Bill Cameron has submitted excerpts from testimony before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War on the condition of the Union Army on the pursuit of Lee after Gettysburg by Union Commander General George Meade and Union Chief Engineer General Gouvernor K. Warren
Confederate Commander General Lee presents the condition of his army during the retreat from Gettysburg in a series of letters to President Davis printed in The Official Records of The Rebellion.
For the military historians out there, I wonder about your opinion of Herman Hattaway and Archer Jone's _ How the North Won_ (University of Illinois 1983)? I found appendix A "An Introduction to Military Operations" quite helpful in helping an ex-USAR truck driver understand interior lines, supply lines, and tactics and strategy.
To the point by Dave Powell that Lee was conducting a raid, on page 414 Hattaway/Jones write about Beauregard's tirade against the "raid of Lee's army into Maryland, in violation of all the principles of war..."
"Beauregard was quite correct technically in terming Lee's movement into Pennsylvania a raid rather than a penetration, because Lee always had lacked any line of supply. The Shenndoah Valley provided the Confederates with as fine an avenue for threatening the enemy's rear as the Virginia Rivers afforded the Union army; but it lacked the lines of communication southward to permit it to be the route of penetration similar to that enjoyed by the North."
In his retreat Lee seems to have secured the strong flank position Longstreet had sought before Gettysburg (albeit not between Meade and Washington D.C.). Meade did not attack. It was the weakness of the supply line that forced Lee to retreat from his strong tactical position at Falling Waters. (drawn from p. 413.)
Was Meade was very bright in not attacking Lee in this strong position knowing that Lee's lines of communication were poor and Lee had to retreat sooner or later? Meade seemed to believe his task was to drive the enemy from "our soil."
Or should Meade have heeded Lincoln's foot pounding hissy fit and attacked Lee as the best chance to destroy the army. Lincoln believed destroying Lee's army, not seizing Confederate teritory, was the way to win the war.
Or did Meade simply realize Lee had checked him by beating him to this position, and had no way of communicating this to a steaming old Abe. So, Meade sat and waited for Lee to slip up, kowing that Lee would make no mistakes in his front?
Just wondering,
Dennis
I confess I've only read parts of _How the North Won_, but what I did read struck me as excellent.
That's a good point about Lee securing a strong point at Falling Waters. Of course, given the fresh victory at Gettysburg, Meade had the luxury of being able to avoid an attack and not be immediately replaced. Had Lee secured such a position threatening DC, I think Meade would have been forced to attack by the Administration.
Once Lee took up the position at Falling Waters, I think any attack Meade mounted would have been a bloody failure, not the least for the lack of strong Corps commanders to mount it. The Union command structure really took a major hit on July 1-3. I think Meade did OK in the follow-up, if not proforming with brilliance.
Dave Powell
Of course he should have attacked Lee. Lee held a strong position, but his army was tired and recently defeated, and the problem of supplying them was immense. The river was up for several days making escape almost impossible. Meade's army was replenished to a degree, while Lee had no such luxury. It seems Meade kept having these war councils, possibly in fear of making a decision, but in keeping with his cautious nature. Lincoln was right to be upset. In Meade's place, what would Grant have done? Or Lee? Or Hancock? Or Jackson?
Pat Ellington
The VI corps arrived after a long march of 35 miles on the 2n and was not as heavily engaged as the other corps at Gettysburg. They were perhaps in better shape than the other corps. I've often wondered what would have been the outcome if Meade had sent Uncle John's VI corps after Lee, not with the intent of catching and destroying him, but with the intent of crossing the Potomac before Lee and keeping Lee in Maryland. If Sedgwick could have held Lee in Maryland long enough to give Meade a chance to resupply and rest the rest of his army, then Lee could have been trapped with the Potomac and the VI corps on one side and the rest of the AoP on the other side. With the ANV otherwise occupied then some of the troops from Washington could be dispatched to take Richmond or to add more weight to Meade. I would argue that Lee's army was a more important target than Richmond.
John Blair
You said:
Or should Meade have heeded Lincoln's foot pounding hissy fit and
attacked Lee as the best chance to destroy the army. Lincoln believed
destroying Lee's army, not seizing Confederate teritory, was the way to win
the war.
Why did Lincoln's generals not subscribe to this philosophy, until Grant? And doesn't this philosphy make Lincoln the greatest "military genius" of the war? Grant seemed to immediately understand Lincoln's purpose and Lincoln, in believing that Grant understood, left him alone. I would think Halleck would have "gotten it" after a few eye ball to eye balls with his Commander in Chief. His failure to communicate this purpose to field commanders may have prolonged the war. Lincoln - and then Grant - understood the arithmetic, bloody as it was.
patf@cyberport.net
Patrick Feeley
Cybersurfer
Gettysburgophile
Here we go round again with Meade's pursuit or lack thereof.
