LONGSTREET - JULY 2


From: Bob Lawrence
Subject: Longstreet-Reluctant Warrior?

One of the ongoing controversies in the years after the Battle of Gettysburg has been Longstreet's actions on the second day. The original accusations were along the lines that Longstreet had been ordered to attack the Union line at dawn on July 2. There isreally no support for this assertion(other than Early trying to shift blame from his ineptness on day 1) and I personally will not dignify this area of dispute by commenting on it. However, there is much criticism and debate on Longstreets slowness in deploying his troops once the order to attack was finally given. It is this area that I would like to explore in this discussion.

Per Harry Pfanz in "Gettysburg-The Second Day" the definitive order for Longstreet to attack the Union left came at around 11AM. there is some dispute as to whether Longstreet should have taken the initiative and began moving his troops earlier but there is little doubt that by 11:00 the movement had been ordered. The question is why did it take Longstreet over 4 hours to get his troops in position?

Porter Alexander, in his book"Fighting for the Confederacy" credits the slowness to "Longstreet did not want to take the offensive" Per Alexander"His objection to it was not based at all upon the particular strength of the enemies position for that was not recognized, but solely on general principles" The most damning example given by Alexander of this "reluctance' to press the attack is Longstreets action at the "turning point". The turning point is a rise on the road shortly after one passes the Black Horse Tavern (and is today protected by a big, mean white dog). Troops marching across this rise can be seen from Little Round Top. When Alexander reached this point in the AM of July 2 he cut through the fields to the east of the rise and picked up the road after it had dipped below the LRT line of sight. When confronted with the same situation Longstreet turned the troops around and found an alternative route-effectively adding 1 1/2 to 2 hours to time it took to set up for the attack. Alexander claims his route was quite visible since he was dragging cannon with him.

In his autobiography ""From Manassas to Appomattox" Longstreet's seems to blame his reconnoitring officer-"Under the conduct of the reconnoitring officer our march seemed slow- there were halts and countermarches" McClaws, in "Gettysburg" seems to dispute this-laying the order to countermarch fully on Longstreets shoulders. Per McClaws when he pointed out the problem with the rise Longstreet replied"why, this won't do. Is there no way to avoid it". McClaws then directs Longstreet to an alternative route his scouts had found earlier in the day. Again no mention of the canon tracks through the fields.

Harry Pfanz disputes that Longstreet and McClaws ignored Alexander's tracks. Per Pfanz "It must be assumed that officers like Longstreet, McClaws and Kershaw were practical men who must have noted the route of Alexanders battalion and avoided it for good reason".

Others have also come to Longstreet's defense-most notable another General noted for meticulous planning and flank attacks-Dwight D Eisenhower-per Ike (commenting on the lateness of the attack)"He certainly could have not done it with any strength" He cited a study by an officer of his acquaintance that showed that the earliest Longstreet could have attacked was 3 P.M.(Eisenhower comments taken from "Lee and Longstreet at Gettysburg" by Glen Tucker). As to the assertion that Longstreet deliberately dragged his feet in mounting the attack Ike replied""...Longstreet was too good a soldier to deliberately botch an attack".

So there we have it-should(or could) Longstreet have attacked earlier? Did he drag his feet in hope Lee would call off the attack? Why did he not follow Alexanders trail?


From: Bryan Meyer
Subject: Re: Turning Point

Excerpts from mail: 12-Jul-95 Turning Point by Robert W Lawrence
> So there we have it-should(or could) Longstreet have attacked
> earlier? Did he drag his feet in hope Lee would call off the
> attack? Why did he not follow Alexanders trail?

IMHO, I think Longstreet did have a few motives in his actions for delaying the attack on July 2nd. However, his motives, IMO, were strictly for the benefit of the Army of Northern Virginia.

First of all, we have to remember a few things about July 2nd, and Longstreet's I Corps. Longstreet, when his corps was all concentrated, had approximately 21,000 men. (Correct me if I'm wrong on that.) In the early morning, when the attack was to commence, he did not have Pickett's Division of some 5,000 men. So now, Longstreet's Corps has only approximately 16,000 men. Take away from that 16,000 men, another 2,200 men or so of Brigadier General Evander M. Law's brigade (of Hood's Division) , and Longstreet's Corps had a maximum strength of 13,800 men. Longstreet was to attack the entire Union left (2-3 corps) and take LRT and the high ground, with 13,800 men? He knew he couldn't do that, so he waited for Law's brigade, and he waited as long as he possibly couldfor Pickett's Division.

Well, he got Law's Brigade, and then attacked, and by this time, the soldiers of Law's Brigade were tired and very thirsty...but yet, Longstreet hurried them and the rest of his I Corps into the fight on the Union left, and they almost captured LRT.

Longstreet could not have attacked earlier because of his corps' lack of strength, until the late afternoon when Law's Brigade arrived. But as I said, there could be other motives for his delay in attacking.

Perhaps Longstreet did want Lee to forget about attacking. Longstreet was all-defense, and perhaps he thought that if he waited till the late afternoon when most of the Army of the Potomac was concentrated, Lee would decide the attack was too dangerous, and would put off the attack until July 3rd. (Unfortunately, Lee made another attack which proved damaging to the ANV on July 3rd.)

My question is...if Longstreet was so terrible in delaying his attack, then why did he wait until Law's Brigade got there, and then rushed Law into the attack along with the rest of the I Corps. And what was Ewell doing during this whole time?


From: Marc73@aol.com
Subject: Longstreet

It has been 132 years since the Battle of GB and much has been written about the campaign. IMHO both Lee and Longstreet were excellant leaders of men, but various persons since the battle have made Longstreet the scapegoat for GB and the South's defeat of the CW in general. The contingent of 'Lost Cause persons' mainly from Virginia have helped thru out time to blame Longstreet for these failures, especially since he was not from VA.

Longstreet did not disobey orders at GB. Confussion existed as to what was in front of the Confederate Army at the RTs and communications being what they were, fast changing scenerios made following earlier planned orders difficult.

I agree as in past posts, Longstreet was waiting for his various divisions to come up and did delay until he felt enough troops were on hand. IMHO Sickles movement to the Wheatfield and Peach Orchard in front of the other Union troops may have swayed Longstreet to advance prior to being completely ready. Volumes of material have been written on GB and various opinions exist as to what or why something happened. I quess this is what makes our discussion group so interesting.

I realize my thoughts are not as complete as other postings on this topic, but I have not studied this particular aspect in detail yet.

Pvt Marc


From: Norman Levitt
Subject: LONGSTREET, JULY 2

For what it's worth, here's my two cents;

1) I agree that Krick is something of a mad dog when it comes to Longstreet. He seems a throwback to the height of "Lost Cause" history.

2) The best source we have for how things were going between Lee and Longstreet on the 2nd (so far as I know) is Fremantle, who stresses how perfectly in accord they were. A grain or two of salt is in order, first of all, because Fremantle was an outsider, and, secondly, because his book was meant to show how strong, unified, and invincible the Confederacy was. But it's probably more disinterested, in respect to the rivalries that existed, than the postwar books.

3) My conjecture is that Longstreet was riled at Lee for his aggressive attitude Gettysburg, contradicting the relative caution that Lee had embraced in planning the Penna. campaign. He was also probably concerned, as a professional, about commiting the bulk of his army in an unknown situation. I believe that he was "surly" to the extent of being very literal in carrying out Lee's direct orders (which may have been given him with some heaat). In particular, I think he was cussed enough to insist on concealing the movements of his people as he'd been explicitly told to do. Hence, the countermarach. AS well, I think he probably wanted to give Lee some time to think things over, and maybe to evolve a more careful plan.

4) Longstreet's refusal to let od move around to the right of the Round Tops and to adavance "up the Emmitsburg Road" may have been another instance of taking Lee literally to spite him. But it was also, I think, sound military judgment. The alternataive would have split Lonstreet's Corps into two disconnected pieces. So far as Longstreet could tell, Hood might well have run into 3 Federal Corps, dug in and loaded for bear, east of the Round Tops. In fact, the Vth Corps was there, ready to engage, and the VIth was coming up as the Confederate assault began. Hood's one division might have had to take them on, whole McLaws would have faced II Corps and parts of II Corps with no help on its right. Longstreet choose to keep his spearhead united, and I think he was right.

4) Whatever you think of Longstreet's surliness and "insubordination", there is no question that once the action started, he pressed it as hard as possible and exposed himself to enemy fire with great personal bravery. If Lee rebuked him for anything, it was for being where even a division commander, let alone the senior corps commander, had no business being--at the front of his advancing troops.

5) In the larger view, Longstreet is a puzzling and contradictory figure. Away from Lee, he could be very erratic, as in Lookout Valley and Knoxville. On the other hand, he came close to giving Lee the outright victory in the Wilderness. Aside from Lee and Jackson, there was no confederate general at the Corps level or above who performed as well on average. Much of the hatred against him came about because of his postwar friendliness towards the Reconstruction government, which has nothing to do with his personal or professional qualities during the war. He doesn't belong on anyone's villains list to any greater degree than any other Rebel general. RIP.

Norm Levitt


From: mthcpa@ix.netcom.com (Mark T. Heath )
Subject: Longstreet

May I be so bold to offer the following on Pete Longstreet?
IMHO, Longstreet was Lee's best commander. However, Pete made one serious mistake regarding his service to the Confederacy; he survived his wounds from the Wilderness campaign. Had Pete died, most uninformed "Lost Causers" would conveniently forget Day 2. Instead, the focus would be on his knock out punch at Manassas, exploiting the Union goof at Chickamauga and his own stonewall defense at Fredricksburg. If he dies, he instantly achieves martyr status in the Lost Cause. Ted's movie probably has done more to defend the honor of Pete more than anyone. How can you not be sympathetic to Tom Berenger's portrayal? We watch as he argues his point to go to the right. History tell us Lee chose not to take this advice. Funny thing, had Lee listend, some of us might be singing a different national anthem today. Perhaps us Longstreet fans can take solace in his much deserved monument to be erected at GB. May I recommmed William Garrett Piston's "Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant" for some skewed reading on the pro Pete side.


From: ADRIII@aol.com
Seems to me on the Longstreet deal that not only his post Civil War activities did him in with the "faithful"...but....he didn't rush home to write "his" version of the truth. Seems like quite a few of the lads couldn't wait to get home to get their version of the TRUTH...down on paper. .and like most of our politicians have learned...The FIRST liar in wins...

Drew Robinson


From: rascal@cpcn.com (Brendan O'Neill)
Subject: Re: LONGSTREET, JULY 2

IMHO

Longstreet did the best he could in a situation that he had feared would come to pass. He had wanted to draw the Union army into attacking, not attacking them first. He was told to attack a position that he had no firm recon. on, he did not have his entire corps at his disposal, and he had to try to position the attack without being observed. Under these circumstances, any general would appear surly. Longstreet's attack on the second actually succeeded in taking much of the prescribed ground that Lee had pointed out. The failure is that the Union lines were actually stronger than Lee knew, and Ewell never moved up to attack on the right in strength until nearly seven o'clock. By then, Longstreet's attack was dying out, and all Ewell succeeded in doing was getting more of his men killed.

As for Longstreet's ties to the post war government, no one ever attacks Lee for taking the oath. Longstreet is attacked for his friendship with Grant, which preceeded the war.

Rascal


FROM BRYAN MEYER

On July 2nd, Longstreet did delay his attack for several number of reasons, all of which would have benefitted the Army of Northern Virginia. But yet even though Longstreet delayed his attack for the army's benefit, it seems as though once again, blame is placed on him by none other than the II Corps officers...Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell and Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early.

First of all, I am not trying to flame anyone here, I'm just simply making a point in defense of Longstreet, and against the two II Corps officers mentioned above. Longstreet delayed his attack because he was waiting for the rest of Hood's Division and if possible and not too late, Pickett's Division (which did not arrive until later that evening). Longstreet had the artillery fire the one (or is it two?) initial shots to alert General Ewell that he was commencing his attack on the Union left. But, where was Ewell? Apparently, he said he didn't hear the shot. I think that even from the distance from LRT to Culp's Hill, you would still be able to hear an artillery shot. Ewell later started his attack when Longstreet had already been pushed back on the Union left. Much good that did...Meade already had reinforcements ready to send over to Culp's Hill after the assault on his left ended, so Ewell's assualt was virtually beaten, before it was started.

Years after the war, in his last years, Longstreet was forced to take the blame from much of the South for the loss at Gettysburg because he was from SC, not VA...Early was from VA. But, in essence, couldn't Ewell's (and for that fact, Early's) delay in starting his motion on the Union right proved fatal for Longstreet's assault on the Union left. If so, then isn't Ewell and Early actually to blame for the defeat at Gettysburg on July 2nd, 1863???

Bryan M.EYER
bm3p+@andrew.cmu.edu


From: benedict@ns.moran.com (Benedict R Maryniak)
Subject: Dick Taylor on Pete as doofus

FROM BENEDICT MARYNIAK

I was just looking for something in "Destruction & Reconstruction" by Louisiana's favorite son, General Dick Taylor. I ran across his opinion on Gburg. page 231

A recent article in the public press, signed by Genl Longstreet, ascribes the failure at Gburg to Lee's mistakes, which he (Longstreet) in vain pointed out and remonstrated against. That any subject involving the possession and exercise of intellect should be clear to Longstreet and concealed from Lee, is a startling proposition to those having knowledge of the two men. We have Biblical authority for the story that the angel in the path was visible to the ass, though unseen by the seer his master; but suppose, instead of smiting the honest, stupid animal, Balaam had caressed him and then been kicked by him, how would the story read? And thus much concerning Gburg.

Ben Maryniak


From: benedict@ns.moran.com (Benedict R Maryniak)
Subject: all we are saying is give Pete a chance

During 1888, an editorial in the Atlanta Constitution talked about Longstreet.

Lee's lieutenant-general at Appomattox! Could man hold worthier title to the affection and veneration of the southern people than to wear that title? Many of us who admired Longstreet as a fighter have not liked his course as a civilian since the war. But he has been more sinned against than sinning . . . But Longstreet criticized Lee! Well, so have others - notably President Davis. But, but, but! Away with your buts! Remember how Longstreet suffered with us.

In the June 1990 issue of the Kent State quarterly "Civil War History," Gary Gallagher masterfully summarized Longstreet's post-Gburg activities -

"Sent west in the late summer of 1863, he hoped to find refuge from Lee's persistent reliance on assaults under the command of Joe Johnston, the Southern officer he most admired. Instead he recd a large dose of Braxton Bragg, whose conduct in the aftermath of Chickamauga alienated Longstreet. Eventually detached to East Tennessee to liberate Knoxville, Longstreet conducted a remarkably ineffective campaign, quarreled with subordinates Lafayette McLaws, Jerome B Robertson, and Evander M Law, and grew so disenchanted that he seriously considered resigning from the army.

In 1867, Longstreet sent a letter to a newspaper that suggested collaboration with the Republican Party and his suggestion (though not in his actual words) eventually reached most southern papers. Coincidentally, his 1865 request for federal pardon was granted soon after the surfacing of this letter. Then he endorsed Grant for president in 1868. When scapegoats were needed to explain the loss of Southern independence, Pete was very convenient. His postwar actions, coupled with his wartime episodes of brooding and his oft-stated desire for independent command (away from Marble Robert's family circle), made him seem self-serving and unfaithful.

Longstreet was unjustly pilloried after the war like many other soldiers - it is part of the hostilities & loyalties of the military camraderie system. For a great consideration of wartime rivalries & factionalism, I recommend The Politics Of Command by Archer Jones & Thos L Connelly.

Going off on a complete tangent, I advise everyone to put aside $50 for the purchase of "Don Troiani's Civil War" which is being published by Stackpole. I got a look at a preliminary copy and, though I don't own a single modern print, I was reminded how much I've admired Troiani's renderings. The book includes all of his past prints and several I've never seen, connected by Brian Pohanka's narrative. One of my favorites is the one of Howard & Hancock at the Cemetery gate.

From: "James F. Epperson"
Subject: Longstreet/July 2nd

Folks who want to read about the events of July 2nd are encouraged to read Glenn Tucker's book, LEE AND LONGSTREET AT GETTYSBURG. Although the book was written in 1968, which means the research is pre-Krick, it does a good job of demonstrating that Longstreet was not being sulky or dilatory, but was trying to fulfill the orders he was given. Another good book which sheds a lot of light on this whole matter is Connelly's THE MARBLE MAN, which has an entire chapter discussing the way Lee's image was created and protected by certain officers after the war.


From:Bill Cameron
Subject: Longstreet/July 2nd

For Jim Epperson:
Agree, LEE AND LONGSTREET... is a good book for anyone studying Gettysburg. However, Tucker is such a Longstreet admirer that the work lacks balance. Not to say that it is not a important work but he doesn't do the best job of presenting both sides of the argument. Also, with Tucker's style, you can have a hard time discerning the difference from what Tucker thinks would have been a good idea and what Longstreet really did. The chapter on Longstreet's flanking proposal is downright confusing. Tucker speaks to the fact that a proposal ("generally discussed") was to flank the Federals by occupying Meade's old Pipe Creek Line. He even shows it on a map labled "Longstreet's Flanking Proposal" and as far as I can figure, it is a hypothetical maneuver designed by Tucker or others and I can't figure out how it is germane. I sure can't find any reference to the fact that Longstreet was aware of the topography of the Pipe Creek area Compared to Coddington and Pfanz, this work is a bit skewed. But again, it sure does a good job of defending Longstreet. BTW, Tucker's HIGH TIDE ..." is a very good first Gettysburg book. It is interesting and holds your attention.


