Drive toward the center of GETTYSBURG and- turn left on FAIRFIELD ROAD (HWY 116). Drive 9.3 miles passing through FAIRFIELD and turn right on JACKIS MOUNTAIN ROAD. (Jack's Mountain road is not marked. There is (was?) a large billboard advertising the Gettysburg Game Park at the turn-off.) Drive 1.3 miles and turn left on PINEHILL ROAD and take the first right on WARREN ROAD. Drive about 100 yards and stop at the intersection of WARREN ROAD and GLADYS ROAD. Park your car and stand by the telephone pole.
This station was occupied by Capt. C. S. Kendall and Lieut. L. R. Fottescue who were ordered here by Capt. Norton when he was at Emmitsburg enroute to the battlefield. They were able to establish flag signals with Taneytown but were never successful in opening flag signals with the Little Round Top station. Confederate troop movements were visible to include the initial formations massing for Pickett's Charge. This information was signaled to Taneytown but not to the Round Top station. The signalmen at Little Round Top were clearly visible and Lieut. Fortescue sent a courier to the battlefield to tell Capt. Norton that the team could see the Round Top station.
[J. Willard Brown, Signal Corps, U.S.A. in the War of the Rebellion, New York, Arno Press, 1974, p. 370]
The information which could have been made available to the Commanding General if the signal officers were more aggressive in contacting each other might have influenced the action. The lack of control exercised by Capt. Norton over the various stations was a limiting factor in the effectiveness of the Signal Corps at this stage in the campaign.
After the battle was over, Capt. Kendall and Lieut. Fortescue were captured by the Confederates. J. Willard Brown, the historian of the U.S. Veteran Signal Corps Association, tells the interesting story:
On Saturday morning, July 4th, at about 6 o'clock, a farmer rode up to the station and hurriedly informed the signal party there stationed that the rebel cavalry (a squad of about twenty) were coming down the Millerstown Pike, intending to capture them, that they had fed and watered their horses at his place during the night, and had been heard to refer to the signal flag, which they remarked would be looked after at daylight.The conduct of signal officers had become a concern to the Chief Signal Officer who issued a General Order in June of 1863 which outlined a "code of conduct." There had been cases where the actions of signal officers had caused panic and confusion within the Army, and this order is interesting in that it not only prescribe conduct to prevent over-reaction from exaggerated reports but also outlines proper conduct in the face of the enemy to prevent capture or compromise of equipment or information which would have an intelligence value to the enemy.Being thoroughly satisfied of the truth of this report from the numerous cavalry squads seen on the pike, the signalmen were soon in their saddles and were shown a road not much frequented, which led them to the Millerstown road near Emmitsburg. Arriving at the latter town, they made a detour of the Catholic College and were soon galloping hard for Taneytown. Later in the day, when near the latter place, they met the advance of Kilpatrick's Division of cavalry going in the direction of Emmittsburg, and, as they had received no orders to leave their station, they returned with them to again occupy it.
When they reached the town it was dark and raining quite hard, a night wholly impracticable for signalling, but with the hope that it might clear away they dismounted under a shed and awaited the rear the cavalry then slowly passing through the town. At twelve o'clock, the last of them had passed.
They had been informed by members of Kilpatrick's staff that Lee's entire army had retreated through the Montery or Fairfield Gap, and that our army would advance at daylight. Acting upon this information, not having had a word from Capt. Norton, and realizing the impossibility of using torches or of seeing the opposite station in such a rain, as well as the extreme probability of a change of stations owing to Lee's repulse, they turned into a barn near the foot of the mountain, stationed a man on guard near the road, while Kendall and Fortescue made a bed on the floor of the house adjoining.
Before daylight, Stuart's cavalry having been cut off by Kilpatrick, who occupied the gap in Lee's rear, commenced retreating southward to find an unoccupied gap, and, although the enemy's cavalry were on the roads all around them within three hours after they had lain down, the guard did not recognize the rebels but supposed them to be Kilpatrick's men.
As daylight dawned, he discovered his mistake and awoke the rest of the party, but too late. The thieving propensity of the rebel cavalry for horseflesh soon led them to the barn, and before very long the signal detachment had taken up the line of march for Richmond.
[J. Willard Brown, Signal Corps, U._S.A. in the War of the Rebellion, New York, Arno Press, 1974, pp. 370-371.]
General Order issued by Col Albert J. Myer, Chief Signal Officer, U.S. ArmySecuring the signal station from the enemy to prevent capture or the compromise of information was a concern which was expressed in Col. Myer's A Manual.General Orders, OFFICE OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER,
No.9, Washington, D.C., June 26, 1863.