I want to bring up another possibility. Richmond, you will recall, was largely undefended at this point and vulnerable to attack from the Washington area and from Federal enclaves on the coast. Shouldn't it have been the overall strategic aim to isolate Lee and hold him more-or-less in place, cut off from his base, while a substantial force headed for Richmond? This would have been enabled the Federal forces facing Lee to engage in the sort of "offensive-defensive" beloved of Longstreet. I.e., give Lee the choice of attacking a well defended line to get back to Richmond, standing a siege, or wandering off into the Pa. hinterland without an obvious source of food or ammunition.
I think the combined Federal forces were strong enough to pull this off, had they been imaginatively and energetically co-ordinated (quite an assumption).
Comments?
Norm Levitt
Norm,
I think this is about the soundest solution to the Gettysburg problem for
the North. In fact, substantial numbers of infantry were still on the
Peninsula and the Carolinas to mount such an expedition. Halleck did try to
orchestrate such a movement in June, before the battle, but it fizzled into a
complete failure (I think a handful of Federals moved briefly up the
Peninsula, only to scurry right back.) Alas, strong leadership in the east
was lacking.
Dave Powell
Dave wrote:
>Once Lee took up the position at Falling Waters, I think any attack Meade
>mounted would have been a bloody failure, not the least for the lack of
>strong Corps commanders to mount it. The Union command structure really took
>a major hit on July 1-3. I think Meade did OK in the follow-up, if not
>proforming with brilliance.
Dave,
Agree. It is interesting to note that at the Beaver Creek conference,
only Howard, Pleasanton and Wadsworth (attending for Newton) voted to
attack. Sedwick and the others thought that the position was too strong.
It doesn't seem that the corps commanders who were left had their hearts in
an assualt.
I think Meade probably made the right decision for that point in time.
Pat wrote:
>Of course he should have attacked Lee. Lee held a strong position, but his
>army was tired and recently defeated, and the problem of supplying them was
>immense. The river was up for several days making escape almost impossible.
>Meade's army was replenished to a degree, while Lee had no such luxury. It
>seems Meade kept having these war councils, possibly in fear of making a
>decision, but in keeping with his cautious nature. Lincoln was right to be
>upset. In Meade's place, what would Grant have done? Or Lee? Or Hancock? Or
>Jackson?
Pat,
I think the councils of war that Meade conducted were beneficial for a new
commander who had only commanded the army for a matter of days. I also
think Meade was reacting to the lack of participation of the corps
commanders in the decision making process under Hooker. It does not hurt to
know the opinion of your subordinates. I really don't think it showed any
weakness on the part of Meade. Just an opinion. Here is what Howard, who
voted to attack, had to say about Meade's decision in a letter to Lincoln.
"As to not attacking the enemy prior to leaving his stronghold beyond the Antietam, it is by no means certain that the repulse of Gettysburg might not have been turned upon us. At any rate, the commanding general was in favor of an immediate attack, but with the evident difficulties in our way, the uncertainty of a success, and the strong conviction of our best military minds against the risk, I must say that I think the general acted wisely."
I really think that if he had gone in at that point in time, he would have gotten whipped. This opinion is more visceral than anything else. Let me admit that up front.
Norm wrote:
>I think the combined Federal forces were strong enough to pull this
>off, had they been imaginatively and energetically co-ordinated (quite
>an assumption).
>
Norm,
You could well be right but I think the risk was high.
Bill
I think Dave Powell continues to hit the nail on the head. (Dave, I have this backyard carpentry project . . . ) Meade's four closest colleagues in the AoP command structure were Reynolds, Hancock, Gibbon, and Sedgwick. Only Sedgwick participated in the pursuit. More than anything else I think this contributed to Lee's escape. It is very easy for us, at the distance of 130 years, to say he should have done such and so. To be frank, I think a more aggressive effort should have been attempted, or at least explored. But the inaction is entirely justified, to me, by Meade's newness to command and the loss of so many capable top officers. Jim Epperson
Please forgive a novice for butting in. I am a family historian, with little knowledge of military tactics.
Nine of my cousins fought with the ANV at Gettysburg. Two men were with the 53th NC Reigment and seven were with Company K of the 47th NC Reigment that was assigned to Pettigrew's Brigade.
During the retreat Gen. J.J. Pettigrew received his fatal wound. Can anyone help me locate information as to where the 47th Regiment was during the retreat?
Of the nine men; one private, with Junius Daniel's brigrade, was killed at Oak Hill, two were killed at Willoughby's Run, three were badly wounded during Pickett's charge and one is still missing in action.
Personally, I am glad that Gen. Meade did not pursue. My family was depleted enough.
Judith Tickel Need
Dennis wrote:
>Or did Meade simply realize Lee had checked him by beating him to
>this position, and had no way of communicating this to a steaming old Abe.
>So, Meade sat and waited for Lee to slip up, kowing that Lee would make no
>mistakes in his front?