From: MEllis3199@aol.com
Subject: LONGSTREET BASHING

I agree that Longstreets' conduct during the Gettysburg was counter-productive but I also agree that much of his conduct was the result of Lees' lack of caution and reliance on frontal assults (ala Malvern Hill). I now realize that Lee was not a "great"commander in the sense that he failed to observe what was happening around him and placed too much on the frontal assault (a traditional tactic during those times).

Lee should have known that the Federal army was on the move and lacking sufficent intelligence of the Federal forces, should have withdrawn to better ground continued the concentration of his army.

I am sure that Lee will continue to be regarded as a great commander from the South and in some respects he was. Hindsight is always better than foresight.

Some times I feel that if I were in Lees' shoes I would have taken a nice trip to Europe in 1861. The war may well have been shortened and saved thousands of lives-on both sides.


Michael E. Hartenstine
E-mail: mharten@admin.mc3.edu
Subject: Lee taking longstreets advice

The question taken from the book "If the south won at gettysburg?" Could the south have won the battle if general lee would have taken the advice from longstreet. The advice was to use gettysburg as a defensive strategy instead of an offensive one. In the book it gives a theory. Which on the night of july 2 Lee orders the cavalry leaded by steurt and supporte d by ewells corp. to move south to the extreme right around the two round tops and come onto baltimore pike. Which this by seperating the federal army from washington. By this strategy allowing steurt to attack washington and lee and longstreet to damage meades army as much as possible. In the book, this might have given lincoln a reason to call off grant out of vicksburg. By ordering grant out of vicksburg to protect washington from invasion. This is just hypothetical but could this have happened? And what if steurt had attacked washington? Could the south have won the war?

From: fibered@earthlink.net (Retail Marketing Services)
Subject: Longstreet's Place in Southern History

The "Afterword" to "The Killer Angels" indicates that after the war Longstreet lost much of his image because of his politics and association with Grant in efforts to rebuild the South. He drew further, and more serious, criticism because of airing his opinion that Lee's actions lost Gettysburg.

Certainly, an unemotional assessment of Lee's actions would conclude serious mistakes and miscalculations were indeed made. As the years passed, did the South reembrace Longstreet, and at least recognize Lee was human?


From: rascal@cpcn.com (Brendan O'Neill)
Subject: Re: Longstreet's Place in Southern History

>From what I have read and heard with talking with Southerners, and admittedly, this is a limited survey, Longstreet has been "forgiven" in some states. In Virginia, he is still seen as a turncoat.

IMHO, Longstreet's biggest problem was that he was not a Virginian. ALL of the Virginia Generals who survived sided with the Lee camp against Longstreet's assesment of Lee's performance at Gettysburg. This is funny to me because in his memoirs, Longstreet used correspondence with survivng officers from the AONV, as well as survivng official reports and orders of battle to reconstruct the Pennsylvania campaign. He interjects his own opinion occasionally, but for the most part, he only writes what others could have. I feel that Longstreet was victimized by Early, Ewell and Gordon, who were so interested in making themselves look like the TRUE paladins of the COnfederacy that they needed ot lay defeat at someones feet. Since Lee was untouchable, it had to be Longstreet.

Of course, his friendship with Grant, joining the Republican party, and receiving a political job from Grant didn't help, but he didn't rob the people of the South in a lottery scam like Early, or start up a lynch mob like Forrest.

Again, I am not asserting that any of this is historical fact, but my opinion from what I have read so far.

Brendan O'Neill


From: fibered@earthlink.net (Retail Marketing Services) Subject: Longstreet's Place in Southern History

The "Afterword" to The Killer Angels"indicates that after the war Longstreet lost much of his image because of his politics and association with Grant in efforts to rebuild the South. He drew further, and more serious, criticism because of airing his opinion that Lee's actions lost Gettysburg.

Certainly, an unemotional assessment of Lee's actions would conclude serious mistakes and miscalculations were indeed made. As the years passed, did the South reembrace Longstreet, and at least recognize Lee was human?


From: benedict@ns.moran.com (Benedict R Maryniak)
Subject: Longstreet forgiven?

Longstreet passed away on January 2 1904, having outlived most of those who murdered his reputation, but murdered it remained. Fewer than five percent of the United Confederate Veterans chapters passed resolutions honoring Old Pete, and Savannah's Daughters of the Confederacy refused to send flowers to the funeral because they blamed Longstreet for losing the South's independence. Confederate Veteran magazine printed a kind obituary and there were many many personal demonstrations of warmth toward the War Horse. An unknown Confederate vet placed his tattered gray shell jacket atop Pete's casket and asked that it be interred with his leader.

Ben Maryniak


From: fibered@earthlink.net (Retail Marketing Services)
Subject: Longstreet's Blame and Why

A comment was made that some blamed Longstreet for the defeat at Gettysburg. Why would he be blamed? Was it because he didn't agree with Lee? Or, that,technically, he ordered Pickett's charge? Or, was it his politics and statements after the war? Maybe I should be asking who blamed Longstreet, as well as why.

Tom


From: GaTechFan@aol.com

So I just spent a few days in the beloved home state of Georgia, visiting a few relatives and friends. On the way back home to Maryville, Tn, I passed through Gainesville in NE Georgia. Of course, since I was the only representative of the Gettysburg Discussion Group in the area, I decided to pay my respects to James Longstreet. I thought the Pete-o-philes among us would be grateful, as would those of my ilk (who are a bit more neutral in our feelings about the Warhorse).

The general is buried in Alta Vista Cemetery on Jesse Jewell Parkway in Gainesville. One enters the gate, drives up a hill and sees a flagpole just ahead on the right. His plot is beneath the flagpole (US flag if you're interested). A few other family members are in the plot as well. Pete's monument is quite appropriate. It's about five feet tall. The front side has crossed USA and CSA flags(CSA is battle flag). The inscription mentions his service in the USA and CSA armies. The right side of the monument says "Manassas to Appomattox," while the left side says "Palo Alto to Chapultepec" (Stanford had a war?). The back of the monument has one of those poems to the Cause that brings tears to the eyes of we Johnnies, but probably gags you Loyalists. A few small flags (GA, USA, CSA) had been placed on his grave. All in all, an elegant, tasteful monument to a fine corps commander( most of the time).

If any of you happen to be in Atlanta, a trip to Oakland Cemetery is worthwhile. SEVEN CSA generals are entombed there: John Gordon, Alfred Iverson, Clement Evans, Isaac Avery, Henry McCay, Lucius Gartrell, and William Walker. Also buried there is Martha Mitchell and, completely unrelated to the CW, the Great Bobby Jones(a golfer of some repute to the non-knowers in our midst). It's also fun to try to trek over the battleground of Peachtree Creek---hospital parking lots, 6-lane roads, a golf course and numerous back yards. Ah well, progress.

Pat


From: Mark A. Fox Subject: Re: Longstreet Forgiven?
As a new member, I just now got caught up on some of the past discussions with particular interest to Longstreet. One post discussed aspects of whether Longstreet has ever been "forgiven." I find the following document quite amazing in that it does, indeed, absolve Longstreet of any wrong-doing at Gettysburg and further, endorses the North Carolina efforts to erect a memorial monument. But is it just talk?? This project is four years old and the funds are still coming in too slowly. Worse yet, the SCV camps seem completely oblivious to the project even though they passed this great resolution. Is my view distorted through Yankee vision? It really seems ironic that many of the biggest supporters of the fund are Northerners. Longstreet forgiven?? I just don't know.

RESOLUTION TO SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS NATIONAL CONVENTION

Adopted by the National organization, SCV while in convention at Wilmington, North Carolina, August 8, 1992

Whereas the purpose of the Sons of Confederate Veterans is to perpetuate the honor, gallantry and chivalry of our ancestors and to pursue the truth in the historical recordings of our Southern heritage. We strive to uphold the Confederate cause and not let it be degraded by those who would rob us of our heritage; and

Whereas an injustice begun in 1870, perpetuated not by revisionist historians, nor by advocates of the enemies of our Southern way of life, but by a group of misinformed individuals, who purposely initiated a campaign against one of their own, who for long, arduous years led his troops valiantly and courageously against the Northern invader; and

Whereas it has been proven over the last 120 years that no one general can be blamed for the South's loss of the Battle of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania on July 1-3, 1863. Mistakes were made not only by Stuart, Early, Ewell and Longstreet, but by Lee himself; and

Whereas the conspiracy following Lee's death, to portray Lt. General Longstreet as irresponsible by these same misinformed individuals resulted in deliberate omission of a memorial anywhere in the South to General Lee's "Old War Horse", until 1939; and

Whereas the North Carolina Division has accepted the challenge to appropriate and erect a monument to Lt. General Longstreet at the Gettysburg Battlefield (pending approval by the National Park Service).

Therefore be it resolved:

The National organization, Sons of Confederate Veterans, in convention do hereby absolve Lt. General James Longstreet of the blame for the loss of the Battle of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania on July 1-3, 1863.

This body, in convention, commend the North Carolina Division for assuming the leadership in an effort to provide a monument for Lt. General Longstreet at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (pending approval of the National Park Service).

This body, in convention, memorialize each division within the organization to support the North Carolina Division effort with leadership and cooperation.

Respectfully submitted,
Robert C. Thomas, Chairman
Lt. General James Longstreet
Memorial Committee of the
North Carolina Division,
Sons of Confederate Veterans

This is not a pitch for funds. I'm genuinely confused at why the 25,000 SCV members can't come up with 5 or 6 bucks a piece and get this thing done tomorrow. Anyone out there understand more about the SCV organization than this dull Yankee?
From: GaTechFan@aol.com
Subject: Pete, Bobby and Harv

One does not usually become a general officer without a magnificent ego. The nature of the position, particularly in combat, requires self-confidence, to say the least. It is natural, therefore, to tend toward self-preservation when attempting to defend one's actions against the apparent attacks of one's colleagues, whether these attacks are verbal or written, particularly when your side lost.

While reading Hal Bridges' book "Lee's Maverick General: Daniel Harvey Hill", I came across a couple of revealing quotes by Hill critical of both Longstreet and Lee. As we know, Harvey Hill was an opinionated fellow, difficult to get along with, and with a critical spirit. To his credit, he was a skillful general and generally criticised his superiors publicly with some restraint. But when it came down to getting credit or blame he opted to speak out.

"Longstreet very early got control of his superior officers and worked things to please himself. Thus at Seven Pines, he disregarded Johnston's order to attack on Nine Mile Road and put my division first, came behind me, was not on the field at all and got all the credit of the battle." (Bridges, p55).

"My impression of General Lee is not so enthusiastic as that of most men who served under him." (Bridges, p276).

I think if we read in depth the thoughts and opinions of most military leaders about their colleagues we could find evidence for incompetence and buffoonery in them all. Part of the fun of researching for oneself is that I can read all the "evidence" (verity and balderdash) and make up my own mind. And never completely know the truth, but so what?

Reference: "Lee's Maverick General: Daniel Harvey Hill", Hal Bridges, University of Nebraska Press, 1961 and 1991, ISBN 0-8032-6096-2

"It is unfortunate to have views different from the rest of mankind. It secures abuse." D.H.Hill

Pat



From: lawrence Dennis Lawrence
Subject: Longstreet's Flanking Move - Again!

Hello,

I just finished posting Buford's order of Battle - thanks, Steve. I also linked to another discussion topic I titled "Little Round Top- No Chaberlain." It is mostly about the signal corps activities. I was rereading the posts, and it is pretty obvious the flag boys up there had been watching the Confederate movement all morning.

How real was Lee/Longstreet's belief that they could move all of those men and not be seen? The whole thing - in hindsight - seems ridiculous.

Hate to start this up again, but at least I'm off the shoes.

Dennis

What did we ever decide about the shoes, anyway?


From: Alexander Cameron

Dennis,
Here is a little ditty written by E.M. Law that I have always found interesting. Obviously, in reflection, General Law thought he had been observed.

"It was now past 4 o'clock in the afternoon and our troops were in position for the attack. The flank movement by which they came into position is referred to in the following dispatch from the Federal signal station on Little Round Top: "To General Meade -4 o'clock P.M. The only infantry of the enemy visible is on the extreme [Federal] left; it has been moving toward Emmitsburg." It will thus be seen that the movement, in spite of our precautions, was not unobserved." [E.M. Law, "The struggle for Little Round Top, B&L III, p. 320]


From: benedict@ns.moran.com Benedict R Maryniak
Subject: screening not hiding

In relation to the Signal Corps tales about Warren on LRT, Dennis wondered how real was Lee/Longstreet's belief that they could move all of those men and not be seen.

Lee/Longstreet did not want to hide their presence - they wanted to screen their strength - and this was accomplished. If not for an officer of high rank who managed to convince some brigadiers to disobey their orders, no one would have been on hand to slam a door in the face of Oates et al.

I think the idea of a "hidden" force was part of the particular Gburg story that made it easier to hiss Sickles and canonize Warren. If anything, it was in the Confederate interest to be seen everywhere opposite the Yankee line. This kept the Union from shifting reserves. The trick was to screen your force - to keep the enemy ignorant of how many were behind the line. To see Rebs in the woods opposite the US left was not to see an attack massing. Sickles knew the ANV was on Seminary Ridge at least as far as a point opposite the Peach Orchard because of the scrap between Cadmus Wilcox and the sharpshooters/Mainers under Berdan. Moreover, Confederate batteries were deployed all along Seminary/Warfield Ridge. From LRT, Warren saw that Sickles had committed every blessed thing facing west and that his flank was "hanging in the air." Short of a redeployment, there was nothing to cover the southern approach except the section of Smith's Battery (the two guns which wouldn't fit in the Devil's Den position) set up in Plum Run Valley.

It was the CSA attack - the sight of CSA troops MOVING toward BRT - that got units to defend LRT. Warren's rank got soldiers' attentions and the report that the enemy WAS ON HIS WAY convinced Vincent and others to ignore their prior orders and move to defend LRT.

PS - We decided that, because all the "real" reasons sounded incriminating or otherwise lame when he composing his after-action report, Harry Heth seized on shoes as an excuse for his whereabouts early on July 1 1863.

Ben Maryniak


From: acameron@tcac.com Alexander Cameron
Subject: Screening not hiding

Ben wrote.... >Lee/Longstreet did not want to hide their presence - they wanted to screen >their strength - and this was accomplished.

Ben, how about a source for this, or is it an opinion? Did Lee tell Longstreet "I don't mind if they see you, just not all of you"? Longstreet specifically ordered Alexander to avoid the signal station. He later countermarched specifically to avoid it when McLaws saw the station as he topped Herr ridge. Take a look in Coddington pp. 374-380. It goes into a lot of detail on their desire not to be observed. As far as "screen their strength", Hall signaled the movement of 10,000 troops (the countermarch), and that was a pretty good clue that there was a significant movement of personnel.

My opinion is that the problem with the signal corps' observation of Longstreet's movement is that the messages sent from LRT to Meade's headquarters appear to have been ignored. I think the culprit for that was probably Dan Butterfield. His opinion of the signal corps was not high and I suspect that he did not react to the numerous messages he received on the afternoon of the 2nd concerning movement on the left.

Bill


From: benedict@ns.moran.com Benedict R Maryniak)
Subject: screening not hiding

Bell - When Dennis mentioned the Signal Corps stories, I thought he was focusing on Warren & LRT in his question. If we are supposed to be talking about Longstreet's movement from the Chambersburg Road to his eventual point of attack on the CSA right, there's no doubt that Lee wanted the move concealed. And I agree that the Signal Corps was ignored at Gburg. Throughout the battle, there was a US Signal Corps post "behind" CSA lines high atop one of the elevations in or near the South Mountain ridge, miles west of Gburg. These 'scopes could actually see CSA movements behind the woods of Seminary/Warfield Ridge, though none of this seems to have entered into Meade's decision-making.

Ben Maryniak


From: acameron@tcac.com Alexander Cameron
Subject: screening not hiding

>Throughout the battle, there was a US Signal Corps post "behind" CSA lines >high atop one of the elevations in or near the South Mountain ridge, miles >west of Gburg. These 'scopes could actually see CSA movements behind the >woods of Seminary/Warfield Ridge, though none of this seems to have entered >into Meade's decision-making.

Ben,
Right you are. In fact, I have visited the site on Jack's Mountain and have it included in a driving tour/staff ride I put together when I was a student at Carlisle. I am trying to get permission to post at least part of it to the web page. Also, the officers in charge of that site, Capt. C.S.Kendall and Lieut. Louis Fortescue were captured by Stuart's cavalry on July 4. Fortescue's diary is located at the Civil War Museum and Library in Philadelphia and I am working on getting up there to see if I can edit it for publication.

Bill


From: OldWarHors@aol.com
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 1995 07:49:02 -0500

In a message dated 95-11-26 21:48:49 EST, you write:

How real was Lee/Longstreet's belief that they could move all of >those men and not be seen? The whole thing - in hindsight - seems >ridiculous. > >Hate to start this up again, but at least I'm off the shoes. > > The shoe thing is definately a myth. The Gettysburg guides have been trying to dispel it for years.

I'm no scholar, but from the talks I've heard, I think Lee HOPED that Longstreet could move unobserved, and Longstreet (given recent discussions with Lee) was not about to make any movements that could be construed as going against Lee's order. Kind of ironic that he got the heat for the whole mess anyway, isn't it?

One other thing to remeber... Lee, of course, had no scouting reports of the area without his cavalry.

Mark Fox


From: acameron@tcac.com Alexander Cameron
Subject: Longstreet's Flanking Move - Again!