I. It having come to the knowledge of the Signal Officer of the Army that,in some instances officers of the Signal Corps have transmitted information by signals of such a character as to produce alarm, uproar, and confusion among troops, and the inhabitants of town or cities with which they may be in communication, which reports have often been without foundation, the officer thereby being guilty of conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline, it is hereby ordered and enjoined that all signal officers shall be held fully responsible and amenable to the military regulations of the Army for such stampede reports forwarded without foundation or forethought. of this
II. Under all circumstances must officers corps be fully cognizant of the responsibility resting upon them as proper and reliable sources of information or means of communications, such information being in most cases for the use of the commanding general or other officers commanding troops, and being the foundation of important movements or operations of the Army or Navy.
III. Reports must be make fully, concise, and clear, detailing all important discoveries, such as movements of the enemy, direction taken, probable numbers, whether artillery, cavalry, or infantry, and their position taken by compass from the station of observation. They must be made quietly, and written or delivered without the slightest exaggeration or excitement.
IV. Should the enemy be discovered advancing toward an officer or station, the signal party must not fall back until it is absolutely necessary to prevent capture, previously reporting to headquarters the advance of the enemy, and then a retreat must be effected quietly, and as much under cover as possible, taking care to create no needless alarm.
V. Every precaution must be taken that no signal apparatus, glasses, or papers of any description fall into the hands of the enemy. If necessary to prevent capture, everything will be destroyed.
VI. Chief signal officers of departments-or army corps are required to see that the provisions of this order are fully carried out and that it is promulgated to every officer of the detachment. Nothing gives to commanding generals greater confidence in their informants than to see that they at least are not in the slightest degree excited, stampeded, or alarmed.
VII. It is designed that the officers and men of this corps shall become known and noticed throughout the Army for their bravery, coolness, and reliability under the most trying circumstances. Every officer not only bears upon himself the responsibility of sustaining his individual honor and reputation, but the honor of a corps performing its duties in the dangerous undertaking of establishing stations of observation and communication almost within the lines of the enemy and amid all the perils of the battlefield.
By order of the Signal Officer of the Army:
HENRY S. TAFFT,
Captain and Signal Officer.[O.R.,SERIES III-VOLUME III, pp. 417-418.]
Stations must be kept concealed from the enemy so far as is possible. On stations of observation solely, no flags will be shown and no persons permitted except those a ctually on duty. Every precaution will be taken to prevent the enemy ascertaining the purpose for which the point is occupied. When communication by signals is needed, the flag will be screened from observation, if it can be, and in any case it will be shown only while t ransmitting messages ...
[Albert J. Myer, A Manual of Signals, New York, D. Van Nostrand, 1868, p. 250.]
Go back to JACKIS MOUNTAIN ROAD and turn LEFT. Drive 1.5 miles and turn left on SR 16. Drive 6.4 miles to EMMITSBURG. Turn RIGHT at the stoplight and drive 0.5 miles to HWY 15. Turn RIGHT and drive 1.1 miles to MT. SAINT MARY'S COLLEGE. Exit HWY 15 to the RIGHT and enter the parking lot of the college. Park by the visitor's center. The signal site was on the hill which you can see directly behind the college. You may ask in the visitors center for directions to the hiking trail. The hill is open to the public. The hill is heavily timbered and visibility is limited. You may wish to read the material here in the parking lot.
Report of Capt. Lemuel B. Norton, Chief Signal Officer, Army of the Potomac
On the 30th, general headquarters removed to Taneytown. A signal station was placed in the church steeple at that place, and a party sent to Emmitsburg for the purpose of opening a line between General J.F. Reynolds and headquarters. Communication was not opened this day on account of the haziness of the atmosphere. The signal officer with General John Buford, who occupied the town of Gettysburg, took position in the steeple of the college, and reported to General Buford the whereabouts and movements of the enemy. The offices attached to the First Corps, from a station of observation on the mountain back of Emmitsburg, made a telescopic reconnaissance toward Gettysburg, reporting the results to the general commanding that corps ...... During the whole of this day [l July 1], endeavors were made to open the signal line between general headquarters, Emmitsburg, and Round Top Mountain, but on account of the smokiness of the atmosphere, the desired result was not obtained until 11 p.m., when the first message was received. These lines were kept open during the subsequent battle at Gettysburg and until July 6. In the event of the repulse and retirement of our army, they must have been eminently useful ....
