi Tom,
Bill
As a native Kentuckian, Buford had
extensive family roots there. Due to the influence of his family, Kentucky
Beriah Magoffin offered Buford command of all Kentucky forces, which he
turned down. He evidently also was offered a commission as a brigadier in
the Confederate army, which he also declined.
BTW, his first cousin Abraham commanded a division under Forrest,
and his wife's first cousin, Brig. Gen. Basil W. Duke, was John Hunt
Morgan's principal lieutenant. He easily could have been a Reb....
Eric
But many factors must be considered in his victory, not just because he was
an excellent commander. Terrain and enemy tactics. Troops readiness.
Henrik :)
Dragoon tactics WERE used by many commanders before John Buford. But at
Hopewell Gap and Gettysburg, Buford used the tactics not with heavy Cavalry
(Dragoons) but with Light Cavalry. There is the difference. Fighting Light
Cavalry Dismounted was considered at that time to be somewhat suicidal.
Light Cav in battle were shock troops, usually held in reserve until the enemy
had broken and the used to harass/disrupt their retreat. Henry Heth's division
were NOT broken when Buford took them on.
Vic
"John Buford was the best cavalryman I ever saw."
"I fear Buford will never have justice done him for the first
days fight... I am not only glad that Buford, who was a good friend
of mine always, spoke to me as you related, but it has given me an
opportunity... of bringing his deeds in more prominence...
"The hero at Oak Ridge was John Buford... he not only showed
the rarest tenacity, but his personal capacity made his cavalry
accomplish marvels, and rival infantry in their steadfastness...
Glorious John Buford!"
William Howard
Matt
BTW, the booklet on 2d Manassas sold at all national park battlefields
also says that Buford fought at the Gap with nary a word about Ricketts.
That was always my source (*not* Shaara) until I was corrected by folks
here and by Hennessy's excellent "Return to Bull Run."
Thad Humphries
Eric Wittenberg
Last week some of us were having a conversation about Buford being at
Thoroughfare Gap and fighting a delaying action against Longstreet in the
Second Manassas Campaign.
The story Michael Shaara recounts in the killer Angles was published by
Fletcher Pratt.
Pratt first published this story in an article about Buford in The Infantry
Journal, March-April 1940. The article was called "Man on Horseback" In
1949 he published a book called Eleven Generals. One of the chapters is
called John Buford, Man on Horseback. Here he recounts that Buford fought a
delaying action at Thoroughfare Gap. This maybe where Shaara and others got
the story.
Mike Phipps in his 1995 book The Devil To Pay, probably has the story right
when he says Buford was in and around the Gap and maybe did some skirmishing
but did not fight a major delaying action. Phipps gives Buford the correct
credit for sending accurate report of Confederate movements.
I guess its like the Heth story about going to Gettysburg for shoes, once
started it can't be turned off.
Thanks.....Matt
MAtt:
Actually, I have a document from the National Archives (quite
obscure--it's on a fragment of an envelope), which indicates that, during
this action, Buford's whereabouts were actually unknown, that he was likely
in the town of Warrenton, and likely at McDowell's headquarters. This, in
my opinion, is proof positive.
The only cavalry that was there was Sir Percy Wyndham's First New
Jersey, of Bayard's Brigade.
I think this is what you are referring to here. Hope this helps.
Eric Wittenberg
Greetings.
I have come in a bit late on this discussion.
Private Julius D Rhodes, Company F, 5th New York Cav
was awarded the Medal of Honor for Thoroughfare Gap on
28 August 1862 and Bull Run on 30 August 1862.
The citation stated:
What is of interest to the Buford and Thoroughfare Gap
discussion is that the 5th NY Cav was part of Buford's
Brigade. Furthermore the 105th NY was part of Ricketts
Division.
Anthony Staunton
Anthony:
Very interesting. I have said publicly that Buford was not there,
that the only cav was the 1st New Jersey. The problem is that much of this
is not documented, other than the envelope fragment which I have mentioned
in this forum. John Hennessy and I have discussed this issue, and John's
opinion is that it is impossible to determine exactly who was where.
Unfortunately, I have to agree. For reasons that are a complete mystery,
there is no official report of Jno.'s role in the Second Manassas Campaign.
Too bad, for it would probably put this whole issue to rest.
Another thought about this...Buford's horses were in wretched condition.
See the large volume of correspondence in OR 12 regarding this issue. Even
Pope was begging for cav horses. Perhaps this man was dismounted due to a
lack of a horse, and was with an infantry unit as a result?