Mark,
This is really not quite accurate. Lee did have a "scouting report". It was provided by Captain R.S. Johnson. Johnson conducted a reconnaissance of the area sometime shortly after Geary's two regiments left LRT (5 a.m.). Johnson reported to Lee at the Seminary that LRT was unoccupied. Lee was very surprised and elated at the depth that Johnson had penetrated the Federal position. Johnson told Lee that he in fact had climbed LRT personally. Lee assigned Johnson as the guide to take Longstreet around the Union left. Now we know that Johnson's reconnaissance was inadequate for the purpose Lee used it, however, the problem was Johnson and Lee's interpretation of the intelligence, not the lack of cavalry. Reconnoitering the terrain between Seminary Ridge and the Round Tops was not a mission that required J.E.B. Stuart. In fact, McLaws wanted to personally reconnoiter the terrain with Johnson and Longstreet refused to let him.

There are three levels of war; tactical, operational, and strategic. Reconnoitering this ground was a tactical mission. Cavalry was used to provide operational and strategic intelligence and Lee didn't need them to gather intelligence for a strip of terrain that is less than 5 or 6 miles long.

Bill


From: Steve Clark
Subject: Re: screening not hiding

At 23:36 26/11/95 -0500, Ben wrote:

>In relation to the Signal Corps tales about Warren on LRT, Dennis wondered >how real was Lee/Longstreet's belief that they could move all of those men >and not be seen. > >Lee/Longstreet did not want to hide their presence - they wanted to screen >their strength - and this was accomplished. If not for an officer of high >rank who managed to convince some brigadiers to disobey their orders, no >one would have been on hand to slam a door in the face of Oates et al. I agree; with your synopsis Ben. What I would like to hear about from others are the demonstrations that should have been taking place on the right. I have always assumed that the right was as convinced as the left that ANV was preparing for an all out on that flank.

Again, I think that if you view the battle in "real time" (not retrospectavely) Lee had every reason to expect a better outcome. Again I submit that after the first day Longstreets suggestion of moving to a defensive warfare, was not an option to Lee, if one takes into account the "state of the Confederacy" as percieved at that particular moment.

Steven Clark


From: Grant_Troop@fcgate1.osc.on.ca Grant Troop
Subject: Re: Screening not hiding

As usual, Bill is right on! He wrote:
(Longstreet) later countermarched specifically to avoid it when McLaws saw the station...

If Longstreet's intention was to screen the intentions of the ANV, countermarching two thirds of his corps a distance of 5 miles on an extremely hot humid July day would seem to be a counterproductive way of doing it! Especially, when he knew that these same men would be making an attack that day, that time was of the essense, and that water was likely scarce. The reactions of all of Alexander, McLaws and Longstreet all suggest that they were under orders NOT to reveal their movements to the AOP if possible. Nevertheless, Longstreet's uneasiness with Lee's order to "attack up the Emmittsburg road" is shown in his petulance with Capt. Johnson, specifically over the latters role in determining the route to the attack step off point.

Then, Bill wrote:
My opinion is that the problem with the signal corps' observation of Longstreet's movement is that the messages sent from LRT to Meade's headquarters appear to have been ignored. I think the culprit for that was probably Dan Butterfield. His opinion of the signal corps was not high and I suspect that he did not react to the numerous messages he received on the afternoon of the 2nd concerning movement on the left.

This is a very interesting point - so we are left with the question why would Butterfield, or whoever in the Union high command was receiving Signal Corps intelligence, be less than receptive to their reports. Maybe, because two months earlier, signal corps reports of a "large body of rebles... retreating along the Orange Plank Road" was followed about 6 hours later by a massive Confederate attack on the Union right flank. Once bitten, twice shy, as they say. I haven't done any research on the signal corps at Chancellorsville by the way - it's just conjecture.

Finally, in a later post, Bill wrote:

I'm not convinced that Johnson was the right choice for this job. First of all, he was in the Corps of Engineers. Maybe I'm wrong but I didn't think engineers were generally used for reconn work. Secondly, throughout most of the war the ANV had a recon advantage over the AOP, fighting mainly in Virginia, where invariably somebody knew "the lay of the land". At Gettysburg, that advantage was lost. Johnson may well have have found his way down to LRT on his own, but leading a column of 10,000 men on what was the most important deployment of the battle is different story. If you start down the wrong lane, you can't backtrack the column "just like that". I would suggest that the ANV's unfamiliarity with the terrain, and the importance of this attack should have elevated the required level of recon info to an operational one. If Stuart personally had been there, I think the countermarch fiasco might have been avoided, IMHO. Not to mention that Longstreet probably would have more comforable with Stuart directions rather than a Captain of Engineers from Lee's staff. I'm sure Johnson did his best - but I do have to question Lee's judgement in sending him to direct the column. Of course, without Stuart there - who else could he have sent?

Grant Troop


From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Johnson, Stuart and Longstreets flanking move

Grant,
I meant to answer this the other night but got off on something else. As usual, you make lots of good points in your post. However, I would like to respond to the Johnson/Stuart issue. First, I don't want to be misunderstood, I am not defending Johnson's recon on the morning of the 1st. Obviously there were problems. But it seems that you and at least one other gentleman are blaming Longstreet's countermarch problems on Stuart's absence and I'm not sure we want to hang that one on poor ole Stuart.

On the engineer issue, they were routinely used for this function. It was one of there primary duties. Remember that Meade had his engineer, Warren, doing exactly the same thing on the morning of the 2nd. Meade sent Warren to the Union right to evaluate avenues of attack. Coddington is a lot smarter than I, so let me quote from him:

"About daybreak he [Lee] sent for Captain Johnston and gave him instruction to reconnoiter along the enemy's left and bring the information back as soon as possible. Johnston knew from long service with Lee that in carrying out his assignment the general expected him to consider every contingency which might come up, including the need to have a route over which troops could move unobserved by the enemy. He took Major J.J. Clarke of Longstreet's engineers and two or three other men with him. Lee had taught him, as a result of his own Mexican War experience, that a small party was best for such work because there was less chance of detection..."
There is a couple of points in the above quote that impact on this discussion. Note that Johnson got another Engineer from Longstreet's staff to go with him. Coddington leads us to believe that Johnson had performed this duty for Lee many times. Also note that this was a mission for a "small party". My opinion is that if Stuart had been "personally" available, Lee would not have sent his Cavalry Corps commander on a 5 man recon party behind enemy pickets. On top of this, McLaws wanted to go with Johnson on a second look at the approach route and Longstreet refused to let him. As far as Lonstreet having more confidence in Stuart that a member of Lee's staff, we need to remember that Longstreet had been feuding with Stuart and Longstreet's own engineer had accompanied Johnson.

So, It is true that Stuart's absence was sorely missed by Lee, however, reconning the route (5 or 6 miles) for a flank attack did not require Stuart's Corps or Stuart himself. My opinion is that Longstreet should have let his lead division commander (McLaws) go out with Johnson and look at the route. McLaws had already selected one route (the one they ended up using after the countermarch) and they could have easily compared notes. They would not have had to go that far to do so.

I always enjoy your posts. Keep them coming!

Bill


From: Grant_Troop@fcgate1.osc.on.ca (Grant Troop)

Bill wrote:

Well obviously, I have to defer to you of this one. For some reason, when I thought about engineers, I had an image of them building pontoon bridges and deciding where the latrines should go. There is no doubt they were heavily involved in tactical and operational recon - the best such officer of the war, Jed Hotchkiss, was an engineer.

Bill also wrote:
<...it seems that you and at least one other gentleman are blaming Longstreet's countermarch problems on Stuart's absence and I'm not sure we want to hang that one on poor ole Stuart.>

Actually, I am not "blaming" Stuart at all - I am merely stating the fact that he was absent at this critical stage of the battle. The discussion of where Stuart was and why has been carried on ad-nauseum both by the GDG and elsewhere, and I am not really offering an opinion on whether he was following orders or not. However, I think you do agree that his absense was a critical blow to Lee and the ANV at that time, as much for the man himself, as for his command. He was, after all, Lee's second most trusted senior officer, after Longstreet, notwithstanding the other two corps commanders, one of whom (Hill) was ill and not fit to be commanding an infantry corps at the time, and the other of whom (Ewell) had frozen. Remember, not two months before, Stuart had personally directed Jackson's corps after the latter's wounding through the tangles of the Wilderness, and was responsible for literally pounding Hooker into submission. Whether Stuart and Longstreet were feuding or not before Gettysburg, I can't believe that Pete would not have listened to Jeb's military opinion, should it have been offered. They had been through too many campaigns together already.

Bill also wrote:

Well..I didn't mean to imply in my previous post that Stuart should go himself, nor that Jeb should lead 6,000 troopers on a recon mission. I admit my post was not clear - one of the limitations of dashing off Email notes. But, what I meant to say is that I think Stuart could have sent his most trusted recon team to do the work - the men in Fitzhugh Lee's brigade composed arguably the finest Cavalry unit in either army at the time, and they were used to finding their way in complicated and unknown terrain. Again, this is all conjecture - it didn't happen. But look at it in the context of what outcomes Lee wanted from the recon:

scout Union troop positions on the right. In my opinion, these outcomes could be have been more easily and efficiently handled by Stuart's men. Nevertheless, I'd like to soften my position of Capt. Johnston at bit. Lee chose him to go on the recon knowing the importance of this attack. I know nothing of Johnston's previous service with the ANV, but Lee must have trusted him enough to do this work. That's good enough for me to suggest that Johston was an officer of high regard and capabilities. Would Lee have gone to Stuart if he had been present? - this we can't know. Under the circumstances, we must assume that Johnston did the best he could, although as you state, there were serious problems with the intelligence he provided.

Finally Bill wrote:

I agree completely that Longstreet should have sent McLaws with Johnston - and to do more than look at the route! What is interesting is that McLaws requested permission of Pete not once but twice, and was denied. This is a telling reaction by Pete to his resentment towards Lee and perhaps the assignment of Johnston to the recon. My recollection of the situation is that Pete told Maj. Clarke to accompany Johnston - rather than Johnston asking Clarke to join him as you imply. And finally, I think McLaws concern in going on the recon was not so much to check out the route, but rather to see the ground over which he would deploy his division and make the attack. From a tactical standpoint, this must surely have been McLaws priority. Obviously, he had to "get" there first, but my interpretation of the situation is that infantry commanders generally did not bear the immediate responsibility for determining how to get there, although they did bear the ultimate responsibility for getting there. It's a subtle point - I don't know if I'm splitting hairs. Anyway, Longstreet's mulelishness at this critical time compounded problems for the ANV later in the day.

Thanks for your well-thought out post Bill.
Regards,M
Grant Troop


From: "James F. Epperson" I think part of the mis-conception over Johnson's fitness for the role comes from thinking of "engineer" in the modern military sense, and not in the context of the times and the experience of the officers involved. Recall that RE Lee's highly-regarded Mexican War service was as an Engineer officer doing recon work for General Scott. Recall also the notion of a "topographical engineer," i.e., a map-maker. As Grant Troop pointed out, Hotchkiss was one of the best recon men in the war, and he is mostly known as Jackson's map-maker. The skills that would make one a good military map-maker would also make one a good scout, in terms of interpreting and understanding the lay of the land.

Jim Epperson


From: Norman Levitt
Subject: Re: Johnson, Stuart and Longstreets flanking move

On the "recon" issue; my two cents worth:

Lee's problem wasn't merely that he lacked clear ideas of where the Federal line was on July 2; the point is that he hadn't much idea of what the entire AoP order of battle might have been. He'd only fought I and XI Corps on the First, probably had some sense that II Corps had come up lat that after noon--but he didn't really know where four Corps of the Federal Aramy was, whetehter it was on the scence or 20 miles back, where its reserves and fallback positions were, where its trains were, and so forth. This is the kind of information that could not have been scouted out by a few men on a morning ride, and this is the kind of thing that a cavalry recon in force would have been useful for. (In any case, Johston's information turned out to be inaccurate; he reported the low area north of the roundtops free of Federals when, in fact, III Corps was all over the place.

PS. On Engineers. Recall that in the pre-war army, the cream of West Point graduates went into the Corps of Engineers; they weren't technicians in the modern sense so much as the experts in the advantages and disadvantages of terrain, fortified and otherwise.

Norm Levitt


From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Johnson, Stuart and Longstreets flanking move

Norm,

I think we are talking about apples and oranges. This "thread" started with Dennis wondered if Lee and Longstreet really thought they could move Longstreet's Corps to the right unobserved. Then someone stated that Lee had no scouting report, then it came up that Longstreet needed Stuart to do the reconnaissance. We are talking about a specific reconnaissance to prepare for Longstreet's flank attack. My opinion is that if Lee had wanted to do an reconnaissance in Force, he would have ordered one. He didn't need a cavalry corps to do that. Sickles did it with a handful of sharpshooters. That is not a maneuver that was normally ordered if one wanted to conduct a surprise flank attack. From the operational or strategic sense, I couldn't possibly agree more that Stuart was sorely missed and that Lee had less information than he needed. As the two armies were closing on each other, if Stuart had been present he would have been able to give Lee the strategic intelligence he needed. I just have a hard time marking up Stuart's absence as the reason that the Confederate troops were observed as they marched to the Union left and that is what this discussion is about. I would much rather mention the fact that Longstreet would not let McLaws go with Johnson after Johnson gave his initial report. As Grant Troop mentioned, he asked twice.

Bill


From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron) Subject: Johnson on LRT

Jim,
You are exactly right. Johnson was up there between the time the 5th Ohio and the 147th Pennsylvania left and when the first signal station (Arron Jerome, Buford's Signal Officer) arrived. According to Freeman in "Lee's Lieutenants", Johnson arrived on LRT at 5:30. Feeman got his information from a manuscript by Johnson. Col. Patrick of the 5th Ohio stated that he received orders at 5:00 a.m. to rejoin Candy's Brigade and most accounts have him gone by 5:30. It would be over an hour later when Briney went into position. Birney wrote in his report that he relieved Geary at 7:00 a.m. I just finished an order of battle of LRT for Dennis and sent it to him tonight. I made an attempt to do a time-line on all the units.

Bill


From: DPowell334@aol.com

In a message dated 95-12-08 09:14:15 EST, Steve Lieberum wrote:
> > Wasn't it Longstreet that wanted to pull to a defensive position, and > that it was HOOD that wanted to do the flanking movement.

> > The whole time Longstreet wanted to let the AOP attach him and not the > other way around.

> Longstreet envisioned a larger flanking move around Meade's flank to interpose between the AOP and Washington, and then let Meade attack. he figured (probably correctly,) that political pressure would force Meade to attack hastily.

Hood's idea was purely tactical, a move around BRT to attack astride the Taneytown Road into Meade's rear. This idea was actually pretty flawed, in that:

A

    • the move could not have been accomplished with enough daylight left to actually fight, and Meade would have had ample time - and troops, namely 5th and 6th corps - to counter this.
    • There is no way Lee could have streched his line enough to maintain continuity and still mass enough men for a solid attack that far south and east. Therefore, such a move would have exposed a large segment of the ANV to piecemeal destruction. Certainly Hood's own flank would have been extremely vulnerable during such an attack, and again, 5th or 6th corps would have been well placed to take advantage of such an opportunity.

Dave Powell
From: Norman Levitt To Dave P. re Hood:

Right on the money!! There's a continuing confusion between Longstreet's strategic idea of making a flank march around theAoP and forcing the battle elsewhere and Hood's idea of taking his division to the east of BRT (which, I agree, was a dumb idea that invited destruction in detail). Just rmember this is Hood we're talking about--Atlanta, Franklin, Nashville. Eager, but not terribly bright.

Norm Levitt


From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron) Steve,
As Dave Powell said, the two are very different proposals. Occasionally, Longstreet's flank march, ordered by Lee, gets confused with Longstreet's strategic flanking proposal which Dave just described. So there were 3 proposals, two tactical and one strategic. For a good description of all three, take a look at Chapter 4 "Longstreet's Flanking Proposal" in Glenn Tucker's LEE AND LONGSTREET AT GETTYSBURG.

Bill


From: DPowell334@aol.com

Subject: Re: Flanking movements

In a message dated 95-12-08 21:55:10 EST, Bill wrote:
>Steve,
> As Dave Powell said, the two are very different proposals. Occasionally, >Longstreet's flank march, ordered by Lee, gets confused with Longstreet's >strategic flanking proposal which Dave just described. So there were 3 >proposals, two tactical and one strategic. For a good description of all >three, take a look at Chapter 4 "Longstreet's Flanking Proposal" in Glenn >Tucker's LEE AND LONGSTREET AT GETTYSBURG.p> Longstreet was not above deliberately confusing the various proposals himself. I think he tries to take credit from Hood in his memiors for a tactical flanking march as well, but then portrays Lee as too rigid to allow it. In effect, he claimed he told Hood that he (Longstreet) had that idea first, and was denied. However, none of the more contemporary sources bear this out.

Dave Powell


From: Alexander Cameron

Dave,
Good point. Agree. It also appears that Longstreet's unhappiness with Lee influenced his actions during the execution of the flank march. It seems as though he thought that Lee had placed the march under the control of our man Johnston instead of simply providing him as a guide. In the B&L article (340), Longstreet wrote that "he [Lee] ordered the march and put it under the conduct of his engineer officers, so as to be assured that the troops would move by the best route and encounter the least delay in reaching the position designated by him for the attack...". Longstreet rode well back in the column. Coddington interpreted this as Longstreet being "more than punctilious in complying with army protocol. Since Lee had ordered Johnston to lead and guide the head of the column, which was McLaws' division, Longstreet decided to regard him as Lee's special representative who during the march possessed greater authority over these troops than he". Coddington continued, "Through this questionable interpretation of Johnston's role Longstreet temporarily relinquished his position as commander of the corps and rode behind with Hood's Division". Coddington references Longstreet's article "Lee in Pennsylvania" in THE ANNALS OF THE WAR..., Philadelphia, 1879, which I do not have. Coddington also believed that Johnston felt that he had the more "modest" role of simply being a guide. Again, it would be good to read exactly what Johnston did say.

