Robert E. Lee
These archived discussions are still open for comment. Last Updated 2/4/96 To join in write
gettysburg@arthes.com
Has anyone developed a chronice listing which summarizes the actions and inactions which led to the South's defeat at Gettysburg? It has always impressed me that so much needed to happen (or not to happen) to make this battle the deciding engagement of the war.
If one doesn't exist. I'd like to suggest that our group develop such a chronicle, including a brief discussion of each action and its significance. Some incidents clearly had the potential to change (or did change) the outcome of the battle, others may have depending on the response taken, while others may have lead to the developemnt of still new and difficult situations.
Let's discuss this or other ideas, which could contribute to the study and evaluation of the battle. Summaries are often vaulable tool for this purpose.
Tom Swantko
Lee's desire to launch direct attacks on a fortified position was his hallmark as a commander. I disagree with the notion that this worked. They worked only in the romantic conviction of Civil War leaders that whoever held the field was the victor. Such notions led to many bloody defeats in victory for Robert E. Lee and ultimately cost the South any chance of victory.
The South did not have the blood to spill that such attacks demaned. Consider these casulaties in Lee's "victories" leading up to and including Gettysburg:
Sharpsburg
Confederate 11,724 (22) ....... Union 11,657 (15.5%)
As Lee said after Chancellorsville, many more victories like that would do the South in. As Longstreet so aptly said, when Lee's blood was up, there was no stopping him.
So he headed north in search of one last bloody victory that would turn the North's stomach against the war. Instead, it doomed the South to defeat - and oddly - helped elevate him to saint hood.
Blood will have blood -
See McWhiney and Jamieson Atack and Diefor a more thorough discussion. of Lee's weakness for frontal assaults.
Dennis
Greetings,
While Grant was the commander of all Union Armies; Lee never had
that title and commanded only in the East. IMHO the War was won in the
West. (What if Lee had gone west instead of Longstreet and fought at
Chickamauga?). With no chance to use waterways, little good rail
infrastructure, and disjointed commands, the war became unbearable for the
South.
IMHO Gettysburg showed once and for all that the South could not
sustain campaigns in the North or win an offensive war. Lee blundered by
pressing an attack when he did not have enough information. A move toward
Washington would have forced the Union to give up a great defensive
position and face Lee on his terms. I believe Lee was not healthy (heart
and old injuries from the fall from his horse earlier, plus general ill
health from the rigors of war), so his decision making skills may have been
affected. He no longer had his "Stonewall" who operated so well
independently, but as Longstreet commented later, Lee was ready for a
fight. He may have been the consumate gentleman, but he was a ruthless
fighter at heart; this perhaps is why he so admired Thomas Jackson, who
said during the valley campaign, "kill them, kill them all." Lee must have
felt he could have won when he sent Longstreet's forces in on the 3rd day.
I also feel that Gettysburg was a tactical stalemate between the
North and South, but a strategic loss for Lee (many comment he was a great
tactical general, but lacked the strategic skills of Grant, Sherman, and
Jackson). It was a defensive battle that was not followed up by Meade
(much to Lincoln's anger) What could have been the turning point was
frittered away on the banks of the Potomac by Meade...
Both Longstreet and Stewart have been blamed for the loss at
Gettysburg. IMHO Lee should take the lions share of the defeat. If he did
not have Stewart to tell him what he needed to know about the North's
position then he should not have pressed the attack and listened to
Longstreet. I would appreciate some comments on these points of view.
Thanks...
semperfi@siu.edu/Patrick
Gettysburg was the most important battle in the war, or maybe any US war(one
could make a case for Midway).
I believe that the non-Virginia campaigns were more window-dressing than
substantive. If Virginia/Richmond were lost, the destruction of the morale in
the South would be so great as to make further fighting a true "lost cause".
Conversely, if the armies protecting Washington could be destroyed or
crippled, who held the Mississippi would ultimately be meaningless. The North
would lose any will to fight, and some settlement would be reached.
Lee was always working with time running out, if you will. I think he knew
what MUST be done to end the war, and end it with an independent South in
existence. He had to win at Gettysburg (or some other such Armageddon) in
order to accomplish what I mentioned above. I think he realized that these
CSA "victories", with as many CSA casualties as USA, would ultimately lead to
defeat as well. So, yes, he was responsible for the Gettysburg defeat. But he
had the big picture in his mind, whereas the whinings of Longstreet, Ewell,
Early, et al reflect their second class thought, and explains why they did
not command armies.
We in the South pride ourselves on "our" generals, but when it comes to the
"vision thing" most were sorely lacking. I think Lincoln, Grant and Sherman
probably understood.
When you bid a grand slam and need to finesse one card to make it, you
finesse where the card MUST be to make the slam. That's what Lee did; indeed
the whole war was was a finesse and ultimately the wrong player held the
card. I feel Lee's strategy was sound---he was always attempting to do what
HAD to be done.
Perhaps these opinions are simplistic, but I believe have some merit.
Pat
Greetings,
I am not a believer that the South was destined to lose the war.
It could have won it's independence in a similiar way North Vietnam won
it's consolidation of north and south. By fighting a defensive war with a
strategy of wearing out the people in the home front, the North may have
had to give up (too many good men dying for too long, too far from home).
Two battles that need not have been fought were Sharpsburg and Gettysburg.
Lee averaged over 20% loses in most of his battles; losses that spelled
disaster for a strategic voictory over the long haul. After taking Harpers
Ferry, there was no need to fight in Sharpsburg, and if McClellan had used
Frankiln and Fitz John Porter and not put his units in piecemeal he would
have swept Lee from the field in spite of A.P. Hills great march and
attack.
Gettysburg might have been different if Lee had not been one
tracked to fight the enemy where he was in spite of numbers faced. As
Nolan writes, after a victorious first day where Lee had chased Meade's
forces from the town to the hills (great hills I might add). He could have
moved to his own ridge and waited for Meade to attack (like Fredricksburg?)
He would have had more time to hear from Stewart and had better counsel
for the following days.
As for second class thinking. It was Longstreet, and others who
made it possible for Lee to be victorious. Granted Longstreets post war
associations hurt him in the South, but he and Jackson were Lee's best.
You might want to consider Gen Porter Alexander, CSA and his
feelings about Lee , "at Gettysburg 60% of our chances for a great victory
were lost by our continuing the agressive..." He has stated Lee's desire
for a fight clouded better strategic thinking. His comments about
Sharpsburg are critical and well written
I apprecite the time to talk about Lee; not always a easy task
with one so highly revered. Thank you for you comments, I did not see them
as simplistic, looking foward to hearing from you in the future.
Semperfi@siu.edu/Patrick
Hello,
This My first post and do hope I get proceedural matters right.
While the term "window dressing" for the campaigns in the West is
overstated, I would agree with the premise that it was Lee and the Army
of Virginia on whom ultimate outcomes were fixed.
So I do concur that it was Gettysburg that was the pivotal battle of
the war and thus also need to say that (despite the danger of
simplistic reductionism) Gettysburg was then the pivotal event in
modern North American history.
Let me push the logic a little further: Is there a turning point to the
battle itself? We say that Pickett's charge was the "high water mark"
of the Confederacy, that being true gives some weight to that as THE
event of the battle/war/century.
But, while Pickett's charge was doubtless the most massive event of the
three days, it does seem that the outcome was a foregone conclusion
even before the cannonade prior to the charge. It seems to me that it
was far more negative odds than a finesse made on a 50/50 wish.
Let me suggest two other possible choices: 1) the choosing of the high
ground by __________ (? oops! I forgot and am away from my books). If
geography is destiny, here surely was a case in point. Can this initial
decision and then the tenacious defense of it be called THE event of
the the battle/war/century?
But I like this one better: 2)Chamberlin's stand on the left and his
command to charge with bayonets fixed on empty muskets. Here matters
truly hung in the balance. If the South had been able to flank the
Union lines at this time on this day, a good argument can be made that
subsequent events would have been very different.
===============
My battlefield visit annecdote:
And when a woman of perhaps 60 or 70 climbed on our bus to guide us
through the battlefield, I dispaired.
But she was great, and the kids ... I don't know if it was the
so-called "spirit of Lincoln" that still moves around the field, or my
threats to "listen and be nice or no ice-cream", or what I hope was a
sense of the immensity of what happened there and the way that has
impacted their lives ... but the kids were hushed. They asked
intelligent questions. Here is the kicker: a couple of them bought
books at the shop!