Dennis,
As to what Meade thought, here is what he said in his testimony before the
Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War:
"...Having, however, been in command of the army not more than twelve or fourteen days, and in view of the important and tremendous issues involved in the result, knowing that if I were defeated the whole question would be reversed, the road to Washington and to the north open, and all the fruits of my victory at Gettysburg dissipated, I did not feel that I would be right in assuming the responsibility of blindly attacking the enemy without any knowledge of his position..."Meade then went on to describe the council of war. Meade recalled that only two commanders voted to attack (Wadsworth and Howard but Phanz included Pleasanton in his treatment of the council. Warren, who was also there, testified that they should have attacked [JCCW, I, p. 379] It is interesting that Warren also testified that he didn't think that there had been a council on the evening of the 2nd but admitted that he had slept "part of that evening").
Meade continued,
"It is proper I should say that an examination of the enemy's lines, and of the defences which he had made - of which I now have a map from an accurate survey, which can be laid before your committee - brings me clearly to the opinion that an attack, under the circumstances in which I had proposed to make it, would have resulted disastrously to our arms".The testimony before JCCW is a good source for the details of this issue.
Bill
Just one more thought on Meade after the Battle of Gettysburg. I realize men should be above the personal issues when they are at war - but sometimes, those things have to have some impact on decisions. Meade's sister was a resident of Vicksburg and her family had gone with the Confederacy. Her personal losses were great during the war, and maybe this too was on Meade's mind - the fall of Vicksburg occurred on July 4, 1863. Just a thought!
Nikki (nikki@postoffice.ptd.net)
I think one thing is clear-If Grant had been in charge they would have persued the south immediately. Porter Alexander, in his book "Fighting for the Confederacy, comments on the fact that it was that trait that seperated Grant form the other Union commnaders-prior to Grant assuming control ,after every major batle the Union would fall back and lick their wounds. Not with Grant. I am not sayng that such an attack would have been successfull-Grant was known to attack when perhaps restarint would have been the better option(Cold Harbor for instance)but I am sure he would have attacked.
Don't disagree one bit. Grant might have been successful. But in looking specifically at Meade's situation, what he did and why he did it, after Lee got into a defensive position south of Hagerstown, I don't think it was a bad decision.
I really don't think Meade ever got the credit due him for his conduct of the army at Gettysburg. Although it deals with day one, my favorite critique of Meade is by Eisenhower in AT EASE. Let me quote it in part.
"No other officer through the war was given so little time to prepare himself and his troops for such a climactic engagement. Moreover, command of the Army of the Potomac through a year and a half had been an avenue to military disgrace.... To command it seemed to invite the enmity of all the politicians in Washington who knew exactly how the war should be conducted. The Army's commander was seldom permitted the luxury of devoting himself totally to purely military problems.[Eisenhower, pp. 51-52]As he rode toward the battle on July 1, receiving reports throughout the afternoon and evening that his I Corps had been forced back, its commanding general killed on the field, the XI Corps dangerously routed and thousands of its men taken prisoner, Mead's mind must have been torn with anxiety about the future of the army and ... occasionally worried about his own fate as its commander.
When he reached the field after midnight, on the eve of the second day of battle, he pushed himself and his horse through hours of inspection. In the darkness, the prospect was far from heartening, for the Confederates -- except on the south -- were ringing the Union lines and all reports indicated that Lee, reinforced from east, north and west, would be ready in the morning for a heavy assault on the Union position. It might be late in the day before Meade would have enough troops on the field to balance Confederate strength.
The morning of July 2, after hardly more than a few hours' sleep, he was back on the lines, accompanied only by a staff officer and an orderly. According to one observer... "His mind was evidently absorbed by a hard problem. But this simple, cold, serious soldier with his businesslike air did inspire confidence.
In complete silence through the minutes, as he scrutinized from a position from a position on Cemetery Hill the surrounding town and terrain occupied by the enemy, he evidently considered all the elements of the situation; pondering the possibilities of disaster and the probabilities of defeat; weighing the defensive value of the ridges held by his men against the offensive capacity of Lee's victory - heartened veterans; calculating the hours required for the movement of his reserves up the Taneytown Road, Emmitsburg and Baltimore Pikes; formulating in his mind moves that might counter or thwart the plans of Lee.
For Mead, this was the moment of truth when all within him, particularly his moral courage, had to bear tough and strong on the problem ahead. No council of war could be called. No delay for leisurely study would be permitted by Lee. The decision had to be made. And the decision was solely Mead's responsibility. As he turned his horse, he is quoted as saying, almost to himself: "We may fight it out here as well as anywhere else." Then he quietly rode away to issue the orders that would make his decision operative.
In all this, there is neither visible drama nor glamour; only the loneliness of one man on whose mind weighed the fate of 90,000 comrades and of the Republic they served. Meade's claim to greatness in that moment may very well be best evidenced by the total absence of the theatrical. When thousands of lives were at stake there was no time for postures or declamations."