Coddington may have been a little tough on Longstreet and easy on Johnston here. Not sure. As we have discussed before, I always thought Longstreet should have been able to scout around and take a similar route to Alexander's once they saw the signal station. If he had sort of "relinquished" control because of his unhappiness with Lee, that might help explain it.

Bill


From: Dave Powell334@aol.com
Subject: Re: Flanking movements

Bill,
Actually, I have always been somewhat suspicious of claims that Longstreet dragged his feet on the march. Consider this: That Longstreet's men marched at a slightly faster rate than Jackson's at Chancellorsville - Longstreet's men marched between 6-8 miles in about 2.5 hours (from 1-3:30 pm) while Jackson's men covered 12 miles in about 8 hours. Longstreet took only about 1/2 hour to deploy for the attack - despite utterly changed tactical conditions he found upon arrival. Jackson took almost three times as long to deploy, from 3:30 to 5:00 p.m. Certainly Jackson had worse terrain to confront, but the essential conditions of the Union exposed flank remained the same.

I've always felt that if Jackson's march and attack were traditionally considered brilliant, it was unreasonable to slam Longstreet for a remarkably similar proformance.

So why the discrepancy? The post-war recriminations are too much at play here, I think. Longstreet's claims are obviously rediculous. However, he first made that claim about Johnson "commanding" the march in 1879, a response to several years of constant attack on his reputation and skill by Early, Fitz. Lee and Rev. Jones. Longstreet tried - rather foolishly - to distance himself from any involvement in any of the attacks at Gettysburg, trying to blame defeat on Lee.

In reality, the isssue is still somewhat confused. Lee did place Johnson in charge of guiding the First Corps to it's jump-off point. McLaws supports that, as do other sources. Johnson, however, claimed that he had "no idea" where Longstreet was supposed to go, a rather odd claim given his morning ride and report to Lee. Lee spent considerable time with Longstreet during the march, and none of the relatively unbiased commanders (Mclaws, primarily) saw any evidence of Lee urging Longstreet along,. In fact, McLaws confirmed that Lee also told him to stay under concealment, indicating that Lee had a direct hand in the countermarch decision.

I think that the rate of progress, the choice of route, and the deployment all were accomplished with reasonable dispatch. Usually criticism of Longstreet is vague, but I've never seen a specific charge (he deliberately took the wrong route, etc.) that stood up to close scrutiny.

Dave Powell


From: lawrence@appsmiths.com (Robert W Lawrence) I have to disagree-although I am a big fan of Longstreet I think he did drag his feet on July 3nd. you mentioned that he got his positioned in the 2.5 hours from 1:30 on. the problem is that he was given his orders no later than 11:00 AM-why the 2 1/2 hour delay in starting?

I mostly fault Longsteet for the "countermarch" which added at least an 1 1/2 to the deployment. Whether it was due to poor reconnaissance or a relucntant Longsteet the fact is that Longsteet turned his topps around even though by most accounts the path Alexander used to advance unobserved past the same position was clearly visible.

Bob


<> From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Longstreet

Dave,
Good analysis. I don't think that the actual rate of march was slow. Comparing Longstreet's rate of march with Jackson's is interesting, the problem is that for part of the time they were going away from the enemy, not toward them. The issue to me is how much faster Longstreet would have gotten into position if he had followed a route similar to Alexander's once he saw the signal station. From my perspective, he rode forward, deferred to McLaws on a new route which caused them to countermarch, and lost a lot of valuable time that could have been avoided. If he was unhappy with lee and in a "petulant" mood, that might explain it, or it could have absolutely nothing to do with it. It just seems like before he countermarched, he would have taken a hard look at the alternatives (Alexander's route).

Clearly, Longstreet took a "bad rap" from his detractors after the war. As you suggested, Longstreet didn't help himself, in some cases, by his post war writings. However, from my point of view, some folks have ridden the pendulum back a bit too far in the other direction. The truth is, I think Coddington was a bit tough on him but I would suppose that I'm just a wee bit more critical than yourself, based on previous conversations. That does not mean that I think that Longstreet lost the battle for the ANV. There were plenty of folks to share that responsibility.

On a related issue, I recently found out how to remotely search the archives collection at the Military History Institute from the internet and found that they have a collection of papers which include messages and reports by Capt. James Hall, the signal officer on LRT at the time of the flank march. The only signal officer's report that was published in the OR for the 3 days of the battle was Capt. Lemuel Norton's. It appears that he consolidated the reports of the other Signal officers and just submitted his. However, for the part of the campaign that included the pursuit of Lee toward Williamsport, all of the signal officer's reports were published and there is a lot of detail. If Hall's Gettysburg report is there, we may have some fresh material that has not been previously published. I can't find the Hall papers referenced in any of the bibliographies of the major studies. Lots of the messages that were published in the OR have been referenced by writers to include Law and Longstreet. It would be great to find additional messages that have not been previously considered. I'm trying to get loose and get up there.

Bill


From: STEVEN CASSEL <STCASSEL@mci.newscorp.com>
Subject: Re: Flanking movements

Dave wrote: >
>I think that the rate of progress, the choice of route, and the deployment >all were accomplished with reasonable dispatch. Usually criticism of >Longstreet is vague, but I've never seen a specific charge (he deliberately >took the wrong route, etc.) that stood up to close scrutiny. > >Dave Powell

Longstreet was upset with the delay made necessary by having his column exposed to the Federal signal station on LRT, and the resulting counter-march. Far from dragging his heels, Longstreet ordered the divisions of Hood and McLaws to about-face and march abreast of each other, in order to decrease the time required for the counter-march.

While it might have been better if Longstreet would have been closer to the head of the column, in order to be in a better position to direct the march of the I Corps -- is another question. But, the results would have been the same. Johnson would have lead the head of the I Corps column to the same rise of ground beyond Black Horse Tavern, that would be visible from the Yankee LRT signal station. Only a few extra minutes would have been saved if Longstreet had have been at the front of the line of march.

I think the point regarding JEB Stuart being unavailable for recon service was missed in earlier discussions. Certainly the entire cavalry force of Stuart would not have been sent out on a sensitive recon, where stealth was important, as was required for this mission. But, there would have been available more small squads of cavalry experienced in recon work (the same size as Johnson's party) that could have been sent out to find the best concealed route to the step-off point for the assault. This would have saved much time.

A lot can change, in the time a single scouting party takes to return to report to headquarters. If squads of Stuart's horsemen had remained out observing, the change in the dispositions of the AoP could have been reported in time to change attack plans. The report of Johnson was much too old to have been seriously regarded as still valid. Stuart's squads could have provided Lee with hourly updates of intelligence reports, that may have changed the final outcome of the battle. If Stuart had been on the battlefield, there would have been more opportunity to adapt to changing battlefield conditions.

It may never be known why Longstreet did not follow the tracks of E.P. Alexander's guns during the counter-march, however that is beyond this supporter of old Pete, ability to reason out. Would two divisions of infantry be more observable than a few battalions of artillery (the sun reflections off of thousands of musket barrels)?

Steven Cassel


From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron
Subject: Longstreet

Steve,
The issue here is indeed why he didn't follow Alexander. That's where he lost the time. I pointed out that he was well back in the column is the context that he seems to have deferred control of the movement to Johnston. As far as ordering an "about-face", I'm not real sure where you are on that one (I'm not trying to be cute, I just don't know). Longstreet asked McLaws "is there no way to avoid it" and McLaws told him of his reconnaissance that morning. Longstreet then asked "How can we get there" and McLaws replied that they would have to countermarch. Longstreet then said, "Then all right" [McLaws, "Gettysburg", S.H.S.P, VII, p. 69].

An "about face" and a countermarch are two different things. Longstreet did comment to McLaws "...suppose you let him [Hood] countermarch first and lead in the attack" but when McLaws resisted, Longstreet agreed to let McLaws countermarch first by stating "Then go on" [McLaws, p.69]. They went back in the same order they came. Kershaw was the lead brigade initially and during the countermarch. I'm not sure where you are getting the "march abreast" unless you are talking about Longstreet moving Hood forward and "doubling" McLaws' column (nothing here about an "about face") after Mclaws had made contact (this is much later) because he felt it no longer made sense to worry about concealing it from the signal station. At this point, let me quote Pfanz, "This made good sense, or so it seems today, but the sophistry used in one of his [Longstreet] explanations for it does not. Longstreet stated in one account that, since Captain Johnston was ordered by General Lee to conduct the head of the column -McLaws' division - he, Longstreet, could not interfere with it; but the order did not apply to Hood's division, so he felt free to order Hood forward and did so" [Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, p. 122].

BTW, I'm a supporter of "old Pete" also, I just don't think his actions on the 2nd are above criticism.

Bill


From: dmercado@BIX.com
Date: Sun, 10 Dec 1995 19:07:05 -0500 (EST)

> BTW, I'm a supporter of "old Pete" also, I just don't think his actions >on the 2nd are above criticism.

> Bill,
I am a big fan of Gen Longstreet, but arguably his biggest mistake was to insist on waiting for his last brigade (Law's) before starting the attack.

While he waited for one brigade to come up, two full Corps came up for the federals.

-Dave


From: DPowell334@aol.com Dave,
Actually, he needed that brigade. The attack faltered for lack of support anyway, even with Law. Without him, likely the attack at Devil's Den would have been strictly a frontal assault, and much more easily repulsed.

As for fresh troops, all the Union troops that repulsed Longstreet were on the field and in place by 10:00 a.m., an hour before Lee even gave Longstreet his orders. The only deployment change after that was Sickles' advance, a movement that clearly benefited the CSA attack. It might be said that waiting for Law actually helped the attack, not hinder it.

Dave Powell


From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron
Dave Navarre wrote:

>Had Longstreet put his foot down, (booted or not) and had his Corps do >an about-face rather than a countermarch, the Corps could have been in position >much earlier and the attack started much sooner.

Dave,
Prepare thyself, you are fixing to get an incoming round from Dave Powell about the fact that they had to be in the original order due to the fact that Longstreet was going to do an "en echelon" attack and the units needed to work in harmony.

Get the idea I've been down this road (no pun intended) before? :) Want to get really confused? Go read Tucker's HIGH TIDE AT GETTYSBURG, p. 234. I knew Tucker was a little "fast and loose" but this is really messy. First Tucker claims that Johnston told Longstreet that they could pass around the shoulder of the hill and through a field, and that the column would still be hidden from the enemy. Tucker said that Longstreet was disgusted and peremptorily called off the entire movement. "He wanted another route. He ordered an about-face and a return toward the Cashtown road. This meant that Hood, who was in the rear of McLaws, now headed the column..." I wonder where he got that. I also wonder if the Johnston papers really say anything about him telling Longstreet to cut through the fields. Only time I've ever hear it. First time I ever heard about an "about face" at that point also. Obviously Tucker never read McLaws' S.H.S.P. article. Tucker goes on to say that Longstreet was finding roads south and following generally Herr Ridge and the bank of Willoughby Run. Tucker also talks about the fact that the signal station never saw Longstreet's columns. He is correct when he talks about the specific point past Black Horse Tavern where they countermarched but clearly the messages later were describing the countermarch and Law going into position (at least Law thought so [B&L], and so do I).

Bill


From: DPowell334@aol.com
Subject: Re: Warning Order for incoming rounds from Dave Powell

In a message dated 95-12-11 16:12:50 EST, Bill wrote:

>>much earlier and the attack started much sooner.

> >Dave,
> Prepare thyself, you are fixing to get an incoming round from Dave Powell >about the fact that they had to be in the original order due to the fact >that Longstreet was going to do an "en echelon" attack and the units needed >to work in harmony. Thanks, Bill for setting the stage:)
Actually, given Lee's order for an echelon attack, with the units keying off each-other in order, I do believe that there was a valid military reason for not reversing the order of march. At the very least, doing so would require more time be spent making sure everyone understood the new order of advance.

Dave Powell


From: Dave Navarre <73613.1150@compuserve.com>
Subject: Countermarching Longstreet

Sounding off on several items of this issue:

Dave Mercado wrote:
"arguably his [Longstreet's] biggest mistake was to insist on waiting for his last brigade (Law's) before starting the attack."

This falls directly in line with Longstreet's not wanting to go into battle without Pickett, since it was like going in "with one boot off." I can understand his reticence about not wanting to attack before he was ready, but Dave makes a good point - it seems that Longstreet made several errors out of petulance. (I still think he was an outstanding commander, but this sure wasn't his greatest battle....)

Steve Cassel wrote:
"Far from dragging his heels, Longstreet ordered the divisions of Hood and McLaws to about-face and march abreast of each other, in order to decrease the time required for the counter-march."

My recollection is that McLaws remained the lead unit. This struck me as the truly egregious error here, as the regiments in the van countermarched past Hood and Law. Had Longstreet put his foot down, (booted or not) and had his Corps do an about-face rather than a countermarch, the Corps could have been in position much earlier and the attack started much sooner (it seems almost all of the actions at Gettysburg got a late afternoon start despite the units being roused at ungodly hours - was this typical of ACW actions?)

Bill wrote:
"during a terrain walk.... we won't be on horseback (big difference in how tall you are!)"

Why don't we plan on building a human pyramid at several points! :-)

Dave


From: DPowell334@aol.com
In a message dated 95-12-10 15:41:21 EST, Bill wrote:

>Dave,
> Good analysis. I don't think that the actual rate of march was slow. >Comparing Longstreet's rate of march with Jackson's is interesting, the >problem is that for part of the time they were going away from the enemy, >not toward them. The issue to me is how much faster Longstreet would have >gotten into position if he had followed a route similar to Alexander's once >he saw the signal station. From my perspective, he rode forward, deferred >to McLaws on a new route which caused them to countermarch, and lost a lot >of valuable time that could have been avoided. If he was unhappy with lee >and in a "petulant" mood, that might explain it, or it could have absolutely >nothing to do with it. It just seems like before he countermarched, he >would have taken a hard look at the alternatives (Alexander's route). Bill,
I think Alexander's route is the most interesting of all these questions. Two battalions of artillery took up a lot of road-space, and would have been as easy to see as a marching Division any day, perhaps easier. Alexander's column should have been almost as long as Hood's or McLaws' entire division, given the latter were moving without trains. Clearly, Alexander could not have gone anywhere that the infantry couldn't. Also, such a movement would have made a clear track, it was unlikely to be missed (unless Johnson were the only one looking, he seemed to miss everything.:))

However, I have some possible explanations (rationalisations?.)

First, I've noticed that none of the contemporary critics of Longstreet ever raised this issue (Though I could be wrong here, I can't recall all the sources. Any help?) I've only read about it in later historical works. Alexander mentions the detour, but not why the infantry bypassed it.

It seems likely that McLaws had done some recon that a.m. as to the approach route. He was the one Longstreet questioned about where to go next, and the one who indicated the need to countermarch. Johnson - the designated guide - was also available, and seems not to have made any suggestions beyond countermarching. Lee was present, (or at least close by,) and aquiesced, re-affirming his desire for the column to remain hidden. Hood was also present.

Given all these qualified military men on the field, it seems odd that none would have mentioned it after the fact if Longstreet were indeed being "mulish" and unhelpful. Also, one wonders at the judgement of so many capable officers ignoring that route. Why did not McLaws or Hood even suggest such a move? Certianly they had other suggestions as to changing the order of march, etc.

Since there is really no way of knowing what happened, I tend to defer to the judgement of the collective group, here, and assume they had some valid reason for not following Alexander. It is unfortunate that this charge was never really leveled while the contemporaries were alive, perhaps then we would have another entire body of conflicting liturature to deal with, but at least we'd have a defense.

There is a likely explanation: The commanders were worried about traffic problems. Passing all two divisions and the guns thru a single choke-point is a good way to invite _real_ delay. They needed deployment space to get into position, and that could be why they looked for alternate routes for the infantry. I tend to view later historians' wonderment over how Longstreet could have missed such an obvious alternative path as a clear exercise of 20/20 hindsight, based on information that it would be unreasonable to assume that Longstreet should have had.

Pinning all this blame on Longstreet seems too convenient - as I mentioned, what of Hood, Lee, McLaws, etc.? Why have a guide - in the form of Johnson - if he's not to guide the column? If it wasn't simple oversight, then likely there were good - if unkown today - reasons for not using that route. If it were just an oversight, then they all missed it, which likely indicates that it might not have been as easy to spot as we now think.

Dave Powell


From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Longstreet

Dave Powell wrote:
>First, I've noticed that none of the contemporary critics of Longstreet ever >raised this issue (Though I could be wrong here, I can't recall all the >sources. Any help?) I've only read about it in later historical works. >Alexander mentions the detour, but not why the infantry bypassed it.

Dave, my guess on this one is the fact that Alexander's book was not published until 1910. There were some earlier articles but I don't remember the dates.

> It seems likely that McLaws had done some recon that a.m. as to the >approach route. He was the one Longstreet questioned about where to go next, >and the one who indicated the need to countermarch. Johnson - the designated >guide - was also available, and seems not to have made any suggestions beyond >countermarching. Lee was present, (or at least close by,) and aquiesced, >re-affirming his desire for the column to remain hidden. Hood was also >present.