Regards,
Greetings,
In Gallagher's book "The third day at Gettysburg & Beyond" (1994),
there are a series of essays. One of note is is his own essay, "Lee's army
has not lost any of it's prestige." He comments, "Vicksburg and Gettysburg
usually appear in the literature on the CW as twin calamities that marked a
major turning point in the conflict...yet a canvas of Confederate sentiment
in the summer of 1863 suggests that many southerners did not view the
battle of Gettysburg as a catastrophic defeat...Lee's soldiers typically
saw it as a temporary setback."
Much of the turning point thesis comes from Thomas, McPherson and
Gorgas. Southern writers such as Robert Garlick Hill Green and John B.
Jones were full of doom and gloom about Gettysburg as well as Lee's
artillery chief, Pendleton. Most southern newspapers cast a positive
light; the south had directed a heavy blow in the northern homeland. Many
papers mentioned Vicksburg, Port Hudson and Braggs retreat, yet were quiet
about Gettysburg ( perhaps a retreat from a heavy battle in the enemies
homeland is not as much a blow as retreating in your own territory).
Lee was not driven from the field at Gettysburg, and on July 1st he
was successful across the board. The defensive battle of the Union was
excellant on the 3rd and 4th. Picketts charge was repulsed by valient
fighting with the advantage of high ground and open battlefield; but,
"there was no loss of honor in failing to capture such a position,"
(Gallager, p. 11).
Gallager closes by commenting that the turning point theory about
Gettysburg gathered popular support because of several factors: Lincoln's
stirring words in his Gettysburg Address, the emmense volume of lost cause
writings that focused on Gettysburg because of a search of the key to
Confederate defeat, and the sheer scale of this historical battle. "This
battle perceived as the most famous military event in American history did
not at the time overshadow all other campaigns at the time," (Gallager, pp.
22,23).
In Shelby Foote's final volume he comments about what happened to
the Union armies when Grant took over. Restructure from top to bottom, new
commanders (Phil Sheridan, etc) posed a turning at the crossroads. Thw CW
would here pivot and drive toward final Union victory...
semperfi@siu.edu/Patrick
John Schuurman's vision of Chamberlain's charge as the turning point of the
turning point is perfect! Just perfect! A fanciful charge against a flank
attack as the fanciful key to the fancied turning point of the war.
For LRT to have been the key to the battle, the Confederates would have had
to have had at least a chance to defeat not only Chamberlain, but the 5th
and 12th Corps as well. That's just like saying that "Rans" Wright's
Georgians "almost won" the battle at Cemetery Ridge on July 2 "if only"
they had been able to break the US line, hold their won ground, and then
roll up the US line in two directions.
Gettysburg was a turning point in that it ended Lee's hubris. Because of
Chancellorsville, he overestimated the ANV.
Gettysburg was also a turning point in that it was the last blood bath
near-completely comprised of volunteers. Theodore Lyman, an ADC to Meade,
put it nicely. "The issue will be settled when at last the infantryman, who
left Boston thinking he was going straight to Richmond, via Washington,
sits down before Petersburg and patiently makes his daily pot of coffee, a
callous old soldier, who has seen too many horrors to mind either good or
bad."
On 8/28/95, jschuu@ix.netcom.com writes:
>Let me push the logic a little further: Is there a turning point to the
>battle itself? We say that Pickett's charge was the "high water >mark" of
the Confederacy, that being true gives some weight to that >as THE event of
the battle/war/century.
>But, while Pickett's charge was doubtless the most massive event of >the
three days, it does seem that the outcome was a foregone >conclusion even
before the cannonade prior to the charge. It seems >to me that it was far
more negative odds than a finesse made on a >50/50 wish.
It is my humble opinion that the turning point of the battle was the
inaction of Ewell's corps during the evening/night of July 1. Had Ewell's
corps taken Culp's Hill and turned the right flank of the Union army, I don't
think there would have been a "Day 2" at Gettysburg. The Pipe Creek Circular
would have become a reality. The massive concentration of Meade's forces on
that same night ruled out any easy chance for the Army of Northern Virginia
to gain a victory.
Humbly Submitted,
> It is my humble opinion that the turning point of the battle was the
>inaction of Ewell's corps during the evening/night of July 1. Had Ewell's
>corps taken Culp's Hill and turned the right flank of the Union army, I don't
>think there would have been a "Day 2" at Gettysburg. The Pipe Creek Circular
>would have become a reality. The massive concentration of Meade's forces on
>that same night ruled out any easy chance for the Army of Northern Virginia
>to gain a victory.
>
>Humbly Submitted,
>
>PS: I'm a Longstreet fan, so of course I have to blame Ewell!
>
Reply From Robert Lawrence:
Two comments concerning the possiblity of Ewell taking Cemetery Hill:
1. Had he done so I agree that there would have been no day 2. However I
think the result would have been that Meade would have fallen back along
Pipe Creek and we would today be talking about the pivotal "Battle of Pipe
Creek" and you would belong to the Pipe Creek discussion group. Gettysburg
would then be reagrded as a tactical victory for the south just prior to
their defeat at Pipe Creek.
2. I am not sure how easy it would have been to for Ewell to take Cemetery
Hill. Harry Pfanz points out well in his book on the Third day at gettysburg
the difficulty in mounting a concentrated attack from an urban setting.
Currently where the Gettysburg Schhols are at the base of Cemetery Hill
there was a large brickyard. The base of Cemetery Hill South of the
Brickyard was also heavily developed-where Scheetz is was the Wagon Wheel
Hotel and buildings stretched both down the Emmitsburg road and up the
Baltimore Pike. I am not saying Ewell could not have done it but I don't
think it would have been as easy as we think.
Robert W Lawrence
If you look closely at my post from 8/28, I was very careful NOT to
discuss the possibility of taking Cemetary Hill. Pfanz and others have well
documented the fortress-like condition of Cemetary Hill in the late afternoon
and evening of July 1, and the difficulties the rebel army would have faced
in attempting to take that hill.
While I am not currently in a position to quote directly from sources, it
is my understanding that Culp's Hill was thinly held (if at all) by Federals
in the time in question, and a thrust of any magnitude by the Southern army
on that hill should have brought success for Lee's army.
Tom
>OOPS!!! Got my hills confused. I agree with you on culps hill-I believe they
could have have walked up there on the night of July 1.
Robert W Lawrence
IMHO (very humble)
2) In G'burg itself: IO take the view that the controversy shouldn't
center on the evening of July 1; Ewell's command was scattered, his
orders were unclear, and it's anyones guess whether an attempt on Culp's
Hill, let alone Cemetary, would have been a walkover or an utter
diasaster. In any case, seizing Culp's might simply have pushed the
Federal line back to Pipe Creek, or Perhaps, somewhere around the Round
Tops; It wouldn't have incapacitated a large part of the AoP, nor would
it have dictated the terms of battle; the situation was still quite fluid.
3) The turning point, in my view (big surprise here!!) is the afternoon
of the 2nd. The key elements were the defense of Little Round top by
Vincent's brigade plus O'Rourke, the charge of the 1st Minn., which not
only prevented an immediate breakthrough to the Cemetary Ridge line, but
seems to have demoralized the Confederate forces in the area, the defense
of Culp's Hill by Green's brigade, and the failure of the unco-ordinated
attack on Cemetary Hill (for which the inaction of much of AP Hill's
command must bear much of the blame).
By the way: Why has there been so much chatter about Chamberlain in this
group and so little about the 1st Minn.? It takes nothing away from
Chamberlain to recognize that the 1st Minn.'s suicide attack was the
equal in gallantry to anything in the war--and for once, it wasn't wasted
gallantry.
Any comments?
If one must pick a "turning point" I think that Grant's taking over of the
Army is probably as good a 'point" as any. I think Porter Alexander put it
best in his autobiography "Fighting for the Confederacy".
"The narrative may now pause(spring 1864) while I give a brief acount of the
forces of the two armies. In all other campaigns there had been, as it
were,"intermissions for refreshment," after every great battle. The actual
fighting had only lasted on one occassion, the Seven Days, before Richmond,
as much as a week. The armies would separate, pause, recruit, & replenish,
then,one or the other would initiate a new strategy to lead uo to another
collission. Now, from the 5th of May, when Lee & Grant met at the
Wilderness, until the next 9th of April, the two armies were under each
others fire every day. The struggle was without pause for over eleven
months. Grant was undoubtedly a great commander. He was the first which the
Army of the Potomac ever had who had the moral courage to fight his army for
what it was worth. He was no intellectual genius, but he understtod arithmetic.