Bill
I'll certianly not dispute Grant's abilities or aggressiveness. However, Grant usually had time to get to know a command before taking on major responsibilities with it. Put him in Meade's shoes, and you still face Meade's problems - newness to command, distrust of some of your own staff, no time to establish clear working relationships with most of the other Corps commanders, etc. Even Grant's one experience that offers a clear parallel - Chattanooga - is not completely similar: Grant brought with him trusted troops and subordinates, and had a couple of weeks to understand the situation and get to know Thomas' army. Even then, the follow-up to Missionary Ridge wasn't exactly a grand pursuit. I think Grant would have attacked if he thought he could win - but I'm not sure he'd have reached that conclusion, especially with an army he distrusted.
Remember, Meade didn't even know the positions of the other Corps when he assumed command at 3:00 a.m. The burden was simply immense, and I don't think if fair to fault the man for the job he did given the weight of it. Plenty of the AOP's commanders would have _lost_ at Gettysburg, and then we'd be arguing about the speed of Lee's pursuit as the AOP retired to DC.
Dave Powell
I must say that the idea of throwing a corps across the Potomac in advance of Lee is something I had not thought of before and is an interesting idea. Of course again without the benifit of hindsight that to was an impossability.
And in terms of Jackson, he was most certainly capable of corp and division command, I could conger up some critisism on his abilities as Commander of the Army. However his aggressive nature would probably have come out on the battlefield and not at Falling Waters if we play out that particular scenario. By that I mean that in Meade's place Jackson would probably have followed up on day two, and emerged as the attacker on day three.
To sum up in terms of hypothetical I would rather be in line of battle defending Falling Waters than charged with task of taking it. I believe that the best poss. outcome would have been virtual annialation of both armies, and in that curcumstance only it would have been a union victory. The risk on the other side (ANV victory) no matter how remote would have delivered an unthinkable outcome.
Steve
Jim Epperson
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron
Subject: Re: Meade's Pursuit
Jim wrote:
>The notion of getting a force across the Potomac
>ahead of Lee is something Grant would have tried very hard to do, I
>think. Are there any indications that Meade thought of this?
Jim,
As to what Meade thought, as I mentioned the other night, the very best
document is his testimony before the Joint Commission on March 5, 1864. Do
you have it? Warren's testimony is also enlightening. Meade discusses when
he found the Confederates gone, his uncertainty as to where they were going,
his decision to directly pursue them with the 6th Corps, Sedgwick's fear of
being attacked in the mountain passes, Meade's detention of the 3rd and 1st
Corps to assist Sedgwick as a contingency and Meade's decision to send the
main force to the Boonsbourogh valley via Frederick. It also discusses
blunders by Butterfield and several false starts. If you read it, Meade's
thoughts and anxieties are evident. Whether you agree with him or not, you
can see the process he went through.
I don't know how many folks have access to this document. If there is an interest, I'll type up the germane portions and post it. I don't think any of the major secondary sources do it justice.
Bill
Meade could not have sent the VI Corps to block the Williamsport crossing for a number of good reasons.
That also meant ignoring the second-guessing of the president, who knew NOTHING about military operations. Remember he is the same man who pushed McDowell to Manassas with is "get it done now" strategy. Because Lincoln is now ensconced on Mt. Rushmore does not mean we have to accept as truth every cheap shot he took at every general who didn't win the war as quickly as Lincoln wanted.
Tom Clemens
Hagerstown Jr. College
>On Fri, 22 Dec 1995, you wrote:
>
I would love to either watch or be part of a war game doing exactly this.
>>> Send the VI corps ahead of Lee, then crush him with the remaining AoP.
>
>A probably-dumb question: If Lee couldn't get across because of high
>water, how could VI Corps have done so?
>
>
@-----jgiglio@nova.umuc.edu --------@
Not a dumb question at all. let me bounce it back to you. Since Lee did eventually cross, why couldn't Sedgwick have crossed? I recognize, of course that my hypothetical is based on Sedgwick crossing far enough in advance of Lee that he could have held Lee on the Northern side of the river. The real question then becomes, "could Sedgwick have crossed so far ahead of Lee so as to prevent Lee from crossing?" I don't know the answer. Perhaps the war gamming could shed some light.
Another possibility would be to have Meade encirlce Lee so as to keep Lee's back to the uncrossable Potomac. This hold Lee while the VI corps is free to find a crossing place. I believe Lee would have eventually been starved our or forced to fight his way out.
Let me add that I have a problem with playing "What If" with history. It only confuses things. On the other hand I enjoy the mental exercise and believe that is can offer insite into the minds of the history makers. A case in point is the fact that this very discussion has prompted Alexander Cameron, (acameron@tcac.com) to do a fair bit of work to help us understand what was on Meade's mind at the time. thanks Alex!!