No argument here as to McLaws "having done some recon that a.m." but I am not sure he went down by Marsh Creek/Black Horse Tavern. He had reconned a route by Willoughby Run. I do fault Longstreet for not allowing McLaws to go back and recon with Johnson after he was asked by McLaws to do so. As I indicated in my post the other day, Longstreet seems to have pretty much deferred to McLaws. Nothing really wrong with that except to me it indicates he wasn't in a "take charge" mood. That's the point I was raising about being affected by his unhappiness with Lee. I am just guessing. Let's look at "Johnson - the designated guide - was also available, and seems not to have made any suggestions beyond countermarching". No way I'm going to defend "wrongway" Johnston's guiding ability but a lot of secondary sources have Johnston being "appalled" when he found that they were going to be following his directions. He could have certainly reconned LRT without going all the way down to Marsh Creek and Black Horse Tavern. He clearly didn't know where he was going. However, did you see the part of my post this afternoon about Tucker? Get your copy of High Tide and look at page 234. Now a lot of the stuff on this page is just wrong but I am really interested in the part where Tucker says "By passing around the shoulder of the hill and through a field, he [Johnston] told Longstreet, the column would still be hidden from the enemy, if the enemy should , indeed, be looking out from the Round Tops toward Black Horse Tavern". The passage has no note. We really need to get a copy of the Johnston papers. Any luck on having friends take a look at it for you?

> Given all these qualified military men on the field, it seems odd that >none would have mentioned it after the fact if Longstreet were indeed being >"mulish" and unhelpful. Also, one wonders at the judgement of so many capable >officers ignoring that route. Why did not McLaws or Hood even suggest such a >move? Certianly they had other suggestions as to changing the order of march, >etc.

Again, we need to see if there is any validity to the Tucker statement that Johnson told him to go across the fields. If that is true (or at least in the Johnston papers), it is VERY significant. As to the rest of your post, you make valid points in Longstreet's defense, as always. The common problem in all of these discussions (Longstreet's flanking movement and Where in the heck was Johnston) is our inability to critically analyze just exactly what Johnston wrote. I would really love to do that. I think the two of us could write a good piece centered on Johnston if we could just get a hold of this material (I'm working on a piece on the 118th Penn. but I have the same problem with resources. They are on the east coast.). I don't remember if Bob Larwence has talked about it since you joined the group but the discussion group is planning on meeting at Gettysburg in June. Any chance you can make that? I plan on coming and am really looking forward to meeting the rest of the group. I could take the souther route out of east Texas and come up through North Carolina and Virginia and pick up the Johnston material if we can't get hold of it before then.

Bill


From: "James F. Epperson"
Subject: Re: Longstreet

Concerning Johnson's role (or lack thereof) in guiding Longstreet's column: Is it possible that he had scouted the enemy position, but not how to get there with a column of troops? I know this is the position that Shaara has him take in KILLER ANGELS, but that's a work of fiction so I am not inclined to take it as ironclad truth. On the other hand, it is a plausible explanation for why he was unable to help out when the problem came up.

Jim Epperson


From: Grant_Troop@fcgate1.osc.on.ca (Grant Troop)
Subject: Re: Longstreet

Actually, Alexander does profer an explanation of why the infantry bypassed his route -at least partially (see Coddington, p.380). A lack of orders! Alexander said, that upon returning along the same short cut he took to the right earlier, he found the head of an infantry division stopped near the rise on Herr Ridge visible from LRT. Surely, this must have been McLaws division- Kershaw's Brigade. It stayed there for over an hour, according to Alexander, despite his claim that he tried to get them to recognize the worth of his route. Supposedly nobody present at that time had the authority to vary orders. Where was Longstreet, McLaws, Kershaw, Johnson,etc. during this hour plus period? Surely, Alexander would have mentioned them had they been present. This does not provide an explanation of why Longsteet, McLaws etc. didn't order the infantry to follow Alexander's route, but it certainly is a bizarre story.

As far as McLaw's recon goes, he was forbidden from doing any by Longstreet earlier that day, as we discussed in previous posts. However, McLaws would have ridden the ground in question at least twice during his trips to and from the Seminary that morning. The ground north of the Fairfield Road and east of Herr Ridge is directly between the Seminary and Black Horse Tavern. He probably picked up his "recon" during this time. Perhaps I'm wrong, but I was under the impression that the head of McLaws division bivouaked at the Black Horse Tavern, with the rest of the division stretched back out to the north along Marsh Creek. If so, they were camped within less than 1/4 mile of where the division halted and then began the countermarch. Nobody rode down the road during that whole morning and noticed this? Again, bizarre.

As for Hood, I'm not sure he was present during the discussions of the countermarch orders. Coddington (p.379) says Hood's division pushed into the back of McLaws - presumably somewhere back north along Marsh Creek. Then Longstreet ordered Hood ahead of McLaws, to the right "...by the most direct route". It's not clear whether this order occurred before or after Longstreet met McLaws and Johnson on the Black Horse Tavern Road. Anyway, I take Longstreet's order to mean that Hood did not have to countermarch. I noted that Coddington's map on p.332 actually shows two routes for the 1st Corps march north of the Fairfield Road - one more direct, the other more circuitous. I wonder if these are Hood's and McLaws' routes respectively - at least in Coddington's interpretation, although there is no reference in the text to this portion of the map. My understanding of the countermarch principle would have kept McLaws (and specifically Kershaw) in the lead of the column, as I have always thought. But I'm no longer sure this is the case. Coddington (p.380) says "At Pitzer's School House, (McLaws) turned to the left....,while Hood's division UP AHEAD continued south toward the Emmittsburg Road." If Hood was "up ahead" as McLaws turned left to the Peach Orchard, then Hood must have been leading the column - at least at this point. Coddington uses a McLaws letter of July 7, 1863 as a source for this. At least it was fresh in McLaws mind at this point.

Grant Troop


From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Longstreet

Grant,
This is very confusing isn't it. Here is my try at it. Correct me if I'm wrong. Jim, Dave(s), Larwence brothers, feel free to pile on. Mclaws is in the lead with Kershaw's Brigade up front. McLaws halts the column and Longstreet rides up to see what is the matter. McLaws tell Longstreet they need to countermarch and Longstreet agrees. Longstreet suggests that Hood countermarch first (not "about face") but Mclaws protests and Longstreet agrees to let McLaws go first. They go back the way they came until they got to Herr ridge at that point they cut down a lane and over land to Willoughby Run which they followed until they got to the road that led to Pitzer's Schoolhouse. Hood is following McLaws. Hood was well behind and Mclaws was very stretched out due to the fact that McLaws had narrowed the company fronts because of the narrow lanes. Longstreet found Hood's column halted and pulled Hood out to double McLaws columns. This was because they could again see the Federal signal station on LRT and was backed up behind McLaws. Longstreet wrote that if he could see the signal station, they could see him and it was useless try to stay concealed. It is not certain where his occurred but my guess is after they got on the road to Pitzer's School House from the Willoughby Run lane but before they reached the school house junction. Hood wrote that he sent out an advanced force to tear down fences which indicates that he cut across fields. He was moved to the right of Mclaws and went into position. Now the problem is that many of the accounts do not agree. Pfanz (p. 122) and Coddington (p. 379-80) have different interpretations (I like Pfanz's). My interpretation is that Longstreet in B&L is talking about two separate halts due to the signal station. At the second halt, he became impatient and moved Hood around McLaws. This was after they had countermarched for a long time. I have used Coddington, Pfanz, Hood (Advance and Retreat), Longstreet (B&L), McLaws (SHSP), Law (B&L) ,Alexander (Military Memoirs) and Kershaw's report in the OR. I do not have Longstreet's Lee in Penn.

Bill


From: Grant_Troop@fcgate1.osc.on.ca (Grant Troop)
Subject: Re: Longstreet (2)

On Dec.11 at 10:43PM, Bill wrote:

For what it's worth, Jeff Wert in his biography of Longstreet supports Tucker's unsubstantiated story concerning Johnston saying:"Johnston claimed that he recommended to Longstreet that the troops skirt the hill by marching across the fields, but the general "preferred the roads"." The phrase "preferred the roads" is in quotes, inferring that it is Johnston's words. Wert's source is the Johnston Papers at VHS. So, after this discussion, we're to believe that all of Longstreet, McLaws and Johnson left the head of the column for an hour or more to find "roads". One thing seems certain from hindsight - they should have let Porter Alexander lead the column. After all, he'd had his batteries in position for about an hour at this point.

And I think Jim Epperson's point about the focus of Johnston's recon is potentially a good one. Lee had ordered Johnston to do three things - find a route, make sure it was screened from LRT, and scout Union deployments on the right. But perhaps, Johnston focused more particularly on the latter (notwithstanding the results - let's be objective), and as a result, was less well prepared in leading the 1st Corps down to Pitzer's Schoolhouse. I know I've gotten lost and turned around on those roads - but then come to think of it, the LRT area "looked" unoccupied as well. Maybe Johnston is a long lost relative of mine.

Grant Troop


From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Lonstreet

Jim wrote: > Then Longstreet ordered Hood ahead of McLaws, to the right "

Jim, This is later, after McLaws had come in contact near the peach orchard.

Bill


From: Norman Levitt
Subject: Re: Longstreet

One questiion that seems to be getting lost in the general discussion of Johnston's recon and Longstreet's countermarch is this: What precisely did lee think he was sending Longstreet's two divisions into? The usual answer is "the left flank of the Federal line". But what, exactly, did Lee and his staff know, or think they knew, about the Federal order of battle? Who did they think was on the field facing them? They'd fought I and XI Corps on the 1st, of course, and probably knew that elements of II and XII Corps were up. But just what kind of thought was given to the dispositi of II, V, and VI Corps? Why would Lee have ordered any kind of large-scale action without at least some sense of where half the AoP might have been? Is it possible that he thought Meade was holding half his Army in reserve somewhere near the Maryland line? Do we have any sources at all on any of this?

Itg all seems rrather puzzling, especially since, as has been observed, Lee never ordered his available cavalry up to feel out the Federal position.

Norm Levitt


From: Dave Powell
Good point, Norm.

Offhand, I don't remember what sources - if any - speak to this. My general recollection is that Lee still hoped to find the Union force scattered, and have to face only a portion of the Army of the Potomac. Certainly he was surprised at the end of June at the rapidity of the AOP's arrival in Pa.

Tactically, of course, he thought he was placing Longstreet astride an exposed Union flank on Emmittsburg Road.

One of the things that made the area such a poor position from the CSA point of view is that Meade's deployments and reserves were almost entirely masked by the fishhook.

This is why Hood's flank end-run proposal was flawed - they had no idea that the 5th Corps was so close at hand.

I think Lee was banking on the Union forces living up to past lethargic reputation. At Antietam, McClellan wasted a day on the 16th, just letting Lee concentrate his army. Witness Burnside at Fredericksburg, where he also wasted at least a day before nerving himself up to attack. Even Hooker at Chancellorsville reinforced the idea. Just as the AOP was about to clear the Wilderness and really put Lee's command in a vise, Hooker recalled the leading elements and essentially adopted a defensive shell. Lee used the ensuing time to shift men between fronts, recon and plan.

Meade did not hesitate. The army was essentially concentrated by noon on July 2nd, with only the 6th Corps not present, and even that command within a couple hours of the field. I think Lee just worked off of past assumptions that he only had part of the army to fight.

Dave Powell


From: STEVEN CASSEL
Subject: RE: Longstreet's Flanking Movement

I am a Beta Tester for the new Delphi Internet/ MCI/Newscorp Service. I received an upgrade in the Beta-test software this week, and have not been able to post a reply to the response regarding my earlier post on Longstreet's flanking movement of 7/2/1863.

I must confess that my comment about Longstreet's column doing an "about-face," to begin the counter march was made off the top of my head without research. I beg everyone's pardon, I am not as a rule that free and loose with history. It was late at night, when I grabbed my keyboard, instead of some reference sources.

I fell back on a remembered reference from a miss-spent youth. I fell victim to the memory of reading the infamous page 234 of Glenn Tucker's _High Tide At Gettysburg_, with regard to the "about-face" reference. In reading the footnotes listed by Tucker, I do not see where he might have found a reference to any, about-face movement of Longstreet's column. Tucker's notes included: SHSP Vol.IV, pp. 99-102; B & L Vol. III, pp. 320, 332, and 359. John B. Kershaw (McLaws Division) in his article: "Kershaw's Brigade At Gettysburg" on page 332 from _Battles and Leaders_ states that -- his brigade counter marched past,(definitely not an about-face) Hood's division, that had been following them [McLaws Division].

Could Tucker have confused a statement of E.M. Law (Hood's Division), in his _Battles and Leaders_ article: "The Struggle For Round Top" on page 320, that referred to a later time period in the counter march? Law said: "...At length, after many vexatious delays, Hood's division was pushed forward until it uncovered McLaws, and soon reached the Emmitsburg road in front of Round Top. Here our line of battle was formed at an acute angle with the road, the right being in advance of it, between the road and the mountain, and the left extending across and in rear of the road..." I believe that Laws was discussing a point in time towards the end of the counter march, not at the beginning of the movement. This is the only possible reference from the notes cited by Tucker that I can see where he might have got an idea about an "about-face." If this is the case, then Tucker is very mistaken.

Harry Pfanz talks on page 121 in his _Gettysburg: the Second Day_ about the incredible incident of Longstreet not pressing his suggestion that Hood's Division lead the counter march over the objections of his subordinate division commander McLaws. Longstreet should have issued an order that would have turned the suggestion into a reality. After all old Pete was being paid the "big bucks" as the I Corps commander, not McLaws.

Another place where I think Tucker confused later events in the counter- march in his reference to the divisions of McLaws and Hood marching abreast of each other, in order to speed-up their march. Pfanz on page 122 says: "...Hood's division followed McLaws. Being far from the front of the column, Hood's men felt the full effects of accordion action -- slow-moving, starting, and stopping. There were vexatious delays caused in part by concern that the column might be seen from Little Round Top. Longstreet became impatient after a time and, considering it useless to worry any more about concealment, ordered Hood to double with McLaw's column and go quickly into position..." Longstreet later wrote a weak excuse that since General Lee had ordered Captain Johnson to lead the column (with McLaws in the lead), he could not intercede but, he could order Hood to double his division with McLaws to speed-up the movement to the right.

So friends of the GDG, I will in the future research old references tucked away in the cobwebs of my aging gray-matter before I reach for my keyboard. And I will not quote anything written by Glenn Tucker again. I will not regard Tucker, as one of the "grand old men" of Gettysburg historiography anymore. After doing a little bit of checking, I see that he definitely is not. After I finish David Martin's _Gettysburg: July 1_, I will finally break-down and finally read Pfanz's _Gettysburg: the Second Day_.


From: Douglas M Macomber (macomb@cello.gina.calstate.edu)

Once again the great Longstreet debate, his actions on the second day are still being debated today. I have heard both sides of the story and we all know Jubal Early(who hated Longstreets guts) tried to make life miserable for Longstreet every little chance he could get. In Longstreets memoirs, he blames Lee for being to one-sided. Early using this fueled the south's anger on Longstreet. Also just as a note:Longstreet was supposed to attack as soon as heard Ewell's guns to the north.

Paul (Douglas) Macomber


From: Ethan Book (eb10996@www.cedarnet.org)

Jeffrey Zirkle wrote:

I just joined the group yesterday so I'm not up to speed on past comments. I have read several entries relative to Longstreets suggested tactics concerning this battle v/s Lees. As I understand it Longstreet suggested a defensive position similar to the F'burg battles, wait and defend. I've always been puzzled at this approach concerning the question of supply and the fact that our forces were in hostile territory. Why wouldn't the Union just wait us out. The only answer I can think of is possibly political pressure to repel the invaders and the possibility that we might make a break for Washington. I am certainly no expert on this battle, however it is my opinion that Longstreets attitude throughout this battle might have very well cost us a victory. His sluggish approach to follow orders (especially the second day) cost us dearly. Our poorly executed artillery barrage on the third day, lack of ammunition, the failure to bring the artillery in close support of "Picketts Charge", battle smoke which caused needed reinforcements to breach the breakthrough in the Union lines etc. etc. I'm not one of those history buffs from Va. that thinks Lee just couldn't make a mistake, but he really almost pulled it off. The fact that we were facing a determined force with leaders like Chamberlain, I feel had the most to do with our defeat. Lets just say not many of the Quote "victors" followed up the "victory" by adequately pursuing our forces back to Virginia. I've said way to much for my first time on. I'll try to keep it short, next time.

To my understanding I thought Longstreets idea of a defensive move was to move around behind the Union army cutting them off from supplies, thus the ANV could still be supplied from the south. And I also think Longstreet did as much as he could with the number of men and amount of amunition he had, he was greatly outnumbered by men and ground.


From: Douglas M Macomber (dmacomb@cello.gina.calstate.edu)

To Jeff and Ethan,

Both of you brought up some good points, yet Longstreets overall campaign strategy was originally to march his corps and link up with the Army of the Tennesee, and Pembertons army somewhere in Mississippi, Lee concluding Virginia must be saved over Vicksburg, headed north. Ethan I do think I dropped you a line earlier, so I was going to suggest a basic reading list, not just to you but to all memebers: Coddington, Edwin B. THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN, Longacre, Edward THE CAVALRY AT GETTYSBURG Also, a subcription to G'Burg magazine would be a good idea. If you need any infor regarding these ISBNS, subscription info just drop me a line.