Eric Wittenberg
From: DPowell334@aol.com
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
The promotion was instigated by a political patron of Buford's. This man,
named Clement Barclay, of Philadelphia, went to visit Buford at his death
bed, in George Stoneman's rented home in Washington. By this time, it was
clear that the typhoid fever would be fatal. Barclay went to the White
House, and called upon Lincoln. Based on that visit, Lincoln sent a note to
Stanton that read, "Gen. Buford will not survive the day. It suggests
itself that he be promoted to major general." Stanton obeyed the request
and issued orders that the promotion be given immediately. The paperwork
was backdated to July 1 in honor of Jno.'s service at G-burg. The papers
were brought to Buford for signature about 2 hours before his death. His
loyal aide, Myles Keogh told Buford of the promotion, and Buford said, "Too
late...now I wish I could live." Keogh helped Buford sign his commission.
Then Buford lapsed into delirium. He died about two hours later.
From: PaulD100@aol.com
From: lawrence (Dennis Lawrence)
From Eric Wittenberg:
From: cakes@ix.netcom.com (Eric Wittenberg)
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
Subject: Buford, Sickles and Pleasonton on July 2
Headquarters, Army of the Potomac
July 2, 1863
12:55 p.m.
Daniel Butterfield, Maj.-Gen,, Chief of Staff
Headquarters, CAvalry Corps
July 2, 1863-1:45
Commanding Second Cavalry Division:
Very interesting stuff, this. In my opinion, this exonerates Buford
for the fact that the Union left was unguarded. It seems, in my opinion,
that the blame must fall on Pleasonton's shoulders. He probably should have
ordered Gregg to send more than one regiment, or he could have brought
Kilpatrick into that position. Kilpatrick had been largely inactive since
Hunterstown on July 1, and was readily available.
lawrence@tyrell.net (Dennis Lawrence) says:
Buford's departure had nothing to do with any desire by Meade to move South.
Rightly or wrongly, Buford was sent off to refit, not to be the southern
eyes of the army.
"The Major General commanding directs me to order you to fall back to
Taneytown and then to Middleburg, in case the enemy should advance in force
upon you and press you hard. The cavalry will dispute every inch of the
ground, and fall back slowly to the place designated, and send in all
information they can gather."
OR 27, Part 3, p. 470.
From: "John A. Leo"
ERIC and BILL,
John Leo
From: William_Howard@prodigy.com (MR WILLIAM R HOWARD JR)
Subject: Re: Buford was tired--retry
William Howard
From: javal
Subject: Meade and Buford
In the "for what it's worth" dept. regarding the reason for Buford's
withdrawal - Doubleday states in "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg":
Anyway, hope it helps...
Joe Avalon
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
Subject: cupola
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Re: cupola
Well of course this is one of those issues that we'll never know for sure.
Coddington has a long note on page 682 and he discusses the Veil account.
Jerome was writing Hancock because he felt Buford was not getting his due.
However, because this letter was written right after the war, Jerome would
have had to just flat make this up if it wasn't accurate. In my studies of
him, I don't see anything that would leave me to believe that he would lie
about it. Coddington thought that Buford would not have been at the
Seminary at this time but it is not that far for a horseman and it is the
best place on that field to see what was going on. It is a lot more
plausible than the Blue Eagle Hotel. As to the conflicting stories between
Veil and Jerome, I do not have a copy of the Veil letter. I am under the
impression that he did not specifically say that the meeting did not take
place at the Seminary, he just stated that it took place at McPherson Ridge.
You may have better information. I always assumed that Veil may have not
know that Reynolds stopped there and when he saw them together on McPherson
Ridge he assumed that is where they met. I would want to make any bets as
to the exact words that Buford used but I think the meeting took place at
the Seminary. If I was writing about it, I'd do the same thing Coddington
did - have a big long note. I'd vote on the side of Jerome however.
From: nikki@postoffice.ptd.net (Nikki)
Subject: Re: cupola
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
Subject: Re: cupola
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: "There's the Devil To Pay"
Do you now where "There's the Devil To Pay" came from. Sauers attributes
it to Jerome in a roundabout way. It is nowhere in the Jerome to Hancock
letter. Eric, is it in the Jerome manuscript?
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
Subject: Re: "There's the Devil To Pay"
From: thumphri@nafis.fp.trw.com (Thad Humphries)
Subject: Re: "There's the Devil To Pay"
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
Subject: Re: "There's the Devil To Pay"
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Re: No pitch hot
Thanks much for the interesting information on the "devil to pay" line.