John Blair
The question of getting a force across the river to block Lee's retreat brings up the issue of coordination and cooperation from Washington. The more I think about it, it would have been very difficult for any of Meade's troops to get to the Potomac and across before Lee did. However, Halleck in Washington could theoretically (which is about all that Halleck was good for) have used some troops from Washington or the Harpers Ferry garrison to cross south of the river and take up a position to contest Lee's crossing of the river.
I would think that a division-sized force with a lot of artillery support could have played hell with any attempt by Lee to cross a river the size of the Potomac, so long as a competant commander was available (a huge 'if'). But, given that the force would have to come from the Washington area forces and the arrangements would have to be made by Halleck, I fear that it was not something that was going to happen.
Jim Epperson
Jim,
Guess what? I looked in the rest of Meade's testimony and it appears that
Meade was directing French. According to Meade, Halleck had placed French's
forces under Meade's command and Meade was directing them. After Meade was
sure that Lee was withdrawing, he sent French to seize and hold South
Mountain Pass and to reoccupy Harpers Ferry, "bringing up the force from
Washington for that purpose". French, on his own, sent a cavalry detachment
to Falling Waters where they destroyed a pontoon bridge. On the 9th French
was ordered to join Meade with two brigades where he was given command of
the 3rd Corps. It appears that Meade had the authority to send French to
the Potomac as a blocking force. Could Meade have done a better job in
directing forces he had in that area? I wonder why he didn't do it. It
looks like Meade was more concerned with protecting Washington (occupying
South Mountain Pass). Was protecting Washington the "center of gravity" for
the AOP?
Bill
addendum to Jim Epperson's remark:
There's also the question of Darius Couch's rather large force of newly-mustered militia. Obviously, these weren't the boys to go one-on-one with the ANV, but still, some way of making use of them could have been found as part of a co-ordinated plan of action.
Norm Levitt
Norm,
For what it is worth, here is Meade's testimony on this point.
"...I also received under General William F. Smith a portion of General Couch's command, charged with the defences of the Susquehanna, and which General Couch had sent forward after the enemy evacuated Carlisle. General Smith arrived at Boonsboro' with a force of from 4,000 to 5,000 men; but he reported to me that those men were entirely new and totally undisciplined, and when I offered to attach him as a division t one of my corps, and put him in the front he advised so strongly against it that I left him in the rear at Boonsboro'."
Bill
Cutting Lee off at the pass, so to speak, has merit, but I wonder if Meade and/or 6th Corps is the force to do that. Meade was starting from behing Lee, and in choosing a route to send some or all of his command around Lee, would have to first divine where Lee was headed, and then require that any flanking force march faster and farther than Lee's advance guard. That's a pretty tall order.
Also, in terms of devining intentions, Meade has already lost one cavalry division (Buford, with his best mounted commander) withdrawn for remounting. The state of his other cavalry become critical in this situation - especially since Stuart is no present, and any Union recon must penetrate the CSA screen.
However, focusing on Meade is too limiting, I think. The real opportunity may well reside with Halleck. Consider that Halleck had, at close hand, some 12000 infantry in the field, yet not fully under Meade's control. French had 5100 troops near Frederick, mostly the Harper's Ferry garrison that was withdrawn to avoid a repeat of the capture of that place. Another three brigades - 5700 troops - were brought north from VA and NC to bolster the defenses of DC. Finally, there was one Brigade of Pa Reserves - 1300 strong - retained in DC. Combined, this force would match the strength of Meade's stongest Corps, and still leave DC's basic garrison of heavy Arty regiments intact. These troops were also veterans, having fought with the AOP at various times, and were likely to give a solid account of themselves - it's not as if they were simply raw militia.
In fact, most of these 7 brigades did join Meade's army in the days after Gettysburg. French and his three brigades, for instance, were assimilated into 3rd Corps, where French took command.
But what if the force were assembled at Frederick - French's location during the battle? This location puts them within a day's march of virtually all of Lee's possible crossing sites, much faster than Lee could get there. Halleck, I think, bears a much greater responsibility for lack of vision and failure to stop Lee than Meade does.
Dave Powell
Dave,
I think "lack of vision" is the key here. Clearly Halleck was trying hard
to send additional troops to the theater, but his objective seems to have
been to simply reenforce Meade with additional manpower. Pages 514 -690 of
part III (correspondence) of the GB OR is simply fascinating reading. I
does a much better job of explaining the movement than any of the reports.
As I mentioned to Jim yesterday, after reading additional parts of Meade's
testimony, it appears to me that Meade was controlling French. There is
correspondence in the OR that clearly shows Halleck deferring to French on
small unit deployments. I think the old 'albatross" of protecting
Washington was a consideration which kept Meade from being "creative" with
French's forces. After he knew Lee was retreating, he sent French's forces
back to Harpers Ferry and to hold the South Mountain Pass. He must have
been concerned that Lee would block SMP and threaten Washington. Jim's
suggestion of sending a blocking force to Falling Waters seems to have a lot
of merit especially in light of the fact that French had the "vision" to
send a small cavalry force there to destroy the pontoon bridge. A larger
force could have possibly kept Lee from retreating across the river. It
would not have taken much to similarly block the fords at Shepherdstown.