(mother goose poem deleted)
Similarly Grant knew that if one hundred thousand men couldn't, two hundred
thousand might, & that three hundred thousand would make quite sure to do
it. That was the game which he deliberately set out to play.
Robert W Lawrence
Doug Macomber's right about the media coverage of Gettysburg. The fighting
in Tennessee, regardless of importance, was inaccessible to reporters and
such.
And I've got one for all you iconoclasts, out there. THE TURNING POINT WAS
STONEWALL'S DEATH. There's all those lithographs and photographs of
Jackson's grave, either with a morose Lee right in the same picture or
phrases like "after Gettysburg came the Fall."
I just had a tooth pulled and I think it's the codeine.
Ben Maryniak
I am forced to agree with Ben, Chamberlain's charge did nothing to affect the
outcome of the battle. Vicksburg, was the turning point of the war, Gettysburg
was the turning point of the war in Virginia. Chamberlain did nothing but halt
Law's attack on LRT. The battle on Cemetary Ridge was still very much in
effect.
Matt
As a note, I live in Philadelphia. I have seen at the Civil War museum
here (in one of Meade's old houses in center city) copies of newspapers
calling for troops. At least 5,000 "invalid" troops marched to the west
from Philadelphia during the invasion to help in the defense of the
state. They never saw duty, but these additoinal troops would have
raised the size of the AoP to nearly 100,000.
Lee would have been hard pressed to stay in Pa for any extended period
with the Union forces breathing down his neck, but remember, the AoP had
to march just as hard and far as the ANV just ot get to Gettysburg.
There is no way to tell for sure what would have happened to Lee's army
if he had won a first victory in Pa and held a major city.
IMHO, the North would not have sued for peace. Troops would have been
called into active duty who were sitting doing nothing. Grant's seige
would have been unaffected. In the long run, Lee would have been
beaten, but the chase back to Virginia, and the taking of Richmond would
have been another series of bloody battles and in the end, the peace
would have been won at an even greater cost.
Brendan O'Neill
To All:
Hello all,
I have just about finished Shebly Foote's three volume set on the
Civil War (still think it's one of the very best). He talks about trying
to write objectively though being from the South. He says if there is any
bias in his books it comes from feelings for the underdog that seem to be
natural for this war. It is clear slavery was an undeniable curse for the
South and it was unexcusable for a nation to have tolerated it for so long.
It is also clear that some of the greatest generals and lesser officers
who ever wore a uniform in this nation had one major character flaw, they
did not honor their oath to the United States when they fought for the
South. This alone does damage to their memory. This said opens the way
for some deep felt observations.
In the early twilight of this March I stood on the spot where
Thomas Jackson was mortally wounded. I find it hard to describe my
feelings; no matter what side he fought on, our nation lost a great Army
officer. I have stood on Marye's Heights among the graves and and gazed at
the stone wall and sunken road where the Irish Brigade lost so many that
the ground was a blue carpet. I have walked from the woods of the Hornets
Nest at Shiloh and across the field to the Confederate guns and wondered
who died at the spot where I stood. I have walked the field behind the
Brotherton cabin at Chickamauga where Longstreet led his men to victory.
Looking down at the water while standing on Burnside Bridge I remember that
they said the blood ran red there. I realize I no longer have a side in
this war. I have grieved for those of both sides and in truth in are
nations heart our blood is mixed.
These places belong to us all and though we argue the merits of
who did what, the real issue is that this war was the seminal point of our
history and this nation has yet to recover from it. We have yet to come to
grips not only with the victory that kept our nation together, but with
what we lost as a people in the years of the war. So much of what the
South could have given this nation was destroyed, ravaged, belittled, and
humbled unnecessarily in the name of reconstruction. While many had hope
of welcoming back to the fold brothers and sisters of the South, this was
not done and even today the South has been stereotyped as a rural backwoods
cousin of the rest of the country.
Did Lee make mistakes at Gettysburg, yes, he has said so. After
rolling the Union forces up like a carpet on the first day, Lee lost
himself in a battle that went nowhere for him and the South. Did the Union
forces under Meade blunder greatly by doing little after Picketts Charge,
yes, the record shows it. This was defensive battle waged by superior
numbers that did nothing but envoke great loses and did not bring the war
any closer to an end. Meade fritered away any hope of victory as he
tiptoed off his high ground and slowly wandered to the Potomac. Blunders
were the name of the game in most of the battles of the war
I am glad the Union became one, but I am sorry it ever had to
happen. As much as I enjoy studying it I would gladly give it all up to
never have had it happen. I have stood in the triangle behind Appomattox
Courthouse where Chamberlain took the surrender of Lee's forces. This a
beautiful empty place. They are gone I think, and here I stood where they
stood so long ago. There are no monuments to mar the view, just the
windows of houses looking out over the split rail fences where soldiers of
blue and gray lined up that morning. It looks just like it did that day
and I can't get them out of my mind...thank you Pat for your thoughts.
Final comment...thanks for all the good information on the why of the
monuments at Gettysburg. I can apprecitae your point of view though my
tastes are otherwise.
I like the cannons in place and the walls and entrenchments. and those
monuments that are tasteful, but to me some of the biggest are not. There
is for me more power in the wall at the angle than the high water mark book
by the trees...
semperfi@siu.edu/Patrick
.
Hello All,
If Lee had been cut off in the "foreign" country his army
could be eliminated at the AoP's choosing. All they had to do
was divide it further, remember it was spread out and divided
already. Once divided Lee's plan would shift from conquest to
survival. The ANV would be alone and threatened at every turn.
It was my understanding that Lee's plan called for the
capture of a major city and the movement of the war out of the
beaten up Virginia. If Harrisburg had been taken by Early, with
the AoP somewhere to the south-east, his army would have to be
concentrated to defend his new prize. That would mean several
days march for Longstreet's corps that was bringing up the rear.
Then what? Defend Harrisburg to the last? Not likely. Escape,
abandon their captured city? Not likely, where would they escape
to? The AoP was coming at them from the south, from the very
roads that meant communication and transportation to the
invaders. The AoP was put in a position that it hadn't really
been in through the war, it was defending. With the tactics and
weapons of the age, the defenders were often the winners.
If Harrisburg had been made into a Confederate stronghold,
what would have happened then? Possibly another siege like
Vicksburg. It was a loose / loose situation once the
reconaissance in force was made headlong into Buford and the
First Corps in Gettysburg. The strategy had changed in Lee's
mind, he had the AoP in front of him and his unbeatable army
would defeat them on their own soil.
But that's just my opinion, I could be wrong. Tell me what
you think.
Matt Tavener
Greetings,
It was Lee's choice where and when to fight. Whether it was shoes
or peanuts, contact was made in Gettysburg. In spite of all the fighting
the ANV could have moved on or the large mounted force (good or not) could
have moved out to find the Union force. It is clear by most diary sources
few foot soldiers had anything good to say about troopers both north and
south. They were seen as dandies who would not fight (which was the case
most of the time). I'm sure fans of Sheridan and Stuart would find fault
with this. Most troopers fought unmounted when they did, but their best
use was recon...when thet applied themselves
The move into Pennsylvania was tempered then and much later by the
death of Jackson. Lee wrote years later, that he could have won it all on
the first day had "...Stonewall been there." It is difficult to believe he
truely believed his men were superior. He stood on Lee's Hill (later
named) at Fredricksburg and watched it all, the bravery of Union
forces-though poorly led-was evident to all on both sides.
Jeb and Pete, Hill, Early, Pickett, Hood, Heth and so forth were
just not good enough for Lee on those fateful three days. He brought them
there and he left many on the ground there, he chose the place and time,
and the how and why, yet Stuart and Longstreet plus a host of others have
taken the blame. If he didn't have news of Union forces, whatever was he
doing fighting like he knew all the news? Because we have hindsight we can
say what Jeb should have done. Hindsight has more than once tainted
historical consideration...
semperfi@siu.edu/Patrick
All of the discussion about the practicality of Lee's line and what
was Lee thinking jogged my memory. So, I went and grabbed Pfanz's book on
Culp's Hill, etc.
On July 2, in the afternoon phase, Stuart's advancing cavalry had a
sharp engagement with Hampton's Brigade at Hunterstown, where Kilpatrick (in
one of his few good moments) defeated Hampton. Further, and as I discussed
in a prior post, the Stonewall Brigade was tied up with Gregg at
Brinkerhoff's Ridge at the same time. In other words, the Confederate high
command quickly obtained knowledge that there were two full divisions of
Union cavalry operating in the approximate area of Culp's Hill. These
cavalry had the opportunity to get onto Lee's unguarded left flank. The
left flank was unguarded due to Stuart's tardy arrival on the battlefield.