On July 6, the lines between Round Top and Taneytown and Emmitsburg and Taneytown were discontinued. The two officers attached to the First Corps made a telescopic reconnaissance from the hill back of Emmitsburg, and sent the information obtained to Maj. Gen. John Newton.
[O.R., XXVII, Part I, pp.201-203.]
As mentioned in the introduction, signal stations had two distinct purposes, communications and observation. The station behind Mt. Saint Mary's College was used for communications with Round Top but its primary purpose appears to have been for observation. Col. Myer explains the observation function in his A Manual of Signals:
The observations and reconnoissances made by signal officers differ from those of other reconnoitering Officers, in the facts that, by their long practice, they are able.to use their telescopes with an almost wonderful skill; and that the information they gain can sometimes be compared by them, from the place of observation, with that had at the same time by other officers in view and watching the enemy from other points, by the immediate transmission from one to the other of the facts noticed by each. The reports of their reconnoissances can also, in many instances, at once be communicated to the commanding general from the Diace at which the observations are making, while the reconnoitering officer remains to add further to his information. The reports are of a general character, relating to the presence or movements of the enemy, etc., Such as are made by scouts. They are not expected to embrace the specialties exhibited in a report of engineers. An officer is often posted for weeks together at one station of observation...The principal station of observation ought to command a view of fords, principal roads, railways, bridgesp towns, camps, gaps in mountains, rivers, ports, as the case may be, and generally of the routes of march or movement in that section of the country ...
Observations of reconnaissance are generally made from several prominent stations. They are to be briefiy made, but they ought to be made with scrupulous exactness. The parties moving with signal-officers on reconnaissance are generally small. They should move with the utmost rapidity and secrecy.
[Albert J. Myer, A Manual of Siqnals, New York, D. Van Nostrand, 1866, pp. 360-362]
Drive south on HWY 15 22.3 miles and exit on WEST 40.
Drive 1.8 miles and turn LEFT ON ALT 40. Drive 5.2 miles
to MIDDLETOWN. There was a station located in Middletown
which was in flaa communication with the station on
Washington Monument. Although it is not documented. it was
probably located in the Zion Lutheran Church. The church
was used as a hospital during the Antietam campaign and
based on the design of the steeple, was more than likely the
site of the Middletown signal station in July 1863.
Continue on ALT 40 for 5.3 miles stopping across from the
OLD SOUTH MOUNTAIN INN. There is room to park by the side
of the road adjacent to a number of blue battlefield signs
marking the battle of TURNER'S GAP.
July 8, in the afternoon, general headquarters moved
to Middletown. A party of signal officers, under
charge of Capt. W. J. L. Nicodemus, arrived from
Washington, for the purpose of working in conjunction
with the signal corps of this army. Captain Nicodemus
opened a line of communication between Frederick and
South Mountain Pass.
On July 9, headquarters of the army moved to Turner's
Gap. A station was occupied near this place,
communicating, through others at Middletown and
Crampton's Pass, with Maryland Heights. This line,
appearing of little importance on account of
telegraphic facilities, was abandoned the same day, and
its officers ordered to more active duty in the
front ... [O.R.,XXVII, Part I, p.- 203]
July 7. - on the 7th instant, with 12 officers and 27
enlisted men, General French ordered me to report to
General Meade, who ordered me to the front, then the
South Mountain Pass; ordered Lieutenants [Charles]
Herzog and [Thomas P.] Rushby to Maryland Heights;
Lieutenant Fisher to Crampton's Pass; Captain Daniels,
with Captain Denicke and Lieutenants [William J.]
Galbraith, Briggs, Denicke, Swain, and [S. Cary]
Tuckerman, to the front, with the following
instructions:
You will open communication between Frederick City
and South Mountain Pass, and establish observation
stations to command the Boonsborough Valley.
July 8. - Left Frederick City on the 8th instant,
accompanied by Captain McCreary. Lieutenant [William
S.] Andrews being sick, was left at Frederick City,
with orders to report to me as soon as able. Broke up
stations along the route as fast as Morse's telegraph
communication was established. Captain Daniels opened
communication at 12 m. between battle-field and South
Mountain station. Result of the day's fighting was
driving the enemy to Beaver Creek Bridge, on
Boonsborough and Hagerstown pike, 31-2 miles north of
Boonsborough. All movements of the enemy were observed
from Washington Monument on South Mountain, by Captain
[Ernst A.] and Lieutenant [C. F. M.] Denicke, and
promptly reported to the different headquarters
concerned.
July 9. - General Buford on the 9th drove the enemy
about 2 miles. A line of signal stations commanded the
enemy's front. A timely report of Captain McCreary
prevented our left from being flanked this day.