There was plenty of communications available between Halleck and Meade which
would have allow Halleck to direct blocking forces in concert with Mead's
pursuit.
Besides, It is a lot more fun to dump on Halleck that anyone else I can think of. Notice that no one is jumping to defend him. Certainly not me! :)
Does Longacre list the Arron Jerome manuscript or letters in his bib? What does he say about the "Devil to Pay" from the cupola controversy? Also, any chance my article is referenced in the Battle of Boonsboro portion. Some of my signal stuff is starting to show up in the current books. One of the points I made in the signal support of the pursuit article is that Buford was an innovator in the use of the signal corps for actually controlling tactical forces. It is always a kick when someone uses the material.
Bill
Subject: Re: Meade's pursuit
As it stood, the "albatross" dominated everyone's thinking in the AOP and out. Halleck tended to lack strategic vision, and this was a clear example - a fine reason why he has gone down in history as a glorified clerk instead of a general.
I must agree with Jim, French is not the ideal commander to lead an independent column, but he was the man in place at the time, and likely to be stuck with the job.
Placing 12000 infantry, plus cavalry and artillery, at Williamsport by July 3rd places Lee in a serious bind. Williamsport also controls access to the crossing sites at Sheperdstown and Harper's Ferry. This leaves Lee with three options, none very palatable. 1) swing east towards leesburg - which exposes his flank to Meade's command from the north, and all but abandons Imboden's column of misery. 2) move due south, and attack French at Williamsport with part of his depleted army while trying to hold off Meade with the other half. 3) swing further west, and cross into W. Virginia - this one is really bad. Doing so would double the march distance, abandon the upper Shennandoah to the Federals, and put the army deep into poor forage in the mountains.
And of course, not having to detach 6th Corps means Meade retains an effective force for an attack of his own, if the opportunity beckons.
Dave Powell
I agree with Dave and Bill that Halleck shoulders a lot of the blame for
not blocking Lee's retreat across the Potomac, although I am not sure
Blinky French is my idea of the man for the job
However, having read the stuff that Bill typed in for us, I have to say
that there is an overall sense of the dreaded "Army of the Potomac
disease:" Meade seems much more worried about countering what Lee might
do to him, than he is interested in what he might do to Lee. Earlier in
the campaign, with the albatross (good metaphor, Bill) of Washington
around his neck, this kind of caution seems prudent. But Meade admits
that he thought he had punished Lee severely, and yet he is almost
refusing to act on that belief.
Something else that came to my mind, since I am reading the new Lincoln
bio, is that Meade is very solicitous of resting and refitting his men at
a time when a little extra effort might have brought great rewards. This
reminded me of Lincoln's comment to McClellan that he seemed unwilling to
ask his troops to do things that Lee's men seemed to do all the time.
However, at the end of this epistle of criticism, I am very loathe to sit
in judgement of George Meade, given the circumstances under which he was
operating. We have all mentioned the loss of key friends among the
officer corps, his newness to command, etc., and I think these are valid
reasons (not excuses) for the retreat having been less than successful.
But I do think more could have been done.
Jim Epperson
Dave,
I certainly don't disagree with Jim either but sometimes you just have to
work with what you have. I couldn't imagine not doing it simply because
French was the one who had command of the garrison and it wouldn't make
sense to me to relieve him in the middle of a campaign with someone who
probably didn't know the leadership or disposition of forces (remember what
Meade did to poor ole Abner?). I was just reacting to the issue that it
appears that Meade could have moved him without a "mother-may-I".
One the Jerome issue, I guess I believe Jerome on the issue of Buford
being in the cupola when Reynolds rode up. The letter to Hancock was
written right after the war (Oct 18, 65) [Bachelder I, p. 200-1]. Sauers
questions it primary because he couldn't understand why Buford would be in
the cupola but it is not that far from McPhearson Ridge and it is plausible
to me that he went up there to see what was going on. Anyway, it is a case
where Jerome would have had to just made up the story. Not enough time had
gone by for him to get it mixed up. During my research on the Signal Corps,
Jerome shows up a lot (he swam wire across the Rapidan, under fire, during
Chancellorsville). Buford thought highly of him and he was an aggressive
Lieutenant but there is nothing I have read that makes me think that he was
prone to engage in hyperbole. He was writing to Hancock on behalf of
Buford's role in the battle and I don't think it was particularly self
serving. Could be wrong, you can become protective of these guys after you
"get to know them".