Because the left flank was uncovered by cavalry, the Confederate
high command did the logical thing. It put infantry out there to guard the
flanks. Specifically, the Stonewall Brigade was sent to Brinkerhoff's
Ridge. Extra Billy Smith's brigade of Early's Division was sent out along
the York Road to guard the flank, and John B. Gordon's brigade was put in
the area between to connect with them. This means that when Early's attack
on East Cemetery Hill kicked off, two of his best brigades of infantry
weren't there, and never participated in the attack. As it was Early's
attack nearly succeeded.
Query: Had Early attacked with his full strength, would the
Confederates have carried East Cemetery Hill? Since they nearly succeeded
with two brigades, it's logical to assume that they would have. The
inevitable conclusion I draw is that had Stuart been where he belonged, with
the ANV, the East Cemetery Hill position would have fallen, there never
would have been a Pickett's Charge, and the course of history likely would
have been very different indeed. In other words, had Stuart been there, we
would not be discussing the issue of whether Lee's line was too long.
Food for thought....
Eric Wittenberg
In a message dated 96-01-25 22:09:20 EST, Eric wrote:
> Query: Had Early attacked with his full strength, would the
>Confederates have carried East Cemetery Hill? Since they nearly succeeded
>with two brigades, it's logical to assume that they would have. The
>inevitable conclusion I draw is that had Stuart been where he belonged, with
>the ANV, the East Cemetery Hill position would have fallen, there never
>would have been a Pickett's Charge, and the course of history likely would
>have been very different indeed. In other words, had Stuart been there, we
>would not be discussing the issue of whether Lee's line was too long.
>
Eric,
I agree with this one completely. If somehow Early or Johnson's division
could have been committed intact to the attack, it would have gone much
harder for the Union than it did. Ewell managed to scatter much of his
command with this exposed flank and his over-commitment towards Culps Hill -
which only exacerbated that flank problem. I've always wondered why he didn't
send a brigade or two of Rodes' division out that way, since they were too
beaten up for a serious assault but still could have defended the flank...
Stuart was sorely missed, and as events showed, Jenkins' Cav was not up to
the job (as well as being seriously outnumbered.)
Dave Powell
In a message dated 96-01-25 22:09:20 EST, you write:
> Query: Had Early attacked with his full strength, would the
>Confederates have carried East Cemetery Hill?
IF the Confederates had attacked at full strength ANYWHERE, the Confederates
might have succeeded. They did so the first day, and destroyed two Union
Corps. Longstreet attacked the second day, with little or no help from the
other two Corps, and did break through at one point, but was forced back. Lee
attacked on the Third Day with 13,000 men, managed to briefly break through
in the center, but with no backups and no support from the rest of his
50,000 or so effective men the breakthrough was a hopeless cause at best.
The point is that everyone in the Confederate high command deserves credit
for this defeat; save for Longstreet, perhaps, who at least counseled his
commander not to do any of the foolish things he tried to do..
At 07:08 AM 1/26/96 -0500, you wrote:
>
>Eric,
>
>I agree with this one completely. If somehow Early or Johnson's division
>could have been committed intact to the attack, it would have gone much
>harder for the Union than it did. Ewell managed to scatter much of his
>command with this exposed flank and his over-commitment towards Culps Hill -
>which only exacerbated that flank problem. I've always wondered why he didn't
>send a brigade or two of Rodes' division out that way, since they were too
>beaten up for a serious assault but still could have defended the flank...
>
>Stuart was sorely missed, and as events showed, Jenkins' Cav was not up to
>the job (as well as being seriously outnumbered.)
>
>Dave Powell
>
Dave:
According to Pfanz, Rodes had a tough way to go to get there, having
to advance through the town. By the time they did so and deployed into line
of battle, the fighting on East Cemetery Hill was over, and Rodes called off
his attack.
Eric
At 05:32 PM 1/26/96 -0500, you wrote:
>
>> Query: Had Early attacked with his full strength, would the
>>Confederates have carried East Cemetery Hill?
>
>IF the Confederates had attacked at full strength ANYWHERE, the Confederates
>might have succeeded. They did so the first day, and destroyed two Union
>Corps. Longstreet attacked the second day, with little or no help from the
>other two Corps, and did break through at one point, but was forced back. Lee
>attacked on the Third Day with 13,000 men, managed to briefly break through
>in the center, but with no backups and no support from the rest of his
>50,000 or so effective men the breakthrough was a hopeless cause at best.
>
>The point is that everyone in the Confederate high command deserves credit
>for this defeat; save for Longstreet, perhaps, who at least counseled his
>commander not to do any of the foolish things he tried to do..
>
I agree wholeheartedly. The ultimate cause of the Confederate
defeat at G-burg was a complete, total (yes, I know that's redundant)
failure of the Confederate command structure. I find it absolutely
astonishing that Lee could conduct a massive three day battle as he did, and
never have a council of war. I have never seen a single account which
indicates that Lee, Longstreet, Ewell, Hill and Stuart had a group meeting
at any time during the three day battle. Meade had three major councils of
war. If that's not a failure of command, I don't know what is.
Eric Wittenberg
Eric:
You said:
So you see that even though Lee was not a complete hands on manager he had
control, in that everyone knew what their job was. The problem came not in
the plan but the execution of that plan.
Mike VanHuss
In a message dated 96-01-26 20:19:10 EST, you write:
> I have never seen a single account which
>indicates that Lee, Longstreet, Ewell, Hill and Stuart had a group meeting
>at any time during the three day battle. Meade had three major councils of
>war. If that's not a failure of command, I don't know what is.
>
It was worse than that. Every one of Lee's commanders disagreed with him, and
he let them get away with it. The worst of it, I think, was when Lee
suggested that Ewell would be better placed on the Confederate right. Ewell
and Early disagreed, stating that they didn't want to hurt the troop's morale
by abandoning ground so dearly won, and there were too many prisoners and
abandoned weapons to take care of. Lee agreed with Ewell, and didn't insist
on moving Ewell. Ewell was wasted on the left. Moved to the right, he might
have made a difference.
>So you see that even though Lee was not a complete hands on manager he had
>control, in that everyone knew what their job was. The problem came not in
>the plan but the execution of that plan.
>
>Mike VanHuss
Mike,
Is there anything to indicate the Longstreet's plan could/would not have
worked better? As I wondered here before, the ANV may have been in deep
spit if it had placed itself between the AOP and the troops protecting
Washington and Baltimore. But it may have been able to destroy the AOP
before the DC/Balto troops came up. Indeed, those troops may never have
come up! We'll never know.
John B
At 09:28 AM 1/28/96 -0500, you wrote:
>
While I generally agree with this, this is the sort of oversimplification
that misses the subtle nuances of this battle that cause this group, and its
resulting dialogue, occur....
Eric Wittenberg
Might I also add, Lee had the utmost faith in his men. He felt whatever he
asked for the men would do. When he had tried both flanks and these attacks
failed, why Lee may have thought Meade had 75% of his army on the flanks. Lee
knew there would be heavy casualties, but once he felt Alexander had cleared
the guns off Cemetery Ridge, there would not be adequate firepower to meet
Pickett, Pettigrew and Trimble. Again, Lee's over-faithfulness in his men.
>
>Comments have been expressed as to why Lee did not listen to Longstreet or other
>corps commanders as to alternative battle strategies or why he did not hold
>conferences of his senior command as Meade did.
>
>Given the rout at Fredericksburg and how he clearly out-generalled Hooker at
>Chancellorsville perhaps he felt that he did not need advice from his
>subordinates. However, given how at Fredericksburg the Federals, as they
>crossed open ground, were mowed down by Confederate soldiers from behind a stone >wall,
>Lee might well have seen the possibility of the same result occurring as he
>ordered Pickett to charge union lines in similar circumstances.
>
>DVB.
>After reading some of the comments yesterday addressing this same issue I
started to basically say the same thing you have. The ANV command
structure had produced far beyond anyone's expectations prior to Gettysburg.
Even after Gettysburg, Lee continued to tactically whip the Federals on
every front with as we all well know, ill-equipped, outnumbered troops. How
can you possibly not agree that the ultimate defeat of the South was simply
attrition and not an inadequate leader or command structure.