July 10. - Heavy skirmishing on the left; enemy
driven to Funkstown; his dispositions accurately
reported to the general commanding. [O.R., XXVII, Part
I, p. 207.1]
STOP 9 TURNER'S GAP SIGNAL STATION
July 7, The headquarters of the army moved to
Frederick. The signal officer who had been previously
assigned to duty with the detached command under
General Neill made a reconnaissance near Waynesborough,
Pa., discovering the whereabouts and movements of the
enemy.
Report of Capt. William J. L. Nicodemus, Signal
Officer, Commander of the Washington Reserve Signal
Detachment
Captain: I have the honor to report that, in
obedience to Special Orders, No. 106, dated Office of
the Signal Officer, Washington, July 6, 1863, 1
reported to General French, at Frederick.
Return To Index
Continue towards BOONSBORO and take the first right on WASHINGTON MONUMENT ROAD. Drive 1.2 miles, following the signs to WASHINGTON MONUMENT STATE PARK. Park in the parking lot and follow the signs on the walking trail to WASHINGTON MONUMENT. Climb to the top of the monument.
Take your compass and sight the signal stations from
left to right as follows: Middletown - 145 degrees, Turner's
Gap - 150 degrees, Crampton's Gap - 190 degrees, Elk
Mountain - 225 degrees, Hill behind Boonsboro - 295 degrees,
and the approximate location of Buford's tactical signal
station at Beaver creek crossing - 322 degrees.
Report of Capt. Lemuel B. Norton, Chief Signal
Officer, Army of the Potomac
On July 13, all signal communications previously
established was still kept up. Two officers were sent
to make a telescopic reconnaissance from Elk Mountain.
[O.R., XXVII, Part I, pp. 203-204.]
Agreeably to orders received at Frederick, Md., July
7, at 6 p.m. I started with Captain Denicke,
Lieutenants Denicke, Galbraith, Briggs, and Swain to
open communications by signals from the advance of our
army, then near Boonsborough, to Frederick. I left
Lieutenant Galbraith at South Mountain Pass, with
instructions to open an intermediate station at that point between Frederick and Washington Monument. On
the morning of the 8th instant, I ordered Captain
Denicke and Lieutenant Denicke to open a station on
Washington Monument; also procured a detail of men to
cut away the timber which obstructed the view near the
monument. At 8 a.m. I ordered Lieutenant Swain to open
a station at Boonsborough, then our extreme advance.
Lieutenant Briggs also proceeded to open a station on
the Blue [Elk] Ridge, about 4 miles from Boonsborough.
At 10 a.m. our forces commenced skirmishing with the
enemy. I immediately proceeded to the front, and
opened communication with the Washington Monument,
about 1 mile from Boonsborough, on the Hagerstown pike.
I directed Lieutenant Swain to take charge of the
station at this point. At 11 a.m. I sent the following
message to Captain Nicodemus: [O.R.,
XXVII, Part I, pp. 208-2091]
Daniels
Enemy are advancing; skirmishing on our right.
Daniels
General Buford:
Daniels
Captain Nicodemus:
Daniels
General Commanding:
Daniels
I had the misfortune to lose my memorandum book containing a copy of the messages sent to General
Buford from station near-Boonsborough during the
engagement on the afternoon of the 8th instant, as well
as some others of later date.
In accordance, with your orders, I left Frederick on
the evening of the 7th instant, and proceeded to South
Mountain Gap, in company with Captain Denicke, at which
point we were ordered to-report to Captain Daniels,
July 8. We arrived at 3 a.m., and as it was raining
very hard and Captain Daniels could not be found, we
lay by till daylight.
Captain Daniels arrived at the Mountain House at 8
o'clock, and as soon as the weather would permit, about
9 a.m., I was ordered to Boonsborough, where I arrived
a 10 o'clock, and reported to General Kilpatrick, after
which I opened station on hill in rear of town, which
commanded a good view of our front.
At 12 m. Captain Daniels opened station near the
Hagerstown pike, about 1 mile beyond Boonsborough, and
ordered me to join him which I did at once.
I remained there during the day in communication with
Captain Denicke, on Washington Monument, whose station
overlooked the enemy, and sent frequent messages from
him to General Buford, then in command.
At 3 p.m. sent the following: Captain Denicke:
Daniels,
July 9. - Enemy retreated last evening about 2 miles
toward Funkstown, and Captain Daniels went to front
this morning, leaving me on the station opened
yesterday.
On your arrival, about noon, you ordered me to send
frequent dispatches to Colonel Myer at Washington,
apprising him of all movements of interest.