On another issue, from reading Warren's testimony, my opinion of Warren
continues to be just a tad lukewarm. Be interesting to know what you, Jim
and others think about it. Not withstanding his actions on LRT, he
criticizes Sykes for being slow (who gave him a brigade when no one else
would), tells Congress Meade should have attacked (as he should have if he
thought that but it still figures into the equation), and blows his own horn
when describing the need to conduct a reconnaissance after the battle. Yet
earlier, he did not accept Meade's offer (request?) to be the acting Chief
of Staff. Meade would have had a LOT less problems if Butterfield had not
been Chief during GB. The truth is, I think Warren's description of what he
did on LRT, written nine years after the battle, is a bit self serving. He
did it, but I think the description was romanticized by Warren. I'm
probably the one person alive who feels this way.
Anyway, hope you all have a Merry Christmas.
Bill
One of the things I fault Halleck for is the command situation when Meade
took over. It was badly confused, and only Halleck had complete authority in
that area.
For example, Meade was operating in the Middle department, under Schenk, but
Meade had no authority over Schenk's (admittedly limited) forces, nor vice
versa.
For that matter, Couch and his militia were charged with the defense of the
Sesquehanna line, but again Meade had no authority over them.
DC had it's own garrison, and numerous troops were retained there from the
AOP, removed from Meade's authority.
Troops in NC and SE Virginia were under independent commanders, neither with
authority over each-other. Hence, any co-operation there for a threat to
Richmond from the rear needed to be orchestrated from DC.
Meade's authority over the Harper's Ferry Garrison was limited, and
restrained by the overall consideration to screen DC from the Rebel Army.
All in all, this command situation was a classic military mistake, and only
Halleck had the authority to co-ordinate efforts. The fact that he made
virtually no real effort along these lines is my real heartburn with him. I
mean, this guy _wrote_ a book on strategy (such as it was - most of it was
instructions on how to entrench) for chrissake.
Dave Powell
Dave Wrote:
>
>For that matter, Couch and his militia were charged with the defense of the
>Sesquehanna line, but again Meade had no authority over them.
Dave,
Meade to Congressional panel:
Answer: Yes, sir; and I had command of everybody. I had command of General
Schenck, of General Couch, and of general everybody else.
Now don't come back with a 6 page email defending your honor. I just
couldn't resist showing you the testimony. You will forgive me won't you?
:) Regardless, your comments about Halleck are valid. BTW, I've read
Halleck's book or at least part of it (a _long_ time ago). It is basically
Napoleonic. No comparison to Jomini's _Art of War_ or Clausewitz's _On
War_, but such as it was, if he had followed his own (Napoleon's)
principles, he would have done a lot better. Again, writing about it and
doing it are two different things. I have seen that "principle" proven over
and over again.
Anyway, I certainly agree with you on Halleck, he was part of the problem as
opposed to the solution.
On Warren, I did some additional reading and my opinion of him continues to
fall. As opposed to Jim and yourself, I had not spent much time looking at
Warren after GB. Here is some interesting stuff.
Warren to William Warren:
His biographer, Colonel Emerson Taylor, who is almost sickening in his
admiration of Warren, admits that Warren had designs on the command of the
entire AOP. Now if you take all this into consideration, it is easy to
imagine that he might have embellished his Gettysburg actions a bit. The
next time I write anything about LRT, I may not be quite as kind. All that
romantic stuff about the gleam of bayonets is from a single Warren letter. I
am beginning to believe Captain Hall, more and more.
Bill
Bill,
Seriously, I could be wrong about authority over Schenk and Couch - I would
be curious to see if and when Meade was granted direction over their affairs.
Time to visit the OR again, for clues.
However, in any case it would only be limited authority anyway - and that's
essentially my point. Both Couch and Schenk were charged with specific
objectives assigned them direct from DC, and had Meade tried to use them in
other ways, almost certainly that authority would have been countermanded.
Also, I speak mostly about events prior to the battle here - certainly Meade
was given control over the militia after Lee began his retreat, but by then
they were in no condition to help out, being deployed along the Sesquehanna
as they were. Sorry if I was unclear before.
As for Schenk, it was my understanding that he was independantly charged with
defense of Baltimore. Some troops from 8th Corps (his department) were
forwarded to Meade as reinforcements, but the bulk were restrained by
previous directives of the War Dept.
For example, I don't regard Meade as having useful control over the Harper's
Ferry garrison prior to the battle, even though he was nominally given
command of them. Nervousness over DC's safety demanded they be kept close at
hand, and as I recall, they were tasked with remaining in Frederick by DC.
I'm not sure of the nominal situation at the time, but in practical terms,
Meade was seriously constrained over using or commanding those forces.
One clarification - I'm mostly speaking here of BEFORE the battle - not
after. I beleive that to have been effective, a co-ordinated response needed
to begin by the end of June, not wait until the 4th or 5th of July. Meade did
gain operational control of a number of forces after the big event, but by
then it was too late.
There: not quite 6 pages, Bill, but I'll try better next time...
Dave Powell
Dave,
BTW, Dave, do you have THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE GORDON MEADE by
Captain Mead? The Meade testimony is in there in full as an appendix (vol.