My personal opinion is that Lee went for broke, realizing this was probably
his last attempt at bringing the war to northern soil. In addition the
argument that we could have shifted to the east in an attempt to place
ourselves between the Northern armies and the capitol and possibly cut off
the northern supply lines was (in my opinion) not a feasible option. Lee
did not have the facts as we can so easily second guess today. His cavalry
let him down, and without adequate intelligence such a strategy would be
extremely risky. After all the South had more supply issues at hand then
the North.
For those that question the leadership abilities of Lee you need only look
at the Virginias, who wanted to give the union lines another try, after
Pickett's failure to rout the Federals.
Jeff Z
>In a message dated 96-01-25 22:09:20 EST, Eric wrote:
>
>> Query: Had Early attacked with his full strength, would the
>>Confederates have carried East Cemetery Hill? Since they nearly succeeded
>>with two brigades, it's logical to assume that they would have. The
>>inevitable conclusion I draw is that had Stuart been where he belonged, with
>>the ANV, the East Cemetery Hill position would have fallen, there never
>>would have been a Pickett's Charge, and the course of history likely would
>>have been very different indeed. In other words, had Stuart been there, we
>>would not be discussing the issue of whether Lee's line was too long.
>>
>Eric,
>
>I agree with this one completely. If somehow Early or Johnson's division
>could have been committed intact to the attack, it would have gone much
>harder for the Union than it did. Ewell managed to scatter much of his
>command with this exposed flank and his over-commitment towards Culps Hill -
>which only exacerbated that flank problem. I've always wondered why he didn't
>send a brigade or two of Rodes' division out that way, since they were too
>beaten up for a serious assault but still could have defended the flank...
>
>Stuart was sorely missed, and as events showed, Jenkins' Cav was not up to
>the job (as well as being seriously outnumbered.)
>
>Dave Powell
Eric and Dave,
Anyone that has ever played simulation war games recreating the Gettysburg
Battle will fully agree with your observations. Union reinforcements are
simply overwhelming as the battle progressed and the inability to secure
high and tactically secure terrain on the first day make a Southern defeat
rather imminent.
Jeff Z
>lee was outgeneraled. why complicate the issue
My point is not that Lee wasn't outgeneraled, concerning this particular
battle, quite the contrary. The reason he was outgeneraled was his rather
sluggish noncommitted Gen. Longstreet.> I do not mean to simplify the issue.
The North should be proud of its victory here against the ANV, after all
they were so few and far between.
Jeff Z
In a message dated 96-01-28 11:43:23 EST, you write:
> Might I also add, Lee had the utmost faith in his men. He felt whatever he
>asked for the men would do. When he had tried both flanks and these attacks
>failed, why Lee may have thought Meade had 75% of his army on the flanks.
>Lee knew there would be heavy casualties, but once he felt Alexander had cleared
>the guns off Cemetery Ridge, there would not be adequate firepower to meet
>Pickett, Pettigrew and Trimble. Again, Lee's over-faithfulness in his men.
>
All well and good. But then, why did he send 13,000 men on a mile-long attack
against the center of the Federal line, without any support? What were they
supposed to do if they DID break through? Did he expect the 13,000 to beat
the Federal Army? Where were the rest of the Confederate army? I'll tell you,
sitting on their hands, watching their comrades be slaughtered. Doesn't speak
at all well for anyone.
Steve Haas
In a message dated 96-01-28 12:10:59 EST, you write:
>For those that question the leadership abilities of Lee you need only look
>at the Virginias, who wanted to give the union lines another try, after
>Picketts failure to rout the Federals.
>
Ok, he was a good leader. Not a great tactical general, but a good leader.
Men would follow him into hell, good idea or not.
The fact is, Lee had no good choices at Gettysburg. Heth got him into a
situation where he could not win. He couldn't attack the Federal Right,
couldn't attack the left, couldn't move around the Federals, felt he couldn't
retreat, had no better position to fight....the whole idea behind the
Gettysburg campaign was to get the Federal army out into the open where it
could be defeated. Instead, the Confederates managed to get the Federals in a
perfect natural defensive position, where they couldn't be defeated. The best
option Lee had was a roll of the dice, with the odds against him.
Steve Haas
blaming Longstreet is oversimplifying the issue. there was no order for a
sunrise attack on day 2. Longstreet got cutoff on his way into Gettysburg by
Johnson's division. Heth committed Lee to battle before the rest of the army
was ready. Pettigrew warned Heth and Hill of the situation at Gettysburg on
the 30th. they chose to ignore him.
On Sun, 28 Jan 1996 LlDdd@aol.com wrote:
> lee believed his army was invincible after his string of previous victories.
> delegated authority to his new generals hill and Ewell. they were no
> stonewalls.
>
when lee reorganized the ANV after Chancellorsville, the previous command
structure which made victories like Fredericksburg possible. Jackson, who
had experience in operating an independent command, could take broad,
loosely defined orders from lee and produce results. Hill, Ewell, and
Early were accustomed to heavy control under Jackson, and had little
experience in how to handle the larger commands. Hill's illness however,
makes one wonder "what would" happen if he had the energy that make him a
great division commander.
Colby Cowherd
On Sun, 28 Jan 1996, Jeffrey Zirkle wrote:
> >lee was outgeneraled. why complicate the issue
>
> My point is not that Lee wasn't outgeneraled, concerning this particular
> battle, quite the contrary. The reason he was outgeneraled was his rather
> sluggish noncommitted Gen. Longstreet.> I do not mean to simplify the issue.
>
> The North should be proud of its victory here against the ANV, after all
> they were so few and far between.
>
> Jeff Z
>
I don't think Lee was ever out generaled, not by much atleast, he was a
born leader and shouldn't be receiving the criticism about his actions at
GB. It wasn't all his fault, and his men believed they could do it
because Lee thought of the plan.
>In a message dated 96-01-28 11:43:23 EST, you write:
>
>> Might I also add, Lee had the utmost faith in his men. He felt whatever he
>>asked for the men would do. When he had tried both flanks and these attacks
>>failed, why Lee may have thought Meade had 75% of his army on the flanks.
>>
>All well and good. But then, why did he send 13,000 men on a mile-long attack
>against the center of the Federal line, without any support? What were they
>supposed to do if they DID break through? Did he expect the 13,000 to beat
>the Federal Army? Where were the rest of the Confederate army? I'll tell you,
>sitting on their hands, watching their comrades be slaughtered. Doesn't speak
>at all well for anyone.
>
>Steve Haas
The fact is they did break through. The needed reinforcements strayed to
the left because of battle smoke. Believe me the rest of the ANV was well
played out, and it was there turn to await the outcome of this charge. Had
the breakthrough surged with the additional momentum the reinforcements
would have produced it is very possible the Northern Army center would have
collapsed. Routed soldiers do not stop to ask about numbers or casualty
statistics they run for safety. The rest of the ANV was in position to
press the flanks had such a collapse have occurred. I have to agree with you
the topography and the distance involved would have made it a long shot.
Regards, Jeff Z>
>On Sun, 28 Jan 1996 LlDdd@aol.com wrote:
>
>> lee believed his army was invincible after his string of previous victories.
>> delegated authority to his new generals hill and Ewell. they were no
>> stonewalls.
>
>when lee reorganized the ANV after Chancellorsville, the previous command
>structure which made victories like Fredericksburg possible. Jackson, who
>had experience in operating an independent command, could take broad,
>loosely defined orders from lee and produce results. Hill, Ewell, and
>Early were accustomed to heavy control under Jackson, and had little
>experience in how to handle the larger commands. Hill's illness however,
>makes one wonder "what would" happen if he had the energy that make him a
>great division commander.
>
I do not believe that the "blame" for defeat of the Confeds. at Gettysburg
can be placed upon any one person's shoulders.
Lee made some critical logistical errors, and chose to fight the enemy on
his enemy's turf when he was totally cut off from reinforcements and
resupply, roaming blind in unfamiliar land, due to Stuart's absence. He was
committed into battle earlier than he had anticipated, yet chose to stay
and fight, perhaps for the glory that a would-be victory on enemy soil
would bring his army and his flag. He was a proud and confident leader,
possibly too confident to realize the gravity of his situation.
Longstreet too, Lee's right-hand man throughout the battle, was not entirely
supportive of the battle plan. Though he may have foreseen the failure of
the second and third day's attacks, he allowed his injured ego to cloud his
leadership. After Lee had stated that he would stick with his original
plans and not heed Longstreet's suggestions, Longstreet in effect pouted,
and did not prepare his generals sufficiently for the fighting that they
would encounter. His generals could see the doubt in Longstreet's eyes,
and this made the plan even less plausible to them.