Boonsborough July 9 - 7.30 p.m.
Nicodemus
July 10, Removed station to hill near Boonsborough,
and opened communication with Lieutenant Tuckerman on
left of our line, with Captain Denicke on Monument, and
Captain Stone on Sharpsburg pike, near General French's
headquarters ... [O.R., XXVII, Part I, pp. 217-218]
Return to ALT 40 and drive 1.6 miles towards BOONSBORO
turning LEFT on ROUTE 67. Drive for 7.1 miles and turn LEFT
on GAPLAND ROAD. Drive one mile to GATHLAND STATE PARK. On
the way up the mountain, notice the high ground to the left.
Park in the parking lot by the CORRESPONDENT'S MEMORIAL
ARCH.
Captain: I have the honor to submit the following
report of duty performed since July 6, 1863.
On the evening of the 6th, was ordered to precede the
main party, with Lieutenants Herzog and Rushby, and
with our men accompany and guard the wagon train to
Frederick, Md., where we arrived on the 8th instant,
and immediately reported to you at your headquarters.
About an hour afterward I received orders from you to
proceed without delay to Crampton's Gap, in the South
Mountain Range, and open communication with Middletown,
Maryland Heights, and South Mountain, if possible, and
take observations of the movements of the enemy. I
endeavored that evening to open communication, but was
unable to find a point where I could see more than one
of the stations, and after calling Maryland Heights for
some time, was obliged to give it up for the night.
Early next morning I moved across the gap, and
proceeded along the ridge about 3 miles, and selected a
station from which, with some labor, I was enabled to
communicate with both Middletown and Maryland Heights,
.thus completing the line of stations between Maryland
Heights and Hagerstown.
On the 12th instant, Captains [Joseph] Gloskoske and
[Richard] Dinsmore received orders from Captain Norton
to close up the station at Middletown and rejoin his
command. I was then obliged to find some other station
with which to keep up the line of communication, and
was enabled to do so with Lieutenant Briggs, who was at
Elk Ridge, in communication, with South Mountain. Owing
to the state of the weather, for the most of the time
we were unable to take many observations, but embraced
every opportunity that presented itself ...
As evidenced by the movement to establish line of sight
with other stations described in Lieut. Fisher's report, it
does not appear that maps were used to establish line of
sight profiles for the potential signal stations. This was
probably due to the lack of maps with sufficient contour
detail as well as the fact that the art simply had not
progressed that far. There is no mention of the use of maps
for this purpose in Col. Myer's A Manual. Col.
Myer's visual method for establishing signal stations is as
interesting as it is intricate. It is described in his
manual as follows:
Now you should drive to STOP 12.
Go back down GAPLAND ROAD and turn right on ROUTE 67.
Drive 5.4 miles and turn LEFT on MT. CARMEL CHURCH ROAD.
Drive 0.3 miles and it turns into DOGSTREET ROAD- Continue
for 2.1 miles and turn LEFT on RED HILL ROAD. You are now
on ELK MOUNTAIN. Drive 1.2 miles and stop in the parking
lot of the MCCLELLAN GUN CLUB.
At 5 p.m. of the 6th instant, I received orders to be
prepared to leave camp with the party going to the
front for active duty in the field.
At 8 p.m., the 6th instant, said party left camp,
Georgetown, D.C., proceeding toward Frederick, riding
all night, arriving at Frederick, Md., 5 p.m. of the
7th instant, when I was ordered to proceed toward South
mountain without delay, in company with Capt. N.
Daniels. We proceeded to South Mountain, opening
signal station on the Washington Monument at 9 a.m. of
the 8th instant, the heavy rain falling all night
preventing its being sooner accomplished.
By order of Captain Daniels, I proceeded to Elk
Mountain to open signal station communicating with one on Washington Monument. Arriving at Elk Mountain 11
a.m., I opened station, and called Monument until 1
P.M.; had no re-ply; atmosphere was clear. I saw the
enemy's pickets within 2 miles of this point. At 2.30
P.M., commenced and called Monument all the afternoon,
excepting from 4 p.m. until 5.30 p.m., without
receiving reply; 4 p.m. received the following message
by orderly;
To Signal Officer:
A. B. Jerome,
At 4.15 p.m. sent following answer:
Lieutenant Jerome:
If you can communicate with Washington Monument, tell
them to answer my call.
E. A. Briggs
At 9 p.m. returned to Boonsborough, and procured
rations and forage for my men and animals, oil, etc.
At 10-30 a.m., received following by orderly:
Lieutenant Briggs:
Nicodemus,
July 9. The day smoky; not able to do anything.