Paul(Douglas)Macomber


From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg (wittenberg@qn.net)

You wrote:

To Jeff and Ethan,

Both of you brought up some good points, yet Longstreets overall campaign strategy was originally to march his corps and link up with the Army of the Tennesee, and Pembertons army somewhere in Mississippi, Lee concluding Virginia must be saved over Vicksburg, headed north. Ethan I do think I dropped you a line earlier, so I was going to suggest a basic reading list, not just to you but to all memebers: Coddington, Edwin B. THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN Longacre,Edward THE CAVALRY AT GETTYSBURG Also, a subcription to G'Burg magazine would be a good idea. If you need any infor regarding these ISBNS, subscription info just drop me a line. Paul(Douglas)Macomber

I have to disagree with Paul with respect to the Longacre book. He was off-line for a while, and has missed a good bit of discussion about it. I am in the middle of writing a biography of John Buford, and have spent years researching cavalry operations in the G-burg Campaign. Longacre's book is chock full of errors, inconsistencies, and lack of detail. You can do a lot better. If you're interested, e-mail me privately, and I will go into further detail. Sorry, Paul.

Eric Wittenberg


From: John Kelly (jkelly@argo.net)

You wrote:

Once again the great Longstreet debate, his actions on the second day are still being debated toady. I have heard both sides of the story and we all know Jubal Early(who hated Longstreets guts) tried to make life miserable for Longstreet every little chance he could get. In Longstreets memoirs, he blames Lee for being to one-sided. Early using this fueled the south's anger on Longstreet. Also just as a note: Longstreet was supposed to attack as soon as heard Ewell's guns to the north.

Paul (Douglas) Macomber

I have always been under the impression that it was Ewell who was to attack when he heard Longstreet's guns.

Regards, Jack Kelly


From: Douglas M Macomber (dmacomb@cello.gina.calstate.edu)

Geez, I have been off-line so long I am mixing things up. Thanks for your corrections Eric and John. Time to re-read Coddington and throw out Longacres philosphy.

Paul(Douglas)Macomber


From: Bryan R Meyer (bm3p+@andrew.cmu.edu)

Comment reference Longs.. by John Kelly@argo.net

I have always been under the impression that it was Ewell who was to attack when he heard Longstreet's guns.

Regards,

Jack Kelly

Jack,

That is what I thought too! Wasn't Ewell supposed to attack as soon as he heard shots from Longstreet's guns? And also, wouldn't this put the blame of a lack of coordination for attack on Ewell??

Bryan R. Meyer


From: Robin Hemperly (longstre@fig.leba.net)

Jeffrey,

Regarding Longstreet,,,,I am a firm believer in the idea, if the team fails, fire the coach. You never fire the Asst. Coach! We need to stop trying to blame Longstreet for the failure at Gettysburg. As pickett said, he thought the Yanks had something to do with it.

Regards..


From: GaTechFan@aol.com

GDG:

Please enlighten me. I am relatively new to my CW study, and am not well versed in my fellow-Georgian Longstreet's CW career. From what I have read, however, it seems that Lee liked Pete because he was a good fighter, good field tactician, obeyed orders, and could be talked to. But, other than at Chickamauga, did Pete ever do anything of any significance when absent from General Lee? I am not trying to trash him, I even like him somewhat. Am I incorrect? But the Virginia interlude(I forget the place ...Suffolk?), and the Knoxville debacle weren't exactly Pattonian. And weren't his pouty antics at Gettysburg akin to Burnside's desultory actions(?) at Sharpsburg when he felt slighted by the Young Napolean? I am not blaming the loss at G'burg on Pete (I subscribe to the Captain of the Ship principle. But the captain expects the mates to promptly obey). Any insights/opinions respectfully read. I sound like Jubal Early...sheesh.

Pat Ellington


From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg (wittenberg@qn.net)

At 09:05 PM 1/28/96 -0500, you wrote:

GDG:

Please enlighten me. I am relatively new to my CW study, and am not well versed in my fellow-Georgian Longstreet's CW career. From what I have read, however, it seems that Lee liked Pete because he was a good fighter, good field tactician, obeyed orders, and could be talked to. But, other than at Chickamauga, did Pete ever do anything of any significance when absent from General Lee? I am not trying to trash him, I even like him somewhat. Am I incorrect? But the Virginia interlude(I forget the place...Suffolk?), and the Knoxville debacle weren't exactly Pattonian. And weren't his pouty antics at Gettysburg akin to Burnside's desultory actions(?) at Sharpsburg when he felt slighted by the Young Napolean? I am not blaming the loss at G'burg on Pete (I subscribe to the Captain of the Ship principle. But the captain expects the mates to promptly obey). Any insights/opinions respectfully read. I sound like Jubal Early...sheesh.

Pat Ellington

Pat:

Ol' Pete's best work was certainly done with Lee. He did rather badly, for example, at Wauhatchie just before Lookout Mountain. At the same time, I can think of no subordinate commander on either side who had three more grandly successful assaults in the War than Old Pete. One need only read about his sledgehammer flanking attack at Second Manassas and also his magnificent assault at the Wilderness (where, by the way, he was badly wounded). Despite his intriguing to succeed Braxton Bragg as commander of the Army of Tennessee, which was so blatant that Bragg sent him away to Knoxville, he was not one capable of independent command. Where he certainly did his best work was in a subordinate role, where he was reliable, steady, and could be counted on the deliver sledgehammer blows when called upon to do so.

Eric Wittenberg


From: SteveH7645@aol.com

You write:

did Pete ever do anything of any significance when absent from General Lee? I am not trying to trash him, I even like him somewhat. Am I incorrect? But the Virginia interlude(I forget the place...Suffolk?), and the Knoxville debacle weren't exactly Pattonian.

Check out the battle of Chickamauga, in Georgia. Longstreet's attack shattered the Federal line. It was one of the most perfect attacks in the entire Civil War. Longstreet was a good, solid player, not flashy like Stonewall Jackson. It can be compared to the quarterback who likes to pass for quick yardage, who the fans really love, as opposed to the quarterback who makes steady progress up the field with slow yardage. The first quarterback gets all the glory, even though it is a very risky strategy. The second one is the one the coaches really like...

Steve Haas


From: thumphri@nafis.fp.trw.com (Thad Humphries)

SteveH7645@aol.com says:

Check out the battle of Chickamauga, in Georgia. Longstreet's attack shattered the Federal line. It was one of the most perfect attacks in the entire Civil War.

Though a fan of Longsteet, he had a real stroke of luck here. The previous day at that very spot, units eventually stood behind breastworks of their own dead. Face to face fighting for several hours--I think easily twice as long as the Battle of Brawner Farm/Groveton which openned 2d Manassas. Pete got lucky the next day when an erroneous order moved a Federal unit out of positions minutes before he attacked.

Thad Humphries


From: Robin Hemperly (longstre@fig.leba.net)

Dan,

I own nearly every book written about Longstreet, including the one written by him. Overall, it is good, however, be ready for conflicting reports and some anger. The book was only published the year he died, many of his original notes and letters from comrades went up in smoke seven years earlier when his home burned to the ground. It is not surprising to read some of the anger. If you read reports that Longstreet wrote over the years on the battle you will find glaring inconsistancy's, but I think that happened with many Generals who lived a long time after the war......such as Fitz Lee and Early. When you study his life you find how often he was over looked because he was not a Virginian. Some misunderstand the fact that Lee enjoyed the company of the General and his staff for slowness and proding needed by General Lee. I will admit that the General was slow, however, this was not the reason Lee enjoyed the friendship of his camp. Forgive me for going on. I also own the book written by Helen Longstreet. If you are looking for insight into "Petes" feelings you will not find it in this book. You will find much love and respect for the General by Helen. I was hoping to find out how Longstreet really felt about everything as he told her, however, this is really not evident in the book. The books written by Moxley and T.J. are VERY good. Also I would recommend Wert and Piston.

Respectfully,

Robin

Date: Fri, 16 Feb 1996 09:09:24 -0500
From: Scott_Hartwig@nps.gov (Scott Hartwig)
Subject: Re: Longstreet July 2

Not to open a huge can of worms but I have always personally wondered what roads Longstreet would have used to move his corps "around the Union left". Presumably, a corps of infantry, with its attendant ammunition wagons, ambulances, and artillery (upwards of 70 horses per battery), would need a substantial road to move on. Other than the small farm road several hundred yards south of BRT, the road network doesn't look like it would support such a move.

Tom Desjardin


Date: Fri, 16 Feb 1996 09:33:57 -0600
From: jeff beckner
Subject: Re: Longstreet July 2

Tom:

This is an excellent sort of comment. So many times, we sit back and say what should have been done, without ever bothering to look at the actual time and place and examine HOW it could have been done -- and therefore IF it could have been done. It's all well and good to say, "Well, obviously, they should have flanked them." It's something else entirely to actually do it. If Lee were here, he'd say, "Fine. Show me the road. Show me how you'd do it. I'll wait." God, and truth, really is in the details.


From: DPowell334@aol.com
Date: Sat, 17 Feb 1996 18:57:04 -0500
Subject: Re: Longstreet

In a message dated 96-02-17 18:40:14 EST, Steve and Thad wrote:

> >Steve Haas writes

>> >> No, Jackson's plan was outlandish. You will get a lot of reasons here >> why Lee rejected it, but the most important reason why Lee wouldn't >> even consider swinging around the Federal left flank has to do with >> Lee's trains. All his supplies and ammunition were in Cashville. This >> was only accessible by the Chambersburg Pike. For Lee to swing around >> the Federal left would mean to abandon his trains to the Federal >> cavalry. Even Lee was not that audacious. The alternative would have >> been to send the trains south, around the back of South Mountain, and >> hope to meet up with them someplace in Virginia. Lee would not have >> taken that kind of gamble.

> >I think you mean Longstreet's plan (do we all have Stonewall on the brain?) >but otherwise this is an *excellent*, I say again, *excellent* post and >a good reason why Lee stayed put.

> Actually, on July 1 Lee's army trains were still at Chambersburg, with Pickett. Had Lee and Longstreet settled on maneuver on the night of July 1st, those trains would have stayed put or moved south towards Greencastle.
Also, such a maneuver would have required at least one corps to remain in front of Gettysburg to pin Meade's attention and act as rear guard. This would hardly have meant exposing the army's tail to destruction. Likely both Ewell and Hill would remain between the bulk of the Union army and the trains, at least until Meade was pulled south by Longstreet's movement.

With the main road from Chambersburg to Greencastle, Lee had a very good lateral route, protected by South Mountain, behind which to screen his trains. As his army's center of mass shifted southwards, so could the trains without significant danger.

Dave Powell


Date: Mon, 19 Feb 1996 07:55:27 -0700
From: taylord@spot.Colorado.EDU (Deb Taylor)
Subject: Re: Longstreet

>I'm not claiming to know everything "let alone anything" ,but is >Longstreet's plan that outlandish. Granted, Lee didn't like the idea of >leaving what he thought was decent ground. One more thing, would anybody >concede that Longstreet was maybe a little ahead of his time tactically.

Indeed. The man who, if not invented, advantageously used trenches and the box barrage deserves some credit from taking us out of the Napoleonic era of warfare.

Deb


From: DPowell334@aol.com
Date: Mon, 19 Feb 1996 17:50:42 -0500
Subject: Re: Longstreet

Deb,

Lee used trenches as readily as any officer in either army in the Civil War, as did all the other commanders. West Point, with it's engineering emphasis, tended to lay a strong defensive bias on it's graduates: even more so those men, like Lee and McClellan, who were graduated directly into the engineer branch. All of these men understood the value of defensive works, most of them regarded defense as the inherently stronger form of warfare. All of them, however, were struggling with the fact that it would require offensive successes to win wars. Longstreet was no more defensive minded than the bulk of his professional contemporaries.

As for "inventor of the box barrage," what is the proof of this claim? Source? Longstreet took almost no active tactical role in artillery use, that's why he gave Alexander such a free hand. Aside from that, the "box barrage," as any artilleryman today would understand the term, was physically impossible to create or control with ACW arty technology.

Dave Powell


Date: Thu, 22 Feb 1996 09:52:05 -0500
From: Scott_Hartwig@nps.gov (Scott Hartwig)
Subject: Longstreet's Roads Right

On the train into DC yesterday Scott clued me in to two more points regarding the situation on July 2 and the ANV's ability to sweep south.
1.) Merritt's brigade of cavalry was posted in that direction precisely because of the danger of this eventuality.
2.) On the morning of July 2, with the exception of the 12th corps and some other entrenched forces, the entire army was massed in formation and ready to move in whatever direction Meade needed them to go. Scott figures Meade was expecting some kind of move by Lee and was ready for it.

I told you it wasn't my area of expertise... Scott easily trumps me in just about every aspect of the battle.

Tom Desjardin


From: DPowell334@aol.com
Date: Thu, 22 Feb 1996 19:59:32 -0500
Subject: Re: Longstreet's Roads Right

Tom,

Good points all, but not ones that could completely preclude an end run by Lee"

1) Consider that Merritt not only had to screen the flank of the AOP but protect the rear flotsam of the army scattered between Emmittsburg and Taneytown. His position is exactly why I think that Lee would have needed vastly better cavalry performance to make such a move than he had heretofore. Merritt was an early warning tripwire, one that could be negated with aggressive CSA cavalry action.

2) Meade still had his forces well in hand on the morning of July 2nd, but nonetheless, had already made the choice to concentrate north. In doing so, he shifted the AOP's center of gravity north of the PA state line, and was in fact farther from the Waynesboro Turnpike than was Lee via the Fairfield road. Unquestionably Meade would react, and react quickly, but the point is that in forcing that reaction Lee would be well on his way to regaining that initiative he'd lost the moment he was forced to turn and confront the Union troops coming up in his rear. Given the position and the time lag bound to incur as information made it's way to Meade's HQ, was digested, and new orders reached the effected commands, Meade would have more ground to cover than would Lee in moving back South.

Dave Powell


Date: Tue, 27 Feb 1996 00:11:59 -0500
From: kgm@rci.rutgers.edu (Ken Miller)
Subject: Re: Longstreet

I realize that the following is conventional wisdom:

"But I do know that he was ordered to >start the attack at 9:00 AM. Lee came back to the southern end of the >field around 11:00 AM and was incensed that the attack had not taken >place. "
posted by Victor Vernon

Obviously Longstreet notes nothing about this in his book, from Manassas to Appomattox. However, from various sources, I also begin to doubt this piece of "history" as an "Earlyism" ( as in Jubal)

I would appreciate quotes from the GDG from any primary source that would tell if:
1) the order was at 9 and not closer to 11 as Old Pete maintained;
2) that Lee felt Longstreet was stalling

Thanks

Ken Miller


From: GaTechFan@aol.com
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 1996 11:03:24 -0500
Subject: Longstreet, Fremantle, etc.

Col. Fremantle had some observations about the morning of July 2, 1863:

"The firing ceased about dark[July 1], at which time I rode back with General Longstreet and his Staff to his headquarters at Cashtown, a little village eight miles from Gettysburg. At that time troops were pouring along the road, and were being marched towards the position they are to occupy tomorrow...

2d July(Thursday)__ We all got up at 3:30AM...Col. Sorrell, the Austrian, and I arrived at 5AM at the same commanding position we were on yesterday, and I climbed up a tree in company with Captain Schreibert of the Prussian army. Just below us were seated Generals Lee, Hill, Longstreet, and Hood, in consultation...General Heth was also present...At 7AM I rode over part of the ground with General Longstreet, and saw him disposing of McLaw's division for today's fight...AS THE WHOLE MORNING WAS EVIDENTLY TO BE OCCUPIED IN DISPOSING OF TROOPS FOR THE ATTACK, I rode to the extreme right with Col. Manning and Maj. Walton...

At 2PM General Longstreet advised me, if I wished to have a good view of the battle, to return to my tree of yesterday...But until 4:45PM all was profoundly still...Longstreet suddenly commenced a heavy cannonade on the right...So soon as the firing began, General Lee joined Hill just below our tree...generally he sat quite alone on the stump of a tree...during the whole time the firing continued, he only sent one message, and only received one report."

Excerpts from "Three Months in the Southern States" Lt Col Arthur J L Fremantle University of Nebraska Press (pages 255-260 paperback).

Excuse the rather long quote, but Fremantle's account is important. He was a great admirer of both Lee and Longstreet but really had no "dog in the fight." His narrative of the morning of July 2 exhibits no sense of urgency by any of the principals. Granted, he was not privy to all that was said, but he had access to Longstreet and his staff, and it would seem he would be aware of any contention between Bobby and Pete. The account proves nothing, but indirectly seems to refute any theory that Longstreet was ordered to attack at 9AM...they spent the previous night EIGHT miles away, and much of the army was not yet deployed.

Pat Ellington


From: Sultron@aol.com
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 1996 18:49:23 -0500
Subject: Re: Longstreet

I have a few comments on Victor Vernon's "2 cents worth" on General Longstreet's performance on 2 July.

1) I wouldn't call the Suffolk campaign a debacle, they accomplished what they had been sent there to due, namely gather supplies; and Lee was completely satisfied with the results.

2) Longstreet and A.P. Hill were never scheduled to fight a duel. In a letter to the Houston Daily Post, T.J. Goree wrote: " The statements contained in a publication in your paper a few days since in regards to a misunderstanding between Generals Longstreet and A.P. Hill during the war are not altogether correct, and especially is the statement incorrect in regard to a challenge having been sent by General Hill and declined by General Longstreet." A disagreement arose when Richmond papers printed accounts of the Seven Days' Battle, giving most of the credit to Hill's Light Division, and ignoring other divisions under Longstreet's command(Hill was under Longstreet's command at that time). Colonel Sorrel "felt called upon in behalf of the other portions of the command to correct the reports published". This led to heated communications between Hill and Sorrel, "and for a short time it was feared that a duel would result."

3) I wouldn't consider Longstreet an "outsider" at that point in history. In fact, many sources remark on the close relationship he had with Lee.