After the death of TJ Jackson, the Confederate high command never really
regained the togetherness that Jackson had brought to the entire army. Lee
trusted Jackson totally and his generals and men did the same. After his
death, the rivalries for his vacated position and the doubts that each
general had in each other's abilities overcame the army and seriously
influenced its effectiveness in the field. Would the story have been
different had Jackson been at Gettysburg? Most definitely. Would the
Confederacy have won? That is uncertain, but the chain of command, in my
opinion, would have been drastically stronger and the chances for effective
field deployments and a possible victory greatly improved.
Daniel Lane
>In a message dated 96-01-28 13:35:09 EST, you write:
>
>>The fact is they did break through. The needed reinforcements strayed to
>>the left because of battle smoke. Believe me the rest of the ANV was well
>>played out, and it was there turn to await the outcome of this charge. Had
>>the breakthrough surged with the additional momentum the reinforcements
>>would have produced it is very possible the Northern Army center would have
>>collapsed. Routed soldiers do not stop to ask about numbers or casualty
>>statistics they run for safety. The rest of the ANV was in position to
>>press the flanks had such a collapse have occurred. I have to agree with you
>>the topography and the distance involved would have made it a long shot.
>>
>The fact is, they didn't break thru, nor were they ever close to. the reached
>the front line of the Union position. Union reserves and strong defense
>utterly defeated the attack.
>
>Dave Powell
>
Gee Dave I always thought they broke through. Thanks for setting me
straight. I guess I need to start reading some other material. When your
from the South breaching the line means they broke through, at least in this
battle anyway. Granted it was only a handful of men and yes we all know
they were defeated.
Regards
>Lee's attack on the Third Day was one of the most mis-managed attacks during
>the war, ranking up there with Fredericksburg and Cold Harbor for futility.
>
>Steve Haas
>
Does this responsibility fall to Lee, Longstreet or Pickett? The obvious
answer is "Lee" since he was overall commander; so, let me rephrase the
question. Do Longstreet and/or Pickett share any responsibility for the
failed attack and the lack of support on hand had their been a successful
attack? It is well known that Lee's style was to give his corps commanders
a task and expect them to implement it. hmmmm. Did Longstreet have the
authority to commit more troops, or did Lee order him not to? Recognizing
that it would have gone against the grain of his personality, could Pickett
successfully have petitioned either Lee or Longstreet for more support? If
yes, then some of the responsibility surely rests with him; if no, then does
that indicate a failure on the part of Longstreet or Lee or both? Who made
the decision to use the untested Pickett? Was any other division up to it?
In other words, was Pickett the bottom of the barrel - everyone else already
having been bested? Where was Pickett during the attack? Should he have
been or was he, indeed in front of his troops?
Perhaps the most telling question of all; is there any way Lee could have
achieved his goals in Pennsylvania?
This is the most intriguing question I have seen in a while.
>Perhaps the most telling question of all; is there any way Lee could have
>achieved his goals in Pennsylvania?
Patrick Feeley
Previous message:
>Does this responsibility fall to Lee, Longstreet or Pickett? The obvious
>answer is "Lee" since he was overall commander; so, let me rephrase the
>question. Do Longstreet and/or Pickett share any responsibility for the
>failed attack and the lack of support on hand had their been a successful
>attack? It is well known that Lee's style was to give his corps commanders
>a task and expect them to implement it. hmmmm. Did Longstreet have the
>authority to commit more troops, or did Lee order him not to? Recognizing
>that it would have gone against the grain of his personality, could Pickett
>successfully have petitioned either Lee or Longstreet for more support? If
>yes, then some of the responsibility surely rests with him; if no, then does
>that indicate a failure on the part of Longstreet or Lee or both? Who made
>the decision to use the untested Pickett? Was any other division up to it?
>In other words, was Pickett the bottom of the barrel - everyone else already
>having been bested? Where was Pickett during the attack? Should he have
>been or was he, indeed in front of his troops?
>
>Perhaps the most telling question of all; is there any way Lee could have
>achieved his goals in Pennsylvania?
I agree that Lee was responsible for the failure of the attack on the Union
center--as he admitted shortly after the action. The more I look at it,
the more the it appears as though no one could have made a success of it,
no matter what their personalities, rank, and experience.
Cheers
Deb
Jeff,
I'm sorry if my answer was too vague. Those reserves I mentioned
included the First Corps, Second Division, First Brigade under Robinson,
who began behind Cemetery Hill but were moved up and behind Hays' Division
of the Second Corps on the right flank of the attacked position; two+
brigades of the Third Corps under Birney, who marched up the Taneytown
Road and positioned behind Gibbon on the left flank plus three regiments
who were sent to reinforce Webb in the center; some number of men from
the Twelfth Corps under Shaler, behind the Third Corps; and portions of
the First and Third Divisions of the Sixth Corps, also south of Gibbon's
position. I hope I've got their positions correctly, but there are
others in this group who can go into it in greater detail if you need
it. This is an amalgam of Bachelder, Coddington, and Stewart. Any
errors are mine.
David Wieck
I'm responding to the very general question: Is there anything that
Lee could have done to "win" the Pennsylvania campaign?
What follows is my humble opinion with the aid of 20-20 hindsight.
I'm not implying that Lee (or anyone) "should" have thought of these
things. At most, I'm saying that it's not impossible that someone
might have.
First of all, let's make clear what we mean by a "win". I take the
Clausewitzian view that the purpose of a war is to achieve certain
political aims. Tactical elegance and strategic insight helps, of
course, but only as they forward the ultimate political purpose. The
business of most general officers is to win battles; but the business
of someone in Lee's position was to win the war, or at least find
some way of keeping that possibility alive.
Winning, for the Confederacy, meant recognition of its independence,
hopefully de jure, but at least de facto (in the sense that the
Federal government would have ceased active pursuit of the war to keep
the South in the Union). The main leverage that the South had in
1863 was northern war-weariness and the sense that preservation of
union with a recalcitrant south wasn't worth the enormous effort.
Of course, if Lee could have destroyed the AOP in Pennsylvania, that
would have enormously strengthened the hand of the northern peace
party, and might have brought recognition from France and England.
The plain fact is, however, that large armies of the era were in some
sense pretty indestructible (as Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg
demonstrated for the AOP and Gettysburg itself for the ANV). It's
hard to find an example of any sizable army disintegrating or
becoming negligible simply because of a tactical reversal on a
battlefield. The only example that meets that description (aside
from besieged armies surrendering, as at Vicksburg, Donelson, and
Appomattox), is the Army of Tennessee following Nashville--and that
was essentially a case of suicide!!
My assumption (dispute invited) is:
Lee couldn't have prevailed at Gettysburg in the sense of destroying
or gravely crippling the AOP, and the risk was much worse that in
trying to do so, he'd damage his own force even worse (which is
exactly what happened).
The alternative of marching by the right flank to "get between Meade
and Washington" and forcing a battle on grounds of Lee's own choosing
also would have been a high-risk operation, with grave logistical
problems attached, as well as the chance that Meade could strike a
savage blow at the flank of a marching, strung out, army, and begin to
destroy it in detail.
On the other hand, a withdrawal to South Mountain--Cashtown or
Fairfield--would have given Lee a solid defensive position, reasonable
communications with his base in Va., and the strong possibility that
the AOP, under political pressure because of Lee's presence on
"northern" soil, would take the offensive as at Fredericksburg, and
with similar results. My guess is that this would have been the most
likely outcome and, combining probability of success with net effect,
the "optimal strategy" for Lee.
Of course, there's always the possibility Meade wouldn't have taken
the bait, but would, instead, have tried to throw a net around the ANV
(with the aid of Couch's militia and possibly some other forces from
W.VA.) Against a patient strategy of this sort, Lee would have had
to avoid a de facto siege, keep his men supplied, and keep open a
line of retreat southward, trying, as much as possible, to avoid
having to fight against a well-positioned enemy in order to break out,
if a break-out seemed advisable. In addition, he would have had to
keep a wary eye on Richmond, which sooner or later would have tempted
Halleck and Lincoln, if not Meade.
But even had he only managed to remain on Northern soil for 6 or 8
weeks, without fighting a pitched battle, Lee would have succeeded at
least in frustrating and demoralizing the North, possibly enough to
give the peace faction a decisive boost.