July 10. - Called the Monument from 8.30 a.m. an hour
and thirty minutes before any reply.
At 3 p.m. received from monument sianal station:
To Elk Mountain:
You will go to the gap, and open with Bakersville and
the White flag at the foot of the Monument.
By order of
Norton,
In obedience to above, I spent from that time till
6 p.m. answering and swinging, as I saw three or four
white flags swinging in vicinity of Bakersville, though
facing too much to my right. Swung torch during the
evening without any success.
Called the Monument to report I was not able to
communicate with Bakerville; after an hour's work, gave
them up.
July 11 - The morning thick and hazy. Clear at
10.30 a.m.
At 1 p.m. received from Washington Monument:
I want communication with Maryland Heights, though
Boonsborough and Lieutenant Fisher.
Nicodemus,
5 p.m. - Sent from Elk Mountain:
Captain Nicodemus:
I have seen Fisher, at Crampton's Pass, and have
communication open with Maryland Heights when
atmosphere permits.
E. A. Briggs,
10 p.m. - Sent from Elk Mountain:
Captain Nicodemus:
Maryland Heights are in full view of this point,
at Crampton's house. On this range, both Maryland
Heights and Monument are to be seen, and commanding
miles of the river and fords at the same time; the
latter not to be seen excepting at Dam No. 4.
Through messenger, I called Monument till 12 a.m. and
got no reply, and sent it by an orderly.
July 12. - Thick and excessively smoky all day; nct
able to see anything.
12 m. Received by Orderly Knapp:
Lieutenant Briggs:
You will open signal station on Elk Mountain beyond
Keedysville, communicating with Maryland Heights,
Crampton's Pass, Washington Monument, and, when
Downsville Station is open, with Fairview. You will
report to me through Washington Monument station, or in
any way possible. My headquarters are with the right
wing. Answer all flags. You will be relieved when
station is not needed.
Nicodemus
Sent the following at 1 p.m.:
Captain Nicodemus:
My men are in need of rations and my animals of
forage. Please light a fire at 9 p.m., that I may find
your locality. In order to run this station
successfully, requires more men.
Your obedient servant,
Briggs
3.30 p.m.. - Heavy shower until 5.30 p.m. Worked
until 12 m. Could not get the Monument. Went to bed.
July 13. - Day rainy and thick. Cut the timber and
bushes from top of mountain, so as to command all
points. Built a tower. Had calls from several signal
officers of Army of the Potomac viewing the country and
Antietam Battle-ground.p>
Elk Mountain,12 p. m.
Captain Nicodemus:
The weather has prevented my getting Bakerville or
Downsville. Communication to Maryland Heights is
perfect. I tried to communicate with you via the
Monument yesterday without any success.
E. A. Briggs,
July 14 , 8 a.m.- Sent from Elk Mountain:
Captain Nicodemus:
Captain Norton orders me to Crampton's House, on this
range of mountains. I await your order.
Briggs,
Kept a close watch all day for flags, and till I a.m.
July 15 for lights near Mount Moriah or Donnellies
Hill.
8.30 p.m. - Received from Fisher, at Crampton's Pass:
Captain Nicodemus:
Our troops crossed and reoccupied Harper's Ferry and
Bolivar Heights. Saw Martinsburg to-day; no movement
to indicate troops there.
Herzog,
Called Monument one hour, and closed up, unable to
forward the message.
July 15, - Smoky all morning and afternoon. Orderly
brought following message:
Lieutenants Herzog, Rushby, Briggs, and Fisher, with
parties, will report to me at Frederick without delay
Nicodemus.
Sent same to Lieutenant Fisher without any delay, and
immediately repaired to Frederick and awaited further
orders.
Turn around and go back on Red Hill Road and drive 1.6
miles. Turn RIGHT on 14AIN STREET in KEEDYSVILLE. Drive 0.8
miles following the signs to HWY 34. Drive 2.4 miles to
BOONSBORO. Turn right and drive 0.6 miles. Turn LEFT into
the parking lot of the BOONSBORO BIBLE CHURCH.
The following excerpts from Capt. McCreary's report
give a good description of the action:
Early next morning, with the advance of our
troops, in company with yourself, advanced beyond
Boonsborough, when I was directed by you to report to
the right, with the right brigade of General Buford's
cavalry division, General Merritt commanding, Captain
Daniels being in the center and Lieutenant Tuckerman on
the left of same division, to keep open communication
along the line.