4) I can't find anything in any of my sources that implies an order was given to Longstreet at 9AM. From what I have read, Johnson and Clarke returned between 7 and 8 am, Lee waited for Venable to return with a reply from Gen'l Ewell until 9 am, at what time Lee went to see Ewell himself to get his assessment of moving Ewell's Corp to the right. Lee then returned at 11 am, finalized his plan and gave Longstreet his orders. Whether Old Pete was too slow in moving his troops into position from that point is a subject open to debate.
William Garrett Piston writes that: Lee did not tell Ewell when the battle would commence, but "report circulated that the attack of Longstreet would be delivered at 4 o'clock." (The quote is denoted as being from Freeman's Lee's Lieutenants)
The Austrian observer, Ross, wrote: "As evidently a long time would elapse before Longstreet's corps, which would do the chief fighting that day, could be placed in position, I determined meanwhile to ride into the town...." Ross rejoined Longstreet at his attack position about 3 o'clock, which suggests that someone told Ross when he should return if he wanted to view the combat.

Pete (Sultron@aol.com)


From: STCASSEL@delphi.com
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 1996 02:07:01 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: Longstreet

To Ken Miller:

I quote from the 3/17/1877 letter of E.P. Alexander to Rev. J. William Jones, as printed in the _Southern Historical Society Papers._:

"...My command, with the greater portion of Longstreet's corps, was in camp at Chambersburg from Saturday, June 27th, to Tuesday, June 30th, and on the latter date we moved in direction of Gettysburg, about 10 miles, and about 2 P.M. encamped at a small village called Greenwood. General Lee was in camp very near us during the same afternoon. On Wednesday, July 1st, we (the reserve artillery) remained in camp all day, and heard nothing of the battle which was began at Gettysburg until about dark, when orders were received to march at 2 A.M. on the 2nd for Gettysburg. Pickett's division of infantry had been left behind at Chambersburg, Hood's and McLaws divisions had marched before us, and when we took the road at 2 A.M (my battalion, 26 guns, and the Washington Artillery, 10 guns, I think, forming the artillery reserve,) we had a clear road and bright moonlight, and saw nothing of the infantry. About 8 or 9 A.M., we reached the vicinity of the field, and the guns were halted in a wood, and I reported in person to Generals Lee and Longstreet, who were together on a hill in rear of our lines... I was especially cautioned in moving up the guns to avoid exposing them to the view of a signal station of the enemy's on Round Top Mountain. I do not remember seeing or hearing anything at this time of Longstreet's infantry, nor did I get the impression that General Lee thought there was any unnecessary delay going on. I had just arrived, and knew nothing of the situation, and my instructions were to reconnoiter the flank to be attacked, and choose my own positions and means of getting to them. This duty occupied me, according to the best of my recollection, one or two hours, when I rode back, and in person conducted my own battalion to the school-house on Willoughby run..."

This does not sound like they Confederates were even attempting a 9 A.M. step-off time for an attack does it?

Steven Cassel


Date: Fri, 01 Mar 1996 21:26:24 -0600
From: jeff beckner
Subject: Marching through PA

Bill --

A great post on the Coddington/countermarch/never-ending story. Letting the pendulum swing too far the other direction is a point well taken -- although as someone much more interested in what the Union did right at GB than all the things the Rebs did wrong, I'm no particular fan of Old Pete.

What I meant by "SOME" reason: McLaws and Johnson, as you said, had a look at Alexander's route. Now, unless they're suddenly and inexplicably thick-skulled, they had some -- by their judgment -- rational reason for not taking the same route. Whether Longstreet should have then gone and looked himself, etc., is another story, of course. But most descriptions of the wretched march would have you believe that these soldiers -- not exactly inexperienced in warfare -- simply suffered temporary insanity by not following EPA. It's just not quite that simple, is it?

I said this in a post a month ago, but I'll say it again: Is there any other afternoon of the war that has been examined as microscopically as this one? If Old Peter had known what was to be made of his march, he'd have called in sick that day.

From: Sultron@aol.com
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 1996 23:06:39 -0500
Subject: Re: Coddington Extremely Predjudiced?

Bill C. wrote:

>I certainly don't believe that he "lost" the Battle of Gettysburg >because of it but I am still resisting what feels like a movement >to the position where Longstreet is not culpable for any of the >mistakes made on the field. The answer is usually in the middle.

Speaking as a "Longstreet-sensitive" person, I will freely admit that I initially get huffy of ANY criticism of Old Pete; but I usually take the time to consider the source and research behind the remark (unless Robert Krick is involved) before I contradict it.
However, it is human nature to be biased; and you must understand why we Longstreet fans are so quick to leap to the defense of our General's name. We are fighting a negative historical image, based mostly on misinformation, that has persisted for over a hundred years. For so long Longstreet has either been the scapegoat, or his role has been ignored.
Even in some (not all) of today's history forums, things that new Civil War enthusiasts turn to learn from, Longstreet is still presented negatively, if mentioned at all; any compliments that are given to his abilities are given with qualifications, as in the Jan issue of "America's Civil War": "Regardless of other faults, Longstreet knew how to manage troops in battle..." I feel no need to mention any printed opinions of Robert Krick.
The above from "America's Civil War" is an entirely reasonable statement, Longstreet had his faults, everyone does and did; however at the same time we are still confronted by many images (new and old) of other generals being touted as infallible and beyond blame. I don't believe that I have ever seen a statement such as the one above, written about Stonewall Jackson. I have encountered Lee & Jackson fans who are just as quick to jump on anyone who makes a statement that hints that either of them had faults.
A serious student of history should always try to find a balance, that should be closest to the "truth"; but it is very hard to be dispassionate about your heroes. So, please bear with us, we are still trying to even the scales. As long as there are people who believe that General Longstreet is to blame for the loss at Gettysburg and therefore the loss of the war, or who believe in the "dawn attack order", we will continue to defend.
Respectfully,
Sultron (Pete)


Date: Fri, 1 Mar 1996 22:24:22 -0600
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Yellow Brick Road

Hi Jeff,
I certainly didn't intend to be overly critical on the "SOME" reason point, just trying to make a point. Having said that, I think I can shed a little light on the issue. You wrote:

>What I meant by "SOME" reason: McLaws and Johnson, as you said, had a >look at Alexander's route. Now, unless they're suddenly and inexplicably >thick-skulled, they had some -- by their judgment -- rational reason for >not taking the same route.

I never quite said that they "had a look at Alexander's route". What I said was "McLaws and Johnson rode around and then McLaws told Longstreet that they would have to go back by countermarching." Now the truth is, McLaws kind of tells us why they didn't follow Alexander. McLaws said "I sent back and halted my division and rode with Major Johnston rapidly around the neighborhood to see if there was any road by which we could go into position without being seen."[McLaws, "Gettysburg", S.H.S.P., VII, p. 69] Did you catch it? He said "to see if there was any road". There's your answer. They wanted to find a road but Alexander was willing to go off road into the fields. We're not dealing with "temporary insanity" or thick skulls, we're just dealing with a fixed notion that they needed to go by a road. Alexander questioned why they didn't follow him and so do I.

Bill


Date: Mon, 4 Mar 1996 08:51:41 -0500
From: Norman Levitt
Subject: Fog of Battle

Thanks to John A. Leo for an excellent posting.
It's curious to me just how powerful the ghost of Jubal Early is. Longstreet's countermarch wasn't the most brilliant move of the war, certainly, but by the standards of the time, it wasn't notably horrendous either. Like everyone else on that field, Longstreet was tired, confused, and uncertain as to just where he was and just where the enemy was supposed to be. He was trying to keep 2/3 of a Confederate Corps--close to 20,000 men--moving in the right direction on a hot day through unknown country in order to carry out orders that were too vague by half in the absence of decent intelligence reports. In other words, he was the victim of the same muddle that governed most movements of this size during most of the war. The idea that he was either cowardly or hesitant on this occasion is belied by the way in which he handled his divisions once the enemy was in sight. As we all know, the delay in reaching the jump-off point didn't harm his chances because, in the event, it allowed Sickles time to make his fatal redeployment. Furthermore, you can't have it both ways!! If you want to argue that the failure, e.g., of the 15th Ala. to take LRT was the result of their exhausted condition after a forced march of 24 hours and a tremendous effort to reach the right flank of the Federal line, then you are, in effect, accusing Longstreet of being too impatient and driving his men too hard! If anyone gets the blame for the overall failure of the Confederate assault on the Federal right that day, it's AP Hill for failing to get his right into action against in concert with Longstreet (and failing to get his left into action in concert with Ewell). But then, that brings us back to Lee, and his failure to issue precise instructions to his Corps commanders and to communicate with them throughout the action. The most damning statement about any high officer on July 2nd is that of Fremantle: One message sent and one received by Lee during the most crucial afternoon of his entire career. And that was meant to be a compliment!!

Longstreet is a puzzling figure. He could be brilliant--2nd Manasssas, Chickamauga, the Wilderness--or he could be lousy--Lookout Valley, Knoxville. But he didn't deserve Early, and he doesn't deserve Krick. In fact, to me, that's the most puzzling thing of all. Why is a contemporary historian of considerable distinction so determined to continue the rather silly vendettas of 125 years ago?

Norm Levitt


Date: Mon, 4 Mar 1996 10:37:38 -0700
From: taylord@spot.Colorado.EDU (Deb Taylor)
Subject: Re: Fog of Battle

Thank you, Norm
At least you deal with Longstreet with an even hand. I think the one word that describes him is "dependable." You need at least one Corps commander with this attribute if you ever want to win a war. None of the commanders, in my opinion were consistently "brilliant," but what human being is? Old Pete gets a lot of criticism for his activities after the war, but in my opinion, he did a great job for Lee, for his men, and for the cause during the conflict. Because of his slight deafness, he probably wasn't a good conversationalist, and because of his "steady" manner, he was not charismatic and did not warrant a lot of press. And I'll grant you, he was stubborn. But, from everything I've read, his men loved him and had confidence in him. This is worth its weight in gold on the battlefield.

--Deb


From: mosby@nando.net Date: Mon, 4 Mar 1996 18:15:54 +0000 Subject: Fog of Battle Norm wrote:
>Why is a contemporary historian of considerable distinction so >determined to continue the rather silly vendettas of 125 years ago?

I think I can answer that, Norm - because he has a lot of fun doing it. I've spent a lot of time around Bob Krick, enduring much ribbing about being both a North Carolinian and a lawyer (the butts of Bob's favorite jokes). He is a wonderful tour guide and an excellent writer, but I think he genuinely enjoys getting the Longstreet people riled up just for the sake of fun.

Don't get me wrong; I think Bob honestly believes a lot of the things he says about Longstreet. It's the intensity of his criticism that I often believe is done solely for effect. I think anyone who's ever met Bob on a tour would understand what I mean; sometimes he seems to be having too much fun to be completely serious...


Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 07:45:10 -0700
From: taylord@spot.Colorado.EDU (Deb Taylor)
Subject: Re: Yikes!

Dear Paula:

Regarding Longstreet's personal material. Unfortunately, for all historians and readers of history, his house burning down with all his letters and papers within, is a real tragedy. I'm always hoping that someone, digging through an old trunk somewhere, will uncover some long-lost material that will help better define who Longstreet was as a human being.

--Deb


Date: Wed, 06 Mar 1996 20:05:47 -0500
From: "Michael D. VanHuss"
Subject: Re: 9am near Round Top

DPowell334@aol.com wrote:

> > Well, I snipped a bunch because this one seems to have generated a lot of comment. > First, Bill's right about Birney's position - he was clearly east of the >Trostle house and north of LRT. close enough to call it a foot. Second, by >9:00 a.m. the lead elements of the 5th Corps are arriving in the immediate >rear of 3rd Corps, ordered to act as army reserve. The backing of this corps, > close at hand, is really the key to a strong defense of the area.

> > At 9:00 a.m. 2nd Corps has just finished passing directly behind LRT >on it's way to the middle of the line, and 12th Corps is essentially gone. >However, the one unit that renders Longstreet's move tactically unworkable >at 9:00 a.m. is Buford's 3000 Cavalrymen, directly across Longstreet's line >of advance and more than capable of playing the same delaying role they did >the day before, only this time with three Corps of infantry no more than a >mile away to come help. (2nd, 3rd, 5th.)

> > All of this activity means that the key area around the RTs was vastly >better defended in the morning than it was at 4:00 p.m., after the departure >of Buford and the advance of Sickles beyond immediate supporting range of >the other troops.

> > Also, I think some of us are getting hung up on semantics. The fact that >Sickles did not have any troops on LRT at 9:00 a.m. does not mean it was >ripe for capture. The critical element would have been Buford's command, >which would act as a tripwire, forcing any CSA column to deploy prematurely, >and giving Meade the luxury of time in sitting the main line as the battle >developed. Even without this tripwire the Union did a pretty good job of >deploying in that sector - I suspect that with it they'd have done right >smartly.

> > Dave Powell

Dave,

I think you've hit the nail on the head with Buford being the trump card in the morning. I am by no means an expert on this part of the battle and your post has left me with some hanging questions.

1. If the lead elements of the 5th corps were just arriving at 9:00AM would they have been able to deploy quickly enough to reinforce a possible Confederate victory in the AM?

2. If there had been a coordination in the attacks on the right and left and Ewell had attacked when he heard Longstreet's guns as ordered would the shuffling of troops from right to left still been possible?

3. With this same coordinated attack in mind would Longstreet's echelon attack have drawn reserves from the center of the line instead of the right flank weakening the center of the line. So that by the time Wilcox, Perry and Wright hit they would have a better chance of breaking through and holding onto what they attained?

All questions which I have no clue how to answer. Just trying to learn something new here.

Mike VanHuss


Date: 06 Mar 96 22:40:34 EST
From: Paula Gidjunis <75613.1751@compuserve.com>
Subject: Longstreet

>>Regarding Longstreet's personal material. Unfortunately, for all historians and readers of history, his house burning down with all his letters and papers within, is a real tragedy. I'm always hoping that someone, digging through an old trunk somewhere, will uncover some long-lost material that will help better define who Longstreet was as a human being.<<

Deb:

Yes I agree! I know that most of his personal papers were destroyed, I just thought perhaps there would have been some info from others on his personal life. The death of his children had to affect him deeply. He must have discussed this with someone?????? I know it's mentioned in the book, but more in the light that he became moody, etc.

I just think that understanding the personal side of the participants helps to understand why they did the things that they did in battle. It makes it easier to accept their flaws also.

Paula


From: LlDdd@aol.com
Date: Fri, 8 Mar 1996 09:36:19 -0500
Subject: Longstreet

I wasn't gonna get into this one again, but........
Longstreet's mistake a Gettysburg was not sending McLaws division into the peach orchard and wheatfield until one and a half hours after Hoods attack on Little Round Top. It was supposed to be an "echelon" attack which means McLaws should have struck within minutes not hours. Oates was doing a brilliant job on LRT considering his troops had marched 25 miles, climbed BRT, and fought with no water, no rest and no support on a blistering hot July day. McLaws attack at the peach orchard would probably have relieved some of the brutal fighting on LRT. "Ole Pete" was between a rock and a hard place: listening to his superior(Lee) to attack and his subordinate (Hood) to change the plan. Tough call. Also Lee is guilty of listening to Ewell and Early on the night of Jul 1. He should have insisted they move to support Longstreet's attack of July 2, but he was sold a bill of goods by Early (but that's another subject).
David Butchin


Date: Fri, 08 Mar 1996 18:14:46 -0500
From: "Michael D. VanHuss"
Subject: Re: Longstreet (vic)

Sultron@aol.com wrote:

>I would appreciate it if you could e-mail me and explain why all >Jackson fans seem so bent on degrading Longstreet's reputation. We >Longstreet fans do not, in the main, make a habit of bashing Jackson. >I am honestly curious.

Pete,

I think you made a gross generalization here on "Stonewall Fans". Few have more respect than I for T.J. but to say that Longstreet was not on the same plain I think is pure lunacy. They were both excellent Generals with their little quirks and mannerisms. Longstreet was no less a General than Stonewall. As I have said many times based on the lay of the land etc. at the Burg I really don't think Stonewall would have made a difference here. You don't realize what a change in position that is for me. A defensive position was easier than an offensive one in 1863 and Longstreet did all he could under the circumstances.

To say Longstreet was the cause of the failure only perpetuates a myth born from Early and passed on through the generations. We should not barbecue the man over coulda, shoulda wouldas.

Now I feel better.

Mike VanHuss


From: DPowell334@aol.com Date: Fri, 8 Mar 1996 18:08:06 -0500 Subject: Re: Longstreet (vic) In a message dated 96-03-07 22:58:26 EST, you write: >I'm speaking prior to Gettysburg. In all movements of the Army of >Northern Va., Lee traveled WITH Longstreet. Some think this was because >Longstreet was Lee's favorite. In actuality A.P. Hill probably claimed >that distinction. Lee's Last words were of Hill. What is theory to some >including me was that Lee could give "suggestions" to Jackson and rely >on him to interpret them properly and carry out Lee's intentions. >Longstreet on the other hand needed Lee's oversight on a somewhat >constant basis. This is not a slight to Longstreet. Even he somewhat >admitted this during his Suffolk "Shopping trip". He constantly wired >Lee for advice. One can not say Jackson "Followed orders to the letter" >because most of the time the "orders" were discretionary suggestions. >Longstreet is not my favorite General. No newsflash there. But, he >served the Army of N. Va. well. And can NEVER be faulted in his devotion >to the cause during the war. Afterwards he understood what was necessary >to reunite the country. Unfortunately most of his contemporaries failed to >understand him in this. In any event he was a D--- sight better than >Bragg.

> >vic

Vic,

You really are managing to resurrect every one of the Early calumnies that you can find, aren't you.:)

A better explanation of why Lee and Longstreet traveled together was the extensive use Lee made of his subordinate's council. Lee constantly bounced ideas off Longstreet, and relied heavily on him for another viewpoint. Prior to the march north, for instance, Lee and Longstreet discussed tactical options in PA almost every day.