There's no guarantee in any of this; with "best play" on both sides, I
think it's a dead loss for the ANV. It was facing larger forces, just
as good man-for-man (or regiment for regiment), cavalry forces at or
near parity with its own, superior artillery, and, on top of this,
acute problems keeping itself supplied with food, fodder, and
ammunition. It's advantage was the indecisiveness and disunity that
still plagued the Federal high command. Conceivably, that might have
turned the trick if Lee had been patient and astute enough.
Basically, it's a "Fabian" strategy, such as Johnston tried around
Atlanta (when it was too late and he had too little to make it work).
In any case, I can't think of a better way of making a forward
"Northern" strategy pay off.
Replies eagerly awaited.
Norm Levitt
>
>>Perhaps the most telling question of all; is there any way Lee could have
>>achieved his goals in Pennsylvania?
>This is the most intriguing question I have seen in a while.
Thanks Pat. I should have provided at least a clue as to what those goals were.
Here is a quote from Foote's "The Civil War, Fredericksburg to Meridian", pg
441.
This, then, as I read it, was Lee's plan; strengthen the resolve of the
peace movement with a threat to northern territory. If the North sends out
peace feelers, accept them. At the negotiating table let a cease fire be
put in place. Once the peace was in place - demand independence in the belief
that the North would be much less likely to resume the war than the south.
So Lee's grand plan was to enliven the peace movement in the North.
John Blair
In a message dated 96-01-28 22:48:34 EST, you write:
>>
>Gee Dave I always thought they broke through. Thanks for setting me
>straight. I guess I need to start reading some other material. When your
>from the South breaching the line means they broke through, at least in this
>battle anyway. Granted it was only a handful of men and yes we all know
>they were defeated.
>
>Regards
>
>Jeff Z
Sorry Jeff, I know of no military definition that would define Pickett's
charge as a breakthrough. The handful of troops that crossed the wall were
killed or captured en masse. The Union reserve line wasn't even engaged. The
integrity of the Union position was never in question.
Dave Powell
In a message dated 96-01-28 20:42:39 EST, you write:
>Dave:
>
> My opinion is that the march around Cemetery Hill, where Rhodes
>either would have had to swing several miles wide, or be under fire from the
>Federal guns on Cemetery Hill would have been impractical. Further, if you
>read Marse Robert's orders, the attacks on the northern end of the fishhook
>were supposed to be "demonstrations", with Longstreet's attack being the
>main event. If this is a diversionary attack, do you subject your command
>to such heavy fire, and risk their being shot up, or do you hold these men
>in reserve to wait for any needs you may have? It seems to me that under
>that scenario, you hold Rodes ready to support a breakthrough by Longstreet,
>particularly in the area of the Bliss Farm, which saw such heavy fighting.
>
>Eric Wittenberg
>
Eric,
Johnson was moved without significant difficulty, and his route took him
right along the north edge of town. I think such a shift could have been made
without undue hardship on the morning of the 2nd - as well as keep the Union
confused by additional troop movements.
However, I think you miss my point. My real question is not so much with
overall positions, but with which divisions went where. Rodes was badly hurt
on July 1, and his offensive potential seriously diminished. He should have
been relegated to defensive tasks, while fresher formations were deployed for
serious fighting. Johnson's command was dispersed and it's hitting power
sharply diminished by the way it was committed.
Note that both Pender's and Rodes' commands were very hesitant about
committing to action on July 2nd, a factor I attribute mostly to the heavy
losses they suffered the day before.
One more thing, about Lee's famous "diversion." Ewell's Diversion would have
only really helped Longstreet if it had started before the latter's attack,
in order to fix enemy reserves. Given that under Lee's original instructions
it would still have commenced well after Longstreet's engagement, it's value
as a diversion was diminished. I've always seen the wording and latitude
granted in that order as very careless indeed.
Dave Powell
I have to agree with Norman. Cashtown and Fairfield being excellent defensive
positions. If Longstreet was let loose, the invasion would have still ended in
defeat. The AOP would wait out the ANV and Lincoln could assemble an army in a
very short time. Leaving Lee with two options, follow that untrained army or
destroy the AOP. Remember General Beauregard was defending Richmond with 25000
men.(Still don't know why Davis would even let Beauregard around Richmond.
Considering the two hated each others guts.)
Please reply,
Hello Norm et al,
Lee might have been able to achieve desirable CSA goals by avoiding
the major conflict and conducting
an extended "raid" upon the Northern areas. This would have frightened and
demoralized the populace and
strengthened the Copperheads and Peace Democrats. As Sherman demonstrated
later an army in the field can sustain itself on the march. Lee's presence
in the fertile valleys of Penn relieved the logistical pressures
sapping VA. Given that certain logistics such as ammo and ordinance might
not have been available without
long and vulnerable supply lines it is feasible that repeated forays of
sustainable duration would have done
much to convince Yankees and Europeans to recognize Southern independence.
Don
I am not sure if the size of Lee's forces in the North was large enough to
conduct such a demoralizing and resource destructive campaign as was carried
out by Sherman and many other Union commanders throughout the war. The South's
excursions into the north were too infrequent and to have posed any real threat
to the Northern agenda. Had the frequency and numbers of personnel involved
been much greater, I believe that the South could have been very successful in
causing turmoil on Northern ground.
Daniel Lane
Dave,
>Taylor only made these claims much later, after the Longstreet-Early feud
>had exploded full-bore. In fact, more contemporary orders show quite clearly
>that Hood and McLaws were assigned a defensive role, with no intention to
>attack that's why Longstreet was assigned Heth and Pender's divisions.
>Taylor knew this, almost certainly, but allowed the fury of the later
>confrontations distort reality.
Just when you think you have all the answers you find out you really don't
know squat. Thanks for the correction.
--
II*
From: semperfi@siu.edu (Patrick King)
Subject: turning point and Lee
I wanted to comment about a statement of a member that Gettysburg
was the turning point of the Civil War. While I find Gettysburg one of the
most facinating battles of the war, IMHO it was not the turning point. I
believe that the key points of victory for the Union were:
1. The blokcade of the east coast and the Gulf, the seizure of New
Orleans
2. The fall of Vicksburg
3. The breakout of Chattanooga (Missionary Hill Battle)
4. Sherman's move from Atlanta to Savannah.
5. Grant's dogged pressure on Lee in Virginia
From: GaTechFan@aol.com
Subject: Fwd: turning point and Lee
From: semperfi@siu.edu (Patrick King)
Subject: turning point
In response to Pat Ellington's comments on "turning point." I
agree that Lee in most cases thought he was doing what had to be done, and
in at least most of his battles he behaved brillantly as a tactician. It
is also clear that the South can take pride in work of it's outstanding
generals (Jackson, Stewart, Lee, etc).
From: jschuu@ix.netcom.com (John Schuurman )
Subject: Re: turning point
I have been lurking for a time and have greatly enjoyed the reading. Do
you people have day jobs? Or are you all history professors? I am much
impressed with the level of insight and evidence of scholarship
demonstrated here.
My first trip to Gettysburg was in August of 1988 as the chaperone of a
touring bus full of teenagers. I was from South Dakota at the time and
was in charge of this bunch of rascals. We had been to a church-related
youth rally at the Universtity of Maryland and were on our way back.
I didn't know what to expect of these kids. I was worried. They were
good kids but typical kids. (If you can't put ketchup on it or dance to
it, it is probably of interest to somebody else). I wanted my first
visit to this place to be special but was steeled to the possibility
that they would all be bored and probably rude.
John Schuurman
Wheaton, Illinois
From: semperfi@siu.edu (Patrick King)
Subject: turning point...John Schuurmans comments
In response to comments on the turning point...enjoyed the story
about a bus load of kids. I usually like to be away from crowds when
visiting battlefields, but must say that over the 4th at Gettysburg I
enjoyed listening and watching people who were seeing the fields for the
first time.
From: benedict@ns.moran.com (Benedict R Maryniak)
Subject: Josh as turning pt of the turning pt
From: KPTom@aol.com
Subject: Re: Turning Point
Tom Yaglowski
PS: I'm a Longstreet fan, so of course I have to blame Ewell!
From: lawrence@appsmiths.com (Robert lawrence)
Subject: Re: Turning Point
>Tom Yaglowski
From: KPTom@aol.com
Subject: Re: Turning Point
From: lawrence@appsmiths.com (Robert lawrence)
Subject: Re: Turning Point
From: Norman Levitt
Subject: Turning Points
1) Gettysburg was, indeed, a turning point, if only in the sense that
afterwards Lee conducted the war in the knowledge that his options were
limited, and also in the sense that the Federal commanders in the East
finally could persuade themselves that their troops and officers were the
equal of the ANV--which they were.