Soon after taking our position, an advance was made
along the line, and we advanced with them. At the
crossing of Beaver Creek, the enemy were established
with infantry, cavalry, and artillery to dispute our
advance, but after a severe skirmish were driven back.
Early next morning, July 10, moved forward, and drove
them to Antietam, a distance of 4 miles. During this
movement, I was. in communication with Captain Daniels,
but the rapid movements of our forces prevented sending
many messages; but from our points of observation much
valuable information was furnished the commanding
officers, for which we received their personal
thanks...
The following are some of the communication sent and
received:
July 9
General Merritt:
A battery of the enemy is visible on the crest of the
hill. I can also see bayonets, indicating that it is
supported by infantry. No cavalry visible except
pickets.
McCreary,
July 10
General Merritt:
Three squadrons of rebel cavalry have passed to our
right, and are concealed behind the woods. We have not
any skirmishers in that direction.
McCreary,
To Commander of the Right:
Cease firing in our front. Captain McCreary, signal
officer, reports three squadrons of cavalry passing to
your right. Throw out skirmishers, and keep a sharp
lookout to prevent being flanked.
Merritt,
General Howard wishes to know anything relative to the
enemy's movements in front.
T. R. Clark
All quiet. Enemy are throwing up earthworks near
Antietam Creek.
McCreary.
Our cavalry are retiring from the right. The enemy's
cavalry and infantry are advancing on the left.
Daniels.
Captain Nicodemus:
The enemy are reported by a citizen from within their
lines to have broken up their camps, and to be moving
all their wagon trains toward Falling Waters.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. G. McCreary,
[O.R., XXVII, Part I, pp. 211-213]
I have stated as concisely as possible the amount and
character of the work performed, When it failed in a
signal point of view it has been noted; but of the real
value of the information obtained by the corps and the
importance of other services rendered, the commanding
general and the corps commanders are best able to
judge ...
During the late movements of the army, 3 signal
officers and 6 flagmen were captured by the enemy. The
only reported injuries were those of 2 flagmen slightly
wounded at the battle of Gettysburg. [O.R., XXVII,
Part I, p. 206] STOP 10 WASHINGTON MONUMENT SIGNAL-STATION
On July 10, the general commanding and his staff
removed to a bivouac near Beaver Creek crossing, west
of Boonsborough. In the evening, communication was
opened from general headquarters, through Washington
Monument station, with headquarters of the Second and
Twelfth Corps, near Bakersville, Third and Fifth Corps
near Antietam Bridge, and the First and Sixth corps
near Beaver Creek crossing on the Hagerstown pike. On
this day the officer who accompanied General Neill on
his expedition from a point selected by him on
Franklin's Cliff, South Mountain Range, near
Leiterburg, discovered the numbers and position of the
enemy in and around Hagerstown, and sent the
information to General Neill, and by orderly to General
Meade ...
Report of Capt. Nahum Daniels, Signal Officer,
Washington Reserve Signal Party
Captain: I have the honor to submit the following
report:
This station was significant in that it served as a key
station of observation and that information gathered by
Capt. Denicke was quickly relayed through Capt. Daniels to
Brig. Gen. Buford in the Antietam Valley. Below is a
representative sample of the message traffic sent from
Denicke and passed to Buford by Daniels as well as some
general traffic.
The enemy are advancing in front and on our right. A
large cavalry force in front.
Report of Lieut. Julius M. Swain, Acting Signal
Officer, Washington Reserve Signal Party
Captain.
Captain
Enemy-have just placed a battery on left of road,
behind-a large barn.
Captain.
Enemy's cavalry pickets are 1 mile in advance.
Captain.
The enemy are advancing infantrv and cavalry across
the Antietam about 1 mile to our left.
Captain
[O.R., XXVII, PART I, pp. 201-202.]
Captain: I beg leave to submit the following report,
which I regret contains but an imperfect record of the
messages sent while with the signal party recently
under your command in Maryland:
Lieutenant Denicke will open communication between
you and Frederick.
Captain
Sent following:
Heavy skirmishing has just opened about 3 miles from
here, on Hagerstown road.
Captain.
Return To Index
Now you should walk back to your car and drive to
STOP 11.
STOP 11 CRAMPTON'S GAP SIGNAL STATION
Report of Lieut. George A. Fisher, Acting Signal
Officer, Washington Reserve Signal Party
[O.R.,
XXV-II, Part I,-pp. 213-214.]