II). You have to get the congressional report for the other stuff (Warren
Sickles, Humphreys) but it is an easy way to get the Meade stuff. I just
have Xerox notes. Jim and I were discussing whether or not the
congressional report had been republished and I just don't know. I don't
think Morningside has it which a pretty good clue that it has not. There is
a lot of stuff I would like to get. I want the Martin book and Tom
Desjardin's new book on the 20th Maine is now available. I also have to get
the rest of the Bachelder papers. I only have vol one. A good buy is THE
ANNALS OF THE WAR, it is in paperback and is only 19.95. That's not bad for
800 pages of primary source work. And my copy of Coddington is literally
falling apart. I have it taped together with duct tape! They have the
paper version of the Shue book you mentioned. They list the hardback as
O.P. I would like to get it also.
OBTW again, You wrote:
>One clarification - I'm mostly speaking here of BEFORE the battle - not
>after. I believe that to have been effective, a co-ordinated response needed
>to begin by the end of June, not wait until the 4th or 5th of July. Meade did
>gain operational control of a number of forces after the big event, but by
>then it was too late.
Halleck's msg to Couch on page 385 of part 3, OR 27 shows his attempt to
give Meade command of all troops in his operational theater on June 28 (the
day Meade was informed he had command). It has the caveat "You will
co-operate, as far as possible" but it does show that Halleck gave Meade
command of all troops within "the sphere of his operations" and it
specifically told Couch that it included his command. I'm not trying to
split hairs or be a pain. I'm just doing what I like to do. Dig up this
stuff. The devil is in the details. :) All your general points on Halleck
are valid. The fact that he tossed the reins to Meade on the 28th does not
relieve him of the responsibility and would in no way make up for the lack
of proper planning on Halleck's part (interpretation = "Oh gosh, pls don't
launch the six pages" :) ).
Bill
Bill,
However, I think my point still stands, in part. Halleck excluded Schenk and
that portion of the Middle Dept garrisoning Baltimore from Meade's control -
leaving virtually no troops in this Dept, practically speaking, under Meade.
Ditto for Heintzelman in DC, among whose garrison numbered that brigade of
the PA Reserves and various other regiments not subject to Meade. Even part
of French's Harper's Ferry command was retained in the DC defenses after they
abandoned Maryland Heights.
So, in effect, Meade got de facto control over Couch's militia, in place
along the Sesquehanna and unlikely to be useful in the battle or pursuit, and
about 2/3 of French's 10,000 men. The three Brigades Halleck brought forth
out of the Carolina coast were retained in DC. Meade had no authority over
(and, I admit, no time to deal with) the 4th Corps and other troops in NC who
were ideally positioned to threaten Richmond from the southside.
Contrast Meade's limited and mostly nominal authority with the freedom
granted (hah, hah) Grant in 1864, and the co-ordinated efforts (not that they
worked all that well, I admit) he orchestrated to put pressure on Lee from
all points. That, really, is the parallel I'm trying to draw.
Again, no 6 pages. Geez, I'm slipping.
Dave Powell
PS. It now looks like I can attend the get-together in June, and really look
forward to this kind of debate and discussion in person. I'm just hoping
it'll be too far for you to haul all your primary sources:)
Dave Powell
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Meade's Pursuit and other stuff
I am not a student of Halleck, but it is amazing to me that he did so poorly
with this sort of thing. It was not because he didn't understand it. He
wrote ELEMENTS OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE (1846) which was a highly
acclaimed work on strategy during the time. However, understanding it and
doing it are two different things.
From: DPowell334@aol.com
Subject: Meade's Pursuit
RE: Halleck
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Re: Meade's Pursuit
>For example, Meade was operating in the Middle department, under Schenk, but
>Meade had no authority over Schenk's (admittedly limited) forces, nor vice
>versa.
You may well be right, but if Meade didn't have authority over them, he
sure as heck didn't know it. :) He attributed the lack of coordination and
cooperation to communications problems (as an old signal officer, does that
ever sound familiar).Question: There were other troops of ours at that time under General Schenck?
[It also appears
that the ole boy had a sense of humor. awc"General Sykes is being pitched into heavily by all the papers; but he did
as well as he ever did, or ever will do... General Sykes has written to me
in relation to some of the strictures upon him, and I expect he cannot be
pleased with my answer... I have no better opinion of the others - all
honest and well-meaning, but not fit to be generals..."
From: DPowell334@aol.com
Defend my Honor? My second will contact you, sir.
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Re: Meade's Pursuit
Very good. Only a page and a half. And I cleared my buffers for you.
I'm disappointed.
From: DPowell334@aol.com
Subject: Re: Meade's Pursuit
I've reviewed. You're right about Couch and French - though I checked
Coddington and he points up that essentially Meade confirmed every movement
of French's command thru Halleck, and requesting permission for such
movements. I'm sure that is where my impression that Meade was constrained
came from.