Norm Levitt
From: lawrence@appsmiths.com (Robert lawrence)
Subject: Turning Point
From: benedict@ns.moran.com (Benedict R Maryniak)
Subject: Turning Point
From: "Douglas M Macomber"
Subject: Re: Josh as turning pt of the turning pt
From: rascal@cpcn.com (Brendan O'Neill)
Subject: Re: The Invasion of Pa.
I have often wondered about the invasion of Pa. that Lee undertook, and
what his real goals were. The best I can come up with is that Lee
intended to force the Union to pull troops from the west to deal with
him. He had already routed the AoP under Hooker decisively. He did not
learn of Meade's promotion until the invasion was well underway. By
beating the AoP in Pennsylvania, or even forcing a siege, he would have
forced the Union to pull troops in from other assignments. It is likely
that had he won any major fight in Pa that this would have heppened.
From: Kevin P Leahy
I recently attended a lecture that was about July 2 and Lee's plans for
that day. According to the speaker's theory the goal for Lee's attack was
Cemetery Hill. The plan was to launch attacks on both flanks of the Union
army and these attacks would be made en echelon. As the attacks made
their way throughout the Confederate lines it would be left to Lane and
Rodes to attack Cemetery Hill. That is the arguement in a nut shell. I
had several questions that night one was about Lee's understanding of the
nature of the Union line. I always believed that he felt that the line
ran along the Emittsburg Rd instead of along the ridge. Because of this
Longstreet's line was placed perpendicular to the Emittsburg Rd so it
could strike the flank of the AOP. The second was about the strength of
the Union line at Cemetery Hill. In theory the Hill is a saliant although
not as pronounced as Sickles at the Peach Orchard. As we know or what the
West Pointers would tell us is that a saliant is the most vulunerable part
of a line. But my question dealt with the number of artillery pieces on
the hill at the time of the attack on the night of July 2. Through my
research I have come up with at least 60 pieces that could fire upon any
Confederates attacking the hill. Is this far off base? I know artillery
alone could not easily repel infantry attacks, but if you look at the
events of the next day, what happened? Two divisions were sent to strike
a small area of the Union line that was protected with artillery and a
small number of infantry and I don't have to mention the results. This
scenerio on July 3 was basically the one that was played out on the night
of July 2. Artillery and a small number of infantry held the position and
repulsed the attack.
Does this theory float? I believe that it gives to much credit to Lee. I
know after the war Alexander wrote about Gettysburg and he felt that Lee
should have done what was just described above.
Kevin Leahy
From: semperfi@siu.edu (Patrick King)
Subject: North...South...Us
I wanted to respond to Pat's comments on Unionists and Southerners.
My living in this country is a fifty fifty deal North and South, having
spent as much of my life in Texas, Georgia and North Carolina as I have in
the North. I have relatives who fought with units from Conn and New York,
and one great great uncle who was a gun runner who died when Sherman came
through Atlanta.
From: GaTechFan@aol.com Subject: Fwd: turning point and Lee
When looking at the conquest of Pa it is important to
remember that Lee needed to keep a line of communication (and a
possible escape route) open back into Virginia. He knew that the
AoP was somewhere to the south-east of his army, presumably
stalled at the Potamac, not knowing of his movements. Well, if
that presumprion is true, it is a rather bold assumption. How
could an army not know of another's invasion movements once the
invasion has started? But that is not what I want to discuss.
Yes, Lee's plan called for the capture of Philadelphia and
possibly Pittsburg. York had been captured, Harrisburg was
within reach. But had he not concentrated his army in Gettysburg
and ignored the AoP once it appeared the AoP would have easily
swung around and cut off the invaders.
From: semperfi@siu.edu (Patrick King)
Subject: Stuart...
When I sent my comments on Stuart I was inplying Lee had plenty of
horse soldiers in which to "check" out Meade. While trying not to beat a
dead horse, a few further comments.
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
Doing so confirmed my memory. Try this on for size...
From: DPowell334@aol.com
From: SteveH7645@aol.com
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
>In a message dated 96-01-25 22:09:20 EST, Eric wrote:>p>
>> Query: Had Early attacked with his full strength, would the
>>Confederates have carried East Cemetery Hill? since they nearly succeeded
>>with two brigades, it's logical to assume that they would have. The
>>inevitable conclusion I draw is that had Stuart been where he belonged, with
>>the ANV, the East Cemetery Hill position would have fallen, there never
>>would have been a Pickett's Charge, and the course of history likely would
>>have been very different indeed. In other words, had Stuart been there, we
>>would not be discussing the issue of whether Lee's line was too long.
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
>In a message dated 96-01-25 22:09:20 EST, you write:
From: "Michael D. VanHuss"
Sorry Eric got to differ with you on this one, Longstreet's memoirs indicate
that a meeting was held @ approximately 9:00 on the morning of July 2 "After
viewing the field he (Lee) held conference with the Corps and Division
Commanders". The only one who could not have been present, obviously was
Stuart. Another reference to a meeting is in the Southern Historical Papers
in a memo from Colonel Walter Taylor Lee's Adjutant General in which he
references a meeting with Ewell, Early and Rodes in which they thought it
best to await for Longstreet's arrival and make an attack on the enemy's
left. This meeting apparently took place late on the 1st.
From: SteveH7645@aol.com
From: jblair@roanoke.infi.net (John Blair)
Your last sentence I find fascinating! Can you offer some concrete evidence
that the "plan" would have worked as Lee formulated it? Perhaps I'm
splitting hairs here. I know that some of Lee's orders were not carried out
as he intended. The question seems to be; Could they have been carried out.
What blame, if that's the right word, falls back onto Lee because his orders
were either vague (Stuart) or impossible to execute (Pickett).
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
>lee believed his army was invincible after his string of previous victories.
>delegated authority to his new generals hill and ewell. they were no
>stonewalls.
From: Douglas M Macomber"
From: cappz@crosslink.net (Jeffrey Zirkle)
From: cappz@crosslink.net (Jeffrey Zirkle)
From: cappz@crosslink.net (Jeffrey Zirkle)
From: SteveH7645@aol.com
From: SteveH7645@aol.com
From: LlDdd@aol.com
From: Colby Allen Cowherd
From: Ethan Book
From: cappz@crosslink.net (Jeffrey Zirkle)
>>Lee knew there would be heavy casualties, but once he felt Alexander had cleared
>>the guns off Cemetery Ridge, there would not be adequate firepower to meet
>>Pickett, Pettigrew and Trimble. Again, Lee's over-faithfulness in his men.
From: dcl4628@ritvax.isc.rit.edu (Daniel Lane)
From: cappz@crosslink.net (Jeffrey Zirkle)
Jeff Z
From: jblair@roanoke.infi.net (John Blair)
From: "Pat Feeley"
Pat>
From: taylord@spot.Colorado.EDU (Deb Taylor)
From: David Wieck
From: Norm Levitt
From: jblair@roanoke.infi.net (John Blair)
>Pat> "Before he (Lee) did so (cross the Potomac), however, he received
from the president a reply to a letter written two weeks before, in which
Lee had made certain admissions in regard to the present national outlook
and had suggested some maneuvers he thought might be available to the
confederacy, not only on the military but also on the diplomatic front.
'Our resources in men are constantly diminishing,' he had written, 'and the
disproportion in this respect between us and our enemies, if they continue
united in their efforts to subjugate us, is steadily augmenting.' This
being so, he thought the proper course would be to promote division in the
northern ranks by encouraging those who favored arbitration as a substitute
for bloodshed. 'Should the belief that peace will bring back the Union
become general,' Lee continued, 'the war would no longer be supported, and
that, after all is what we are interested in bringing about. When peace is
proposed to us, it will be time enough to discuss its terms, and it is not
the part of prudence to spurn the proposition in advance, merely because
those who wish to make it believe, or affect to believe, that it will result
in bringing us back to the union.' If this was sly, it was also rather
ingenuous, particularly in its assumption of such a contrast between the
peoples of the North and South that the latter would be willing to resume
fighting if negotiations produced no better terms than a restoration of the
Union, whereas the former would be willing to concede the Confederacy's
independence rather than have the war begin again."
From: DPowell334@aol.com
From: DPowell334@aol.com
From: "Douglas M Macomber"
Paul(Douglas)Macomber
From: Donald Bouchard
From: Daniel Lane
From: "Michael D. VanHuss"