As you know, we've been discussing whether or not Buford really said this or
Lieut. Jerome just made it up. I believe that the meeting took place at the
Seminary but of course, I wasn't there. However, your explanation of the
term gives me some concern. Jerome had spent a bunch of time signaling
aboard ships. It might be a term he picked up there and not one Buford
really used. Interesting stuff!Being an old Maine kid I THINK I can shed some light on "The
Devil's To Pay," or "There's the devil to pay".
In 19th cent. shipbuilding (of which Maine was considered the
"Capital of the World") the spaces between the wooden "slats" of
the vessel were caulked from the outside and then sealed from the
inside with hot pitch. The process of sealing with pitch was
called "paying".
The term "There's the devil to pay and no pitch hot" meant that
there was a lot of "paying" or sealing to do but no material to do
it with. If the ship was in the water, you can imagine the
urgency.
If Buford - a man Mainers would have called a "Flat-lander" or a
person not from the coast - understood the ship-building aspect of
the phrase, then I suppose he meant that he had a lot of work to
do and not enough men to do it with. Either that or he meant that
his line was "leaking" and he had no way to seal it.
This presumes that Buford knew the term's original meaning and,
having no psychic ability that I know of, I have no idea what he
was thinking. If he did know, it seems a very apt description of
his situation.
From: Scott_Hartwig@nps.gov (Scott Hartwig)
Subject: Buford on 7/2
From: "John A. Leo"
Well folks, the posts regarding Buford's cavalry location from the evening
of July first through the morning of the second finally got to me, and I did
something unthinkable and unpardonable to any discussion group but ours: I
actually made reservations at the GNMP library to dig out the "truth" for
myself. A 180 mile drive in the rain is no obstacle when we all need to
know which hundred yard tract of land someone camped in overnight!
8th Illinois 6th NY
12th Illinois 9th NY
3rd Indiana 17th PA
8th NY 3rd West Virginia.
From: DPowell334@aol.com
Subject: Buford slept where?
From: "John A. Leo"
Subject: Re: Buford's bivouac and patrols July 1-2
From: ajackson@oyez.law.upenn.edu (Anita Jackson-Wieck)
Subject: Re: Buford's bivouac and patrols July 1-2
From: "John A. Leo"
Subject: CAPT. JOHNSON v BUFORD, july 2, 5/6 am
I just love this. Here I've puzzled for years about how Johnston,
Clarke, et al. could have missed Geary and his men and failed to see and
hear Birney and just when you all had figured it out for me you go and do
this.
Logically, Johnston would have led Longstreet by the same route he
took to get to LRT. If you buy this, then at least to the point where the
countermarch took place they were retracing his route, and that route
would lead across the Emmitsburg road north of the Plum Run Valley. So
far, no problem with Buford's men, assuming they were, in fact WSW of BRT.
However, Geary's two divisions had to camp somewhere, and I can't accept
that, even if his troops had moved out (with attendant bugles and other
noisemakers) just before Johnston and Clarke arrived, the two scouts would
have failed to note the evidence of two divisions.
After LRT Johnston and Clarke go south, through or around Buford's
men, who may or may not be moving south to the trains and across their
path at this moment, again with attendant noise. (Of course, Ewell never
seemed to hear Longstreet's guns on the 2nd so maybe there were any number
of atmospheric anomalies that would allow the battle to be heard in
Pittsburgh but not half a mile away).
The simpler solution is that Buford DID camp in Plum Run Valley
and that Johnston and Clarke crossed the Emmitsburg Road SOUTH of them.
But that seems contravened by John's evidence.
I'm more confused than ever.
From: Susan and Eric Wittenberg
Subject: Buford and July 2
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
Subject: Devin's men
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
Subject: Devin's men (part 2)
From: DPowell334@aol.com
Subject: Re: Buford's bivouac and patrols July 1-2My Trailhead Graphics, Inc. map shows a small wooded hill to the WSW of BRT
in what I imagine would be an excellent position for covering the AOP left
flank - the wide open, comparatively flat space along the Emmitsburg Road
for observing any Confederate activity while being behind Warfield Ridge
offered some protection from the Confederates seeing them - except of
course for Capt. Johnson who must have walked through their camp unseen and
unmolested on his way to LRT and back.
Susan and Eric Wittenberg wrote:
Could you please clear up something for me.
Just when did Pleasenton order Buford to guard line of communications in
Md.??
I assume it was sometime on 2 July because Buford's division was somewhat
preoccupied on 1 July.
Vic:
From: Victor Vernon
Subject: Re: Buford & Capt. Johnson I agree with everything you said in your last post.
indeed which hill...that is the burning question.
Tom Desjardin advanced some possibilities earlier
today, see below.