As for A.P.Hill being Lee's favorite, I'd say that Hill's rather dismal performance at Bristoe, and Lee's curt response to it, make that rather implausible.

Dave Powell


From: DPowell334@aol.com
Date: Fri, 8 Mar 1996 21:54:47 -0500
Subject: Re: Longstreet(vic)

In a message dated 96-03-08 17:06:12 EST, you write:

> >Since you are a strong Longstreet supporter, I'd like to get your views >on something. It has been often said that generals are always one war >behind. That is they try to fight their war with their fathers tactics. >I always felt that Longstreet was at least two wars ahead. His theories >on defense were perhaps better suited to World War I. Ludendorf and >Petain would have been well served if they could have read HIS memoirs. >What do you think?

> Vice,

Longstreet's strongest suit was clearly the tactical realm. However, perhaps too much has been made of this 'defensive bent.' The prewar army was dominated by Engineers, all of whom placed a strong emphasis on defensive works. Hillock's essay on Napoleonic tactics - often hailed as a tribute to the offense and responsible for the search for a decisive victory during the first two years of war -was more than half devoted to the construction and sitting of field works. McClellan, one of the rising stars of the pre-war army, returned from his observation mission in the Crimea with the belief that the defense had become pre-eminent, and was also a devoted follower of fieldworks. Lee himself committed to entrenching right from the start, constructing relatively massive works in front of Richmond, and especially at Fredericksburg. The layout of the defense that was Burnside's undoing was very much a Lee project. In short, the best minds of the Army were all convinced that the defense was the stronger form: it was not simply a rogue idea of Longstreet's.

Longstreet tactical thought was really a little more specific than usually given - he thought that the proper war to conduct a battle was thru the defensive-offensive. In other words, stand on the defensive until the enemy has made sufficient mistakes in front of you so as to present a significant opportunity - and then counterattack, swift and hard.

A few posts back you alluded to the anvil and the hammer - except tactically, you had it backwards. Longstreet was the hammer, not the anvil, and his attacks were amazingly powerful for the era. He commanded four of the largest and most successful tactical offensives of the war - 2nd Manassas, Gettysburg, Chickamauga, and Wilderness. In two of those, the enemy army was driven from the field. In the other two, Longstreet attacked a superior foe thru difficult ground and succeeded in seriously damaging his opponents. No other officer of the war had such a record of tactical success, if measured by the size of the attacking force (control in the 19th century was critical to success - most large attacks fell apart into piecemeal attacks) and damage inflicted on the enemy.

Simply to call him a defensive genius and thus dismiss him is only to see half the picture, and misunderstand his ultimate goal.

Remember, while both sides viewed the defense as the stronger form, they also viewed offense as the way to achieving long term success. Hence the quest for decisive victory despite what all were convinced were long odds. Longstreet's formula was - in my opinion - the likeliest form of achieving that offensive success. Certainly it's the form Lee put to greatest use in his classic victories - Chancellorsville and 2nd Manassas.

Dave Powell


From: Dpowell334@aol.com
Date: Fri, 8 Mar 1996 21:55:44 -0500
Subject: Re: Rate of march--Jackson vs Longstreet

In a message dated 96-03-08 17:54:23 EST, MBradley wrote:

> > According to his own orders, Jackson trained his men to march one mile >in 25 minutes, 2 miles in 50 minutes, and then take a 10 minute break. The >key to Jackson's ability to cover ground was not the speed of his men but their >endurance. They could do 25 minute miles hour after hour. Please check the >OR or the recent book on A.P. Hill to see the controversy which could arise >when subordinates did not keep to this march discipline.

This is, BTW classic march discipline used since time immemorial. Virtually every army of the Napoleonic wars used a similar scheme, and Jackson used nothing original here.

Comparing rates of march over various times in the war, you find that units under good commanders - no matter what the unit or army - easily matched Jackson' performances, and often exceeded them, sometimes with significantly larger bodies of troops. On the other hand, Jackson had his share of bad-march days as well, and as often missed this mark as made it.

I'm not trying to pick on Jackson here, but simply point out that good commanders - Jackson included, - tended to outmarch bad ones. Too much has been made of this 'speed' as if it were a secret weapon.

Dave Powell


From: DPowell334@aol.com
Date: Fri, 8 Mar 1996 21:54:42 -0500
Subject: Re: Longstreet(vic)

In a message dated 96-03-08 16:45:55 EST, Vic Wrote:

> >I have finally found the source of the "9:00 am" order. >The first mention of this was on January 19,1872 by Maj. Gen Jubal Early >it was also stated to be true by Rev William Nelson Pendleton, Lee's >chief of artillery and John Gordon and Fitzhugh Lee. >Since this was AFTER Lee's death he could not agree with it or deny it. >Given the stature of these men, honorable men all, "so are they all >honorable men" one could take it at face value as true. After all it was >REV Pendleton. But at the time Longstreet was in disfavor in the South >because of his views on reconstruction and re-union. His accusers were >in the process of enshrining Lee's memory and in doing so attempted to >expunge any blame for failures attributable to Lee. So there take it as >you wish. I never trusted Early anyway. I guess they made a sucker out >of me, but that's not the first time that happened. My apologies to >James Longstreet.

> >Deo Vindice

If it's any comfort, Vic, they made suckers out of virtually every historian who wrote about the issue up thru the 1950's. The 9:00 version was a variation on the sunrise attack theme, and is demonstrably false. For instance, when Longstreet first contacted Lee's four closest aides (Taylor, Long, Venable, and Marshall who comprised his immediate military family) they all flatly denied that such orders were given.

I heartily recommend Garret Piston's excellent book - "Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant," for more detail on this sordid affair.

Early-Pendleton-Jones' version of history, however is still fairly common, especially among popular history. The worm turns but slowly.

Dave Powell


From: DPowell334@aol.com

DPowell334@aol.com says:


Sorry I had to leave town and miss most of the Longstreet discussion while it
happened. Suffice to say, I think Bill Christen is mostly correct about using
Column of company as the advance formation, except I think it likely that the
column did spend more time in march column that he thinks. Some of the
terrain precludes effective company column, and ( wooded areas mostly) and
when Hood doubled on McLaws, if they were both in colomn of companies, the
combined frontage would be something like 40-50 men wide - very awkward to
find room to deploy that wide a column, given the room needed to turn it.

A variety of countermarch commands existed to reverse direction of a column,
depending on the exact nature of the column (of comany, by files, or of
division, etc.) About face, however, would not do the trick. They would have
to reverse the columns front to back.

Dave Powell



From: Steve Florman <florm001@maroon.tc.umn.edu>
Steve Florman <florm001@maroon.tc.umn.edu> says:

How you would reverse the direction of a column in CW drill would depend on
the type of column and what you intended to do with it. In a brigade, you
would want to make sure that the fighting front was always in the same
direction, so that when your men spread into line-of-battle they were in the
right place. Thus, you couldn't simply "do a U-turn" or an "about-face"
(this is called "right-about" when done on the move) because this would mean
your brigade front would now be 180d in the wrong direction. The answer
will depend on how the men are marching.

Remember that the men were lined and sized so that, in line of battle, the
shorter guys would be in the front and the taller guys in the rear, so they
could fire in two ranks more easily. If you do a U-turn and then deploy in
line-of-battle, you are either facing the wrong way, or the short dudes are
trying to fire over the shoulders of the tall dudes. It also bears
remembering that modern drill is essentially only ceremonial and is no
longer a real way of moving troops to the battlefield and into action.

If someone can enlighten me as to how the formation was arranged - men in
two ranks, moving forward in rows, or coming up in columns of fours or how,
I would endeavor to give a better answer.

regards,
--steve


>acameron@tcac.com (Bill Cameron) says:
>
>Ray,
> Thanks. It's been a while since I had my nose in FM 22-5 and couldn't
>remember the command to reverse a column. It is never used for large
>formations or at least in any cases I can remember in modern ceremonies.
>It's pretty much a small unit drill. What I would like to find out the
>normal procedure for a 1863 unit for reversing direction. I suspect that it
>was not "about face". Any reenactors have a period drill manual? Drill is
>a fascinating subject to which I haven't given much time. I know some of
>the reenactors deal with it a lot.
>
>BTW, there is a nice chapter on drill in Griffith's BATTLE TACTICS OF THE
>CIVIL WAR but it does not address this issue.
>
>Bill
>
>>sholarm@TEN-NASH.TEN.K12.TN.US says:
>>
>>Bill,
>>There is a command of "Counter Column" used today which will place the
>>flags in the correct placement when the column is reversed. I don't know
>>if it was used on the the battlefield. My guess is that would have been
>>dictated by the number of rank (abreast) the column is in at the time. A
wide
>>column could be messy to turn and probably would just reverse(about face)
>>march and move the flags to the front of the units.
>>
>>Ray
>>Major
Steve Florman
steveflorman@delphi.com (preferred)
florm001@maroon.tc.umn.edu



From: thumphri@nafis.fp.trw.com (Thad Humphries)

thumphri@nafis.fp.trw.com (Thad Humphries) says:

Hesitating to open old wounds (he says tongue and cheek) I found
something pertaining to the discussion on Longstreet's column of the
2d. In the Feb 96 issue of "Blue & Gray Magazine"--they call it their
Gettysburg special edition--there is a article LRT by GB guide Garry
Kross. Of the march, he says

"The infantry was drawn up in a series of columns by company.
Each regiment marched 15-20 rows or files across, twenty deep
so as to deploy rapidly and to control and maintain direction.
Longstreet's columns marched and counter-marched to the south
end of the battlefield..."

I don't know his source (no footnotes :-) ) nor does he explain how
long they marched in such a wide order or how the columns reversed.
However, 15-20 men across is about 20 meters wide at a route step
(folks sway more and need more space). Such a formation would need a
wide road and I would guess that that may have contributed to any
decision (if it occurred to anyone) to not follow Alexander's track:
15-20 abreast would be hard to do across country. It would have also
made the reversal a mess since you would need twice that 15-20 men to
wheel the whole column to the rear. I remember in high school band
reversing our column within itself so maybe they did that but it would
have left all the regiments in reverse order. I don't know how wide
that road they took was in 1863 but I'm guess not that wide. Thus the
reverse was probably a mix of moving men off to the side, marching
others past, and reforming the regiment.

This prompts me to point out to current chronicler's that the devil is
in the details. As the "Hardtack and Coffee" author wrote, smoe 20
years after the war, most questions were on camp life since nobody
wrote on that, only on the campaigns and battles. Too often, we assume
that everyone knows (or would be bored by) this day to day stuff and we
ignore it. That sort of writing has gone on for a long time--read the
4th chapter of the Gospel of Matthew. What did Christ do for 40 days?
Fasted. Well, what else? Got hungry. That's it for the King James.
Well, did he pray or meditate. Yes, likely. So *how* did he pray. *How*
did he meditate. What on? Likely not the sound of one hand clapping.
But the author didn't tell us *possibly* because prayer and meditation
were so much a part of a Jew's life that the reads were expected to
know it. But as a late 20th Century American WASP, I have a hard time
seeing it, just like I have a hard time seeing Longstreet's column
reverse itself.

Folks, our writing could well (we hope) out live us. Think of how
the story will sound to your great-grandkids. Hell, my nine year old
thinks I'm joking when I say that our phone didn't have push buttons
but a pulse dial!!

From: acameron@tcac.com (Bill Cameron)

acameron@tcac.com (Bill Cameron) says:

Steve wrote:

>I don't know if he was there too early to see Longstreet...I don't think it
>makes a difference. AS I said, his report places him back to Birney at
>2:00....this would have been sufficient to see Confederate movement...

Hi Steve,

Steve, Berdan was indeed there too early to see Longstreet. The time he
reported back to Birney is not germane to that argument. He could not have
seen "Confederate movement" (I take it you mean Longstreet) standing back in
the Federal lines talking to Birney at 2:00 p.m. Berdan began to withdraw
from his advanced position at 11.55 a.m. This is the latest he would have
been in position to observe anything and it was long before Longstreet had
advanced to the point where Berdan could have observed him. [O.R. 27, 3, p. 488]

Bill




From: ajackson@oyez.law.upenn.edu (Anita Jackson-Wieck)


ajackson@oyez.law.upenn.edu (Anita Jackson-Wieck) says:

Just a few odd questions about what remains for me one of the
continuing great puzzlements of our subject: Can anyone tell me precisely
what Johnston said in his papers about what he did to get to the top of
LRT? Did he dismount and climb on foot or did he ride up? Did he and
Clarke both go up and if so did they tie their horses (super-risky if
they're in the midst of an enemy army, don't you think?) My distinct
impression from my readings and those Frassanito pictures, and perhaps Tom
DesJardins can help me here, is that LRT was too densely wooded to be
climbed on horseback. The difficulties involved in getting cannon onto
LRT are well-documented. Same with BRT. If Johnston claims to have ridden
up LRT and that was impossible then doesn't it follow that he must have
been somewhere other than LRT?
Thanks in advance,

David Wieck




From: DPowell334@aol.com
DPowell334@aol.com says:

In a message dated 96-05-16 18:10:47 EDT, you write:


> Just a few odd questions about what remains for me one of the
>continuing great puzzlements of our subject: Can anyone tell me precisely
>what Johnston said in his papers about what he did to get to the top of
>LRT? Did he dismount and climb on foot or did he ride up? Did he and
>Clarke both go up and if so did they tie their horses (super-risky if
>they're in the midst of an enemy army, don't you think?) My distinct
>impression from my readings and those Frassanito pictures, and perhaps Tom
>DesJardins can help me here, is that LRT was too densely wooded to be
>climbed on horseback. The difficulties involved in getting cannon onto
>LRT are well-documented. Same with BRT. If Johnston claims to have ridden
>up LRT and that was impossible then doesn't it follow that he must have
>been somewhere other than LRT?
> Thanks in advance,
>
> David Wieck
>
>

Dave,

Johnston's papers concerning LRT - the ones I obtained from the Virginia
Historical Society, anyway - are not forthcoming about the exact route he and
Clarke took on the recon. I have copies of letters to Fitz Lee about the
subject, but he spends more time discussing the strange charge from
Longstreet about who was in charge of the march.

However, remember that the western and northwestern aspects of LRT were
logged clear, and not densely wooded. It is Pfanz, I think, who touches on
the point that they did not go all the way to the top, but climbed only
partway up the western face.

Dave Powell




From: javal <javal@postoffice.ptd.net>
javal <javal@postoffice.ptd.net> says:

Hi folks:
I think it was Nancy that asked if it was possible that Clarke &
Johnston may not have been on LRT. Just found the following quote in
Tuckers "High Tide at Gettysburg" (p.228):
"About all the information they had (Johnston & Clarke) was that
sure enough the Federals occupied the opposite ridge. They could not be
so positive about Little Round . They clambered up a shoulder - perhaps
Vincents Spur or Devils Den - and could see no Federals on Little Round
Top."
Unfortunatly he quotes no reference sources, but seems you may have
been right. Hope this helps...
Joe Avalon




From: DPowell334@aol.com


DPowell334@aol.com says:

In a message dated 96-05-17 00:41:19 EDT, you write:

>
>Hi folks:
> I think it was Nancy that asked if it was possible that Clarke &
>Johnston may not have been on LRT. Just found the following quote in
>Tuckers "High Tide at Gettysburg" (p.228):
> "About all the information they had (Johnston & Clarke) was that
>sure enough the Federals occupied the opposite ridge. They could not be
>so positive about Little Round . They clambered up a shoulder - perhaps
>Vincents Spur or Devils Den - and could see no Federals on Little Round
>Top."
> Unfortunatly he quotes no reference sources, but seems you may have
>been right. Hope this helps...
> Joe Avalon

This is one of the most frustrating things about Tucker - if this is true, it
is very important to the events of the day. Tucker, however, has seen fit not
to document the reference. Alas.

Dave Powell



From: "John A. Leo" <johnleo@erols.com>

"John A. Leo" <johnleo@erols.com> says:

At 01:53 PM 3/21/96 EST, you wrote:
>ERIC JAMES <jamese@vax.library.utoronto.ca> says:
>
>>A little while ago someone mentioned that Longstreet refused to
>give orders to 3rd Corps units on July 3rd and that the scene
>depicted in the movie is thus false. (Curiously, it's one of
>my favorite scenes. The esteem or lack thereof among fellow ge-
>nerals has always interested me.) I wonder, then, how the orders
>were conveyed to the 3rd Corps. Would a staff officer have done
>this or would Lee have spoken to Hill? (The two generals were seen
>confering on more than one occasion.) Was there confusion with
>the orders and would that explain the rather poor performance of
>3rd Corps units on that day?
>
>
Eric,
You've hit upon an excellent question and I'm sure I don't have a
clue towards an answer. Hopefully someone else does. I have learned (often
the hard way) that personal interrelationships have a great deal to do with
a project's success or failure. Time and again we see clear evidence of the
importance of the human element, but because of the difficulty in
identifying and quantifying such we simply give up and stick to the
sometimes relatively minor "hard facts". When I proposed to do PhD work in
the Sociology of Systems Development, I was bluntly told that work in such a
soft area would not be accepted, although everyone I spoke with agreed that
personal dynamics within a team may well be the single most important
element in a project's success or failure.

Two books that I have that touch on such issues are:

Partners In Command, the relationships between leaders in the Civil War, by
Joseph T. Glatthaar, and

The Confederate High Command, the 1988 deep delta Civil War symposium,
edited by Roman J. eleniak and Lawrence L. Hewitt.

Good Luck, John Leo

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