To open a line of stations across a country, first
choose some prominent position, and one well visible;
and here establish the initial station. Let the party
assemble here. Let them, together, select a second
prominent point in view as nearly as possible in the
line of direction you wish to take. Upon the first
station, erect some kind of beacon - as a white or
other colored signal-flag; or some marked object, by
which it can be recognized from a distance. Take from
this first point the bearing by compass of the point
selected. This second point should be one not only
visible from the initial point, but one also probably
in view from positions beyond it. Note should be made
of some peculiar house, rock, tree, or other marked
object upon it, in order that the exact place may be
recognized when it is reached. At the first point, now
marked with its beacon, station an officer to reply to
any signals he may see, and to watch the course of the
marching party. The other officers will then move,
guided by compass, if need be toward the second point
selected, carrying a signal-flag flying, in order that
their position may be known whenever they come in view
from the first station, and intently watched by the
officer left at that station, the marching party will,
from time to time, put itself in communication with the
first station, so as to receive from it any direction
as to its course the first station may wish to give, or
any other information. It will also frequently verify
its course by compass. On reaching the point chosen
for the second station, a beacon or flag will be there
erected, observations will be made, and communication
will be opened with the first station. Points, on
either side or to the rear, will be examined, to see if
the second station can be better located than it is
with reference to a third station to be next
established. The second station will then be
definitely established and marked, and an officer there
stationed, as before at the first station, to watch the marching party. The point for the third station will
be hence chosen,. and the party will proceed toward it
with the same general rules as before. These
operations will be repeated in the case of each
rminal station is reached.
station, until the te
Attempts will be afterward made to reduce the number of
intermediate stations by finding other and better
points at which to locate some of them.
[Albert J.
Myer, A Man anals, New York,D. Van Nostrandt
1866, pp. 255-256.]
STOP 12 ELK MOUNTAIN SIGNAL STATION
Captain: In compliance with an order received this
morning to make an official report of all duty
performed by me as acting signal officer of the
Washington Reserve Signal Corps since the 6th instant,
I submit the following:
[O.R., XXVII, Part III, pp. 214-217.]
Ascertain and send immediate report whether the
rebels are in Sharpsburg or Keedysville. Their evident
intention is to take Sharpsburg. Make report in
writing, and send by orderly.
First Lieutenant, and Acting Assistant Signal
Officer.
I can see no signs of enemy occupying Sharpsburg or
Keedysville. Their cavalry were in both places this
morning, I am informed by reliable citizens.
First Lieutenant, and Acting Signal Officer.
Proceed to station on Elk Ridge, which you occupied
last night, and communicate with station one-half mile
northeast of Boonsborough. If you cannot see that
station, communicate with the Monument.
Captain, Signal Officer.
Captain.
Captain.
Lieutenant, Acting Signal Officer.
E. A. Briggs,
Lieutenant, Acting Signal Officer.
Captain, Signal officer
Lieutenant, and Acting Signal Officer.
Lieutenant, and Acting Signal Officer.
Lieutenant, and Acting Signal Officer.
Lieutenant, and Acting Signal Officer.
Captain, Signal officer Comdg. Washington Reserve
Signal Party.
Return To Index
Now you should drive to STOP 13.
STOP 13 BOONSBOROUGH SIGNAL STATIONS
The hill behind Boonsborough referred to in the reports
is directly behind the church. The hill is not accessible
but this location affords a good view of it and the
Washington Monument. The station on the hill was occupied by
Lieut. Swain whose report we have already read. Now you
should leave the parking lot turning RIGHT on ALT 40. Drive
3.3 miles on ALT 40 until you reach BEAVER CREEK. Pull to
the side of the road. This is the approximate location of
Captain Daniells station on the Hagerstown Pike. Captain
Daniels, Capt. William McCreary and LieLLt. Tuckerman
supported Brig. Gen. Buford's First Cavalry Division between
the Beaver Creek crossing on the Hagerstown Pike and the
Antietam. As previously described, Captain Daniels was
receiving reports on Confederate troo,o movements from the
Denicke brothers on Washington Monument and passing that
information to General Buford.
Report of Capt. William G. McCreary, Signal Officer,
83
Report of Capt. Lemuel B. Norton, Chief Signal Officer,
Army of the Potomac
Washington Reserve Signal Party
Signal Officer.
Signal Officer.
General
July 13
Captain, Signal Corps, U.S. Army.
In summing up the operations of the signal corps of
this army for the month and a half herein recorded, I
find that sixty-seven signal stations of observation
and communication were occupied, eight signal telegraph
lines established, and seventeen extra reconnaissances
made.
This is the last stop of the tour. The quickest way
back to Gettysburg is to go back to FREDERICK on ALT 40.
Take HWY 15 north to GETTYSBURG.
End of File
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