There are a number of elevations that may have
confused Johnson on his recon. He could have
confused the "spur" or shoulder of BRT toward Devil's
Den or ascended Houck's Ridge anywhere between DD and
the Wheatfield. Most of this ridge was open and rocky
on its western face in 1863 (near the triangular field).
Your guess is as good as mine on this one.
Also the position of Buford at 6:00 pm is along the Emmitsburg road
south of the Peach Orchard. Is this Correct?? If so it would have been
possible for Johnson to miss Buford by crossing Emmitsburg Rd. North of
Buford.
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
Subject: pseudonyms
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Re: Buford on 7/2
John Bachelder's "Hour by Hour" maps of the battle show Buford's
cavalry in the Valley of Death between the Wheatfield and Plum Run
on the 4:30am and 9am maps. Candy's Brigade of Geary's Division
is in place resting its left on the Wheatfield Road on the
northern slope of LRT (where the 5th Maine's left flank marker now
rests). The rest of Geary's Division reaches toward the north.
The 9am map shows the 3rd Corps with Birney massed between the VOD
and the Trostle House (with Buford still in VOD). The closest he
shows Birney to LRT at 9am is near the George Weikert House.
There are no maps after 9am until 4pm.
Bachelder's maps are by no means infallible, but most of his
errors are slight in terms of positioning (a hundred yards or so
off). I don't know that he ever misplaced a whole division.
Bachelder's 9 a.m. map and Birney's description of where he had his
division don't seem to quite match do they? I suspect that Birney was not
"massed" the whole time he was in that area before he moved forward. His
report sounds like he was tactically deployed (Skirmishers and sharpshooters
all the way out to the Emmitsburg Road). Do you believe that he would have
stated that he "formed a LINE (EIM), resting its left on the Sugar Loaf
Mountain and the right thrown in a direct line with the cemetery..." if he
was massed and never got closer to LRT than the George Weiker House. I do
know that he reviewed several of the Bachelder maps and with one exception
(July 3) approved the positions as drawn. I tend to think that although the
9 a.m. map might be accurate, he didn't stay in that position long. I am
also a little weak on just where Birney stood during all of the
Meade-Sickles squabbling. I know he went to see Meade to smooth things over
at one point. It's interesting as always. Bachelder may have never
misplaced a whole division but you would think that a general officer who
was there and in control would know where his division was.
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
Subject: Re: one more Buford-related quote
Henrik Schou wrote:
Dragoon tactics have always been to act like "mounted" infantry. To move to
objectives quickly, dismount and defend the objective on foot until the
infantry could arrive in support. Cavalry use during the ACW were quite
confusing. They were often used in ways that did not utilize their many
benefits. I agree that Buford used his cavalry to the limit of their
abilities (but, many a commander have done this before him).
From: (MR WILLIAM R HOWARD JR)
Henrik:
I agree with your point, but I think Vic and I are talking
strictly about cavalry officers. I don't think calling John Buford
the best is very original, though, since two of the men you mentioned
above also praised him. Here are some quotes that my friend Mike
Phipps chose to introduce his book, "The Devil's to Pay" (Farnsworth
Military Impressions, 401 Baltimore Street, Gettysburg, PA 17325):
-Maj. Gen. John Gibbon
-Maj. Gen. W.S. Hancock
to first Lt. Aaron B.
Jerome
-J. Watts dePeyster
From: thumphri@nafis.fp.trw.com (Thad Humphries)
Subject: Re: Buford and the South
Michael Shaara obtained his information about Buford being at Thoroughfare
Gap from a book written in the 1950s or 60 about various Union commanders.
The name of the book and author escape me. But the author was wrong, Buford
was not at T Gap. Thus an old story is passed along.
It sure has spread, too. We live only a few miles from Thoroughfare Gap
and I don't think I'll change my Buford-loving 8 year old's mind on it.
Best regards.
From: MASpruill@aol.com
Subject: Buford and Thoroughfare Gap
The most recent retelling of the story is in the Killer Angels and we were
wondering where it came from... I mentioned a book that was written in the
1950's - I thought - but I could not remember the author or the books name.
I have done some research and have developed the following information.
If anyone else can bring any more information on this to the front, please do
so.
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
Subject: Re: Buford and Thoroughfare Gap
From: Anthony.Staunton@pcug.org.au (Anthony Staunton)
Subject: Re: Buford and Thoroughfare Gap
After having had his horse shot under him in the fight at
Thoroughfare Gap he voluntary joined the 105th New York
Volunteers and was conspicuous in the advance on the
enemy's lines. Displayed gallantry in the advance on the
skirmish at Bull Run, VA where he was wounded.
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
Subject: Re: Buford and Thoroughfare Gap
end of file